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Preface
I had chosen, impulsively as usual, a title for this collection:“Choices.” Almost immediately, a different title presented itself
for my inspection. It was: “Driving under the Influence.” I
approved of it, except that it sounded too active; “Driven under
the Influence” would be better, especially since this collection of
essays shows what I find myself to have been driven by these
thirty-plus years, and how.
Still, whatever the collection's title, it will give readers an
intimation of every tipsy driver's experience, a feeling also conveyed
by the cover image for the book, which captures the uncanny
simultaneity of looking forward and backward, and the co-presence
of the familiar and the mysterious. Such disorientation, combined
with desire and occasional frustration in the course of one's attempts
at reaching a dimly known destination in a city, returns us back
surprisingly to spots that are vaguely reminiscent of places once
traveled before. In any case, in the end I recalled that what to the
busy writer may look like responsible, even knowledgeable choices,
will strike the older author as having been favorable winds of
invention—one seems to have been guided by them, but one does
not quite know Whence they came or Whither they went. Is “having
been guided” the same as “being offered the choice of accepting past
moves?” That is, is it really a matter of “having been Chosen under
the Influence?”
Yes, I suppose. But now I am finding myself too close to too
bold a claim. Yet in any case, God knows just how I have been
driven and to what identifiable purpose, and I have enjoyed the
adventure. And what’s even more, I remain curious, for “without
a future there is no thought,” as Hans-Georg Gadamer told me
when he was ninety-nine years old. So let readers choose for
themselves and take such bearings as they find their own.
A special word of thanks is due to my good friend, Anthony J.
Cernera, president of Sacred Heart University, and all those from
Sacred Heart who worked so patiently with me in accomplishing this
labor of love, especially David L. Coppola, executive assistant to the
president; Sidney Gottlieb, director of editorial and production work
for the Sacred Heart University Press; Roberta Reynolds, manager of
Creative Services; and John DeGraffenried, assistant professor of Art
and Design.
x /  PREFACE
SEEING THE MYSTERIES, ARTICULATELY

Belief in God and the Sense of Privilege
The Bible does not support the view that God is God in the
same way at all times.
—Karl Barth
Monotheism
One survey after another confirms that most people in the UnitedStates believe in God; most of them attend “the church of their
choice” often enough to count as churchgoers. The United States has
more houses of worship per capita than any other country (as President
Bill Clinton reminded us in his 1995 State of the Union address). Close
to seventy percent of the population prays, regularly or irregularly, as
Andrew Greeley has shown.
Factoids like these regularly make the headlines. This is curious. If
belief in God is established so widely, why treat it as news? With believ-
ers in the majority, wouldn’t we expect monotheism to be treated like
any other majority phenomenon: as a matter of course and a generally
credible thing? Yet believers in God typically feel that our common
belief in God is not what it could or should be. Do they find it easier
to believe in God than to believe that others believe in God? Is this
behind the often-heard, very emphatic politically-tinged professions of
faith in God “and in Jesus Christ as my personal Savior”?
But then again, if God is such a sure thing, why do many of us
turn irresolute (or just blandly tolerant) when asked what difference
our belief in God actually makes? Not until he was an undergraduate
at Harvard did Avery Dulles realize that if God existed, that was “the
most important thing in the world.” Just how many of us make this
discovery, never mind acting on it? The wag who joked that Unitarians
believe “in at most one God” could have cast his net a lot wider. Isn’t it
odd that our belief in God is as lackluster as it is widespread? But this
raises another question. How on earth did this flat, anemic monotheism
ever emerge and take root?
Objection! Isn’t our belief in God simply the biblical faith we have
inherited from the Christian Churches and ultimately from Israel? Good
question. Answer: it is advisable to call this common assumption firmly
into question. For this belief in one God, who has created the world but
who otherwise remains nameless and dwells above all times and places, is
a recent development; not till the Age of Enlightenment and
Romanticism did it become widespread. It strikes Jewish believers and
Christians (especially Orthodox, Catholics, and classical Protestants), not
to mention Muslims, as pretty frigid. This faraway, one-size-fits-all God,
who never changes colors and thus rarely if ever inspires people to show
theirs, is so ghostly, and especially so neutral, that He or She (why not
It?) strikes us only as of some kind of “Super-reality.” But such an unde-
finable, superessential Entity, which is what it is forever and ever, hardly
appeals to anyone; no wonder it is hard to appeal to, let alone to call
upon in prayer and praise. This Being only gets more incomprehensible
as you give it more thought; while it may appeal to our sense of mystery,
it remains mainly baffling. “It” could well be adorable, but who is to tell?
It is faceless—a God without Countenance; thus, not a God of visions
and dreams. While inviting discussion, this God hardly ever elicits real
talk; it certainly is not a God who gets prophets to talk (or preachers to
“say it”). It inspires neither deeply-felt prayer, nor, for that matter,
liturgy—whether of the solemn kind, with noble organ tones, or of the
exuberant kind, with singing and dancing and clapping of hands in the
Lord’s presence. This God is a remote Supreme Being, equivalently
absent, as deadly silent as the silent spaces of the universe, of which Pascal
wrote that he found them frightening. At best (as the ancient Stoics
thought), it is a kind, reasonable gas that permeates all things with its
subtle presence (but which nobody has anything much to do with,
really). Or perhaps (in the manner of the Romantics or the modern
Humanists) it is the Higher Being, preferably to be approached philo-
sophically—in which case it mainly serves to make us, modern,
self-conscious human beings aware of our own immortal, profoundly
spiritual nature. (So God may have drifted out of our ken, but we are
turning out to be more deeply religious. Peculiar, isn’t it?)
Again, Jewish, Christian, and Muslim believers have problems
with so rarified an understanding of God. Not that they are against it;
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they just find it dreadfully incomplete and impersonal. In this God,
they hardly recognize the Living God: %&%*, Creator of Heaven and
Earth, or God the Father of the Lord Jesus, or Allah, Great and
Merciful.
Yet even this minimal divine Being has impact. It gives rise to
higher thoughts. It reminds us there is more than meets the eye, more
than can be had, acquired, gotten under control, or brought to heel. It
suggests that all creatures are inherently worthy of respect, and espe-
cially every human being, without exception or distinction based on
status, race, or sex. Thus even this ethereal God reminds us moderns of
the unity of the world-order and of our responsibility for universal
conciliation. That is no small thing in our world, violent and destruc-
tive as it has been from time immemorial, and inclined to make a virtue
of exclusion, and thus, unable to stop disparaging and harassing aliens,
very much off-kilter affectively (and thus sexually as well), and as a
result of all this, intensely divided.
In this perspective, straightforward belief in one God helps
encourage humanity, in the face of all this dissociation and dissipation,
not to abandon the search for new things, new knowledge, new ways.
It positively inspires most of us in the United States to peace, quite
apart from any sort of “organized religion,” to hold on to our high
hopes for unity, reasonableness, meaning, solidarity, equal civil rights,
harmony. But many of us disagree. To the atheists among us it makes
no sense at all to call the United States “One Nation under God.” For
now, most of us find it unreasonable to resort to the courts to get the
words “god” and “God” (and the issues they raise) thrown out of the
civic vocabulary. But the question is real nonetheless. Is there such a
thing as the rights of professed atheists and their children?
Divine Menageries?
Believing in “at most one God.” It sounds a bit cynical. Still, do
not most of us find it reasonable to believe in one, and only one, divine
being—“One God of the Universe,” as a Passover Seder song puts it?
Monotheism is ingrained in us; if there is more than one god, we spon-
taneously figure, none of them are really God.
That may very well be logically and even theologically correct; it is
not what humanity has always and everywhere felt and thought. It is far
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from being felt and thought everywhere today. Look around in India or
South East Asia or Japan; you may soon find yourself wondering how
we modern Westerners have managed to reduce, in the name of
Reason, the entire supernatural world to one bland lowest-common-
theological-denominator God. Notice the many shrines in India, read
one of the Vedas in translation, or drive around in Bali; let yourself by
fascinated by the Hindu world, so alert to the staggering and often
overwhelming diversity of life forms, life forces, and living spirits—a
powerful and far from peaceful torrent of vital energy, emanating ulti-
mately from the all-encompassing but utterly inaccessible One. Or take
a walk in Bangkok, with its profusion of statues and statuettes of the
Buddha. All of them obviously carry the same message, yet all of them
also acknowledge the countless experiences that affect human life, and
the innumerable disruptions to which it is apt to be exposed. Those
images are meant to place all that scrambling and struggling in the
perspective of Nirvana—the cool, transcendent, perfectly quiescent
peace of soul that has literally Nothing in common with the hot busy-
ness of life. Or walk in on a wayang show in Java, and watch all the
gods, godlings, heroes, and demons that populate the Ramayana and
Marabharata epics, recounted from time immemorial; take time to
listen to modern Javanese youngsters, and discover that the moral and
religious imagination of innumerable Indonesians continues to be
controlled by these great epics. And while you are there, visit a Chinese
temple in one of the big cities, with its statues and statuettes, big and
small, kitschy and refined, and representing not just the Buddha, but
also all kinds of gods and heroes and sages and fools and protectors and
fiends.
Now those are the kind of places you want to go to—small,
insignificant person that you are. So you go, alone or with your family
or your neighbors and friends, to make an offering or just to think or
implore or lament, with your whole perplexed, torn-apart self, with
your family feuds and your whole assortment of worries. There you can
get squared away with all those invisible, inexplicable forces that domi-
nate your life.
We, visitors from the West, must slow down to take in what
happens in such places. If we do, we may begin to realize, in a surge of
either anxiety or realism, how we, too, in the monotheistic West, let
ourselves be moved and guided and surprised and baffled and dislodged
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and terrified by all kinds of prevalent or controlling mentalities and
powers and authorities, big or small, cosmic or human, not to mention
the inhuman. Then a thought may occur. Could it be that we
Westerners think we are monotheists without actually being it?
Back home again, you may find yourself stopping by a museum,
and savoring the quiet, stately figures, animal and human, by means of
which the ancient Egyptians placed humanity’s varied story in the
context of the invisible world, with its untold powers and forces. Or
you may sense that it is unseemly to dismiss, with typically modern
arrogance, the worlds of the ancient Greek and Roman gods and heroes
as “divine menageries.” Yes, you could do worse than read somebody
like Cicero on the subject. In his The Nature of the Gods he left us a
penetrating account of the religiosity of his day, even though in the last
resort his assessment of polytheism is mainly negative. But at least he
makes you realize that belief in one God is anything but self-evident.
In this way, too, you may begin to see (unless an excess of rational
prejudice has got you deaf and blind) how many phenomena in the
world really support polytheism. Take our earth with its amazing vari-
ety of climates and landscapes; look at the immense realms of plants
and animals, not to mention humanity. All of them are undeniably
ordered and interrelated, yet also startlingly and awesomely dissimilar,
and far from harmonious. Such observations open us to the inherent
riddles of the universe. We discover that it is all beyond us, really, it is
all a bit much, everything seems charged with invisible energies.
That if anything is the most typical feature of polytheism: the stun-
ning, irresistible omnipresence of the spiritual and the divine within our
restless world (and thus not really above it). These invisible powers and
influences are legion; it is characteristic of divinity to be multitudinous
and to vary according to places and seasons. Yet always and everywhere
it is part of human life—frequently benign, sometimes playful, roguish,
or mischievous, sometimes appalling or truly malicious, always enig-
matic. It is almost palpable as well: a crossfire of forces and processes:
lunar, solar, planetary, astral, terrestrial, subterranean, pelagic, climatic,
vegetable, animal, ethnic, dynastic, familial, social, political, you name
it—a measureless mix of influences, subject to nothing but the One
Inexorable World Order, stark blind, unknown, and unloved.
What does it mean to be religious in such a world? Most of all, you
find yourself steeped in narratives about the unseen world and its
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denizens. Thanks to these, you live in an encompassing system of culti-
vated attitudes and relationships—all of them incorporated in a web of
traditional practices and observances, in which awe, devotion, fear,
subservience, and sometimes abject obsequiousness alternate with
divination and playing the odds, with cunning, calculated reverence,
and desperate attempts at suborning the powers that be or buying them
off, and even with recklessness, revolt, and hubris.
To have a dark intuition of the world’s coherence and at the
same time to experience its obvious disharmony on a daily basis is
very perplexing. No wonder the world of polytheism is characterized
by division and tension. Each power, even the highest, controls
particular locales and seasons; jealousy both destabilizes and governs
the world. No wonder mythologies are rife with rivalry. The unseen
powers vie with each other; they are partial and rarely compassion-
ate; often they will play games with particular regions and human
communities, and they do not always play fair by a long shot. No
wonder human life is unpredictable. No wonder human communi-
ties are apt to be rivals, if not downright each other’s hereditary
enemies. The simple fact is that all interests operate at cross-
purposes; the nomad’s death is the farmer’s breath. So, if people want
to create any order and stability at all, or at any rate within the circle
of their own experience, they will do well to practice their local reli-
gion—sensibly and with moderation if possible. So take into
account the invisible powers and comply with their wishes, prefer-
ably out of piety, but at least out of enlightened self-interest. For
only if you oblige the gods, the heroes, and the powers that be are
they likely to be in your corner. Or at least you will have a chance of
keeping their influence within limits. Of course you must stay vigi-
lant. For that reason, religiosity demands a fair amount of
self-discipline. But that again has a real advantage: it keeps you
modest—conscious of your place in this overwhelming world. For
along with everything and everybody else, you are at the mercy of
the play of the forces and the powers. And in the end you are no
match for them.
But even that has a bright side: in the end, nobody is morally
responsible. The great comfort of polytheism and mythology is the un-
burdened conscience. For in the last resort life is a matter not of taking
things in hand but of handing things over, not of giving of yourself but
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of giving in to what plays. So just play along in the ancient game, go
along in order to get along, do what you have to do, and if you must,
do your worst. Isn’t the bottom line that we can’t really help it?
Israel’s God—God the Father of Jesus Christ
Only those who appreciate that Israel was part of a cluster of civi-
lizations in which polytheism was wholly unproblematic can appreciate
the uniqueness of its faith. In the ancient Near East, Israel came to
stand increasingly alone. Religiously speaking, it must have looked as
explosively aggressive in its world as Islam does in India and Africa
today. Like all its neighboring nations, Israel acknowledges the exis-
tence and influence of all kinds of gods and spiritual powers. But
instead of being awed by them and honoring them accordingly, it
praises, lives in awe of, gives thanks to, implores, serves, and obeys God
and nothing and nobody else. Israel’s first commandment, therefore, is
diametrically opposed to everything that passes for religion in the
ancient world: “In my Presence, there shall not be any further gods for
you.” Faith in this God is so singular that it strikes one as nothing short
of a revelation, and Israel is the first to declare that it is precisely that.
Thus, ordinary historical realism demands that we, twentieth-
century Westerners who think monotheism is only reasonable, allow
Israel’s claim that its faith in God is a matter of being exceptionally
favored—favored beyond reason.
Accordingly, nowhere and never does Israel’s faith degenerate into
a habit; it remains an immeasurably deep privilege, cherished in a living
(and hence flexible) faith tradition. This is confirmed rather than
contradicted by the fact that in the history of both Israel and later
Judaism one prophetic figure after another will be carrying on against
the worship of other gods and of the powers that be. But because
Israel’s god is God, how could its faith ever become a routine?
Before Israel’s God, gods and powers and influences and heroes
pale into insignificance. They turn into regular denizens of the heavens
and the world: spirits, angels, demons, immortalized human beings
perhaps. For God is beyond compare. “Which of the inhabitants of the
heavens is comparable to the Lord, and which of the mighty ones is a
match for the Lord?” “Not one among the gods is like You, Lord.” That
is why God is called “God of gods,” “Lord of the dominations,”
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“Sovereign of the heavens,” “God from everlasting to everlasting,”
“Lord of the earth and everything belonging to it.” Obviously, you
cannot abandon yourself, in praise and thanksgiving and supplication,
to such a God, while keeping at hand the powers that be at the same
time, just in case. For it is impossible to serve God only as needed—
sensibly and with moderation. With the God of All (“of Heaven and
Earth”) you just don’t negotiate or bargain. Once you understand that
it is from God that you have everything you have, and indeed that it is
from God you are everything you are, you can only dedicate yourself to
God with everything you have and are—“with all your heart and with
all your soul and with all your strength.”
This God is literally above and beyond all that is. First of all in
holiness. Israel is amazed at its privileged self:
When Israel went forth from Egypt,
Jacob’s house from a gibbering breed,
Judah came to be God’s Sanctuary,
Israel God’s Dominion.
Incomprehensible. But the height of incomprehensibility is this: this
startlingly holy God is not remote. Moses, face to face with God’s holy
fire, takes off his sandals and hears: “I Am Who I Am.” He prays that
he be allowed to see God’s Glory and hears: “I will favor whom I favor,
and befriend whom I befriend.” This means: “Just don’t ask; just
accept. Whoever and however I may be, I am with you, you are my
favorite, I love you.” God has nothing—not even a name; but God is
Israel’s demanding friend—not faraway but close-in, not menacing but
endlessly faithful. Israel’s Holy One inspires awe, but does not create
distance; God embraces.
To accept this revelation is being born anew. To be addressed in
this fashion lays bare something unfathomable and wholly original at
the core of every human being; it awakens a memory that seemed lost
forever. In Israel’s faith-experience, humanity recovers and recalls its
native affinity with God. This is far more than an intimation of a shad-
owy existence after death; it is a positive aspiration to everlasting Life.
Like no other creature, humanity turns out to carry the Living God’s
ineradicable image and likeness in itself. Being human means living by
an impulse implanted by God.
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This has direct consequences for all Israel’s doings. If God “has got
the whole world in his hand,” then human behavior in the world must
not be finally determined by the inexorable play of the powers that be.
Israel cannot salve its conscience; it cannot deny its freedom any longer,
nor can it satisfy itself with myths, idols, and ideologies; it can no
longer sidestep its responsibility for itself, for the nations, for the world.
Faith in God is inseparable from the works of justice and conciliation,
laid down in Covenants old and new, and (later on, in Judaism) specif-
ically in the Torah. In this way, Israel will always feel the burden of
God’s plan for the world and humanity on its shoulders; it will serve
God by becoming God’s agent, creative and increasingly mature, in a
world that is not only unfinished, but torn apart. In this way, Israel gets
to acknowledge within itself the germ of the truly human life: in our
deepest selves, all of us human beings are called to enter upon
Abraham’s faith and Israel’s dignity, as the Roman liturgy prays at
Easter. If God is the stamp of our being, the world is ours, and noth-
ing and nobody is beneath our notice.
In Israel’s footsteps, Christians have been privileged to watch God
actualizing this reborn humanity with a new, utterly incomparable
intensity, in the man Jesus Christ: the Covenant embodied, the Torah
incarnate, the Word made flesh. “On Him You have conferred author-
ity over all that lives; He is to give everlasting life to all that You have
entrusted to Him. And everlasting life is this: to know You, the One
True God, as well as the One You sent, Jesus Christ.”
Thus favored by God and made responsible for the life of the world
we are empowered to go forward, from era to era, from habitat to habi-
tat. For God is tied to neither place nor time, whereas gods and powers
and authorities are dominant only here and there and now and then. This
is why Jews and Christians, and Muslims as well, cannot sidestep their
obligation to declare their God-given sense of both privilege and respon-
sibility to the world, and to express themselves accordingly at all times
and in all places. They will do so in various forms of civilization, at home
as well as in exile, whether free or oppressed, and for richer for poorer. In
the long run, they will even find themselves, in faith, at home in exile,
morally free in oppression, and inwardly rich in poverty. They will
acknowledge, praise, serve, and represent God, against the grain if there
is no alternative; in this way, too, they will get used to taking responsibil-
ity, in God’s name, if necessary in the teeth of the powers that be.
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All of this harbors a deadly danger, of course. One fatal step—a
step, we know, taken from the beginning, and no longer to be
discounted—and the sense of privilege will degenerate into the sense of
superiority: human beings will set themselves up as God’s equivalent,
and faith in God will cheapen into self-assertion, intolerance, and
fanaticism. Only if, personally and communally, we keep experiencing
our faith in the “One God of the world” as a lasting privilege, and not
as the most reasonable thing in the world (let alone as God’s seal of
approval on our prejudices), will our faith in God be the source, not
just of tolerance, but of creative, civilized realism, rooted in a deep,
clear-sighted and truly searching appreciation of everything the world
offers to our quest for true life.
One God of the World: The Great Surmise
Feeling privileged makes one appreciative; those who feel privi-
leged have a taste for what is truly precious anywhere and at any time.
Accordingly, those who feel privileged by God and reborn in faith are
apt to discover and appreciate the vestiges of that privilege and the
germ of that rebirth in humane civilization of every kind. Great Jewish
thinkers like Philo of Alexandria and Moses Maimonides, great Muslim
thinkers like Ibn Sina and Ibn Roschd, an early Christian apologist like
Justin Martyr, and church fathers like Gregory of Nyssa and
Augustine—all of them have perceived God’s Word and intuited God’s
countenance, not just in Israel’s prophets and sages, but also in
Socrates, Heraclitus, Plato, and Aristotle, and in the civilizations that
have drawn nourishment from those wellsprings of the human spirit.
Christian thinkers of the second, third, and fourth centuries came to
regard the Stoics, with their disciplined life style and their respect for
transcendent Intelligence, as allies, not adversaries. Seventeenth-
century Catholic missionaries in China discerned “the Lord of the
Heavens” in writings by Lao-tsu and other sages, while Roberto de
Nobili, in the South of India, ventured to take the haughtiness of the
Brahmin into the bargain, to be able to combine his deep respect for
the nobility of their civilization with catholic catechesis. In our own
day, Christians have beheld the Spirit of God and Jesus in great souls:
Mahatma Gandhi, Dag Hammarskjöld, Jan Tinbergen, and countless
other peaceable, dedicated people. It is deeply Christian to say this. Did
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not Jesus himself admit that he had found, in some gentiles, the kind
of faith he had been vainly looking for in Israel?
Live faith in the Living God, in other words, must prove itself true
in our capacity for religious surmise. It must open our eyes to the splen-
did variety of non-Jewish, non-Christian, non-Muslim religious
sensibilities, discernible at all times and in all places. It remains
discernible even in the sallow monotheism of North America. For to
the eye blessed by faith, the Living God is simply the One Who is ever
Present yet ever Veiled, ever Old and ever New, always according to
times and places. This is how God is God. Think about it. Pray, with-
out asking if you can. Even better, be thankful and offer praise, without
words if you can.
Notes
Originally delivered as lecture at the Tantur Ecumenical Institute for
Theological Studies, Jerusalem, in the Spring of 1996. Abridged version
published as “One God: And Other Revelations” in Commonweal 123, no. 6
(March 22, 1996): 15-19. Just before the original lecture, the author decided,
on an impulse of insufficiently discerned origin, to promise his audience that
he was not going to vocalize the word “God” wherever he would find it in his
text, following the Jewish tradition of not enunciating the “ineffable tetra-
gram” %&%*, out of reverence. The performance “worked”; many were
moved. Still, unwilling to put God to the test, the author has never repeated
the experiment.
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Humanity Alive to God’s Glory:
Ten Basic Quaestiones Disputatae
in Christology and Soteriology
1. What is the origin of christology?
Christology, which encompasses soteriology, is theological reflectionon, and formulation of, the Church’s faith in God inasmuch as it
centers on Jesus Christ.
The Christian faith-tradition knows Jesus Christ primarily as the
living Lord, present now: “I am the first and the last, and the living
One; I was dead, and behold, I am the One alive forever and ever” (Rev
1, 18). This faith in Christ alive originates in what has been called,
from the earliest tradition on, his Resurrection. Christian faith would
be devoid of meaning without it (1 Cor 15, 17); arguably, it would not
even exist. It follows that the Resurrection of Jesus is the origin of all
christology. Two reflections can flesh this out.
Christ’s Resurrection is the origin of Christian worship, which
inseparably links the One True “Living” God and the One sent by God
(Jn 17, 3). On the one hand, Jesus is professed as Lord “to the glory of
God the Father” (Phil 2, 11); conversely, God is “blessed” for being
“the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ” (2 Cor 1, 3). Through
Christ, “the Amen, the Witness Faithful and True” (Rev 3, 14),
Christians say their “Amen” to the glory of God (2 Cor 1, 20).
Conclusion: no christology must disregard worship as a theological
theme.
All speech and thought about the historical Jesus are set in the
context of present faith in Christ alive. A dead Jesus leaves (besides
deep shame at the manner of his execution) only disappointed hopes
(Lk 24, 21); a Jesus raised from the dead prompts christological recol-
lection and reflection. Conclusion: Christologies which speak of Jesus
Christ only in the past tense are essentially incomplete.
2. What is the double christological meaning
of the proclamation “Christ is risen”?
By the Resurrection, Jesus’ divine identity is established, definitively.
God, and God alone, has effectively recognized Jesus, “established as
Son of God in power, according to the Holy Spirit, by resurrection of
the dead” (Rom 1, 4).
This living Jesus is identical with the Jesus who was crucified:
“God has made him both Lord and Christ, this Jesus whom you cruci-
fied” (Acts 2, 36; implied in Lk 24, 39). Consequently, Jesus’
identification as God’s Son also reveals, in retrospect, the divine depth
of his life and death. What had been well-attested human history (Acts
2, 22; 10, 36ff.) now turns out to have been God’s work, for if Jesus
“went about doing good,” this was because “God was with him” (Acts
10, 38). God was active, mysteriously, even in Jesus’ death: the Christ
“had to” suffer to come into his glory (cf. Lk 24, 26).
“Resurrection” is not a metaphor of Christian origin. It was a piece
of “apocalyptic,” Pharisaic spirituality, rejected by the Sadducee estab-
lishment (cf. Acts 23, 6ff.; Mt 22, 23). It involved the confident hope,
held on to amidst oppression and injustice, that final justice, for both
Israel and the world, was to be expected from God alone. On Judgment
Day, the Lord’s own Day, the Sun of Justice would rise, and God’s
genuine servants, “too good for the world” (Heb 11, 38), would be
“raised up,” “revealed,” and “glorified”—all those good people who had
suffered at the hands of the powers that be because they resisted the
temptation to make common cause with injustice (Wisd 2, 10ff.).
The revelation of Jesus alive, “vindicated in the Spirit” (1 Tim 3,
16), activated the Resurrection metaphor to an unprecedented level of
significance. By raising him from the dead, God, and God alone, has
vindicated Jesus, condemned by the Jewish authorities as a blasphemer
and executed by the Romans as a threat to the emperor’s sacred author-
ity, as “the Holy and Just One” (Acts 3, 14). This vindication also
identifies Jesus as the Christ—i.e., as the anticipated agent of God’s
final judgment: “God has set a day-in-court on which he will do justice
to the whole world by someone he has appointed, and he has guaran-
teed this to all by raising him from the dead” (Acts 17, 31). All
Christian teaching, life, and worship, therefore, imply the prayer:
“Marana tha—Our Lord, come” (1 Cor 16, 22; cf. Rev 22, 20).
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3. What is involved in Jesus’
identification as the Son of God?
The risen Jesus evokes, not detached affirmation of, but partici-
pation in, his divine identity. Professing Jesus’ divine Sonship
involves us; involvement with God’s Son makes us children of God in
actuality.
This participation is gift, and only God’s to give. The New
Testament conveys this by having the risen Christ communicate the
Holy Spirit—the very intimacy of God’s Holiness, revealed as the total
love-abandon of Father and Son.
Only by the Spirit do we worship God, by professing Jesus as
God’s Son, as Christ, as Lord (1 Cor 12, 3; cf. 1 Jn 4, 2-3; Phil 2,
11). By the Spirit, therefore, we fathom the awesome depths of
God (1 Cor 2, 10ff.; cf. Jn 4, 23-24), and receive access to all truth
(Jn 16, 13). Drawn by the Spirit into Christ’s Sonship, we are
God’s children (Jn 1, 12; Rom 8, 16), addressing God as Jesus did:
“Abba—Father dear!” (Mk 14, 36; Gal 4, 6; Rom 8, 15-16). Hence,
what Christ is by “birth” or “nature” we Christians are by “adop-
tion” (Gal 4, 5), “rebirth” (Jn 3, 3), or “grace”: we are “sharers of
the divine nature” (2 Pet 1, 4), “gods by [God’s] grace”
(Athanasius).
Yet this gift is not foreign to humanity’s natural aspirations.
Made in God’s Image (Gen 1, 27), we reach the fulfillment of our
original selves by being graciously remade in Him whom the
Resurrection has identified as “the Image of the invisible God” and as
“the Word of God,” in whom God created all things (Col 1, 15-16;
cf. Jn 1, 3).
Participation in Christ’s divine identity is also a matter of hope.
Christ is risen, but the full resurrection, with the definitive “Amen!
Halleluyah!” (Rev 19, 4), is still outstanding. Our participation in
Christ’s unity with God, therefore, is imperfect and hidden. Christ is
in us “the hope of the glory” (Col 1, 27), not the vision (Rom 8, 24).
The gift of the Spirit is the “first fruits” (Rom 8, 23), not the harvest—
the “down payment” (2 Cor 1, 22; 5, 5; Eph 1, 14), not the
inheritance. Our true life is still hidden, waiting to appear (Col 3, 3-4);
we are God’s children, but our divine likeness is not yet apparent (1 Jn
3, 2). Creation is still groaning in hopes of sharing in the freedom of
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God’s children (Rom 8, 18-25); the new heaven and the new earth (Rev
21, 1) are still to come.
4. How does the narrative of Jesus’ life and death
figure in Christian worship and witness?
By raising Jesus, and only Jesus, God has definitively vindicated
him, and identified him as the Savior: “In no one else is there salva-
tion, since God has given people no other name to invoke under
heaven for us to be saved” (Acts 4, 12). This “invocation of Jesus”
becomes a basic feature of Christian worship; it takes the shape of the
thankful rehearsal, in the Spirit, to the glory of God the Father, of the
significant themes of the life and death of Jesus, in anticipation of his
coming.
Invocation of Jesus also governs the community’s witness.
Christian witness, therefore, interprets Jesus’ life and death in light of
his Resurrection. (Bible scholars now find substantial harmony
between this post-Resurrection, witnessing account of Jesus’ person,
ministry, and death, and the picture of Jesus recoverable by historical-
critical analysis of the Gospels.)
Accordingly, Christian witness serves a double purpose:
a) To the world at large, Jesus’ life, death, and resurrection are
the substance of the Gospel message. The risen Jesus is held up
as the standard by which God will judge the world.
Accordingly, the Gospel calls for faith in God in Jesus’ Name,
and for conversion to the true God in anticipation of Jesus’
coming (e.g., 1 Thess 1, 9-10; Acts 10, 36- 43).
b) Within the Christian community, the rehearsal of Jesus’
ministry and death—model of the life of holiness and
justice—spells out the Gospel commitment to discipleship: no
exclamations of “Lord, Lord!” to the living Christ without
doing the Father’s will, in imitation of Jesus, in watchful antic-
ipation of his coming (cf. Mt 7, 21; 25, 11). (This tradition of
rehearsing the life and death of Jesus for the benefit of the
Christian community eventually produced the written
“gospels.”)
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5. By what interpretation can Jesus’ life and death
be viewed as having saving significance?
The theme of the Christian story of salvation is the person of Jesus,
now risen, as he went about not just teaching, but embodying a new,
unprecedented, urgent offer of salvation, calling for total abandon to
the living God, and defeating the powers of evil. He encountered
people, in word and deed, in a ministry of compassion that set aside
accepted forms of socio-religious discrimination; he challenged the sole
authority of the Mosaic Law. He did so with unprecedented, authori-
tative freedom—evidence of an original sense of mission. Most
importantly, his style implied an incomparable intimacy with God, in
which he invited his followers to share (Mt 11, 25-27; 5, 43-48). His
person and ministry elicited faith, but not generally or for long.
Miserably, he turned out to be altogether too much to take; he met
with misunderstanding and rebuff; in the end, a disciple betrayed him
to his enemies; sentenced as a blaspheming criminal, abandoned, deso-
late, and crucified like a foreigner and a slave, he accepted what was
inflicted on him, and entrusted himself and his life’s mission wholly to
his Father’s saving will.
The treatment Jesus received reveals a world estranged from its
God: “He came into his own, yet those who were his did not welcome
him” (Jn 1, 11). Much as the world yearns for a lost innocence, it is
misguided in the pursuit of it; enslaved by “the knowledge of good and
evil” (Gen 3, 5), it is hell-bent on judgment, and determined to bolster
alleged right by might. Both the just and the unjust repay sin with sin,
and will let the Holy and Just One be traded for a murderer (Acts 3, 14).
Put to this test, Jesus clung to God (Mt 4, 1-11). He neither made
common cause with sin, nor even did he “resist the evil one” (Mt 5, 39)
or turn against anyone in judgment (Jn 3, 17; 12, 47). Instead, he freely
took on, absorbed, and outsuffered humanity’s violence and sin, as well
as the shame of crucifixion (Heb 12, 2); willingly bearing others’ sins, “he
carried them in his body to the tree” (1 Pet 2, 24). Loving and forgiving
his enemies even while suffering death at their hands, he remained faith-
ful to his mission as God’s agent of salvation, determined to let nothing
get lost, but rather to bring it home to God (cf. Jn 6, 37-40).
In this way, Jesus revealed a God who is “for us” (Rom 8, 31),
“reconciling the world to himself, not holding their sins against them”
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(2 Cor 5, 19)—a God who “shows his love for us by having Christ die
for us while we were still sinners” (Rom 5, 8). In the risen Christ, there-
fore, “we have an advocate with the Father, . . . and he is the expiation
for our sins, and not for ours only, but for the whole world as well” (1
Jn 2, 1-2). Consequently, Christians live “with their eyes fixed on Jesus,
who sums up faith from start to finish” (Heb 12, 2), and who draws
them along the way of perseverance he went to where he is—“to the
throne of Mercy” (Heb 4, 16).
6. What is the fundamental principle of christology?
Easter proclaims the identity of the raised Son of God with the
Jesus who ministered and died. This remains of pivotal significance: the
Tradition insists on faith in “One and the Same Lord Jesus Christ.”
This must be interpreted dynamically, in terms of an encounter
involving a divinely initiated mutuality of sharing. In Jesus Christ, the
living God meets humanity, in an “admirable exchange” of “natures.”
The Church Fathers never tire of repeating, in endless variations, the
exchange-principle: “The Word of God, our Lord Jesus Christ . . . , out
of his limitless love, became what we are, so that he might make us
what he is” (Irenaeus). “God’s Only-Begotten Son, wishing us to share
in his divinity, assumed our nature, so that, having been made man, he
might make human beings gods” (Thomas Aquinas).
In Jesus Christ, therefore, God “recapitulates” (Eph 1, 10) and
transforms humanity by graciously participating in it. This draws
humanity and world into participation in the divine life, which also
restores them to their original innocence. This is accomplished by Jesus
being the embodiment, both of God and of the fullness of creation;
specifically, he also embodies everything we human beings are, includ-
ing his being “tempted as we are, yet without sin” (Heb 4, 15). Yet the
depth of the divine participation in the human condition is revealed by
Jesus’ enduring our inhumanity, without paying back in kind (cf. 1 Pet
3, 21-25). This implies two important truths.
First, far from being centered in himself, Christ is entirely other-
related, both in his divinity and his humanity. A perfect windowpane
is near-invisible and draws almost no attention to itself. Similarly, Jesus’
crucial perfection lies, not in his being perfectly self-identified (“a
strong Ego”), but in that he finds his identity by being wholly “empty”
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and transparent, both toward God and toward humanity. His divinity
is his being “God from God”; his humanity is his being “for others”—
Gentile and Jew, slave and free, woman and man (cf. Gal 3, 28). In
him, therefore, God’s “love of humanity has appeared” (Tit 3, 4) and
humanity has gained access to God: “I am the way” (Jn 14, 6).
Second, the central purpose of Christianity is not the betterment
of humanity, but union with God. There are a hundred admirable ways
to become better, more just, and more humane, but only one way (Jn
14, 6) to become divinized. Christians are very much called to practice
goodness, justice, and humanity; they are not sanguine about unaided
human effort. Humanity tends to be self-maintaining and self-right-
eous; we do justice with a vengeance, without compassion. Christians
expect true justice from union with God, who, by graciously taking on
humanity in Christ, disarms it. Orthodox christology blocks the reduc-
tion of faith to ethics—both autonomous and heteronomous.
7. Did Jesus learn from experience? Did he gradually discover
who he was? Or did he, as God’s Son, only appear to grow?
These questions involves the meaning of the doctrine that Jesus
Christ is “perfect in humanity.” This is crucial to Christian life, for if
Jesus, on account of his divinity, was incapable of human growth, any
real imitation of Christ will be impossible, and hence, an unsound ideal.
While eloquently conveying Jesus’ all-embracing sense of God and
his love of all, the Gospels provide no information about his personal
life-experience. Hence, well-intentioned statements like “Jesus discov-
ered who he was at his baptism” are fanciful. Yet the Gospels do
mention Jesus’ growth (Lk 2, 40. 52), and present him as exultant (Lk
10, 21), troubled (Mk 14, 33; Jn 11, 33), upset (Lk 19, 41), impatient
(Mk 8, 17f.), and even as ignorant (Mk 13, 32). Jesus’ divine Sonship
clearly does not demand that he be pictured as a person constantly in
sovereign control, incapable of truly human life-experience.
The only common New Testament tradition that involves Jesus’
inner history is that he did not sin (cf. 2 Cor 5, 21; 1 Pet 2, 22; Jn 8,
46; 1 Jn 3, 5). This cannot mean he was unable to sin; incapacity for
moral choices would have made him less than human. It must mean
that he “could not get himself to sin”; that is, he was able not to sin: he
was “tempted as we are, but did not sin” (Heb 4, 15).
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We can reverently try to understand this. Far from diminishing
any person’s free and conscious humanity, union with God enhances
it. Unconditional union with God, therefore, must have drawn Jesus
into an ever deeper human (i.e., moral) maturity. Consistent obedi-
ence to God must have made him ever more deeply free as new
decisions came his way; his pervasive sense of God must have
resulted in ever deeper understanding as he learned more. Far from
being effortless, this growth must have been a struggle: as a deeper
understanding of God, the world, and himself became available to
him, mystery must have deepened, too. Total abandon to the Father
must have given him an increasingly uncomfortable wisdom (cf. Mk
3, 21; 6, 2-6). The obtuseness of others must have tested his patience
(Mk 8, 17f.); prophetic insight into others’ thinking (Mt 6, 8; 12,
25; Lk 9, 47) must have involved the painful realization that he
could not entrust himself to them (Jn 2, 24). Yet for those very
others he lived.
Jesus’ unity with God was not a matter of being in control—of
having the kind of “grasp” that gives one a sense of what one is all about
and thus, an advantage over others (Phil 2, 4). Rather, it was a matter
of voluntary “emptiness” (cf. Phil 2, 6-7)—of service and obedience in
total abandon, down to a slave’s death. It was a school of testing and
endurance, in increasing loneliness.
Divine compassion, not power, is the motive of the Incarnation;
accordingly, Jesus’ human experience as God’s Son must, in the end,
have been one of bottomless inner suffering. Jesus’ “whole life was cross
and martyrdom” (The Imitation of Christ); he did not come to his
passion and disgraceful execution unprepared. “From what he suffered
he learned what obedience is” (Heb 5, 8).
8. Why did Jesus have to suffer?
This question invites a retort. Given the world we live in, how
could Jesus not have suffered? No one should “have to” suffer, yet—
natural disasters and mishaps aside—humanity does inflict suffering
and death on itself and the world. The fact that, of all people, Jesus,
“who did nothing wrong” (Lk 23, 41), “had to” suffer, and at the hands
of persons no better or worse than ourselves, reveals both the fragility
of the cosmos and the ugly depth of human sin.
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The Christian faith does not glorify suffering and death in them-
selves. Jesus was in agony about them and prayed that they might pass
him by. Yet he did willingly accept them, out of obedience to the
Father’s will (Mk 14, 32-36; Phil 2, 8).
What the Father wills is not suffering but the salvation of all (1 Tim
2, 4). Yet true salvation is open only to a humanity responsible as well
as responsive to God. Simple indulgence would have been an easy way
out, but it would have consigned humanity to perpetual infancy: God
could have fondly smiled, forever, at our pardonable mistakes. But such
a humanity does not really matter; it would be unworthy of God.
Conceivably, God could have held humanity responsible by
punishing it, consigning it to the deadly consequences of sin. God,
however, graciously chose to enable humanity to make amends, by freely
“giving up” his Son for us all (Rom 8, 32); Jesus, in his turn, “gave
himself up” (Gal 2, 20), freely shouldering responsibility for sin and its
consequences. In so abandoning himself wholly to the Father, he took
the sting out of sin and death and turned them into the very stuff of
life. The chasm of sin and death now help reveal the measure of God’s
mercy. O felix culpa!
9. What does it mean to say that Jesus suffered and
died “for us”? Was the world redeemed by a heavenly
transaction which occurred without our involvement
and from which we benefit without our consent?
The New Testament uses several Greek prepositions translated by
“for”: hyper (“Christ died for all”: 2 Cor 5, 14-15), peri (“he is the expi-
ation for our sins”: 1 Jn 2, 2), and dia (“for whom Christ died”: 1 Cor
8, 11). There is another Greek preposition meaning “for”: anti.
Significantly, with the exception of the lone expression “ransom in
exchange for” (lytron anti: Mk 10, 45 parr. Mt 20, 28), the New
Testament does not use anti in a soteriological sense.
Anti implies substitution; it means “instead of.” The New
Testament never says that Jesus suffered “instead of us,” which
would imply that Jesus settled the debt humanity owed to God by
excluding us from what he did and suffered by way of satisfaction. It
would also imply that God had decided to “impute” Christ’s merits
to us, with no cost to ourselves. The world’s salvation would have
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been a matter of divine power overriding human sinfulness and
responsibility.
Peri and dia mean “for the sake of,” and hyper “in behalf of.”
Therefore the New Testament says that Jesus Christ, in living, dying,
and rising from the dead, was moved by us and represented us. Christ
shared our predicament out of sympathy and compassion, to enable us
to live for God again. This is the meaning of the doctrine that the Word
has “assumed human nature.”
Substitution excludes participation; representation invites it—indeed,
from our point of view, it demands it. Christ’s saving work, therefore,
does not get us off the hook; on the contrary, having been “bought free
dearly” (1 Cor 6, 20; cf. 1 Pet 1, 18-19), we are restored to freedom and
responsibility before God and called to follow Christ, for the salvation of
the world. This is why the praise we offer to God must take the form
of rehearsing the story of Jesus, not only in word, but also in active and
patient discipleship. Attracted by Christ, we are called, like Paul, to
“spend and be spent” (2 Cor 12, 15).
The great Tradition unequivocally rejects the unfortunate (yet
widespread) view of Jesus as scapegoat, implying that the Father owed it
to himself to demand damages, and that consequently, the Father’s will
was for punishment in return for atonement; in this construction of the
Atonement (often wrongly attributed to Anselm and his treatise Cur
Deus homo), Jesus submitted to being dispatched instead of us—i.e., as
our substitute, to appease an angry Father-God, forced by his own
Majesty to demand satisfaction for the infinite offense involved in even
the smallest human sin. The faith-conviction which the Tradition
endorses is entirely different: (a) the “law of Christ” calls for the shoul-
dering of the burdens of others’ (Gal 6, 2), and (b) God’s blessing rests
on the patient, willing acceptance of undeserved suffering, in imitation
of Christ the Lamb (cf. Jn 1, 29; 1 Pet 1, 19; 2, 19- 24; 3, 14; 4, 13-
16; Mt 5, 10).
10. Does faith in Jesus as sole Savior imply the rejection
of non-Christian religions and cultures, and of the
great figures held in reverence by them?
The perspective of Christ’s Resurrection is God’s universal judg-
ment; this commits the Church, along with her message, from the
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outset to the whole world. From the outset, too, the Church has had to
learn, often painfully, and never without dialogue with the world, new
ways to give shape to this universal mission.
Christian mission does (or should) not aim at imposing an alien
religion on the nations. Christians believe that God, in Christ, recapit-
ulates and transforms all of humanity, “overpowered by sin” (Rom 3,
9), by graciously participating in it. Simply in virtue of common
humanity, therefore, all human persons and nations, no matter how
sinful or virtuous, are “naturally Christian” (Tertullian), if (perhaps)
“anonymously” (Karl Rahner). To proclaim Christ to them is to call
them to the fullness of their original integrity.
A Church that anticipates God’s judgment does not meet the
world judgmentally; she is too aware that its own faith is incomplete.
While it does have “the word of the truth, the Gospel” (Col 1, 5) to
proclaim to all nations, it knows that it, too, is incomplete till all of
humanity’s riches are incorporated into Christ. Moreover, the imitation
of Christ, who admired the faith he found outside Israel (Mt 8, 10; 15,
28), requires the Church to behave as the agent (“sacrament”) of salva-
tion, not judgment (Jn 3, 17).
Hence, while always calling for conversion “away from idols” (1
Thess 1, 9), the best of the great Tradition has met the world in an atti-
tude of critical sympathy. Far from committing her to intolerance, the
knowledge of Christ can enable the Church to understand and cherish
the world, without expecting to understand or be understood quickly.
Patient, discriminating appreciation will enable it to discern the activ-
ity of God’s Word wherever wisdom and virtue are found, and to be
edified by them. This first applies to Israel and her models of longsuf-
fering faith (Heb 11, 1-12, 2), but then also to the great souls of all
times (“from Abel on”) and places, who have lived and suffered for
wisdom and justice. “Such were Socrates and Heraclitus among the
Greeks, and those like them” (Justin Martyr). There is no good
Christian reason not to include in this “cloud of witnesses” (Heb 12, 1)
the Buddha, Lao-tsu, Mahatma Gandhi, Dag Hammarskjöld, Martin
Luther King, and countless other peaceable men and women touched
by grace (Lk 2, 14).
Judgment can take two forms, disapproval and approval.
Christians, therefore, can commit two sorts of errors in this regard. Out
of a mistaken sense of superiority, we may think that our commitment
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to Jesus Christ obliges us to carp at non-Christian religions and
cultures and at the great figures held in veneration by them without
discernment; alternatively we may think, out of a lack of a sense of the
privilege involved in being a Christian, that Christian love of human-
ity and the world entails the obligation to admire them in an
undiscerning way.
Notes
First published as “Ten Questions on Christology and Soteriology,” in Chicago
Studies 25 (1986): 269-78. Used in workshops in Central Java, Indonesia;
rewritten, translated, and published as “Kemanusiaan Hidup demi Kemuliaan
Allah: Sepuluh Quaestiones Disputatae dalam Kristologi dan Soteriologi,” in
Jatuh? Bangun! Jaditiri Kristiani dalam Sorotan [“Fall? Arise! Christian Identity
Under the Magnifying Glass”], in Orientasi Baru, 7, ed. J.B. Banawiratma,
Tom Jacobs, B. Kieser, I. Suharyo, M.I. Emmy Tranggani (Yogyakarta:
Penerbit Kanisius, 1993), 84-96. Published in Italian as “Dieci questioni sulla
cristologia e sulla soteriologia” in La Scuola Cattolica 124 (1996): 615-25.
This theological essay is studded with references to Scripture. Their
purpose is not to prove that the doctrines formulated in the essay are right
(“orthodox”) by undisputed biblical standards. Instead, the ten questions-and-
answers pull together the de facto consensus of the catholic tradition as it stands
today. Put differently, the scriptural quotations serve the vital purpose of
acquainting the reader with the “family idioms” of the Catholic (and Orthodox
and classical Protestant) tradition.
The order in which the ten issues are proposed is broadly historical. The
first five questions and answers substantially represent the scriptural record and
the first three centuries, but the probable motives attributed to Jesus Christ in
the fifth answer owe a lot to twentieth-century efforts to enter into the
consciousness of the historical Jesus. Questions and answers 8-9 represent the
sixteenth-century debates between the Catholic Church and the chief Calvinist
(and Jansenist) interpretations of Christ’s saving work; these debates are largely
(but by no means wholly) a matter of past history.
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On Professing the Uniqueness of Christ
Introduction: The Triple Embarrassment
of Christian Doctrine
Doctrines are, at root, nothing but the Church’s praise of God, eventhough spoken and heard outside worship, by way of witness.
What we sing and speak before God by way of praise is indeed couched
in words that are ours, but they are elicited from us by the Risen Christ,
present in the Holy Spirit. Our words before God, therefore, are fruits
of the Spirit, not original human achievement of the liturgical or theo-
logical kind. Risen beyond the wildest human expectation, Jesus Christ
has opened for us unprecedented access to where God is enthroned in
graciousness; hence, it is through him that we are to offer up, in every-
thing we do, and indeed in our very persons, an offering of praise to
God (Heb 4, 16; 13, 15; Rom 12, 1).
Unsurprisingly, the first form this praise takes is words: “the fruit
of lips that acknowledge [God’s] name.” Our words of praise to God,
recounting how Jesus lived and died and lived again, so as to be Lord
of the dead and the living (cf. Rom 14, 9) turn out to do more justice
to God than our own lives. This is hard to admit; Pelagius is alive and
well in everyone. But we are to remember that, even though our lives
have the advantage of being real, they have the drawback of being far
from perfect; they fall short of the glory of God. And while it is true
that we can (and often do) use words to escape from deeds, we also use
them to express our aspirations and our commitments. The Risen
Christ draws out of his Church the Halleluyah (“Praise God”) to his
Father in the form of the story of his life, death, and resurrection. In
doing so, the Church is drawn into a life commitment that will trans-
form it, a commitment such as Paul details in Romans (Rom 12, 2-15,
12), wedged in between a call to worship and a wish for hope (Rom 12,
1; 15, 13). The Christian life is a life of discipleship and imitatio
Christi, but its soul is worship, in anticipation of the Lord’s coming:
“Marana tha”—“Come, Lord Jesus” (1 Cor 16, 22; Rev 22, 20).
This means that our Christian witness, that echo of worship,
embarrasses us, and it does so in two ways.
Firstly, the word of faith is not our own: it is drawn out of us by
the Risen Christ; the Christian kerygma presents itself for acceptance,
not as a “human word,” but “as what it really is, the word of God, at
work in you, believers.” The presence of a kind friend or a good-look-
ing work of art can prompt us to respond from the heart, with words
we did not know we had inside us, and we feel a bit embarrassed utter-
ing them, albeit delightfully. Analogously, the presence of “the glory of
God, in the face of Christ” prompts us to speak words too big for our
mouths and for others’ ears (1 Thess 2, 13; 2 Cor 4, 6). What we do is,
quite literally, “boasting,” as Paul repeats. Put differently, all Christian
witness is overstatement, though encouraged and authorized by God.
Secondly, the word of faith which we speak puts our lives to
shame; our walk belies our talk. Being a Christian means living by over-
statement; we are always tempted to tailor the faith we profess to the
lives we lead, if only to avoid the sense that we are living above our
station, or worse, that we are being hypocritical. Then it is time to
recall that our witness draws its authority, not from the power of our
words or the appeal of our lives, but from God. Others may indeed
recognize us as Christ’s disciples from the love we show one another; we
realize that such love as we show, and indeed our entire “competence,”
is from God (Jn 13, 35; 1 Jn 4, 7; 2 Cor 3, 5).
Thirdly, Christian doctrine is the Christian articulation of faith; it
is witness couched in the language of statement. It, too, therefore, is, at
root, authorized by God, and all the more uncomfortably so for being
part of the Christians’ effort to “give an account of the hope” that is in
them to those who want an explanation (cf. 1 Pet 3, 15). For that is yet
another thing about doctrine: it mediates between faith-community
and world, both by helping identify and define the former and by
trying to gain understanding in the latter. Thus the pressure to hedge
on doctrine comes, not only from within, but also from the world we
live in, the world we are called to appreciate and love, not flatter or
kowtow to.
Thus, in the final analysis, we find ourselves, with Christian
doctrine, in a triple bind of embarrassment: (a) we speak out of God’s
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Spirit, not our autonomous selves; (b) our lives only partly bear out
what we say in words; and (c) we are called to account for what we say
by people who do not necessarily share what we have come—precari-
ously—to believe and understand in worship and mutual love.
Christ’s Uniqueness: An Embarrassing Doctrine
If doctrine is embarrassing in and of itself, some doctrines are more
so than others, depending on times and places. One of today’s embar-
rassments, even among Christians, is saying of Jesus Christ, without
qualification, that “there is salvation in no one else, and God has made
it so: there is here among people on earth no other name to be invoked
by which God has decreed we will be saved.”1 Saying such a thing
smacks of intolerance and self-righteousness; it raises the suspicion that
we think there is incontrovertibly no salvation outside the Church, in
the sense that at least all non-Christians are damned; and it tends to
associate us with imperialists, colonialists, and other advocates, real or
alleged, of the superiority of Western culture, including its religion.
Thus, to get out of this bind, many of us feel the urge to tone
down the affirmativeness of the Christian profession of faith to the level
of earnest conviction; we may say that “in my personal opinion,” Jesus
Christ is Savior “for me” or “for us.” Not a few bona fide theologians,
too, have (rightly) decided that intolerance in relation to, and condem-
nation of non-Christians cannot possibly be part of the Christian faith.
Many have (however questionably) come to the conclusion that Jesus
must not be professed as universal Savior, except in the sense that he is
one of the numerous ways in which God has been with all of us and
dealt with us all. Thus, over twenty-five years ago, John Hick could
write: “Christianity will—we may hope—outgrow its theological
fundamentalism, its literal interpretation of the idea of incarnation.”2 It
is not only the comparison with world religions that prompts us to tone
down our profession of Jesus Christ; ecumenism—strongly colored, in
the United States, by the experience of religious pluralism as a public
blessing—adds its share of pressure. While religious devotion to the
person and work of Jesus Christ is undeniable in all forms of
Christianity in the United States, the churches and denominations
show a whole range of degrees of affirmativeness in declaring just where
Christ’s significance lies. To mention just one example, Evangelicals are
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quite forceful in urging us to accept Jesus as our “personal Savior”; still,
the emphasis on personal raises the question whether we are dealing
with no more than individual conviction—something perfectly accept-
able in a country with deep roots in the Enlightenment conviction that
religion is a private affair. Recognizing the uniqueness of Jesus Christ
as what the Catholic and Orthodox traditions have taken it to be,
namely, as an indispensable and obligatory element of a Christian
Church’s public and communal faith-commitment—is a different
matter altogether.
So the pressure is on. In a situation like this, it is tempting to look
for quick answers to alleviate the stress, whether of the “liberal” or the
“conservative” kind. Then it is time to remember the repeated calls for
perseverance in the profession of faith, in the Letter to the Hebrews.
Precisely because the community has a “sure, firm anchor of the soul”
secured in the everlasting Holy of Holies, where Jesus has preceded
them (Heb 6, 19), they can afford to be patient, without grasping for
quick remedy. Doctrine is part of the Church’s perseverance, of its
having settled in for the long haul, once the Parousia appeared to be
longer in coming than (perhaps) originally expected. The pilgrim
Church has, as part of its traveling equipment, pistoi logoi.3
In this connection, two questions are worth asking. The first
concerns history—always a good school for perseverance. Has the
Church had to deal with the issue before, and if so, how? The second
concerns the interpretation of the New Testament and the early
Tradition; it will be treated later. So for now, can it be argued that the
first generations of Christians positively meant to affirm the uniqueness
of Jesus Christ, or must this feature of their profession of faith be put
down to their limited world-view?
Some Pertinent and Distinctive Historical Developments
The question, as we know it today, has been with us since the eigh-
teenth century, with its interest in other, non-Christian religions.
Curiously, that interest was not so much in other religions for their
own sakes; rather, it was predicated on interest in Religion as a univer-
sal, natural human phenomenon. Other religions came to be cited to
witness that Christianity was only one of the many forms general
human religiosity had taken. John Toland had made this underlying
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point as early as 1696. His personal journey had taken him, away from
the Catholicism of his native Ireland, by way of the Protestantism of
Glasgow and Leyden, to Oxford, where he published his book
Christianity Not Mysterious. Toland argued that there is nothing essen-
tial to Christianity that cannot also be developed on the sole authority
of Reason; and all that is not essential to it is just the result of pagan
intrusion.
Toland’s book still caused an uproar, but slowly a widespread,
widely authoritative conviction took shape: “Religion”—that is to say,
natural, universal religion—is humanity’s real, quintessential blessing;
special doctrines, moral codes and rituals are at best secondary. (Toland
considered them quite simple: just live like Jesus and the apostles.)
After all, had Gottlob Lessing not written in Germany, “of what inter-
est to Christians are theologians’ opinions, so long as they feel blest in
their faith?”4 About century later, in distant America, Thomas Jefferson
and Benjamin Franklin were to agree.
Thus, normative, doctrinal Christianity found itself summoned
before the allegedly impartial tribunal of Reason, and challenged, for
the first time in about 1500 years, to account for its uniqueness. This
uniqueness ultimately lies, so the traditional profession of faith had
always maintained, in the absolute uniqueness of the person of Jesus
Christ. Still, 1500 years is a long time, and even Christians sometimes
forget. Over the years, they had come to take an important fact for
granted, namely, that the Christian faith was the normative political
(and eventually also intellectual) climate, and that this climate centered
upon the divinity of the Logos, uniquely Incarnate in Jesus Christ. For
all its internal disagreements, the Christian Church had developed its
teaching in an imperially steadied, increasingly unified climate, firmly
set by Nicaea in 325 A.D. and Constantinople in 381 A.D. It continued
its course, never mind how precariously, at Ephesus and Chalcedon in
431 A.D. and 451 A.D., piloted by the classic theologians of the fourth
and fifth centuries: Athanasius and the Cappadocian Fathers, and, in
the West, Hilary, Ambrose, Augustine, and Leo the Great. In 361-63
A.D., the versatile and determined Emperor Julian (“the Apostate”)
tried to reestablish the old Roman religion, but the effort proved
abortive. The Christian faith, already at this early stage of its develop-
ment, had enough inner coherence to last as the religion of the
Empire.
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This leads to an important conclusion. The great doctrinal and
theological tradition, which took shape, roughly, between the fifth and
sixteenth centuries, and out of which most of us are still living, was
never forced to deal with our modern issue in any serious fashion.
Thus, three centuries ago and even today, the new theological issue of
Christ’s uniqueness of has not found us very well equipped. The long
“Constantinian Era” had by and large prevented the development of a
theological account of Christ being the world’s universal Savior that
combined doctrinal affirmativeness and openness to other religious
cultures.
Long before the Christian Church had become established,
however, there had been a serious intellectual challenge, by a man who
saw much in Christianity to commend it, especially its Logos-theology,
but who seriously objected to what he perceived as the Church’s intol-
erance and its unwillingness to respect the state. It was the particularity
of Christianity that Celsus, the late second-century philosopher,
rejected in a special way. In his Alethes Logos (“True Reasonableness”),
he characterized all religions as essentially local and particular; the
objects of religions’ attention, so he maintained, were local gods, spir-
its, and demons. But despite their plain particularity and grossness,
Celsus observed, all religions tended to advance absolute claims—
something that can only lead to barbarism. Therefore, he argued, it is
in the interest of humane civilization to reject the absolute claims of
every single religion. This can only be accomplished if the human mind
everywhere places all religions in the light of the transcendent Reason
or Nous, in which it participates; only true reasonableness will realize
that no single religious group can put its God or indeed any gods above
Nous.
Celsus appreciated the fact that the Christian faith claimed univer-
sal significance, but he was offended by its insistence on being its own
particular self—an insistence, Christians know, is nothing but the
echo, at the level of ecclesial sense, of the profession of faith. The Creed
acknowledges Jesus Christ, and no one else, as the Savior of the entire
world. There is no doubt about the Christian self-understanding Celsus
was dealing with; the Church was committed to the profession of
Christ’s absolute uniqueness.
Can the same be said of the New Testament and the Church before
Nicaea?
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Interpreting the New Testament
This second question is not as simple as it is sometimes made out
to be. It is not, Does the New Testament affirm the uniqueness of Jesus
Christ? It clearly does, in a variety of ways. Still, an anthology of proof
texts is never a satisfactory answer, and, in fact, often a way to hide the
truth. “Proofs tire out the truth,” Georges Braque once wrote. We must
face the task the second-to-fourth century fathers found themselves
facing, i.e., the task of interpretation. That is to say, we must ask the
question: Did the New Testament authors and their communities
mean to affirm the uniqueness of Jesus Christ, or must their verbal
affirmations about Christ’s uniqueness be put down to the limitations
of the world-view they were necessarily operating with?
A case in point. The author of the fourth Gospel writes: “The only-
begotten God who is at the Father’s bosom—he has been our guide.”5
Now was he making a claim involving an unparalleled, incomparable
knowledge of, and saving access to the one True and Living God, or was
he just professing a novel religion’s faith—one eventually to be sanc-
tioned by an Emperor who continued to enjoy the aura of divinity.
Clearly, Constantine was implying that this religion was better or nobler
than other religions. Did the author of the fourth Gospel do the same?
Put differently, if the New Testament authors had been aware of
what we know now about the great world religions, would they have
written what in fact they wrote, or would they have couched their affir-
mations about Christ’s uniqueness in different, less offensively absolute
language? And are the fourth-century fathers likely to have fully appre-
ciated this serious problem?
We will argue, in three moves, that the former is true. First we will
argue that the Christian faith did not very well fit the religious concep-
tions prevalent in the world it came into; after that, we will argue, in
two steps, that New Testament authors show themselves well aware of
what they were implying when they makes their claims about the
universal and unique significance of Christ.
Religions in the Ancient World
First of all, what did the Ancients think about religion? Above all,
they thought of religions, in the plural, as local and particular, and they
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were right; Celsus was not alone. Curiously, in a number of passages in
the Jewish Scriptures, we find this conception, too. To take one exam-
ple, Naaman, a Syrian courtier just healed in the waters of the Jordan
at the word of the prophet Elisha, comes to believe in the Lord God of
Israel, and at once requests that he be allowed to take two mule’s loads
of Israel’s soil with him. Why? Henceforth, he wants to offer sacrifice
to Israel’s God; but on Syrian soil the god Rimmon is worshiped, so he
needs some of Israel’s soil to build an altar on, to worship the true God
(cf. 2 Kings 5, 17-18).
The local character of religion asserted itself in a variety of shrines,
dedicated to the miscellaneous gods, spirits and demons that gave every
aspect of life—weather, harvest, love, wisdom, family, business—a reli-
gious charge. Local religions also tended to be subsumed under larger
religious “systems,” represented by cults offered to tribal, or even
national, gods. Various (and in some regards mutually compatible)
pantheons symbolized these comprehensive religious world-pictures, in
which every place and every pursuit had its divine representative, culti-
vated by appropriate votaries.
In the Greco-Roman world, religiosity was local in yet another
way: it was contingent on geographical location; the guidance of astrol-
ogy, one of the products of Hellenism, was avidly sought. The
“inclination,” or celestial angle6 of one’s city or country was a matter of
great consequence; so were the stars under which one was born or got
married or clinched a deal; heavenly powers conditioned life on earth,
inexorably. Even if there should be a supreme “God of the heavenly
hosts,” for immediate purposes it was more conducive, both for indi-
viduals and communities, to deal with the heavenly hosts themselves,
and even closer to home, with the lower local gods and lords.
In the large cities of the ancient world, such as Alexandria,
Antioch, Corinth, Rome, and later on Constantinople, with their
numerous ethnic enclaves, many religions were represented. It was
there that they also showed a characteristic that was very much theirs,
yet which they showed less in the places of their origins: tolerance. At
home, local cults were intolerant; tribal religion always is. But votaries
of local religions know that other religions hold sway in other places;
hence, though locally intolerant, ancient cults had the potential for
tolerance built into them. Once settled in Rome, the numerous
imported cults did as the Romans did. They had few problems with the
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demands of Roman religion, which required little more than periodic
offerings to the emperor, symbol of the all-powerful state.
Well-educated Romans, who had seen through the pretenses of popu-
lar religions, made no bones about their contempt of these imports.
When Tacitus, with his solemn respect for the observances of the state
religion, mentions the execution of the Christians, whom Nero had
declared guilty of the fire of Rome, he offers a brief, stereotypical
account of Christianity’s origin, growth, and move to Rome—“a place
where revolting and disgraceful scum of every kind will gush in from
everywhere and draw crowds by their observances.”7
Christianity, coming into the Greco-Roman world, availed itself of
the established public habits of religious tolerance. In this regard, it
imitated diaspora Judaism. There even were Roman edicts protecting
the collection of the Jewish temple tax and those carrying it to
Jerusalem. The Christian communities, too, profited from the tolera-
tion offered to them; the New Testament warnings to lead quiet lives
and to respect the civil authorities bear witness to Christians’ attempts
not to push their freedom beyond the bounds allowed by toleration
(Rom 13, 1-7; 1 Pet 2, 13-17).
Still, in this tolerant world, Christians, like Jews, looked strangely
irreligious, as well. Like Jews, they refused to recognize any divine pres-
ence at all in the many sacred places; they insisted on worshiping one
God—worship incompatible with any other worship. They must have
appeared like atheists, not only in the eyes of those who insisted on the
periodic enforcement of the demands of state religion, but also in the
eyes of those who had taken the “higher viewpoint” of philosophy; they
viewed all particular religions, including the official state religion, as
superficially tainted forms of the pure religion of mind.
All of this raises a demanding question. How did New Testament
Christians in their turn interpret the pluralistic religious world they
lived in?
The New Testament on Christ’s
Unique and Universal Significance
The New Testament shows a curious combination of acceptance of
the ancient world’s habits of toleration and refusal to accept the
grounds on which they are based. Paul bluntly calls the gods from
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which the Thessalonians have turned away “idols” (since that is what
these recent Christians now know they are); they have come to know
“God living and true” and to await his Son’s coming (cf. 1 Thess 1, 9-10).
Those idols were taken seriously, just as seriously as people took
the demons and spirits Jesus cast out. When Paul discusses the eating
of meats previously used in pagan sacrifices, he does not treat idols and
demons en bagatelle. Thus, no matter how true it is to say, with
Deuteronomy, that “No god is God except the One,” he demurs at the
(mildly gnostic) slogan “Not one idol in the whole world is for real” (1
Cor 8, 4; cf. Deut 6, 4). And he continues:
For it is true, people do refer to gods, in heaven as well as on
earth, and they are right: there are many gods and many lords.
Yet for us there is one God, the Father, from whom all things
come and to whom we go, and one Lord, Jesus Christ,
through whom all things come [into being], and through
whom we go. (1 Cor 8, 4-6)
So even if idols are not really significant (1 Cor 10, 19c; Gk. ti mean-
ing “really something”), they are real enough to those who offer
sacrifice to them; and Christians, too, can get involved with them.
And, weak as some of them still are, they may end up putting their
salvation in jeopardy (1 Cor 10, 20; 8, 9-11; 10, 22). Hence, Christians
should not play with their religious loyalties, lest they should force the
Lord into competition with the demons for the loyalty of those who
belong to him; that would amount—intolerably—to placing them-
selves equivalently in a position superior to the Lord’s.
Faith in the one, true God, through Christ, in the Holy Spirit, has
given Christians a true, higher freedom. They know God in the Spirit in
which God knows himself, and they have the thoughts of Christ. This
gives them a perspective on the whole world; they will even sit in judg-
ment on the angelic powers. Still, while Christ has put the local gods and
demons—that is to say, the gods of the religions—in their places, they are
still very real; they are not destroyed and subjected just yet; it is dangerous
to associate with them, and in any case, they are not on the same level of
excellence as Christ (cf. 1 Cor 2, 9-16; 6, 3; 1 Cor 15, 24-27).
In the first letter to Timothy (1 Tim 3, 16), we have a community
profession of the “mystery of religion” which is “professedly great.” It
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bears out the same faith, except that the place of Christ is here defined
with reference to an astrological world picture. In that world picture,
the (“sublunary”) earth is enclosed by a number of crystal-clear spheri-
cal heavens; on the spheres, the moon, the sun, and the planets
harmoniously revolve around the polar axis, with the fixed stars as the
outermost sphere. On the one hand, these heavens, moved and
powered by “angels”, are interposed between the-world-and-humanity
and the realm of God’s glory, which is “above the heavens”; thus, the
“heavenly powers” effectively block (or at least impede) free access to
God. Yet by the same token, they influence everything and everyone on
earth, in a hierarchy of interventions and intercessions. Nowhere on
earth is there true freedom from these powers-that-be; nowhere is there
unobstructed, immediate access to the living God.
Now this is the universe in which Christ was
a. manifested in flesh
b. vindicated in Spirit
c. seen by angels
d. preached among gentiles
e. believed in the world
f. taken up in glory.
That is to say, the one whom God sent among us as a one of us, shar-
ing our weakness (a), has been proclaimed the Just One by God, in a
new existence, enabled by God’s Holy Spirit (b). In this newness (i.e.,
in the Spirit), Christ also dealt with the powers that run the world and
separate it from the living God (c);8 he has cracked the power of these
“angels,” and opened direct access to where God dwells in his glory (f ).
As a result, the Christian Mystery is now being heralded everywhere on
earth (d), and (believe it or not) actually welcomed (e).
This cosmic victory of Christ is echoed in various places in the
New Testament, but most eloquently in the hymns in Ephesians and
Colossians, and in Romans (Eph 1, 21; Col 1, 16; Rom 8, 38-39). Two
implications are to be noticed in all these texts.
First, the powers of the universe, which no longer separate us from
God, are the objects of religious attention and invocation (“all names
that are named”).9 The New Testament authors are not interested in
describing some kind of objective cosmography whose merits can be
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scientifically evaluated; they are dealing with religious observances
offered to the cosmic powers that be—observances that enslave, and do
not make free.10 The exaltation of Jesus has inaugurated, everywhere in
the cosmos—in the heavens, on earth, and in the nether world—a new
worship in celebration of true freedom. The same worship also does
justice to the One True God the Father who raised Jesus Christ,
summed up in the words: “Jesus Christ is Lord!” (Phil 2, 11).
Secondly, Paul mentions the hardships of his apostolic travels in
the same breath with the ultimate defeat of the powers that be: they will
never be able to separate him from “the love of God in Christ” or from
“the love of Christ” (Rom 8, 35. 38-39). In other words, access to the
living God also means that the various places in the world are no longer
completely under the spell of the celestial powers or in the grip of the
local gods and demons. The universalist vision of Israel’s prophets has
become an actuality in these last days, inaugurated by Christ’s
Resurrection. Now that the whole world is opened and set free by the
one God of heaven and earth, all of it must be brought home, the
mission to the Gentiles must start, the message of the one Christ must
travel: the feet of those who have the good news must simply walk
(Rom 10, 15, quoting Is 52, 7). Now that Christ is being “preached
among gentiles,” and has been “believed in the world,”he has brought
together those far as well as those near” (1 Tim 3, 16—above, d and e;
Eph 2, 17).
Finally, the itinerant apostolic life is shaped and empowered by the
love of Jesus Christ, and its dangers, no matter how numerous and real,
are now no more an obstacle to the Gospel than the powers themselves.
Christian missionaries effectively must now take on the local lords and
gods, everywhere in the oikoumen—the inhabited world. Live faith in
Christ Risen means being on the road.
The New Testament: Tolerance and Pluralism
In spite of their clear awareness of Christ’s victory over the powers
that be and their own participation in it (cf. 1 John 5, 4), the tone of
the New Testament churches is remarkably free from triumphalism or
aggression. True, the New Testament has harsh words for Christians
who have seen the freedom and the enlightenment found in Christ,
and have yet returned to the slavery of the powers (e.g., 2 Cor 4, 3-4;
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Gal 3, 3; 4, 8-10; Phil 3, 18-19; Heb 6, 4-6; 10, 26-31). It is also true
that neither the Synoptics nor the Pauline Letters have any illusions
about the world—a world “subject to futility,” where people live
“oppressed by the devil” (Rom 8,20; Acts 10, 38). There are the
demonic powers; there are the great prejudices of all times: the walls of
separation between the free and the slaves, between men and women,
between Greeks and barbarians, between Jews and Gentiles; there is
also the encumbrance of the noble Mosaic Law, with its knack, on the
one hand, for breeding self-righteousness, and on the other, for driving
home the dread weight of sins past and present, thus shutting the door
to newness. Yet on the whole, the New Testament does not inveigh
against these gods and lords, these “elemental spirits of the universe”
(Gal 4, 3), and even less against those who serve them. Paul’s passion-
ate account of the plight of Gentiles and Jews, both of them turned
merciless, callous, and hardened in their ignorance of the living God,
is hardly a warrant for a war on paganism. The famous tale of Paul’s
sympathetic inquiry into the Athenians’ groping faith in an unknown
God, even as they defer to their many “objects of worship,” sets the
tone throughout (Acts 17, 16-34).
A final point. The New Testament reveals that the early Christian
communities were very much aware of living in a world of religious
pluralism—a world where many “powers and authorities” demanded
respect, as did their worshippers. Put differently, we have a manifold
record of the encounter-in-process of one very particular religious
community (though widespread and driven by a universalist sense of
mission) meeting with numerous, very particular cults.
By the end of the first century, what was still outstanding was the
development of Gnosticism, which was to explain to Christians that
what was truly good and constructive, both about the Christian faith
and about the person of Jesus the Christ, was not a life of flesh and
blood, but an idea. That idea consisted in the freedom consequent
upon initiation into life’s central mystery understood as a purely spiri-
tual divine presence. The issue had occurred in raw form in Corinth;
Paul dealt with it by pointing to Christ’s cross, the business of everyday
living,11 and the call to mutual love and service. For the communities
that possessed the first Johannine letter, half a century later, the issue
had considerably sharpened; they had to be pointedly reminded that
“every spirit that professes that Jesus Christ has come into the flesh is
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from God,” so they, too, are told to love, “not by speech or word, but
by action and real concern” (1 Jn 4, 2; cf. 2 Jn 7; 1 Jn 3, 18). In this
way, in the New Testament, Christianity’s encounter with ancient
philosophy is foreshadowed rather than developed. The apostolic
Fathers, the second-century apologists, Irenaeus in the West and
Origen in the East were to write the record of that later encounter.
Time to sum up. The New Testament shows the Christian Church
at its beginning, coming into a world of religious pluralism and profit-
ing from it, yet confidently claiming that its faith involves a call, to be
issued to all alike, to turn away from all the local gods, lords, spirits and
demons, in order to find salvation in the one true God, and in the man
Jesus Christ, God’s unique Son. It was with open eyes that the
Churches made the claim; if modern Christianity has been guilty of
“theological fundamentalism,” it has merely learned its New Testament
lesson.
Now the next question is whether this obliges the Christian
Church to principled intolerance.
Jesus Christ: Divine and Therefore Superior?
For present purposes, let us assume without argument that the
definitions of Nicaea, Constantinople, Ephesus, and Chalcedon,
involving the full divinity of the Logos and the true divinity and
humanity of Jesus Christ, the Logos Incarnate, express the faith embod-
ied in the various writings put together under the title of “the New
Testament.” The two themes, divinity and humanity, naturally suggest
themselves as approaches to an answer to the question asked at the end
of the previous section. Let us begin with Jesus Christ’s divinity.
It is often said that the affirmation of Christ’s divinity causes
members of the Christian churches to think of other religions as infe-
rior. This may have happened in fact, but the question is whether the
inference is legitimate, or even orthodox. It is neither.
In the year 393 A.D., at the General Council of the North
African Churches held at Hippo Regius, Augustine, thirty-nine years
old, not a bishop yet, but at the peak of his youthful intelligence,
newly sharpened by his debates with the Manicheans, presented a
compact exposition of the Creed. In the course of his presentation
he said:
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I am confident that spiritual people will recognize that noth-
ing can be the opposite of God. Only of God can it properly
be said that he is, for what truly is, remains without change,
since what is subject to change was what it no longer is, and
will be what it is not yet. Now if God is, he has nothing oppo-
site to him. If we should be asked what is opposite to white,
we would answer: black. If we should be asked what is oppo-
site to hot, we would answer: cold. If we should be asked what
is opposite to quick, we would answer: slow, and so forth.
However, when it is asked what is opposite to what is, the
right answer is that it is not.12
There is more the matter here than mere logic; this is where meta-
physics and mysticism meet. God is not “against”; God may have
opposition, but he has no opposite. God is God of each and all at the
expense of none.
Accordingly, he affirmation of Christ’s divinity puts him in a posi-
tion not of superiority but of sovereignty. Let us put this in different
words. “God or Man” is “a false dilemma,” as the late Piet
Schoonenberg used to argue time and again.13
This proposition warrants close inspection. In his so-called “proofs
of the existence of God,” Thomas Aquinas “places” God, not at the
beginning of all motion, nor at the apex of the scale of being, nor at the
end point of all desire, but, as the old textbooks used to say, extra
seriem—“outside the series”—outside the hierarchy of created beings.14
So God is the First Cause of all that is, in the sense that God causes all
causes to cause; all degrees of being participate in the absolute ontolog-
ical intensity of God; all beings strive to attain their perfection, drawn
by a God who remains beyond attainment. So, whatever the “divinity
of Christ” may refer to, it cannot mean that he is the author or the
focus of the “highest,” “noblest,” or “most perfect” religion—who
would be in a position to make that judgment, anyway? Nor does it
mean that Christ is superior to the Buddha or to Muhammad.
Christians may have argued this way, but whenever they did, they did
not have orthodox Christian faith on their side—except (perhaps) an
orthodoxy inadequately understood or politically motivated. For God
is incomparable. No one must bring Christ’s divinity into play to defeat
other religious figures.
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The history of Christian thought proves that this understanding
has eluded much of modern thought. For the claim that Christianity is
the superior religion has not been heard until the late seventeenth
century, and not from any orthodox tradition, but from schools of
thought that qualified the affirmation of Christ’s divinity—the tradi-
tions often called “Neo-Protestant,” or “liberal Protestant.” Many of
these traditions were interested, of course, in finding new, modern
answers to the question, What is the real, “objective” (i.e., historical)
truth about Jesus Christ? With that question, the historical-critical
search took off, in search of the real Jesus.
At the start of the twentieth century, George Tyrrell characterized
the “real Jesus” discovered by the application of “unprejudiced” histor-
ical-critical method to the New Testament as a century’s worth of
discovery of “a liberal-Protestant face seen at the bottom of a deep
well.” But those liberal Protestants were convinced of the superiority of
their form of Christian faith. When one scrapes the surface veneer, the
reasons most commonly given for Christianity’s alleged superiority turn
out to be not theological, but rational and cultural. For the liberal-
Protestant tradition has tended to say that the Christian religion favors
the loftiest type of morality, cultivates the most spiritual form of
humanity, embodies the highest form of pure consciousness, possesses
the noblest symbol-system, spurs the human mind to the highest
achievements in industry and technology, or most deeply appreciates
the infinite value of the individual human soul.
It is easy to recognize in this list the historic themes of the
Western sense of superiority, the soul of colonialism and imperialism.
It looks as if the missionary West, in the process of losing faith in the
central truth of Christianity, was forced more and more to fall back on
cultural prejudices to maintain its authority. Had it not also taken the
superior insight of liberal Western Christians to idealize the pure reli-
gion of the noble savage and play it off against orthodox Christianity?
And is it not true that this same superiority is still operative today, at
least in some quarters? The overt profession of Christianity’s superior-
ity has been dropped, of course; Christianity is now simply presented
as one of the many religions. But it is still often said that what Christ
is to the Christians, that Muhammad and the Buddha are to the
Muslims and the Buddhists. Modesty? Hardly, for Christianity is still
implicitly used as the yardstick of the other religions. It is theologically
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sounder to try to understand and appreciate Islam and Buddhism on
their own terms.
This has, in fact, been the tendency of orthodox Christianity at its
best: it has often been critical of other religions. The Christians of the
second half of the second century explained that guests were as
welcome to their tables as they were unwelcome to their beds, and that
they exposed none of their infants. They ridiculed the deifications of
emperors as much as the marital affairs of Zeus and company. But they
knew how to be appreciative as well as discriminating. Because they
knew the One Teacher, they had a good eye for the many tutors.
Because they knew the Logos Incarnate, they recognized the voice of
the Logos in the many and varied ways in which God had spoken to
the prophets (cf. Gal 3, 24; Heb 1, 1). They also knew that Jesus
Christ
is the Logos of whom the whole human race partakes, and . . .
those who live according to the Logos are Christians, even
though they are considered atheists, such as Socrates and
Heraclitus among the Greeks, and those like them.15
Thus, to the early Church, Christ’s divinity was the guarantee of a deep
affinity with the true, the good, the beautiful and the noble, wherever
they were to be found. Justin was not implying that Christians were
morally superior to others, or that there was nothing for them left to
appreciate elsewhere. To him, Christ’s divinity was the warrant of full
and true humanity.
But there’s the rub . . .
Humanity: The Power and the Glory
The orthodox profession of the Christian faith, we have argued,
puts Christ in a position of uniqueness, but this involves not superior-
ity but sovereignty. This sovereignty entails, we have hinted, not
intolerance, but appreciation and discrimination. This leads us to the
the final issue of this essay. It can be worded in twin questions. Have
this appreciation and this discrimination been professed in the past?
And how can they be professed and practiced in Christian doctrine and
life today? Let us start with the former.
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The liberal tradition has diminished the profession of the unique-
ness of Christ, by qualifying the fullness of his divinity. Still, the
tradition of Christian orthodoxy has put enormous obstacles in the way
of a new interpretation of this uniqueness—one that would fit
Christians in the pluralist world of today. The great tradition of
Christian doctrine, we have said, has not prepared us very well to deal
with this situation.
The era of the great councils, Nicaea and Chalcedon, which set the
intellectual climate of the great tradition of Christian theology, also
marks the period in which the Church gained public acceptance, first
as the Emperor’s favored religion (Constantine, Edict of Milan, 313
A.D.), and eventually also as the official religion of the Roman Empire
(Theodosius, Cunctos populos, 380 A.D.), to the exclusion of all forms
of “heresy” and “paganism.” Orthodox Christianity developed a habit
of thinking not that it was the superior religion, but that it was the only
one, and Emperors developed a taste for promoting the unity of the
Church in the interest of the unity of the Empire. The association of
faith with power was born; the sovereignty of Christ was regarded as a
victory for the Church; Christians began to relate faith with winning as
early as the days when Eusebius of Caesarea was finishing his
Ecclesiastical History, in the three-hundred twenties.16
This tight linkage between political identity and doctrine was rein-
forced, in the course of subsequent centuries, by the mass conversions of
the Germanic tribes, and by the medieval establishment, in which the
secular arm served the spiritual realm and its truth; one symbol of the
close association was the eighth-century Christus vincit.17 Even when the
unity of Christendom broke down in the Reformation, the principle
remained intact: the religion of the land was determined by the religion
of its prince (cuius regio illius et religio), and despite differences in profes-
sions of faith and ecclesiastical establishment, christological orthodoxy
remained the norm. The last and far more serious wave of this tradition
came when the great monarchies, each with their established churches,
started exporting their versions of the Christian religion by the use of
power, in the interest of their expansionist trade policies. By now, it was
often hard to tell which arm held the sword, which the cross. Divided
Christianity became a threat to the world.
As long as orthodoxy was supported by political means, it became
more and more determined by images that associated truth and power.
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From Constantine on, victory—increasingly understood, not as victory
over demons and unholy powers, but as public victory—became a
favorite Christian word. Julian the Apostate was recounted as having
died exclaiming: “Thou hast won, Galilean!” The standard representa-
tions of Christ became the Victor and the Teacher. Even when, from
the late eleventh century on, the dying man on the cross became the
favored image in the West, it was set against the background of a theol-
ogy of “objective atonement”: Christ had suffered vicariously, and the
Church had access to the inexhaustible treasury of Christ’s merits,
which had more than abundantly redeemed “the entire world.” The
Reformation came, but none of its bitter polemics touched these chris-
tologies. It was to take another few centuries before the Constantinian
settlement broke down altogether, and Christianity became once again
what it had been for the first three or four centuries: one religion
among many.
In christology, all of this has had an impact on the interpretation
of Christ’s humanity. The universality of the salvation wrought by
Christ was conceptually expressed by saying that the Word had
assumed “human nature“—i.e., whatever it takes to be human; all of
humanity, therefore, has been welcomed, in advance, into the
communion with God. There is no doubt that this doctrine is
profound as well as fertile; it has served as the charter for a whole tradi-
tion of Christian humanism and mission. Still, it is one-sided, too: it
reveals the universal Lord, but it hardly shows the way he went; it
assures all of humanity of salvation, it does not show anyone how to
follow in the footsteps of the historical Jesus. The way in which the
uniqueness of Christ appeared in the life of the historical Jesus is left
out. The picture is attractive, but it paints too static, too intellectual,
too impassive, too totalitarian a picture of Jesus Christ. It reflects the
christology of a Christian nation or civilization, not the faith of a
catholic Church in a modern, “post-Christian,” pluralist world. We
must develop a way to profess Christ’s uniqueness that positively does
justice to the fact of modern religious pluralism, and yet does not
compromise the profession of the fullness of his divinity. This means
we should return to Christ’s humanity. However, we should do this,
not in the abstract, by simply attributing to Christ, with Chalcedon,
a truly human nature, but by concentrating on the style of his
humanity.
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Humanity: Imitation of Christ in Weakness and Patience
Let us clearly state, from the outset, that a simple “return to the
New Testament” would be a historic illusion. Modern pluralism is a far
cry from the pluralism of the first century, and the Christian Churches
are a significant global presence, not a hardly noticed minority—it
would not be candid for modern Christianity to pose as weak. Still, the
triumphalist Church is yielding to the servant Church; the settled
Church is resuming her pilgrimage; the fortress Church is becoming
the open Church. All of this means much change. Let us close this essay
with at least a few suggestions.
Given the openness of the modern Church, the Christian identity
experience can no longer be so strongly associated with the experience
of limits—catechism answers, dogmatic definitions—as previously. If
we do not draw our convictions about Christ from a central experience,
we will not go out to meet the culture’s questions with confidence. “A
central experience”: convictions about Christ must become a matter,
not just of dependence on authoritative teaching, but of a true, and
shared, experience of the core of the Christian faith. This central expe-
rience is essentially mystical, and actualized in worship: only if we
experience Christ’s uniqueness in vital participation in the Church’s
liturgy—the main locus of catechesis—will we develop an inner sense
of his unique significance. Through, with, and in him, the living, risen
Lord, we address ourselves to the Father; through, with and in him we
wake up to the hope that is in us, a hope for salvation which the
Christian cherishes, not against a rotten world, but in behalf of a world
groaning for redemption. For hope unites us with the world. At the
doctrinal level this means: a shift of emphasis, from the Incarnation
theme, to the theme of the Lord’s Resurrection, that is to say, his pres-
ence now: “The mystery is this: Christ in you, the hope of the glory to
come” (Col 1, 27).
It is from joy and hope—the assurance that comes from the Risen
Christ—that we draw the courage to be patient. It is important to
understand this well, for the association of power and truth in the great
tradition has produced an impatient christology—one not very capable
of entering into a discriminating dialogue with the world. This impa-
tience has two sides to it: withdrawal and aggression; the impatient
tend to ensconce themselves in the security of a self-protective fortress,
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from which they can also attack the outside world. Patience, let it be
noted, is not passivity, but deep receptivity: patience unites us with the
world as well. The patient can empathize and sympathize and under-
stand, as well as endure and suffer. Where the impatient withdraw, the
patient are hospitable; where the impatient attack, the patient question.
The impatient want to win; the patient are prepared to struggle—“to
labor with” Christ.18 This means: the patient do not seek quick and easy
answers; they can appreciate and be discriminating. They neither reject
nor idealize.
The Christian courage to be patient, we have said, derives from the
risen Christ. This amounts to saying that the risen Lord draws the
Church into discipleship, into the imitatio Christi. How? The hope and
assurance and confidence of the Resurrection is meant to free us from
our need to win, from our desperate instinct for self-defense and self-
justification: “If God is for us, who can be against us?” (Rom 8, 31). It
is meant to disarm us, and thus to make us disciples of Jesus the Christ.
He was so open as to welcome all, yet so free as not to be taken in by
any. No one encountered the world with less prejudice. He recognized
faith where the customs of the day saw only unbelief. He saw suffering
and oppression where the religion of the day saw sin and guilt. He freed
the people from the powers that be, whom he challenged and silenced
and told not to identify him publicly, as if he were one like them: a
power to be reckoned with. Where he saw no more than the brave trap-
pings of religion, he did not call it faith. He did not hesitate to question
the establishments. He did not hesitate to call for total abandon to
God. He courted no one’s favor, but when rejected, he did not reject in
return. He gave himself—to all, to his Father.
In this way, he uniquely showed what kind of God his Father is.
He resisted the temptation, offered him by religious people all the time,
to win debates about God and to justify himself or prove his own
authority. There was a claim of unprecedented authority and intimacy
with God, but it was implied rather than stated, acted upon rather than
proved. He was God’s welcome to the world, not in talk, but in deed;
God can take the world.
This is how Christ’s uniqueness can be shown, today as always: not
by mere tolerance, but by patient appreciation and a real meeting of
minds and hearts—that is, by love. We are Christ’s welcome to the
world, not in talk but in deed; Christ can take the world.
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Accordingly,
Always be joyful; pray ceaselessly; give thanks to God for
everything, for this is what God would have you do in Christ
Jesus. Do not extinguish the Spirit; do not despise prophetic
gifts; test out everything; hold on to what is good; keep away
from every semblance of evil. (1 Thess 5, 16-22)
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My Encounter with Yossel Rakover
My first encounter with Yossel Rakover was only indirect, but veryunsettling nonetheless. The year was 1969. I was in my late thir-
ties, and, academically speaking, I had behind me three years of
philosophical studies, five years of theological studies, and six years of
doctoral studies, the latter in English and Italian Literature at the
University of Amsterdam. In the late summer of 1968 I had arrived, as
a visiting lecturer, at Boston College, to teach, not English, but theol-
ogy. For, under the influence of Vatican II, a deep-seated taste for
things divine in me had blossomed into a passion for theology; and,
given that faith is both deep and wide (that is, both liturgical and
ecumenical), true prayer and transparent (or at least open) human rela-
tionships were becoming my themes. I had come to regard the two as
both fully actualized and fully reconciled in Jesus Christ, who (as I had
understood in a flash of blinding insight in the early afternoon of
Thursday, December 12, 1968) is at once humanity’s wholly transpar-
ent, distortionless window opening out on to the living, invisible God,
and the living, invisible God’s transparent, wholly human welcome
extended to all human beings, at the expense of none—a welcome that
includes the whole world.
A friend in the Netherlands sent me a present: a collection of essays
entitled Het menselijk gelaat (“The Human Face”) by Emmanuel
Lévinas, translated into Dutch and clarified by means of illuminating
notes by Adriaan Peperzak, now happily my colleague in the
Philosophy Department at Loyola University, Chicago.1 Having tried
Lévinas’s Totalité et infinité seven years before, I was vaguely familiar
with some of his themes. I especially remembered his insistence that
more than anywhere else, it is in the face of the other that we meet the
unconditional demand for goodness, thoughtfulness, and concern that
lies at the heart of the moral (that is, the responsible) life; before moral-
ity ever wells up from the depth of our autonomy, Lévinas had long
insisted, it arises in us in response to a call from outside. I advanced
from essay to essay—an interesting introductory tour of a thought-
world which, at this early stage, appealed to me mainly because it was
reminiscent of Martin Buber’s I and Thou. That profound little book,
which I had read seventeen years before, when I was in my twenty-third
year, had not only made me a firm (if largely inarticulate) convert to
personalism; it had also prompted a profound desire in me, amounting
to an intellectual conversion. That was how I would love to be able to
think! To have real thoughts and insights, as well as encounters with
intellectually and personally significant others to learn them from and
share them with!
Lévinas’s touch, I found, was sterner, harsher, more insistent than
Buber’s; he sounded much less contemplative and serene, and, frankly,
much less religiously comforting as well. Going from essay to essay, I
came upon a piece entitled “To Love the Torah More than God.”2 It
was, in Lévinas’s own words, a commentary on
a text which is both beautiful and real—as real as only fiction
can be. An anonymous author published it in an Israeli jour-
nal; it was translated for La Terre Retrouvée—the Zionist paper
in Paris—under the title Yossel, son of Yossel Rakover of
Tarnopol, speaks to God, by Mr. Arnold Mandel, who, it would
appear, had read it with deep emotion. The text deserves even
more. It conveys an intellectual attitude that reflects some-
thing better than the reading-habits of intellectuals . . . What
this text provides is Jewish learning modestly understated, yet
full of assurance; it represents a deep, authentic experience of
the spiritual life.
Now, thirty-five years later, what I most vividly remember is the
consternation that invaded me as I read Lévinas’s short, squarely
polemical piece—originally a radio talk broadcast from Paris on Friday,
April 29, 1955. Rereading only made things worse. There it was. Right
under my nose I had the single most compelling intellectual and moral
challenge to my Catholic and Christian faith I had ever experienced.
In the figure of Yossel Rakover, so Lévinas was explaining, we meet
the core of Judaism: an ordinary Jew, proud of the faith of his ances-
tors, who, in the midst of mindless, criminal, totally undeserved
violence inflicted on him, his family, and his people, holds on to his
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God. He can do so only by holding on to the Torah. For in a world in
which God’s countenance is entirely veiled, and in which justice has
disappeared and humanity has turned savage and merciless, only those
who represent what is noble and holy and godlike—that is, those who
live by the discipline of the Torah—are left to represent the hidden
God. In this predicament, faithful Jews are destined to feel the weight
of God’s responsibility for the world on their own shoulders; naturally,
they are also the first victims of the forces of injustice. Thus in Judaism,
cultivation of the Torah makes mature moral responsibility for a just
world an ineluctable element of life with the God of the Covenant—
the God who, while incommensurably greater than humanity and
hence, wholly incomprehensible, freely and graciously elects human
beings (not as slaves but) as partners,
capable of responding, of turning to their God as creditors and
not all the time as debtors: that is truly divine majesty! . . . How
vigorous the dialectic by which the equality between God and
Man is established right at the heart of their incommensu-
rableness!
Thus instructed and shaped and equipped by the Torah for the
disciplined, fully responsible life, faithful Jews can proudly (that is,
with a deep sense of their privileged position) acknowledge and glorify
the living God, even at times when God manifests the divine greatness
only by veiling his countenance.
By contrast, so Lévinas went on to argue, in Christianity, God’s
free and gracious love of humanity takes the shape, not of a call to disci-
pline, but of reassurance and indulgence. The sinner’s utter dependence
on the comforts of the Incarnation and the all-atoning death of Jesus,
and on the all-forgiving divine clemency implied in both, becomes the
center of the faith. But this makes full moral responsibility negotiable;
Christians are permitted (and indeed, encouraged) to settle for a
morally imperfect world—are not all human beings sinners, justified
by God’s grace alone? In this way, not only are Christians excused in
advance from the full holiness demanded by God; far worse, they can
make their moral incompetence the measure of God’s majesty and
God’s demands. Thus they can reduce God’s majesty to God’s willing-
ness to forgive human sins; Christians can rest and take comfort in that
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forgiveness, and settle, by divine warrant, for a world that is less than
just. Christianity’s complicity with the Holocaust, or at least its ineffec-
tualness in the face of it, Lévinas suggests, are there to prove just that
point.
So, Lévinas warns, instead of thinking of Judaism as the prefigura-
tion of their own, superior religion, Christians had better wake up to
the fact that the shoe is entirely on the other foot. Judaism is seasoned
religion, professed and practiced from time immemorial “in Spirit and
truth,” and cured and matured in the furnace of suffering.3 Christians
have an alibi: not only can they invoke the always-readily-available
divine mercy as an easement from full moral responsibility for unjust
suffering in the world; by pointing to Jesus, they can even accept unjust
suffering as mysteriously meaningful.
Thus, while Christians can settle for an immature variety of both
religion and humanism, Judaism is
an integral and austere humanism, coupled with difficult
worship! And from the other point of view, a worship that
coincides with the exaltation of Man.
The implication of all this is obvious. Judaism, Lévinas points out, is
a religion of adults; Christianity is, in the last analysis, a children’s religion.4
Despite this frontal attack on my fundamental convictions, I
found Lévinas’s piece irresistible. Here I was, a graduate of the secular-
ization and death-of-God theologies of the 1960s, deeply convinced
that faith in God was not a crutch, that we modern Christians had
“come of age,” and that, if any god was dead, it was, not the living, true
God, but only “the problem-solver God,” “the god of the gaps”—the
god who (it had been thought) was needed to fill the lacunae still left
in the human understanding of the world and humanity, and to furnish
irresolute, immature believers with the props they still craved. The
central contention of Lévinas’s essay blew this complacent theological
picture of myself and my theological generation out of the water. For
what Lévinas was equivalently saying was this: precisely because the
God of the Christians is the God of the Incarnation, of the close
comfort involved in a humanity shared with God, and of uncondi-
tional indulgence and forgiveness extended to human weakness for the
sake of Jesus’ Passion and Death, the Christian God is the god of the
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gaps par excellence. Christianity, in other words, draws the living God
into complicity with human injustice, interpreted as an acceptable part
of the world. With a terrible clarity I saw that I must come to terms
with Lévinas’s piece, if I wanted to be a Christian, a Catholic, a Jesuit,
a priest with intellectual and moral integrity. Thank heavens I also real-
ized that it would take time. But a big quest had begun.
*   *   *   *   * 
That quest clearly consisted of two parts. First of all, I must begin
to think through Lévinas’s interpretation of Christianity and its relat-
edness to Judaism. That was the main task and the most demanding by
far. Secondly (as well as more practically), I must find the story that
Lévinas had commented on.
For a start, I wrote to a friend. Dries van den Akker, a Dutch Jesuit
who was studying in Paris at the time, succeeded in putting his finger
on the French original of Lévinas’s radio broadcast. I translated it into
English, and, initially with more zeal than discernment, began to use it
in the christology courses I was teaching. Thus I got to understand it
thoroughly—an essential first step if I were ever going to come to terms
with it. Then I asked Dries to find the Yossel story in La terre retrouvée
and send me a copy. He did. In fact, he not only sent me a dim photo-
copy of the actual pages; he became so engrossed in the French text that
he went to the trouble of typing it out for me in full. At the very least,
I had more translation work ahead of me.
In the meantime, in January, 1973, before I had received the
French text, I had temporarily moved to Regis College, Toronto. The
move would enable me to get a book on christology under way;5 I was
to return the favor of the college’s hospitality by teaching, in that
Spring semester, the basic christology course at the Toronto School of
Theology. Not long after my arrival I met Barry Walfish, a young Jew
who had recently become the assistant librarian at Regis College. We
started talking occasionally, and one day, in the reading room, I showed
him my English translation of Lévinas’s essay. He glanced at it and told
me it looked familiar. An hour later he was sure he knew the story
Lévinas was talking about. The next day he came to see me, Albert
Friedlander’s anthology Out of the Whirlwind in hand.6 I was stunned.
The anonymous Yiddish story whose French version I had just asked
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my friend in Paris to find for me turned out to have an author, in the
United States. His name was Zvi Kolitz.
It did not take me long to discover that things were complicated.
When the French version of the story arrived, it proved to contain
passages that were absent from Friedlander’s English version—absent
even from the first published English version which, some time in early
1974, I had found in Zvi Kolitz’s own Tiger Beneath the Skin, which
had appeared in 1947.7 This raised questions. What had happened?
Who had written what? For the time being, however, these redactional
questions stayed on the back burner; I reverted to them only sporadi-
cally, as time and interest allowed. The truly burning issue was neither
the textual tradition nor the matter of authorship, but the theological
challenge implicit in Yossel Rakover’s Appeal to God—the one that
Emmanuel Lévinas had made so painfully explicit in “To Love the
Torah More than God.” However, lest I confuse my present readers by
a mixture of theological reflection and reports on my pursuit of matters
of text and authorship, let me first tell the full and curious story of my
involvement with the text of Yossel Rakover’s Appeal to God and its author.
*   *   *   *   *
By the middle of 1984, I had found—I no longer recall how—a
letter that Zvi Kolitz had written, in 1972, to the editor of Shdemot, the
journal of the Israeli kibbutz movement; Dr. Arye Motzkin, a Jewish
colleague in the Department of Theology at Boston College, translated
it for me. In it, Kolitz unequivocally claimed authorship. With (as I was
to learn) characteristic contempt of detail, he called the text “an origi-
nal story which I wrote and published about twenty years ago in New
York.” He further explained that “in 1953, a great Yiddish poet, Avram
Sutzkever, was misled by a Jew from Argentina, who had read the story
in Yiddish, and passed it on to Sutzkever as a ‘document.’ Mr.
Sutzkever published it as such in Di Goldene Keyt.” And Kolitz added:
“Meanwhile the origin of this error has become clear, but errors like
these have a life of their own.”
In retrospect, it is clear to me that Mr. Kolitz, in this letter to the
editor, was appealing to the English text published under his own name
in 1947, in Tiger Beneath the Skin, solely to document his claim that he
truly was the author of the story. At the time, however, I interpreted it
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differently: I took it as a declaration that the English version was the
original, and that, consequently, the Yiddish version behind the French
translation was a text that had not only been pirated by an unknown
translator, but tampered with as well. That Yiddish version, I assumed,
had been sent to Avram Sutzkever by the nameless Argentinean Jew
mentioned in Kolitz’s letter. Thus it became a matter of the highest
urgency to find the Yiddish version published, in 1954, in Di Goldene
Keyt.8 When, in late May, 1985, I traveled to Chicago to take up my
position at Loyola University, I had among my papers a photocopy of
Yossel Rakover Redt tsu Got; I had finally put my hands on it, in the
library at Brandeis University, in March or April, 1985. In the fall of
that year, Dr. Anita Abraham transliterated it. In early December,
1985, I finally had everything I needed to start comparing the texts—
or so I thought, since I remained unaware of Anna Maria Jokl’s German
translation published in book form that same year.9
However, by that time I had, once again, other things to do: I had
come to Chicago to write a multi-volume systematic theology. The first
volume, started in October, 1985, did not get finished till the late
summer of 1987; it was to appear in the spring of 1989.10 Work on that
book had been intense and I needed a break. In February, 1988, the
thought came to me that I might at last be ready to take on Yossel
Rakover’s Appeal to God—both its textual problems and Lévinas’s unset-
tling interpretation. It turned out I was ready; by the end of November,
1988, the manuscript was finished. It appeared in the fall of 1989,
under the title Loving the Torah More than God? Toward a Catholic
Appreciation of Judaism.11 My friend Rabbi Eugene B. Borowitz wrote
an appreciative foreword for it.
In that little book, the first chapter consists of an introduction,
followed by the text of Yossel Rakover’s Appeal to God itself; a commen-
tary on some issues raised by the text brings the chapter to a
conclusion. The composition of that first chapter had given me quite a
bit of trouble. Throughout, I had operated on the assumption that the
text in Tiger Beneath the Skin was the original; accordingly, I had come
to the conclusion that this English text had been, not only translated
into Yiddish, but also revised and significantly expanded by one or
more alien hands. But Lévinas’s essay, which was to be the subject of
the second chapter of the book, was a commentary on that expanded
text; in fact, it treated some of the expansions as the most significant
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parts of the story. If my readers were to make sense of Lévinas’s argu-
ment in the second chapter, they would need to have the expanded text
available to them in the first. Thus I decided to print the 1947 English
version of Yossel, but to insert, in indented paragraphs, the seven princi-
pal expansions I had found in the Yiddish text, while registering further
differences in the footnotes.12 And by way of explanation I wrote:
The Yiddish translation . . . had not only dropped Kolitz’s
name; it had also undergone a process of revision. This is
understandable. A story like Kolitz’s, appealing, as it does, to
such a deeply neuralgic theme as the Holocaust, is likely to
elicit passionate responses, and hence, it will invite commen-
tary. That is to say, at the hands of an editor, it will invite
editorializing, and at the hands of a translator, it will invite
expansion. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Yiddish version
shows both: the anonymous translator availed himself of his
freedom in order to introduce seven major expansions as well
as a large number of relatively small changes.13
In putting together this expanded version—the English text from
Tiger Beneath the Skin augmented by seven passages from the Yiddish
version in Di Goldene Keyt—I had received considerable help from my
friend and colleague Jeffry V. Mallow, a theoretical physicist at Loyola
University Chicago who learned Yiddish in the Yiddish school system,
and subsequently earned a bachelor’s degree in Jewish Literature. Little
did I know that in a few years we would be collaborating again. Even less
did I realize that, in putting together the expanded version of Yossel
Rakover’s Appeal to God, we were unwittingly approximating, as closely as
the data available to us at the time permitted, a complete English trans-
lation of a Yiddish text written in 1946 by none but Zvi Kolitz himself!
That realization did not dawn on me till several years later. It
began when, on February 10, 1993, a German journalist named Paul
Badde contacted me both by phone and by fax. He had found the Yossel
story in Anna Maria Jokl’s version, had been deeply touched by it, and
had come to New York City to interview Zvi Kolitz. At the end of the
conversation, he told me, Mr. Kolitz had given him a copy of my
Loving the Torah More Than God? When Herr Badde had started to read
it on the plane, he had been surprised to discover that the story existed
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in several different versions. From then on, it had become imperative
for him to try and recover the Yiddish original, which was the reason
why he called me. At this first contact, the only thing I could put at Mr.
Badde’s disposal was my copy of the transliterated version of the text
that had appeared in Di Goldene Keyt. But I did suggest to him that he
might call the Jesuit theological college in Buenos Aires. By a stroke of
good fortune, when he did so on March 9, it was Father Oscar Lateur,
S.J., the librarian of the Colegio del Salvador, who answered the phone.
It was that same Father Lateur who succeeded in finding the text a few
days later, in the library of the Asociación Mutualista Israelita Argentina,
in the Tuesday, September 25, 1946 issue of Di Yiddishe Tsaytung (also
known as El Diario Israelita). On March 12, he hastily sent a pale fax
copy of the first three pages of text to Mr. Badde. They established,
beyond the shadow of a doubt, the place and date of the story’s original
appearance as well as Zvi Kolitz’s authorship. It was sufficient to enable
Paul Badde, a few weeks later, in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Magazin of
April 23, 1993, to publish an virtually complete German translation of
the story based upon the Yiddish, along with a moving feature article on
Zvi Kolitz. In due course, Father Lateur succeeded in procuring a better,
better legible copy of the text as it had appeared in Di Yiddishe Tsaytung.
Paul Badde sent me a copy of that on August 31, 1993. At long last,
Jeffry Mallow and I were in a position to prepare an English translation
that would do justice to what we now knew was the Yiddish original,
written by Zvi Kolitz in Buenos Aires, in 1946.
We started slowly and carefully. In the fall of 1993 we made a
detailed comparison between the anonymous Yiddish version
published in Di Goldene Keyt, and the text in Di Yiddishe Tsaytung. The
first thing we discovered was that what I had taken to be expansions
were all part of the original text written by Zvi Kolitz himself. It also
became clear that this original Yiddish text, by the time it had been
rendered anonymous and before it saw the light in Di Goldene Keyt,
had been subjected to extensive editorial revision. While most of these
revisions are lexical and stylistic, in as many as five places they involve
simplifications and omissions. Yet in the end, the revisions, numerous
and sometimes drastic as they are, substantially alter neither the tone
nor the tenor of the piece. It became clear that either the unknown
person who first sent the text to Avram Sutzkever, or the Yiddishist
Sutzkever himself, or perhaps both, had basically respected the text.
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Unfortunately, the same could not be said for the English transla-
tion that had appeared in Tiger Beneath the Skin. A comparison
between it and the original Yiddish text showed that the translator and
editor, Shmuel Katz, had taken the liberty not only of adopting many
non-Jewish religious idioms more accessible to Christians, but also of
deleting ten sizable passages; some of them were potentially offensive to
either Christians or non-Orthodox Jews; quite a few of them were also
among the most memorable passages in the text.
By now, the conclusion was obvious: in very different ways and to
very different degrees, neither the English version published in 1947 in
Tiger Beneath the Skin nor the Yiddish version published in 1954 in Di
Goldene Keyt were faithful to what young Zvi Kolitz had written for Di
Yiddishe Tsaytung in his room in the City Hotel in Buenos Aires, in the
late summer of 1946.
A story that commands such a wide appeal in North America,
Jeffry Mallow and I thought, deserved a better English translation. So,
with the encouragement of Mr. Kolitz, with whom I had meanwhile
had a moving encounter in his New York City apartment on Sunday,
April 10, 1990, we started work on a new English translation. We
finished it in the middle of May, 1994; it first saw the light in early
November, in the journal of the Association for Religion and
Intellectual Life, Cross Currents.14 At long last, English readers were in a
position to read what Kolitz wrote. A month before, the original story
had been made available to German readers by Paul Badde, in the form
of a handsome little book published in October, 1994.15 But
ominously, on July 18, 1994, the Jewish community center AMIA in
Buenos Aires, in whose library collection the original of the Yossel story
had been found in March, 1993, had been almost entirely destroyed—
by a terrorist’s bomb. With it, the only known surviving copy of the
text perished as well.
*   *   *   *   *
With the issues of text and authorship recounted, I must now turn
to the more important questions of faith and theology. What has my
encounter with Yossel, son of David Rakover of Tarnopol, taught me?
A first answer must be: simply itself. A good piece of literature is
its own study and its own reward; it shapes us the way friends shape
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us, especially dear and difficult friends: deeply, if often almost
imperceptibly. They affirm and enhance us as persons, they broaden
our inner horizons and deepen our capacity for appreciation, under-
standing, and compassion; thus they ready us for further encounters
with others yet unknown.
But secondly, and more specifically, in encountering Yossel
Rakover I encountered the world of living Jewish faith in a manner in
which my almost lifelong familiarity with the Jewish Scriptures, and
especially with the Book of Psalms, had never quite let me encounter
it. One of the tragedies of the West is that Christians and Jews have
almost no shared religious, intellectual, and theological traditions
other than the Hebrew Bible, which, however, we Christians read in
significantly different ways. In the second century, the frictions
between Jews and Gentiles, which had exercised the Christian
communities in the first, gave way to a next to definitive estrangement
between Jews and Christians, to be substantially reinforced by the later
establishment of Christianity as the religion of the West. It fixed a
chasm of ignorance, prejudice, and adverse judgment between us.
Across such chasms, true calls from faith to faith rarely occur. But they
do occur.
*   *   *   *   *
One of my favorite instances of such a call happened just over
two centuries ago, when an unconventional Christian theologian
took Moses Mendelssohn to task.16 Johann George Hamann, a pietist,
yet a friend of Immanuel Kant’s, is nowadays best remembered for his
odd-titled tract Golgatha und Scheblimini! Von einem Prediger in der
Wüsten (“Golgotha and Sit-at-my-Right! By One Preaching in the
Wilderness”), published in 1784.17 It is a fierce attack on Moses
Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem oder über religiöse Macht und Judentum
(“Jerusalem, or, On Religious Authority and Judaism”) published the
year before, in 1783. Mendelssohn (whom Hamann considered a
friend) had argued that Judaism was entirely compatible, both with
the spirit of the Enlightenment and with the religious, cultural, and
socio-political establishment of late eighteenth-century Prussia. That
thesis had Hamann utterly dismayed, so much so that even after
Golgatha und Scheblimini! was published, he remained restless and
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dissatisfied with himself. In the end, he decided to raise the alarum
once again in a brief tract for general circulation, to be entitled
Entkleidung und Verklärung: Ein fliegender Brief an Niemand, den
Kundbaren (“Denudation and Glorification: A Flying Letter to
Nobody the Well-Known”).18 He never lived to see it in print. In
capitulating to political and religious convenience, Hamann felt,
Mendelssohn had forsworn the voice of prophecy. He had presented
Judaism as a time-honored tradition of ritual and conduct, but one
that incorporated nothing substantially new in the way of truth or
fact. In doing so, he had settled for the Enlightenment proposition
that the only substantive realities are the timeless, generally accept-
able truths always accessible to natural reason. While appearing to
honor the Jewish Tradition, Mendelssohn had robbed it of any claim
to distinctiveness. Hamann felt that his friend had protested too
much; unwilling and unable to prophecy, he had denied the chasm
that lay between Judaism and the Enlightenment; at Mendelssohn’s
hands, Judaism had deteriorated into a profession of harmlessness.
The record had been misinterpreted, and Hamann felt that he had
the duty to point this out, precisely as a Christian. For Scripture
treats the most intractable passions and paradoxes as part of the
substance of the faith of ancient Israel and its inheritor, post-exilic
Judaism—not as incidental to it. Honesty in reading the Bible
demands that we refuse to domesticate the truth. Mendelssohn had
forgotten the real Jerusalem. That Jerusalem is not timeless but
painfully historical, and hence, inseparable from the gift of prophecy
and the duty to prophesy; only in this way can it be appreciated as
the Vision of Peace and the Holy City—the substance of faith, hope,
and universal reconciliation.
*   *   *   *   *
Johann George Hamann’s outcry, across the chasm that separates
Christianity from Judaism, came from the Christian side: in the name
of the City of Jerusalem—both its historic glories and its historic
sufferings—Hamann called on Judaism not to sell its soul to the
conveniences of the Enlightenment.
In my case, the outcry across the chasm came from the Jewish side,
in the form of Zvi Kolitz’s story and Emmanuel Lévinas’s commentary
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on it. In the remainder of this essay, let me give an account of some of
the ways I have come to terms with its impact. I shall do so by raising
three issues.19
*   *   *   *   *
The first concerns the Glory of God. In the name of the victims of
the Holocaust and of their faith, Yossel calls on Christians not to sell
their souls to the conveniences of anthropocentrism. Anthropo-
centrism yields a version of Christianity that is little more than a clearly
revealed divine scheme for the salvation of a humanity mired in sin; it
reduces humanity and the created universe to a mere stage on which
the salvation of Christians is taking place. This variety of Christianity
is mainly a religion of piety and reassurance; it assures sinners of
forgiveness, and proclaims, often in deeply moving organ tones played
in Crystal Cathedrals, that the forgiveness of human sin is the para-
mount wonder of God’s gracious love and the principal manifestation
of God’s greatness. Lévinas obviously had encountered the type in
Europe; arguably, it is even more wide-spread in North America.
There is an enormous problem with this interpretation of
Christianity. In the phrase of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (who was hanged in
Flossenbürg on April 9, 1944, for his complicity in a plot to kill
Hitler), this version of Christianity “cheapens grace.”20 It allows human
beings to take comfort in the assurance that they are in God’s good
graces at no cost to themselves; they can rely on God’s love, and God
is welcome to be entirely at their service, weak and sinful as they are.
But this indulgent, very intimate God is a caricature of the God of the
Covenant—the merciful, faithful, steadfastly loving God who “will by
no means clear the guilty” (Ex 34, 7). While graciously forgiving the
People of Israel its dreary history of unfaithfulness and sin, this living
God never ceases to call his people to worship and to loyalty to the
Covenant, to the practice of steadfast, responsible stewardship on
behalf of all of humanity and the whole world. Made in the divine
image and likeness, those who worship the living God must be the
representatives, in time and place, of God’s own Glory and Holiness,
which permeate and encompass all times and all places.
A Christian community that merely basks in God’s forgiving love
will lose the sense of God’s transcendent majesty. It will believe less in
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God than in salvation, which it will in due course feel free to define any
way it pleases;21 thus it will be inclined to absolve itself from any wider
responsibility, whether for humanity as a whole or for the cosmos at
large. This form of Christianity makes human weakness and sin the
measure of God’s greatness. It fails to remind Christians that God is
immeasurably greater than the forgiveness of human sin can commu-
nicate and convey. Thus it also loses the ability to remind Christians
that God’s graciousness is not cheap but (again in Bonhoeffer’s words)
costly: God’s mercy should lead the mature human conscience to heroic,
self-sacrificing virtue.
Let me put this first theme in the stark language of theology.
Doxology should govern soteriology, not the other way round. Faith
and theology understood as human participation in the everlasting,
worshipful glorification of the living, evermore transcendent God
should be accorded pride of place over faith and theology understood
as the human experience of salvation in history. Only in this way can
the radical asymmetry be upheld that prevails between God and all
things created, which is the central conviction of the great Tradition of
faith in the One True God, both in Judaism and in Christianity. In Zvi
Kolitz’s story, Yossel’s final words combine a profession of this faith in
the One True God with that ultimate act of worship: the unconditional
abandonment of self, by which human beings acknowledge that God
alone is God and that they themselves are entirely God’s.
It is only fair to observe that the mainstream Christian Traditions
of East and West, especially in their great liturgies, have consistently
said “Amen” to this ultimate act of worship. In that sense, Lévinas’s
description of Christianity is only partly accurate. Consequently, his
comparison between Judaism at its noblest and Christianity at its
cheapest must be called somewhat unfair. But the indubitable power of
his essay lies in its critical analysis of a type of Christianity which is
dangerous, both theologically and morally, yet into which Christians
slip only too often and too widely, even if largely unintentionally.
*   *   *   *   *
The second theme, it seems to me, must be the Torah—God’s
Word and the exalted repository of God’s eternal Wisdom. Here both
Zvi Kolitz and Emmanuel Lévinas have simply forced me to come to
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terms with the continuing meaning of Torah for Christianity. After
much reflection and some study I have come to the conclusion that
when the Fourth Gospel declares that “the Word was made flesh” (Jn
1, 14), it brings into play “a number of the religious currents of the
time,” among them speculations current in Hellenistic Judaism.22 But
one of the themes indubitably also brought into play is the Christian
interpretation of Jesus’ life and death as the fullness of the Wisdom of
the Torah, so much so that one title that can be responsibly applied to
the person of Jesus is “the Wisdom of God” and in that sense, “the
Torah Incarnate” (1 Cor 1, 24).
I realize, of course, that putting things in this way raises a host of
issues between Jews and Christians—far more than can be discussed
here. To mention just one: in the eyes of a Jew, what is left of the Torah
when, with appeals to Jesus and to the evangelization of the Gentiles,
the observance of the sabbath, circumcision, the purity regulations, and
the food laws are abolished, as the Christian community has done?
Christian universalism, while not alien to the later writings in the
Jewish Bible, sacrifices far too many essentials of the Torah to be still
recognizable as a legitimate form of life in obedience to it.
Yet, it seems to me, there is a bridge across the chasm even here.
For Jews, faith in God is as inseparable from obedience to the Torah as
faith in God is inseparable from faith in Jesus for Christians; in both
cases, the latter is the shape and the actuality of the former (as well as
its verification). And, most importantly, both the Torah and the person of
Jesus involve demands of divine origin. Here Christians, and perhaps
Jews as well, have a great deal to ponder and learn.
When we Christians say that Jesus suffered and died “for us,” what
do we mean? Do we mean that the world was redeemed by a heavenly
transaction which occurred without our involvement and from which
we benefit without our consent? No. That would be nothing but divine
whim posturing as mercy. The New Testament never says that Jesus
suffered “instead of us”—that is, as our stand-in or substitute. Jesus,
Christians say, settled the debt humanity owes to God, but he did not
do so by excluding humanity from what he did and suffered by way of
satisfaction. If God had decided to impute the merits of Jesus’ individ-
ual suffering and death to us who believe in him, with no cost to
ourselves, then salvation would be no more that the cancellation, by
mere divine fiat and by mere indulgence, of the sins of Christians; but
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that would imply that God had absolved Christians from any moral
responsibility, either for their sins or for their conversion. That would
make Christianity a children’s religion indeed, as Lévinas well saw.
Against this, what the New Testament does say is that Jesus, in
living, dying, and rising from the dead, did so “in our behalf ” or “for
our sake”—that is, as our representative. Jesus, living and dying in
unconditional self-abandon to his God, freely took on the human
predicament out of compassion, to enable and call us to live for God
again, in hopeful anticipation of the resurrection of which he himself is
the first-fruits.
Thus, whereas substitution excludes participation, representation
invites it; it even demands it. Jesus’s saving work, therefore, does not get
anybody off the hook; on the contrary, having been “bought free
dearly” (1 Cor 6, 20; cf. 1 Pet 1, 18-19), Christians are restored to both
freedom and responsibility before God and insistently called to follow
Jesus, for the sake of humanity and indeed the whole world. Faith in
Jesus, in other words, is vacuous without life in imitation of him. This
is why the praise Christians offer to God in Jesus’ name must take the
form of rehearsing the story of Jesus, not only in word, but also in
active and patient discipleship.
Not surprisingly, the mainstream Christian tradition has often put
this in terms borrowed from the Jewish Scriptures. It has unequivocally
rejected the unfortunate (yet widespread) view of Jesus as scapegoat.
That view would imply, blasphemously, that God made the punish-
ment of an innocent the precondition for atonement, and that Jesus,
therefore, “had to” be dispatched as humanity’s substitute, to satisfy the
divine demand for retribution. (There are, of course, good reasons for
saying that Jesus was scapegoated and victimized, but if we do so we
ought to add at once that this was done, not at God’s bidding, but by
characteristic human injustice.)
What the Christian tradition, in continuity with Judaism, endorses
is something quite different. God’s blessing rests on the voluntary, will-
ing, patient acceptance of suffering—even undeserved suffering. The
book of Job stands as the prototypical instance of this affirmation, for
Jews and Christians alike. Additionally, the Christian tradition has seen
the theme reflected in Isaiah’s Suffering Servant bearing the sins of
many and interceding on behalf of sinners; thus it has regarded Christ
as the Lamb led to the slaughter (cf. Is 53, 12. 7; Jn 1, 29; 1 Pet 1, 19;
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2, 19-24; 3, 14; 4, 13-16; Mt 5, 10). What all of this means is this:
there is such a thing as the “law of Christ.” It calls for a life dedicated
to discipleship, which includes the shouldering of others’ burdens
(Gal 6, 2).
The differences between the fictional figure of Yossel and the
historic person of Jesus of Nazareth are, of course, legion. Yet I wish to
suggest respectfully that what I have just explained establishes a deep
affinity between them—an affinity, it seems to me, able to challenge
both Christians and Jews. Let me put this differently. Kolitz’s story
makes the same provocative statement as Marc Chagall’s White
Crucifixion—one of the treasures of the Art Institute in Chicago. In
this disturbing painting, the crucified Christ is surrounded by scenes of
pogroms: Jews killed, hunted down, and driven away, synagogues burn-
ing, Torah-scrolls desecrated. To a Jew, this is the world turned upside
down: the cross, traditionally the sign and symbol of their persecution,
has become the emblem of compassion. But for Christians, too, the
tables are turned. In Chagall’s painting, far from being the victim of
Jewish rejection—as he is depicted even by the Gospels—Jesus is on
the victims’ side. Naked and exposed, his only covering is a talith: in his
death, Jesus has become total prayer. He has also become the exemplar
of the suffering, rejected Jews who have none but God to commit
themselves to. In light of this comparison, is it surprising that, in Zvi
Kolitz’s story, Yossel’s last words are identical to Jesus’ in the Gospel of
Luke: “Into your hands, O Lord, I commit my spirit?” (Ps 31, 6; cf. Lk
23, 46).
In Chagall’s painting, by whom is Jesus rejected? The answer, while
not explicit, is very much implied: in the persons of the persecuted
Jews, Jesus is rejected by the very people who, at least by tradition,
acknowledge him as their Savior. How do they reject him? Kolitz’s story
answers that question very explicitly: those who profess faith in a God
whose universal love-commandment Jesus proclaimed have actively
inflicted violence on the Jews for close to two thousand years; even more
insidiously, there are many self-centered, irresponsible, and apathetic
Christians who are passive, silent accomplices of that violence. Here the
figure of Yossel turns into a massive challenge to the Christian
conscience, testing its willingness to acknowledge that forgiveness of
sin and the assurance of eternal life in the name of Jesus have conse-
quences for the Christian community’s commitment to the promotion
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of justice in the world. A Christ believed in but not followed is a stum-
bling-block, a scandal, not the center of the Christian faith.
*   *   *   *   *
The third theme. Here I wish to speak rather more personally. If
there is one thing Judaism and Christianity have in common it is
that they believe that the fullness of salvation promised by the living
God is still outstanding. For all their differences, both Jews and
Christians live by hope and desire for the revelation of the Glory in
the resurrection of the just; consequently, both live with the realiza-
tion that salvation is still incomplete. In this interim, Judaism and
Christianity are inseparable—tied in with each other dramatically, in
mutual tension. For Christians, faith in Jesus as the risen Messiah
has not made God’s promises to Israel vacuous; much as Judaism
opposes the Gospel, it remains God’s Beloved, for the gifts God
bestows and the calls God issues are irrevocable (Rom 11, 28-29);
whatever blessings God may have graciously accomplished in Jesus
and in the Christian community, they have not displaced the faith
embodied in Judaism.
My encounter with Yossel Rakover drove this home to me, and the
manner was anything but theoretical; it put my Christian faith on the
line. More than I could ever have learned from books, I came to real-
ize that the Christian community is and remains radically dependent,
for its faith and its understanding of God, on Israel’s faith and its
understanding of God. This fact has all too often been obscured by
traditional, yet (upon reflection) relatively superficial assumptions and
statements about allegedly wholly irreducible differences between
Israel’s monotheism and Christianity’s trinitarian faith, and between
Jewish interpretations of Jesus and the Christian acknowledgment of
him as the Messiah. In this light I have also come to the conclusion that
the common Jewish-Christian understanding of God must remain the
yardstick by means of which contemporary Christian theologians must
take the measure of modern Western civilization, which has been so
deeply shaped by Christianity—its triumphs as well as its failures. They
must do so both to the extent that the West continues to profess a
commitment to some form of monotheism and to the extent that it has
settled for, or positively committed itself to, the various atheisms.
23
I
66 /  Frans Jozef van Beeck
wish to suggest that Jewish theologians have an important part to play
in this enterprise.
Since Yossel, these are no longer theoretical truths for me. It is
extremely unlikely that I will ever acquire the learning needed to meet
Jewish believers on the ground of their own faith-traditions, nor do I
expect to meet many Jewish experts on the Christian faith-traditions
any time soon. Others will doubtlessly take up these complementary
challenges and shed light on the relationship with the authority and the
mutual respect that comes with broad and deep learning. I cannot
afford the luxury of waiting till this comes about. I have come to find
it impossible to be a Christian (and a fortiori a Christian theologian)
now without having actual ties of (mostly implicit) worship, shared
manners, and especially mutual instruction with Jewish thinkers and
believers now. The chasm simply has to be taken on now, in full aware-
ness of our considerable mutual ignorance, and hence, in careful faith,
patient hope, and thoughtful affection. For in the last resort, God alone
can raise up true Wisdom in us and among us, by graciously turning
not only the Holocaust and its bitter aftermath, but also centuries of
alienation and injustice, into blessings. I have been fortunate enough to
find such Jewish thinkers and believers. They are friends in God. They
have become part of my company as I Walk the Way. And, I am find-
ing out, like Christians, they come in kinds.
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A Blessed Wait for “Infinity”:
Hans-Georg Gadamer
It is 2:30 P.M., on Easter Monday 1999, in Heidelberg. We have hada vigorous, four-hour conversation. As we try to say goodbye in the
front hallway, Gadamer says: “Wissen Sie, van Beeck, I now tend to
think that I am really not so much a thinker as a speaker. Heidegger—
he was a thinker; I am more of a speaker, a lecturer—a Redner.” I think:
the sheer modesty of this ninety-nine-year-old man, still reviewing his
life and consciousness and coming to conclusions. To celebrate his
hundredth birthday this February 11, the whole world of philosophic
thought has its superlatives at the ready, but he is still examining his
life, quietly and in the main silently—that is, in thought. Outside, we
shake hands a third time, and, precariously, I go down the curved front
steps, where Frau Gadamer is waiting with the Volkswagen to take me
to the railway station. On to Amsterdam.
I had arrived at 10:30 in the morning by taxi. Frau Gadamer, a
spry seventy-four-year-old, had answered the door and told me her
husband had been looking forward to my visit for weeks. As I walk into
the large living room, Gadamer is getting up from behind a big table
by the window overlooking a beautiful valley formed by a tributary of
the Neckar. He looks well—much better than he did three or four years
ago. He says, with his intensely polite smile: “I notice we have both
become richer by one cane,” and we shake hands. Kaffee und Kuchen
are not far behind, with the promise of lunch a little later. We are on
our way.
I have enjoyed conversing with him ever since we first met, in the
Roberts House Jesuit Community at Boston College, in the autumn of
1977. He lived with us Jesuits while teaching at the university. Like us,
he made his own breakfast. Most of us were music lovers; so, obviously,
was he. He worried out loud to us when one of us went into deep with-
drawal for a time. When, on weekdays at 5:15 P.M., we and the
unforgettable Sebastian Moore went down to our basement chapel to
celebrate the Eucharist, Gadamer would occasionally remark: “Time to
go to my stony bench to contemplate.”
Gadamer first swam into my ken in 1961, when I was an assistant
to the editor of a journal, in charge of getting book reviewers to live up
to their promises. Two books caught my eye: Gadamer’s Wahrheit und
Methode and Lévinas’s Totalité et infinité: Essai sur l’extériorité. I read
them hastily, getting only the main drift of the two arguments, but
aware that both had given me something important to ponder. Lévinas
had reawakened Buber’s Ich und Du in me, save that both Hegel and
the Holocaust had been added to the mix. Suspicions about grand
schemes of understanding were revived, and memories of Jews raided,
picked up, and kicked into a waiting truck returned; so did the sealed
front door of Mr. Samuel Schuijer, my violin teacher, arrested and (as
I found out much later) killed in Auschwitz on December 11, 1942.
Truth and Method took longer to enter into my bloodstream. I had
long been fascinated by the eighteenth century’s knack for Sentiment—
feeling for feeling’s sake. Such bits of Enlightenment thinking as I had
found in excerpts from the Encyclopédistes, Locke, and Hume had
struck me as lucid but curiously disturbing. As a boy I had also
wondered how you could possibly get, in a matter of decades, from
Bach’s monumental geometry to Mozart’s melancholic, sweet, often
thin melodies, and as a twenty-year-young Jesuit seminarian I had
discovered Christian Friedrich Daniel Schubart, the eighteenth-century
poet and music theorist. He had made things clearer by introducing me
to Johann Stamitz, the Mannheim school, and the empfindsamer Stil.
Later on, with my seminarian’s knowledge of Kant and my passion for
Max Scheler’s passionate refutation of Kant, I had concluded that,
intellectually speaking, there was less to be said for the Enlightenment
than met the eye, and that Mozart was a grand exception. So, I figured,
Truth and Method had to be right, even without my getting the details.
I joined the Roberts House community in early 1977, while
completing at the time a sizable book on christology. One evening I
found myself conversing with Gadamer about my interpretation of the
Council of Chalcedon. He asked if he could see the pertinent chapter
in its draft form. The next day I got it back, with a long note in English
that included the sentence: “The interpretation and the use you make
of the Chalcedon-text is absolutely a masterpiece—really a step toward
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a new foundation of hermeneutics of religious texts!” I wondered what
to make of the overstatement—Gadamer was not given to making
them. What I did know was that he had a way of respecting knowledge
any way he found it. I had noticed how he listened to Jesuits in our
community: a biochemist, an economist, a clutch of philosophers, an
English scholar, a theologian or two. I had never seen a person so ready
to understand and so meek (if decisive!) in turning his own knowledge
to good use. What he did show was considerable acquaintanceship with
scholars of every stripe (including Pope John Paul II) and with notable
politicians and thinkers across the spectrum, whom he had either
taught or met. His little book Philosophical Apprenticeships, a collection
of thumbnail portraits of thinkers to whom Gadamer felt intellectually
and personally indebted, published when he was eighty-five, turned
out to be a portrait of the man himself. Not that Gadamer was nice in
conversation. A fellow Jesuit, whose considerable thoughtfulness
suffered under a burden of worry, once tried to end an argument
saying, “Well, Professor Gadamer, I think I will simply stick with Saint
Thomas Aquinas on this point.” Gadamer did not miss a beat: “But,
Father, surely you don’t wish to imply that for me to listen to you is as
good as for me to listen to Thomas Aquinas?”
About ten years ago, I had indicated in a Christmas letter that I
had been tired. In mid-June, 1995, a note from Gadamer arrived:
Your health is a matter of concern to yourself and all your
friends. How are you, I wonder? Aging is a hard process, and
even if one is so fortunate as to remain of sound mind, like
you and me, we are to allow Nature to make its claims, and
defer to Infinity much of what we still wish to do and would
be able to do as well. May you succeed in finding the discern-
ing balance that is now being asked of you. I am with you, as
I am looking for this balance as well.
This tender note reminded me of an occasion on which he told me
how important it was to live in tune with one’s health and not to
believe in specialists. It reminded me even more of a fairly long auto-
biographical letter from him I received in January of 1989, in which,
besides other things, he explained how he viewed his relationship to
Christianity:
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While Christianity has never touched me more than peripher-
ally, it has provided me all the same with the openness not to
be completely enslaved by the delusions of the
Enlightenment.
Openness. At that point I began to realize why my hermeneutics of
Chalcedon had enthused him. Like so many other children of the
German Aufklärung, he had been unaware that hermeneutics had long
been part of Catholic philosophy and theology. He later told me that
he had been led to believe that the Christian faith was based on axioms
that were simply not a matter for debate, “justification by faith” being
the principal, with Christ’s divinity and salvation by substitutionary
atonement not far behind. And the great Heidegger, who had never
made a secret of the fact that he was a former Catholic, had not unde-
ceived him.
But does this make Gadamer a “child of the Aufklärung”? Of
course it does. When his father, a professor of pharmacology at the
University of Breslau and a scientist of the austere kind, sent him to the
university in 1918, he told his son to study science, the only tolerable
alternative being the law. But the world young Gadamer had come to
inhabit was populated by the characters of Shakespeare and
Dostoevsky. So imagine the relief when he noticed that a course in
psychologia rationalis was being offered: Psychologie—that had to be it!
He went, and found himself in a classroom full of black-robed Catholic
seminarians taking the regular course in what used to be called rational
psychology: Aristotle’s De anima and what Aquinas and other
Scholastics had made of it. But he had discovered what he wanted to
learn: classics and philosophy, and especially Plato—the chief source of
Christian humanism as we know it. In that environment Christians
and former Christians were hard to overlook.
Years ago, on a previous visit, I had told him that I had always
suspected, from Truth and Method and from his own stories about “the
happiness I have been blessed with in later life,” that the book,
published when he was sixty, had been his way to settle his accounts
with his father—a personification of Enlightenment rationalism.
His mother had died when he was a mere child. Not until much
later, he told me, had he found out—much to his consolation—that
she had come from a family of teachers and artists. I decided to
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bring up the subject again. He remembered the previous conversa-
tion, but this time, when I suggested that Truth and Method might
have been cathartic, that it might have helped him settle his
accounts with his father, or maybe even liberate himself from his
father, it was Frau Gadamer who jumped in: “Liberated is the
word!” That moment helped me understand. I am now even less
surprised at a certain natural catholicity of taste I always sensed in
Gadamer. Once, at least twenty years ago, he returned to Roberts
House on a rainy Sunday evening. The previous Thursday he had
left for a brief lecture series at one of the universities in Salt Lake
City. We welcomed him, took his luggage and raincoat, but he kept
shaking his head. Asked for an explanation, he could only bring
out: “Terrible, no vinum, no veritas!”
There is a side to Gadamer not often discussed: he was an admin-
istrator with no small responsibilities. A professor at the university in
Leipzig since 1939, he knew what it took to work with barbarians look-
ing over his shoulder; in 1946-47, he told me that, as rector of the
university, he kept only one goal in mind: preserving the university. He
did not give details. What he did do was strike an imperious pose—he
must have been quite effective at acting the Magnifizenz part in the
presence of Communist authorities. In fact, one of Gadamer’s lifelong
commitments was to the Platonic and Aristotelian notion that it is
judgment rather than knowledge that yields truth. I have often heard
him say that truth is primarily objective: alethes chrysos, echtes Gold, true
gold. Only in dealing with objectivity does true knowledge start;
dialogue, not transcendental reflection, is the road to truth. Not
surprisingly, he was upset when Heidegger died while he himself was
teaching at Boston College. He regretted that he would not be there for
the convocation of the Akademie Pour Le Mérite to commemorate his
most important mentor. Now, he said, for the eulogy they would have
to turn to Karl Rahner—the second most senior Heidegger disciple.
“Ach, Rahner is of course a splendid thinker, but he does not think in
dialogue. Heidegger did, always. Rahner prefers to paint stars up
against the inner firmament in his head.” I agreed, though with a smile,
and he apologized, also with a smile.
Dealing with objectivity. Having moved to West Germany in 1947,
first to Frankfurt and two years later to Heidelberg, to the chair previ-
ously occupied by Karl Jaspers, Gadamer succeeded in getting a
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wealthy friend in Vienna, a patron of the arts and sciences, interested
in providing a neutral venue where thinkers, politicians, and social
economists from East and West could meet regularly. The aim was to
prevent the Iron Curtain and the Berlin Wall from hardening into
permanent cultural divides. An estate in Croatia became the venue for
this forum and it was there that Gadamer first met the young philoso-
pher-bishop Karol Wojtya, then teaching at the University of Lublin. I
have never asked Gadamer if he had read Wojtya’s The Acting Person. If
he did, he will have understood. Only by taking on the world of objec-
tive fact, Wojtya argues, does one’s understanding become trustworthy.
Only by dint of understanding the unfamiliar other, Gadamer has
consistently argued, can our own selves, familiar yet always to some
extent prejudiced, form reliable judgments. Being fundamentally a
philosopher of culture, Gadamer has never shirked involvement in less-
than-purely-intellectual pursuits, as anyone who has heard him debate
Jürgen Habermas about the events of 1968 can testify.
In a set of essays pulled together and published in grand old age
titled Über die Verborgenheit der Gesundheit, now translated as The
Enigma of Health: The Art of Healing in a Scientific Age, Gadamer
(who survived polio at the age of twenty-two) has sounded the same
trumpet. Medical specialists know about illness and disease, but only
ordinary, judicious persons know about health, and so do good
physicians—that is, physicians with sound judgment. Health is a
mystery of wholeness, of being-well; it is not definable by dint of
expertise—something the experts had better understand. He looks
out of the window: “Neither my wife nor I are taking any medicine
these days.”
The end of the visit was as touching as its beginning. The first
thing he had said after we had greeted was: “Van Beeck, is it not inter-
esting that one can properly think only with a view to a future?” He
had also mentioned the formidable Ernst Jünger, the controversial
German adventurer, diarist, commentator, essayist, and philosopher of
the Right, who had died at the age of almost one hundred and three
just over a year ago, a good two years after being quietly received into
the Catholic Church. “I think I understand something about that,” he
added. Now, toward the end of the visit, I tell him that the journal
Gregorianum has just accepted an essay of mine in fundamental theol-
ogy entitled “What Can We Hope For, Really?” My answer, I explain,
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is: “What we can hope for, really, is what we do not know.” He says:
“We understand one another here, do we not?” I just nod and go down
the steps. Frau Gadamer is waiting in the Volkswagen.
Notes
Published as “Man of a Century: Hans-Georg Gadamer” in Pacifica 13 (2000):
84-89, and in Dutch (“Hans-Georg Gadamer, Man van de twintigste eeuw”),
in Streven 67 (2000): 207-13. Brought up to date for the present collection.
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THINKING THROUGH MATTERS OF FAITH

“Born of the Virgin Mary”:
Toward a Sprachregelung on
a Delicate Point of Doctrine
This essay offers an interpretation of the traditional Catholic teach-ing that “Jesus Christ, conceived by the power of the Holy Spirit,
was born of the Virgin Mary.” It will be attempted to do so in such a
way as to positively acknowledge three blocks of non-theological
knowledge: (1) the critical difference between tacit, unspoken mean-
ing-elements in speech and the invisible, unwritten meaning-elements
discoverable in texts; (2) the account of the anatomical and physiolog-
ical “facts” involved in human fertilization and conception as they were
widely understood in the classical and medieval periods, and thus,
presumably, at the place and time of the composition of the infancy
narratives in the gospels of Matthew and Luke, and (3) the modern,
scientific account of these same “facts,” now generally understood and
accepted. Indirectly, the contrasts treated in (1) and between (2) and
(3) will raise issues in the field of the hermeneutics of Christian
doctrine. For all this, the author’s chief purpose in writing is systematic-
theological, but in such a way as to emphasize linguistic, and hence,
pastoral elements as well. After all, the accepted, shared language of
faith must never be totally severed from the live speech of the people
professing it, and silence is a strangely telling part of live speech.
Happily, the Great Tradition’s constant teaching on this point is
now being studied in many places. Unhappily, some of the scrutiny,
often allegedly academic, is mixed with scorn; still, scrutinizing (as
against doubting) Christian doctrine is the birthright of Christians; if
they do not take advantage of this privilege, non-Christians will. For
Christian thinkers and teachers, intellectual integrity in believing is
part of the Christian project; for them, the pursuit of genuine theolog-
ical questions is an outright moral and professional duty.
Unhappily yet again, legitimate questioning of the virgin birth is
quite often poorly met and managed in the churches. Insinuations of
heresy, not to mention overt charges, are quite common;1 but the only
thing these may succeed in doing is silencing questioners. This is apt to
breed subliminal doubt and even practical denial. The same can be said
for magisterial answers so forceful as to raise suspicions of fear and
anxiety on the part of the teaching officers. Habitual avoidance of the
issue is even worse. Such passivity, in hopes of burying this delicate
issue in Christian teaching in silence, will allow doubt and denial to
enter by the back door, unacknowledged. Unstated embarrassment
with regard to the Catholic doctrine of the Virgin Birth will infect the
household.
What we need is neither a neighborhood search by the magisterial
police, nor proclamations broadcast, to flares of triumphalist trumpets,
from the front balcony, nor whispers of mutual reassurance with the
back door unattended in hopes of getting the unacknowledged, unwel-
come visitor to leave. This essay is an effort to write a script for an
orderly, informed, open conversation where it counts: in the living
room. After all, even in living rooms intelligence has its part to play, at
least occasionally. Non scholae sed vitae discimus.
I. Introduction: A Quick Essay on Speech and Text
In a fully literate culture like our own, an enormous amount of
information and explanation goes on between and among people who
do not know one another, and who in fact do not need to know one
another. Wherever and whenever this happens, we completely depend
on text, and specifically, text deliberately composed “on a need-to-
know basis.” Nothing must be implicit; every detail counts; nothing
must be left to the imagination; there is nothing to be read in between
the lines; the sole idea is to “get it right.” Do this, and thou wilt be the
author of a user’s guide to a software program or a scanning machine.
Nobody will read your writing except the poor secretaries and techni-
cians who must use the programmed machines, and in the end, there
will be little to enjoy except the “it-works!” experience and the
paycheck, yours and theirs.
It would never have entered the mind of the great logical positivist
thinker Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) to compose the previous paragraph,
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although he might have found it worth writing. Yet in essence a soft-
ware user’s guide is the result of what he thought about the true nature
of language. For this is what he wrote:
The essential business of language is to assert or deny facts. Given
the syntax of a language, the meaning of a sentence is deter-
mined as soon as the meaning of the component words is
known.2
Russell was wrong. For if the essential business of language is to
assert or deny facts and nothing else—how about live speech—conver-
sation, argument, tête-à-tête, and all those other ways of oral
communication? We all know that in a strictly-business conversation
we have to focus on the matter in hand, without going all over the
place, and we are amazed at the merchants in the Eastern
Mediterranean, who (or so we are regularly told) talk for hours about
everything and nothing and then decide they have a deal. But to the
extent that the story about the merchants is true, we understand the
issue quite well: in live speech, there is a lot that is not purely factual:
tone, pitch, force, rhythm, voice and its opposite, whisper, self-control
and lack thereof, self-discipline and lack thereof, and even more,
metaphors and turns of phrase galore. All these “figures of speech” keep
us affectively involved, whether we want to express ourselves or not;
unlike the bland software user’s guides that some of us write, we human
beings cannot not-communicate ourselves as long as we are speaking or
participating in a conversation.
How, then, about our practices of writing and reading? First of all,
we know that there is always more than strict denotation in what we
say, write, or read; in fact, we know that connotation is practically
everywhere, not only in live speech, but also in written texts. Of course
there are differences between a carefully prepared speech and an unpre-
pared or ill-prepared one; the latter is apt to offer more connotation
than the former. In either case, though, listening is interpreting, which
enables us to ask a friend, “What’s your take on what she read to us?”
or (perhaps more importantly) “What’s your take on what the piece she
read to us didn’t say?” Let us put this differently. Even prepared
language, written to be read out loud for others to hear, leaves room for
ambiguity. Still, ambiguity is not the same as total incomprehension.
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For, in the case of the prepared speech, standard idioms are expected.
Insiders, who know the “family language” or the “company talk,”
recognize the idioms; that is to say, they know whether the truths
spoken are to be taken as strictly factual or metaphorical. At issue here
is the participants’ sense of belonging: “a word to the wise is enough.”3
In the context of faith and theology, the issue of interpretation
occurs regularly, especially when we touch on bodies of religious texts
of great antiquity and religious authority. Here is an example. Once, in
Israel, on my way down on foot from Mount Tabor, I fell in with a
group of teenagers on their way home after school. One of them
explained to me that I could not possibly have read the Qur’an, since I
did not know Arabic. I said that I had read it in a carefully annotated
translation, but she persisted: I had not read the Qur’an. However, this
did not keep her from inviting me home to supper with her family, who
treated me as an important guest and invited me to say grace before the
meal. (After their Amen, they added grace in Arabic.) In this case, the
acoustical elements of the prayer were obviously more relevant than the
precise meaning of the words, mine and theirs; when we come to the
Holy Book, those acoustical elements are obviously central to believing
Arabs. We know the same phenomenon when we meet people whose
respect for God’s Word is almost inseparable from the King James
Bible—its cadences, its idioms, its odd past tenses, its tone, never mind
the Hebrew and Greek originals.4
Now if we recall that all biblical texts were originally written to be
publicly read or “performed,” our comparison with prepared speech
delivered in “company language” comes further alive. How so?
Detached scholarly treatment of scriptures as written and printed texts-
and-no-more-than-that runs considerable risks; it just may miss the
unstated meaning-ingredients—the ones which it takes a good and
sympathetic ear to pick up. Put differently, tone-deaf scholarship may
end up supplying statements of alleged fact to fill the exasperating void
left by the unstated meaning-ingredients present in any written text
(except software user guides and its equivalents, where denotation
reigns supreme).
What has been explained here is immediately relevant to Jane
Schaberg’s The Illegitimacy of Jesus: A Feminist Theological Interpretation
of the Infancy Narratives.5 Coming from a (former?) Catholic, this is a
plainly unorthodox book, in the doctrinal and theological sense; still,
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what is of present interest is the author’s apparent lack of interest in the
theoretical possibility of a “family language factor” in the Infancy
Narratives, especially in Matthew’s gospel, but also in Luke’s. From the
outset, Schaberg treats Jesus’ illegitimacy as a plain, factual fact—
though one that chiefly women are apt to detect in the gospels. For as
a matter of both fact and hermeneutical principle, women will suffer at
the hands of men, whether by willing subjection, fornication, or rape.
Only women, therefore, are apt to appreciate Jesus’ illegitimacy; they
“know the story,” even if the (male) gospel writers and redactors and
the (male-dominated) ecclesiastical tradition have done their best to
conceal it.
Further on in this essay, we will need a good sense of what has been
(somewhat ramblingly) explained so far. For in the understanding of
such texts, momentous silence may be part of the total meaning.
II. The Texts: Various Important Preliminaries
1. Over more than two centuries, Christian (and post-Christian)
biblical interpretation has been dominated by historical-critical
method; North American scripture scholars of every stripe joined the
fray about a hundred years ago. After vigorous initial participation,
temporarily defeated by the anti-modernist movement, Roman
Catholics have been making a distinguished contribution—a story well
told by Gerald Fogarty.6 But pride in recent discovery has a way of
making us unduly surprised at past insight. Thus, it may amaze us that
pre-modern but far from uncritical readers of the New Testament could
intuit long ago, without benefit of historical-critical method, that the
infancy narratives are the result of inspiration, not recollection. Saint
John Chrysostom is an example. In a commentary on the Acts of the
Apostles, he notes that the account of the choice of Mathias is guided
by Peter’s proposition that only eyewitnesses would be able to credibly
testify to Jesus’ life “from John’s baptism on” to his crucifixion and resur-
rection (Acts 1, 21-22). So what was needed were people who could
testify: “This man, who ate and drank and was crucified, he was raised.”
But why the pointed reference to John’s baptism? Chrysostom explains:
none [of the disciples] knew from observation what happened
before it; in fact, they were taught [about that] in the Spirit.
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In other words, eyewitnesses to what had preceded Jesus’ Baptism were
not needed.7 That is to say, behind the narratives of the virgin birth lies
inspiration, not recall.
2. The late Raymond Brown dealt with the question at length, in
two books: The Virginal Conception and Bodily Resurrection of Jesus8 and
The Birth of the Messiah: A Commentary on the Infancy Narratives in the
Gospels of Matthew and Luke.9 John P. Meier has followed suit, less elab-
orately, in A Marginal Jew.10 After painstaking analysis, Brown
concludes that judging by their literary form, the infancy stories are
best read as renditions of the Christian Gospel in narrative form,
patterned on Jewish models—a conclusion he has repeated in the more
recent, updated edition of the book. In the latter, Brown, faithful as
always to the magisterium of the Catholic Church, also reviews the
“Debate over the Historicity over the Virginal Conception”; here
again, he repeats the conclusion of his first treatment: “the scientifically
controllable biblical evidence leaves the question of the historicity of
the virginal conception unresolved.” Yet he also warns his readers not
to jump to conclusions; the biblical evidence in favor of historicity is
stronger than the evidence to the contrary.11 Thus he can state that in
his opinion Matthew and Luke “regarded the virginal conception as
historical,” yet also caution that “the modern intensity about historic-
ity was not theirs.”12 Meier has broadly agreed with this.13 So will this
essay.
Meier’s purpose in writing is different from Brown’s. He sets out to
separate objective historical fact in the gospel accounts of Jesus’ origins
from faith interpretation or theological truth—an enterprise somewhat
questionable on hermeneutical grounds. Still, on the question treated
here, Meier comes to the following conclusion:
During the reign of King Herod the Great . . . a Jew named
Jêshûa‘ (=Jesus) was born . . . somewhere within the confines
of Herod’s kingdom. Jesus’ mother was named Miryam
(=Mary), his (putative) father Yosef (=Joseph) . . . . the many
diverse traditions in the NT about his Davidic descent argue
well for his being known during his lifetime as a descendant
of King David, whatever the biological truth may have been—a
truth probably not accessible even to Jesus’ contemporaries.14
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Presumably, the pointer to “biological truth” in this quotation is at least
partly connected with Meier’s parenthetic designation of Joseph as
Jesus’ “putative” father.
3. The treatment offered here intends, among other things, to
construct two related arguments.
Firstly, it intends to distance itself from the hypothesis—often
implicit—that the two synoptic narratives are adequately interpreted
only if their sole point (or at least their sole essential point) is taken to be
the statement of a fact, whether “historical” or “biological.” Authors
making this case can be divided into three categories. Some, surprisingly,
will construe the silence of the New Testament outside the Matthean and
Lukan accounts as an affirmation of the historicity of the virgin birth;
others will appeal undiscerningly to scriptural inerrancy; others will
postulate sources for which no historical evidence exists, such as the avail-
ability to Matthew and Luke of local oral traditions or family traditions.15
Secondly, this essay will call into question a second, subtler hypoth-
esis, which lies at the root of the accounts offered by most exegetes,
including Raymond Brown and John Meier, viz., that Jesus’ conception
and the manner of his birth are valid historical questions. In the case of
the virginal-conception narratives, so Raymond Brown and John Meier
suggest, the problem is that no historically valid answers are in fact avail-
able to these otherwise valid historical inquiries. On this exact point, the
present essay will demur. It will do so by arguing, on hermeneutical
grounds, that the questions are not properly historical questions. This
argument will yield two related theological conclusions: (1) the unavail-
ability of answers to these particular questions poses no fundamental
intellectual obstacles to the profession of the Christian faith,16 and (2)
since the questions, when actually asked, are likely to have a hidden
theological agenda, they must be answered accordingly—i.e., with the
help of theological, not historical, hermeneutics.
In mounting this second argument, therefore, this essay will also
take its distance from efforts to interpret the two gospel accounts of
Jesus’ virginal conception as “purely symbolic” (“pure legend”)—i.e., as
having no basis in fact whatsoever. There are good reasons to suspect
that the oft-heard dilemma “either historical or theological” (which
fosters the polarized positions reviewed by Raymond Brown) is the
result of a cultural impasse.
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At the core of this impasse lies our inability to live with living
truths that are neither wholly factual nor wholly reducible to verifi-
able certainties. The culture we are part of tends to insist that
non-verifiable truths are unreal; they have no “cash value.” As a
result, when we find ourselves encountering apparent “factlessness”
in biblical texts, we will experience a “truth void” that will turn the
biblical text into a Rorschach inkblot; when this happens, horror
vacui is apt to push us into needless denials, unwarranted projec-
tions, or both.
4. Finally, with Raymond Brown, this essay will distance itself
from interpretations based on extrinsic claims, viz. that the genuine
sources of the profession of the virginal conception as an historical fact
are the anxieties brought on by the psycho-sexual immaturity allegedly
prevalent among an all-male clergy, the hidden prejudices against rape
victims, or the abject submission allegedly exacted by the Roman
Catholic Church’s teaching office.17
5. For reasons of clarity of exposition, the present essay will limit
itself to Mary’s virginity before the birth of Jesus (“ante partum”) and
(albeit in passing) during the birth of Jesus (“in partu”).
6. What are the data?
a. The Church’s indubitable teaching in this matter can be reliably
worded as follows: the Lord Jesus, whom Christians acknowledge, in
the Holy Spirit, as the Christ of God by virtue of resurrection of the
dead (cf. Rom 1, 3), was “conceived by the power of the Holy Spirit
and born of the Virgin Mary.”
b. Note that an early Coptic creed specifies “without male ‘sperma.’ ”18
c. Note likewise that the fairly authoritative regional synod of
Toledo (400 or 405 A.D.) expressly teaches that the Son of God,
born from the Father as God before every beginning, . . . has
assumed from her [=the Virgin Mary] a true human being,
generated without a man’s seed.19
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d. The Latin phrase absque semine (“without seed”) also occurs in
the third canon of the Synod at the Lateran (649 A.D.).20
e. Earlier, in 521 A.D., Pope Hormisdas had written to the
Emperor Justin that
the One who was Son of God before all time became Son of
Man, and was born, in time yet beyond expectation, in the
way human beings are born, by opening, at birth, his mother’s
birth canal, yet, by virtue of his divinity, without undoing his
mother’s virginity.21
f. Finally, a synod held in Toledo in 675 A.D. used age-old Eastern
language, but emphasized the novelty and uniqueness of the event:
[The Son was born] by a new (type of?) birth: untouched
virginity did not know relations with a man, yet furnished the
material (i.e., the flesh) made fertile by the Holy Spirit. This
virgin birth can be neither grasped by reason nor evidenced by
[another] instance; if it is grasped by reason it is not miracu-
lous; if it is evidenced by [another] instance, its uniqueness
will be gone.22
g. Conclusion: it is theologically irresponsible to state that the
Great Tradition leaves the issue of “Mary’s physical virginity” open.
Conclusion from this conclusion: those who state, as if it were a posi-
tive fact, that Jesus was conceived by ordinary sexual intercourse must
not expect to be accepted as orthodox Christians. But, as always in the
Catholic tradition, this does not imply that the door to theological
reflection and interpretation is closed.
7. The Tradition’s unconditional affirmation of the virginal
conception and birth of Jesus raises enormous problems, of course.
Unlike many so-called “pre-modern” people, sophisticated, physiology-
conscious, contemporary people will find the virgin birth most
implausible. By way of rationalization, they are apt to protest that it
calls into question the genuine humanity of Jesus—a reasonable obser-
vation. Miraculous events are hard to accept any day, but to postulate
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an outright cosmological miracle to vouch for the true humanity of
Jesus strains the ability to believe of most, including serious Christians.
Why? Modern Christians know the anatomical and physiological facts
of fertilization and conception; while most of them do somehow allow
room for marvels and even miracles, they find it worrisome that the
truth of the Word Incarnate—part of the doctrinal heart of the
Christian faith—should be based on a cosmological miracle, especially
since the virginal conception of Jesus was not properly considered a
natural (“cosmological”) miracle until just over three centuries ago.
8. There is a final complicating factor. The doctrine of Jesus’
virginal conception is founded on two single-tradition, mutually inde-
pendent gospel passages, viz., the Matthean and Lukan infancy
narratives. At first blush, this seems to favor the conclusion that we are
dealing not with history but with a theologoumenon in narrative
shape—an interpretation also favored by the fact that the literary genre
of both narratives is legendary. Besides, this interpretation is supported
by the fact that the oldest writings of the New Testament appear to be
unaware of any virgin birth.
But then again, there is the fact that the two accounts have no
fewer than eleven features in common;23 this suggests that the oral
traditions behind each of them are of a fairly early date. This creates a
wide field of possible interpretations—a field day both for the imagi-
native of every kind and for those urging caution.24
9. Like any mystery of the Christian faith, the topic of Mary’s
virginity invites (besides affective contemplation) frank and respectful
theological reflection. The catholic tradition has considered faith a
virtue; it has not encouraged credulousness. Asking keen questions and
testing new interpretations of the virgin birth are not a sign of “liberal-
ism,” let alone unbelief. Banning or maligning this kind of inquiry is a
sign not of faith but of lack of faith.25
10. The purpose of this essay is: hermeneutical-theological reflec-
tion. Still, sound theological reflection somehow presumes a context of
ministry. Accordingly, some academic theologians calling certain sorts
of theological language “pastoral” just may be damning by faint praise;
at worst, they are guilty of academic complacency. By virtue of
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Baptism, the so-called “simple faithful” are entitled to the full truth, at
least as they can understand it, and it is not up to academic theologians
to decide in advance just how much the faithful can understand. Since
the early Renaissance (when a new, often thematically humanistic
understanding of the university arose), sophisticated “Nicodemites”
have been suggesting that there are two versions of the Christian faith,
one for themselves and one for common people.26 The catholic tradi-
tion has long recognized the problem, but handled it in a very different
way. It has recognized how right Greek philosophers were when they
taught that it takes “spiritual exercises” to attain to true knowledge, as
Pierre Hadot has reminded us.27 Also, in the footsteps of Paul and the
authors of the Johannine letters, the Tradition has put a heavy burden
of accountability on those who have claimed, implicitly or in so many
words, to be “knowledgeable” (γνωστικοί): they are traditionally
expected to verify their claims to higher understanding (or γνäσις) by
the practice of certain forms of asceticism, prayer and contemplation,
and other-regarding love.
III. Essentially a Cosmological Miracle?
1. This essay will end up arguing that neither the New Testament
nor the Church’s magisterium teach that Jesus’ virginal conception is a
cosmological miracle. Put differently, it will be argued that calling the
virginal conception and birth a miracle is a conclusion from the data of
the faith, not an article of faith in and of itself.
Still, this does not imply that thinking or even saying (preferably
modestly) that the virgin birth is a cosmological (“physical,” “natural,”
“biological,” “physiological”) miracle is irresponsible. Still, those who
think or speak in this manner will do well to add that this is a respon-
sible theological opinion, not the stated teaching of the Great
Tradition. Why is this important? Answer: it is a mistake to think that
the relevant passages in Matthew (1, 18-25) and Luke (1, 26-38) have
one, and only one, perfectly certain point to make, namely, the physical
virginity of the Virgin Mary. Why?
Faith-affirmations never have only one single, unequivocal point
to make; their meaning is “always fuller”; like Godself, “the things of
God” are “always greater.” In our case, over-affirmation runs the risk
of reducing a mystery to one, and only one, simple, factual truth;
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accordingly, overstating the virginal conception and birth of Christ
runs the risk of stripping it of any fuller meaning.
It is, of course, far from irresponsible to say: “I (along with many
others) cannot come up with a better interpretation; I am content to
regard the virgin birth basically as a natural miracle.” All right, but (it
will now be argued) theologically unsatisfactory. In other words, those
among us who still wish, in today’s world, to treat the virginal concep-
tion as “simply, basically a cosmological miracle” must sit down and
count the cost.
2. To begin with, “miracles” have long been known to happen, but
it is wrong to regard them as common occurrences, let alone as incon-
trovertible ones. Besides, those who have decided to interpret the
virginal conception and birth of Jesus as an obvious miracle should
realize the following.
3. Firstly, they are dealing not with one miracle but with three:
a. Worldwide human experience teaches us that no pregnancy
occurs without previous sexual intercourse (or one of the prosaic
modern alternatives to it). This is ample reason to consider a virgin
birth—any virgin birth—a miracle, in and of itself.
b. Question: can the conception of Jesus be accounted for by
regarding it as a case of “parthenogenesis”? Did the Virgin produce a
fertile ovum formed without meiosis? Answers: (1) in “explaining”
miracles, we must take care not to explain them away;28 (2) partheno-
genesis, while passable as a biological hypothesis, has never been
observed in the human species. Conclusion: human parthenogenesis is
rare enough to qualify as a (cosmological) miracle, but only if properly
attested to.
c. But there is something else here as well. A parthenogenetically
conceived Jesus would be female. Why? The sex of a fetus is a func-
tion of the fact that (theoretically) half the gametes in any human
male’s sperm carry the Y-chromosome, whose presence in a fertilized
ovum causes the ovum to develop as a male, almost from the begin-
ning of the embryo’s process of development on; the other half carry
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the X-chromosome necessary for the fetus to turn out female. The
parthenogenesis hypothesis implies that the Virgin produced a Y-chro-
mosome which, being female, she did not naturally possess, thus
enabling Jesus to be born male. This would have to be called another
miracle, of the cosmological kind.29
4. Secondly, even a quick look at Wendy Cotter’s recently
published Miracles in Greco-Roman Antiquity: A Sourcebook for the
Study of New Testament Miracle Stories will suffice to show that far from
regarding wondrous phenomena as puzzling, the ancient world posi-
tively anticipated them in connection with persons and situations in
which the supernatural and the superhuman were involved—an atti-
tude both the synoptics and the fourth gospel depict Jesus as being
critical of (cf. Mk 8, 11-12; Mt 12, 38-39; 16, 1-4; Lk 11, 16. 29-32;
Jn 2, 18; 6, 30).30 Accordingly, medieval Christianity both East and
West were inclined not to demand miracles, yet if and when they
occurred or were said to have occurred they knew how to welcome and
interpret them.
Only just over three or four centuries ago did the notion of natu-
ral (“cosmological”) miracle take shape, slowly. This development was
the result of the scientific understanding of exceptional occurrences as
events in which the “laws of nature” are suspended by virtue of a direct
intervention by the omnipotent God in the course of cosmic events.
The far-sighted Pope Benedict XIV canonized this definition in the
mid eighteenth century.31
However, modern theory of science (Wissenschaftstheorie) is a great
deal more modest about the truth status of so-called “laws of nature.”
Modern scientists agree that even our best scientific knowledge of natu-
ral regularities is substantially statistical; accordingly, freak occurrences
can never be excluded in the cosmos. Thus modern science is far more
conscious of its ignorance than the scientists of even a century ago.
Modern scientists (as against many engineers) are far less surprised by
“miracles.”
5. But, thirdly, it takes more than a freak event to make a miracle;
freak events do occur and they are puzzling, yet by themselves they
mean relatively little. Why? To call an unusual cosmic event a miracle,
we must establish not only the absence of “natural” explanations for the
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event, but also the presence of the event’s appeal to the faith of certain
believers. In other words, miracles are established by a combination of
objective investigation/diagnosis and discerning personal or shared
faith-interpretation.32
6. The final point, fairly abstract and perhaps unsettling, but it has
to be made: the virgin birth cannot be a necessary precondition for the
divinity of Christ. Let me speak like a fool. God the Father could have
been as fully the Father of Jesus if Joseph (or anyone else for that
matter) had been Jesus’ human Father. Why? Because God is “omnipo-
tent.” God is “the God of the powers.”33 In dealing with creation, God
has no competitors to wrestle down or stand-in-the-ways to push aside.
Augustine, a newly ordained presbyter speaking at the Synod of
Carthage in 393 A.D. explains this as follows:
I am confident that those who understand things spiritually will
recognize that nothing can be the opposite of God. God is the
One who is, and only of God can this verb be properly predi-
cated. (For what truly is, remains without change, since what is
subject to change was at one time what it no longer is, and will
be some time what it is not yet.) But if this is so, then God has
nothing opposite to him. If we should be asked what is oppo-
site to white, we would answer, black. If we should be asked
what is opposite to hot, we would answer, cold. If we should be
asked what is opposite to quick, we would answer, slow, and
thus we could go on and on. However, when it is asked what is
opposite to what is, the right answer is that it is not.34
Accordingly, suggesting that the biological paternity of Saint Joseph
would have excluded the possibility of the Father’s paternity implies
that the Father is not truly God Almighty.35
7. One notable Church Father, Gregory of Nyssa, appears to
support the natural-miracle theory. In his Great Catechetical Oration, he
first explains that all things have been created good; only evil is incom-
patible with God. But there is nothing evil in a human being’s birth,
upbringing, growth, natural advance to maturity, experience of death,
and return from death.36 Then he goes on:
92 /  Frans Jozef van Beeck
but what preceded his birth and followed his death eludes
the nature we share. When we look at the two limits of our
human life, we know from where we begin and where we
go to meet our end. Having begun existence as the result
of involuntary passion [¦κ πάθους], man involuntarily
and passively [πάθει] brings his life to an end. But in this
[=the Incarnate Logos’s] case, neither did birth originate in
involuntary passion  [•πÎ πάθους], nor did death run into
involuntary passivity [εÆς πάθος]. For neither did lust
precede the birth, nor decomposition follow the death.
You do not believe in this astounding thing [τè θαύµατι]?
I am happy with your unbelief! For in the very act of find-
ing what I have just said too much to believe you are
acknowledging that these astounding things are above
nature.37
What to make of this text? Two things jump off the page. Firstly,
Gregory sees a double miracle: the virgin womb has a counterpart in
the tidy tomb and must be interpreted accordingly.38 Secondly, the
“astounding thing” (miracle?) is the absence not of so much of sperm
as of πάθος [Lat. passio].
What does πάθος mean? A contemporary theological author
explains:
The Greek noun pathos, especially in its plural form pathe
(“passions”), generally denotes all those affections by which an
experiencing subject is unavoidably, and far from voluntarily,
implicated in, and involved with, the object of the affection.
This gives the noun apatheia (“passionlessness”) a broad, fairly
imprecise range of significations: impassibility, incapability of
suffering, incapacity for change, insensibility, freedom from
emotion, freedom from self-interest, freedom from sin.
Specifically in reference to human persons (and thus, eventu-
ally, in the idiom of Christian asceticism and mysticism), it
conveys the (originally Stoic) ideal of “mastery over the
passions, detachment, tranquillity, imperturbability, insensi-
tivity to suffering”; it also denotes the Christian ideal of
“contemplative peace.”
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There is more here than meets the eye. Accordingly, our author goes on
to explain not only how pathos is part of human life, but also just what
it means to say, with the Great Tradition, that “there is no pathos in
God”:
Our real capacity for spontaneous self-disclosure is tempered
by at least some degree of dependence on the influence of
outside agents. Much as we may be poised for spontaneity,
whether for good or for ill, we also have to be “moved” into
action. . . . No matter how much we are inclined, for better,
for worse, to take initiatives, both in regard to ourselves and
to our world, not even the most spontaneous and creative
among us ever completely lose their dependence on change
thrust upon them from outside.
Apatheia, when applied to God, conveys that God is
wholly different in this regard. God is not waiting, whether
impotently or impassively, for inducements to action in order
to manifest the divine nature. God is transcendently free to be
self-communicating. So if God does create, this is neither
God’s predictable, conditioned response to the provocation of
chaos, nor an enigmatic production, by an inscrutable God, of
a collection of distant objects; it is the free self-expression of
the divine goodness in meaningful and purposeful realities
that are not God. And if God, having created, does show
mercy, this is not a concession extorted from a feeble deity
unable to face the misery of humanity and the world; nor is it
an indulgence nonchalantly thrown at humanity and the
world by a cryptic deity that remains impervious. For if and
whenever God does self-manifest and self-communicate, God
freely initiates, and freely allows those who receive the gift of
the divine self-communication a glimpse of what is—must
be—at the heart of God: transcendently free self-giving.39
So this is how Gregory interprets the virgin womb and the tidy
tomb: not as hard facts that prove some truth, but as “marvels” that
betoken the wholly gracious freedom with which God’s Word goes in
and out among us as he pleases. In writing this, Gregory is taking us
back to Irenaeus, who explains that what the Word accomplished was
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truly just.40 He came into the world without breaking and entering,
because he came into what was his own in the first place, from the
beginning: “all things were made through him, and nothing at all was
made apart from him,” even though when “he came into his own,” “his
own did not receive him” (Jn 1, 3. 11).
8. We have moved from Gregory’s catechism to the fourth gospel.
Hard on the heels of the lines just quoted, the author of this gospel
avails himself of what was common knowledge about fertilization and
conception. He does so in order to compare and contrast that knowl-
edge with the Christians’ spiritual rebirth by God’s free gift of faith in
Christ—the very thing he has Jesus tell Nicodemus later on (Jn 3, 3-6):
But all those who did receive him, to them he gave the free-
dom-and-power [¦ξουσίαν] to become God’s children—those
who believe in his [=the Logos’s] name, and they were born,
not out of a mass of blood [¦ξ αÊµάτων], nor from [a
woman’s?] craving of the flesh [¦κ θελήµατος σαρκÎς], nor
from a man’s craving [¦κ θελήµατος •νδρÎς], but from God.”
(Jn 1, 12-13)
These references, right in the Prologue to the fourth Gospel, to physi-
ological conditions associated with conception and to the passions
involved in the acts that lead up to it invite a brief excursus into the
ancient world’s interpretation of the process of conception.
IV. A Few Remarks on Ancient Physiology
1. Before we proceed any further, we must remember two things.
First, there is no progress to report (and thus, no ever-shifting
“state of the art” to admire) in anatomical and physiological knowledge
between, say, the late-second century A.D. and the mid-sixteenth
century.41 Anatomy as we understand it today developed very slowly, as
an art rather than as a form of knowledge, in the West as in the East.
Only about the year 1300 A.D. did a native of Bologna, with its proud
medical school, Raimondo (“Mondino”) de’ Liuzzi (c. 1260-1326)
dare open and inspect human cadavers (chiefly of criminals executed by
beheading or hanging), but, oddly, the accounts of what he claims to
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have found are riddled with error.42 How so? Understandably, Mondino
had not properly looked.43 He had not been able yet to get away from
Hippocrates and especially Galen,44 whose treatise ΠερÂ χρείας
µωρίων (“On the functioning of the body parts”) was to remain the
authoritative medical text till well into the Renaissance.
Second, the first modern anatomical atlas, De humani corporis
fabrica (“The Makeup of the Human Body”), by Andreas Vesalius
(1514-64), appeared in 1543—five years after his fairly crude Tabulae
anatomicae sex (“Six Anatomical Plates”).45 It was the first anatomical
atlas based on actual inspection. In the priceless phrase of J. H. van den
Berg, before Vesalius, the anatomists’ and physiologists’ chief instru-
ment had been not the scalpel but the pen; even a few of Vesalius’
discoveries, not just in the Tabulae but also in the Fabrica, came from
not from ocular observation, but from books.
46
Anatomists took their
time becoming sufficiently objective (and irreverent) to cut, look, and
see.47
2. Still, the ancients were far from naive. From common experi-
ence they knew that blood comes in two kinds: the dark red, heavy,
trickling type, and the bright red, foaming,48 pulsating type. The
former came out of veins, the latter out of arteries.49 Loss of the former
rarely led to death, except if help was very slow in coming; in the case
of the latter, there was no time to lose, so most of the time help arrived
too late even to try to stop the bleeding. The slow type of blood was
connected with the liver; butchers had long known that in the
abdomen of animals tissues full of veins, and especially one large vessel
known as the “portal vein,” linked the small intestine to the liver. One
good look sufficed to reveal that the food in the intestine surrendered
its most refined elements to the blood in those veins, which took them
to the liver.
The conclusion was easy: the liver was the body’s nutrition center.
In the liver, heavy, plodding, “cold” blood (alive only in the vegetative
sense of the word) was loaded with nutrients and sent out to every part
of the body to deliver its goods. By contrast, the heart was clearly the
body’s life center: in the throbbing furnace of the heart (you could feel
the hot exhaust fumes by breathing on the back of your hand!) some of
the blood deriving from the intestine was filled with fresh, clean air
from the lungs (hence the foam!), heated up, and especially, filled with
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sentient, hot, passionate life, for the arteries to transport to every part
of the body.50
3. Besides the blood carrying vital spirit and nutriment to all parts
of the body, to keep it alive and fed, the body had at its disposal blood
with a more specialized mission: reproduction. In women, some highly
refined blood was turned into a mass of fresh, non-sentient blood,
stored in the womb; it stayed fresh only while its vegetative life lasted—
one lunar cycle; left alone, it spoiled and had to be evacuated, to be
replaced by a new mass. In men, leftover blood was turned into semen,
which carried not just vegetative but properly sentient life—a quality
derived not just from the male’s inherent vitality but also from the sun,
plainly the origin of life and heat. Like the slow blood in the womb, it
did not keep well, so it had to be regularly evacuated; yet unlike the
woman’s blood mass (which was “cold,” given its affinity with the
moon), it was periodically discharged with a passion, often in dreams.51
4. Now to beget a child, it was thought, it was the male’s function
to actualize the woman’s inherent potential for motherhood, by enliven-
ing, ordinarily by repeated (and preferably energetic) coital
interventions, the refined but barely living blood passively waiting in
the woman’s womb to be spurred into growth and development as an
individual living being, and (in the case of human beings) a living
being yet to be ensouled, in due time, by God. That is to say, until the
mid-seventeenth century, Western medicine regarded the man as only
the catalyst of conception, and not as a contributor to the physical
make-up of the fetus.52
5. The question was, of course, What makes the sperm capable of
initiating the development of a human being? Thomas Aquinas, who
came by almost all his physiological knowledge through Aristotle’s writ-
ings, devotes two careful questions in the third part of the Summa
theologiae to this problem (qq. 118-19)—one he had treated many
times before. He states, reflecting on experiences as old as humankind,
that the male sperm is merely instrumental:
a saw or an ax does not actively possess the forma of a bed, but
only some kind of “move” in the direction of that forma. In
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the same way, the active power [that will bring about concep-
tion] does not need an actual bodily organ to be effective; instead,
this power resides in the [vital] spirit contained in the semen,
which is frothy, as is apparent from the fact that it is white;
this spirit partly consists of heat coming from celestial bodies,
by whose power inferior [cosmic] agents are brought to bear
upon the formation of specific living beings. And because in
such a [vital] “spirit” the power of [vital] soul combines with
heavenly power, it is said: “man is born from man and sun.”
Now elemental heat is related to vital power by way of instru-
mental causality . . .
. . . in the higher animals, which reproduce by intercourse,
the active power resides in the male’s semen, as the Philosopher
says . . . ; by contrast, the matter of the fetus is furnished by
the female. In this matter [=“embryonic mass”], there resides,
right from the beginning, a vegetative soul, not in full actual-
ity, of course, but inchoatively, just as a soul resides in those
who are asleep. But when it starts to attract nourishment, the
[vegetative] soul is actually at work. Thus the mass undergoes
a transmutation due to the power contained in the male’s
semen. . . . Now as soon as, by the power of the active princi-
ple resident in the semen, the sentient soul arises in the mass
(or [at least] in the chief part of it), then the sentient soul of
the offspring starts to be active, so as to fashion a finished
body of its own, by way of nutrition and growth. By contrast,
the active power that once was in the semen ceases to exist: the
semen dissolves and its [vital] spirit evaporates. And this is not
inappropriate, in that the [vital] power is not an independent
agent, but an instrumental one; and the work of an instru-
ment ceases once the effect is achieved.53
In other words, the only thing any father ever contributes to the
conception of the fetus is “vital spirit” suspended in a viscous fluid; this
spirit is needed to raise the merely vegetative blood in the mother’s
womb to the level of sentient life.54 Small wonder that whatever mate-
rials the husband, at the time of intercourse, has contributed to the
development of “his” child simply cease to exist. How could Aquinas
have made it more apparent that he was of the opinion, along with the
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entire pre-scientific Western world, that physically speaking we are the
children of our mothers?55
6. But this leaves something unsaid. Aquinas does not spell it out, but
it is implicit in his reasoning. If we receive our bodies exclusively from our
mothers, and if God is the creator of our spiritual souls, then we are truly
no different from the man Jesus as far as humanity is concerned. The
difference between Jesus and other human beings turns out to lie neither
in their bodies (they owe them to their mothers) nor in their souls (they
are immediately created by God).56 This very much diminishes the
“human distance” (so to speak) between Jesus and all other human beings,
at least to us moderns. We will have to come back to this.
7. What, then, is the vital role of the male in the lore of the
premodern world? Answer: any father is responsible for the legitima-
tion of his children; a father must “own up” to having initiated this
child, which must now be a manifest individual with its own identity.57
Fathers achieve this legitimation by publicly naming the child.58
8. With this, we are at last ready to interpret the only two sources
on which the Great Tradition relies for the doctrine of Jesus’ virginal
conception and birth: the infancy narratives in Matthew and Luke. By
now, the question to be answered has become: What would Matthew
and Luke have been able to mean in the infancy narratives, given the
commonly available understanding of the physiological processes lead-
ing to conception in their day?
V. The Virgin Birth: A Theological Interpretation
1. Like any other story in the New Testament, the narratives of
Jesus’ virginal conception are first and foremost matters of faith. If
these source narratives are to be understood at all, we are to understand
them by interpreting them as they desire and deserve to be understood.
This means we must interpret them theologically before insisting on
making sense of them as (would-be?) historians. In order to do so, we
must begin by firmly suspending our modern scientific pre-judgment,
whose chief element is that conception occurs only by the fusion of two
genetically co-equal half-cells.
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2. Matthew and Luke tell their virgin-birth stories not as miracle
stories but as what might be called “missionary theophanies.”59 This is
vital to our interpretation. The two angelic annunciations are met with
confusion and awe on the part of Joseph and Mary (cf. Mt 1, 20; Lk 1,
29-30); this is only proper at an encounter with the Living God by way
of one of his messengers. Still, in neither narrative do we find even the
slightest trace of amazement on the part of any third parties. That is to
say, from the point of view of audience or reader response, whether real
or presumed, we must say that the virginal conception regarded as a
physiological event hardly raises an eyebrow: Jesus is conceived by the
power of the Holy Spirit, period. A few decades later, Ignatius of
Antioch will agree, and write that Mary’s virginity is one of the
“resounding mysteries, such as were wrought in God’s silence.”60
3. The two annunciation stories are as different as the two
“genealogies” of Jesus associated with them (Mt. 1, 1-17; Lk 3, 23-
38).61 Matthew’s point of view is largely Jewish: Mary’s husband,
Joseph, is of the House of David, so Jesus is entitled to the (messianic)
title “Son of David.” Luke’s perspective is universalistic: by the time we
get to his genealogy we know already that Gabriel has conveyed to
Mary that Jesus “will be called holy, Son of God” (Lk 1, 35);62 no
wonder he is called “Son of Adam, Son of God” (Lk 3, 38): he will be
the fulfillment of the promises, even from the world’s origin forward.
4. Raymond Brown lists the details the two stories have in
common.
63
But, uncharacteristically, he does not point out that there is
one feature which these two otherwise very diverse stories literally—in
the sense of textually—have in common, viz. the semitism, “You shall
call his name Jesus” (καλέσεις τÎ Ðνοµα αÛτοØ zΙησοØν: Mt 1, 21 =
Lk 1, 31). That is, the Name Jesus comes from God.
Could this be the cue to the interpretation of both passages?
Matthew gives Mary’s legitimate husband, Joseph, the authority to
name the Child, but in a dream he is told by an angel to name him
Jesus. In the Lukan account of the annunciation to Mary, too, the
name Jesus comes from God (Lk 1, 31), and the actual naming is
narrated in the passive voice: “He was named (¦κλήθη) Jesus” (Lk 2,
21)—conceivably a subtle pointer to an act of obedience to divine
command.
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5. We are ready to offer our conclusion. The infancy narratives
employ the assumptions of ancient physiology as well of ancient legit-
imation practices. They propose that Jesus is truly the Son of God, who
gives him his name and in so doing identifies himself as the (sole) true
initiator of this child, who is the world’s Savior. Jesus is also truly a
member of (the Jewish and) the human race; this he is by virtue of his
human conception in Mary’s womb, without human initiative, by
sheer divine initiative, without passion (and in that sense, “without
seed”).64
VI. Some Typically Modern Difficulties
1. It is often argued that the infancy narratives cannot be inter-
preted “literally,” since such an interpretation would concede that Jesus
is not fully human. This approach to hermeneutics of any kind is
misleading, for two reasons:
a. Using the word “literally” is nonsensical if we do not make an
effort to find out what the “literal” meaning of the narratives may have
been in the culture that produced the texts.
b. When interpreted “literally” in this sense, the texts precisely
affirm Jesus’ full humanity, by squarely making him the child of his
mother, Mary.
2. Citing parallels of promised children in the Jewish Scriptures
(e.g., Isaac, Jacob, Samson) and in the New Testament (John the
Baptist), in order to argue that Jesus, too, “must have been” conceived
by sexual intercourse is intellectually dishonest. Such an interpretation
disregards the obvious and distinctive difference between the parallels
and the infancy narratives.
Still, there are contemporary Hellenistic parallels, which show that
virgin births were neither unheard-of nor wholly unthinkable in the
first century, as Raymond Brown (who lists a few of them) would seem
to imply.
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Thus we have Plutarch’s story of Romulus, who was said to
have been conceived as a result of Zeus’s relations with a Vestal Virgin.
There are the legends of Heracles: his mother Alcmene had refused to
consummate her marriage until her husband had helped avenge the
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murder of her brother, and how she had conceived Heracles from Zeus
while her husband was away fighting the wars. Finally, there is Pseudo-
Callisthenes’ account of the birth of Alexander the Great (who had
claimed descent from Heracles himself ) from his mother Olympias,
after she had relations with Zeus. It is, therefore, not foolish to imag-
ine that in the towns and cities of the Greco-Roman world narratives
about unique individuals having been born “virginally” may well have
enjoyed a prima facie plausibility, if only “in the streets.”
3. To argue, on the basis of modern anatomy and physiology, that
Joseph and Mary “must have had intercourse” to produce Jesus is intol-
erable; it flies in the face of the only sources we have; it amounts to
making assertions unsupported by verified data, and in the teeth of the
only data we do have.
Things are slightly different with the oft-heard opinion that Jesus
“must have been” illegitimate.66 For one thing, Matthew’s narrative
drops a broad hint in this direction when it relates how Joseph, being
a just man, decided not to take Mary to court on account of her preg-
nancy. The later Jewish charge that Jesus was illegitimate, therefore,
does more justice to the data that we have than the claim that Jesus was
simply the natural child of Joseph and Mary. This charge of illegitimacy
was aimed, of course, at challenging the Christians’ faith in Jesus
Christ’s uniqueness; but, as explained above, this overlooks the fact that
nothing created can defeat God and God’s purposes. Thus, theologi-
cally speaking, even a Jesus conceived out of wedlock (or worse, by
rape) could be the Son of God.67
4. It is better, therefore, and more honest, to say simply that the
Gospels provide us with no answer to our specific historical-physiolog-
ical questions about the origin of Jesus beyond the fact that Mary was
his mother. Still, this is precisely the point at which we must read the
texts properly hermeneutically (i.e., realistically as well as in an urbane,
well-educated manner), as follows.
Is it really true that the issue of Jesus’ physiological provenance is
an historical question? It would seem it is not, as John Meier’s phrase
“a truth probably not accessible even to Jesus’ contemporaries” would
appear to imply.68 In actual life, paternity questions are forensic, legal,
judicial questions, raised only if paternity is doubtful.69
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Thus, no historical biography of a celebrated person begins with
conception (let alone with parental intercourse). At the earliest, biogra-
phies start with family backgrounds and with conditions attending
their subjects’ births.70
5. Why, then, should anybody wish to insist on having “historical”
(here meaning “biological”) information about Jesus’ origins?
Answer: we live in a historicist, rationalist culture, which tends to
equate truth with factual truth and to associate figurative language with
non-reality. This is an honest problem, so it deserves articulate correc-
tives, e.g., pointing out that we use metaphors to deal with realities so
real that we cannot quite handle them.
Yet there is a second answer to the question, too: demanding
historical certainty about Jesus’ biological origin is a loaded move,
with a theological agenda that is typically unacknowledged, even
though it is part and parcel of the agenda that prompted the gospel
narratives in the first place. This hidden agenda often represents a
wholly justified concern about the genuineness of Jesus’ humanity.
Far more often, however, while purporting to be an unassuming
question, it is an effort to cast doubt on the truth of Jesus’ divine
sonship, and so, indirectly, on the credibility of the Christian faith
as such—an understandable move in its own right. But this kind of
inquiry is best met not with overstatements but with a non-arro-
gant, friendly smile, a quiet eye-to-eye, and a pregnant, reverent
silence.71
After all, being the setting of every kind of significant speech, it is
unsurprising that eloquent silence has a part to play, too, in Christian
Sprachregelung. Hence:
VII. Afterword: Rules of Speech for Ministry
1. Those of us who think of the virgin birth as a cosmological
miracle act wisely if they honestly say so; in matters of faith, nothing is
more unsettling than evasive language. However, they do well to add
that the Gospel passages have a deeper meaning: in his loving mercy,
God, and God alone, takes the initiative in having his Power and
Wisdom dwell among us as one of us. To use an idiom of the Greek
Church Fathers: in the person of Jesus, God’s Creative Word takes on
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not just one among us, but all of us—the entire “lump of dough”
(φύραµα)—to renew us all, together.72
2. It is wise to explain the parallel between the gospel accounts of
the virginal conception and the Baptism and Transfiguration narratives:
the Father identifies his Son by naming him, just as human fathers in
the not-too-distant past proudly went to city hall to register their chil-
dren by name, the very day they were born.
3. It may well be a good idea to explain the idiom “born of
woman” (Gal 4, 4; cf. Mt 11, 11 par. Lk 7, 28; Job 14, 1; 15, 14; 25, 4).73
4. Let me end by acknowledging that it has taken me over twenty-
five years of reflection to put all the bits and pieces (for that is what they
are) of this essay together. While the limits of my intellectual powers have
a lot to do with this, I do not think that the underlying attitude—an
intellectual appreciation of mystery rooted in faith and fed by contem-
plation—is easy to acquire. Accordingly, part of reading and
understanding this essay is, well, patience and habits of reverent, affective
reflection. The pieces may fall in place. Or, to borrow an idiom of Ian
Ramsey’s, “the penny may drop.”74 A “fuller meaning” may well emerge.
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tion is “by God.” This is the very point the pericopes of Jesus’ Baptism and
Transfiguration are making, each in their own way.
63. See above, n. 20.
64. See Leo the Great’s letter to the Empress Pulcheria: being consubstan-
tial with his Father, [the Lord] deigned to be consubstantial with his mother as
well (“[ut] consubstantialis Patri, consubstantialis esse dignaretur et matri”:
Litt. 31, PL 54, 792B).
65. See BM, 522-24.
66. See BM, 534-42; BM2, 705-08.
67. See supra, II, 6.
68. MJ, 229; see n. 11 supra.
69. In fact, this is also implied in Matthew’s account: Joseph does not wish to
expose Mary to the rigors of the Law. Conceptions are historical facts only in the
sense that men and women of historic significance must have been conceived.
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70. At the earliest, they will start with the mother’s premonitions during
pregnancy, but here we are passing from history to legend or hagiography. One
instance among many is the life of the pious eleventh-century crusader
Godfrey of Bouillon.
71. Incidentally, this is not a piece of “pastoral advice.” In two antiphons
of great antiquity (second quarter of the fifth century), O admirabile commer-
cium and Quando natus es, sung for centuries in the Latin West on the eve of
the Feast of the Mother of God (January 1), the phrases sine semine (“without
seed”) and ineffabiliter (“beyond words”) occur as parallels, suggesting dynamic
equivalence and hence, a reverent silence.
72. On the notion of humanity as the “lump” (Gk. φύραµα, Lat. massa)
assumed in its entirety by the Word, see God Encountered, vol. II/3
(Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1995), §115, 8, [h]. See also St.
Andrew of Crete’s sermon on Palm Sunday: [Christ is on his way to heaven]
“by way of the first batch of our lump of dough (PG 97, col. 993A). In 1 Cor
5, 7, φύραµα refers to the whole community.
73. See n. 52. Very much depending on situations, it might even be wise
to explain a less proper, exclusively male analogue to “one born of woman”:
“one passing water at the wall” (Heb. 9*8" 0*;:/: cf. 1 Kings 14, 10; 21, 21;
2 Kings 9, 8).
74. Ian T. Ramsey, Religious Language: An Empirical Placing of Theological
Phrases (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 25-26, 39.
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Theologia: On Not “Dropping
Out of the Trinity”
In memory of Cardinal Joseph Bernardin,
and in support of his Common-Ground Initiative
This essay is divided into seven parts. Its subject-matter is the natureof theology. It will also suggest, chiefly indirectly, that the faithful,
the clergy, and the bishops of the Catholic Church in North America
today, together with the faithful and the leadership of all Christian
churches, could do worse than letting themselves be taught and indeed
enlightened by the confused and confusing sixty-year period between
the Councils of Nicaea (325 A.D.) and Constantinople (381 A.D.). In
those decades, ruling families everywhere were learning, conservatively
of course, how to live with an increasingly Christian (yet equally impe-
rial) politico-religious establishment. Thus, the underlying proposal of
this essay is to show that the chief merit of the Cappadocian Fathers is
to have shown, on grounds both reasonable and scriptural, that the
deity can be the True and Living God only if it is triune. Let us start
with a quick historical sketch.
Christian Churches in an Age of Confusion
In the aftermath of Jesus’ ministry, execution and Resurrection, the
New Testament writings show that Christian communities in various
places around the Mediterranean began to move in the direction of an
appreciation of what was ultimately implied in membership in the
Christian Church—cosmically, anthropologically, and especially theo-
logically. One of the bolder signs of this occurs in a late arrival to the
New Testament canon known as Peter’s second letter: Christians “share
in the divine nature.”1 John’s Gospel puts this as boldly whenever it
suggests that knowing the Son is knowing the Father—an understanding
not unknown in the Synoptics nor even in Paul, who reminded
Christians that they were members of Christ’s body. In this, the Church
was showing its understanding of its own life, and interpreting it as a
life of actual participation in the life of the Triune God, Father, Son (or
Logos), and Holy Spirit. It also began to term this life theologia, mean-
ing “thinking, acting, and indeed existing in light of the One God
Living and True.” This implies that theologia is holistic. While a matter
of articulate learning, it means an integrated life whose integral
elements (“moments”) are worship, conduct, and teaching.2
Quite importantly for present purposes, Yves Congar’s comprehen-
sive article Théologie, intended for publication in the Dictionnaire de
Théologie Catholique, became available in an English translation under
the title A History of Theology.3 Unsurprisingly, theologia is a pre-
Christian Greek word, and the translation includes a brief account of
the pre-Christian usage of theologia. But this observation leads to
another, far more significant one. The history of the word “theology” is
part of the substance of Catholic theology. For this reason, it makes
little sense to give any account of the development, say, of christologi-
cal doctrine in the wake of the Councils of Nicaea and Constantinople,
without first walking down an important side street. In other words, if
we professional theologians guided by the Great Tradition are to under-
stand what we are doing in the catholic Church today, we may have to
hold back and listen to fresh old, proven teachers first.
To make our restraint more fruitful, we must also quickly visit vari-
ous topics: tradition and interpretation, and the representative capacity
of single words4—one of the many issues implied in Newman’s obser-
vation that Christian Revelation must not be reduced to truths that are
entirely manifest and thus, completely manageable.5
Fifteen centuries before Newman, a young bishop named Gregory,
known as “Nazianzen” after his birthplace Karbala near Nazianzus in
Cappadocia (329-89 A.D.), was invited to Constantinople to preach, with
a pulpit of his own. He was a poetic, introspective, monkish man who
had studied philosophy in Athens, along with his friend Basil—a man as
monkish but quite ambitious and forceful as well, who after a falling-out
with Gregory after seven years of study left Athens in pursuit of the
monastic life.6 By 361 A.D., Gregory had found himself reluctantly
ordained a priest by his father, a man of local influence, who had
converted from a unitarian sect to the Catholic Church at the insistence
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of his wife Nonna in the year of Nicaea (325 A.D.), only to be ordained
bishop of Nazianzus three or four years later. After eleven years at home
in Nazianzus trying to make peace between the local monks and his
father, the local bishop, and on the road for a number of other concil-
iatory errands, Gregory found himself appointed bishop of Sasima and
ordained by his difficult friend Basil in 372 A.D., but settled in
Nazianzus as his elderly father’s auxiliary; but his thirst for the life of
prayer and study drew him back into seclusion, in faraway Seleucia this
time, where he sojourned at St. Thecla’s convent for a full three years
(375-78 A.D.). Finally, in 379 A.D., he was invited to Constantinople as
the “missionary bishop” for the small Nicene community in “the City.”7
Gregory had found himself involuntarily involved in every controversy
of the day and thus propelled into public life. Small wonder he was
elected bishop of Constantinople late in the year before the first
Council of that name (381 A.D.), at which he presided for three
months, only to find himself pressured into retirement once again after
six months in office, and taking shelter on his estate, near his home
town. A gentle soul not made for politics or big-city life, he availed
himself of his position to think and teach long enough to give the defi-
nition of “theology” a lot of thought, as his early nickname “the
Theologian” demonstrates. He became what Newman was to be in his
day: a private, hypersensitive, philosophic, literate Christian man very
much in touch with the religious confusions of his age. What were
they?
By the second half of the fourth century, the Christian Churches
had become, so to speak, the victims of their own success. Politically,
they had a future; under imperial warrant, the network of local
churches pretty much retained the structures of the old empire. Bishops
were generally influential politically, even if the emperors’ favor could
be counted on to remain fickle; theologically, their Logos-doctrine, both
high-minded and neighborly, promised height and breadth of vision.
The proclamation of the one universe created by God Omnipotent
through Christ, God’s consubstantial Word Incarnate, and forever to
be unified in Him, the Crucified and Risen One, was not just a
message for martyrs to die for, but also a summons for thoughtful men
and women to live for. The regula fidei was unifying them in a flexible
way. So did a thankful appreciation of the cultural fruits already gath-
ered in the pre-Christian past, supported by the efforts of the civilized
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(invariably, “us here”) to draw even the insufferably heterogeneous
savages “out there” into a common horizon by dint of imperial protec-
tion, letters, travel, and hospitality. Transcultural consensus was as yet
unthinkable, let alone advocacy of “multiculturalism,” but the Greek
poets and thinkers were widely accepted—also on biblical grounds—as
an authoritative beginning. No wonder Christians respected them, as
Paul had done in his letters, especially in ethical matters.
Still, it took well over a half-century for three talented bishops
finally to accomplish the task that Athanasius of Alexandria had left
undone in the aftermath of Nicaea, except by suffering exile for its sake:
forging an intellectually coherent account of the Christian faith as the
accepted spiritual platform of the empire.8 Right in the teeth of the
sophisticated doubletalk in the Greco-Roman academies (instanced by
the multifarious disquisitions of Eunomius, the elusive bishop of
Cyzicus, and his various followers), Gregory Nazianzen, Gregory of
Nyssa, and Basil (known as “the Great”) kept thinking and teaching. To
them, class and good taste came naturally. Their cultural aim
was wide-ranging peace and unity commending themselves by good taste.
They intimated that if we want to believe as Christians, we must cultivate
intellectual integrity. If we are to live and die as reasonable, considerate
living beings, “deriving our nobility from above,”9 we must allow ourselves
to be directed by the truth, not by deft quotation or opinion.
Why rehearse this today? Does it apply to us, and if so, how? It
would appear it does.
In North America, the United States was the first country ever to
adopt as its civil religion a modern, rational unitarian Deism of
Scottish extraction. Without nominating René Descartes, John Locke,
and David Hume for sainthood, we can say that faith in the existence
of an omniscient and benevolent Creator-God has emancipated, thank
heavens, the state-and-church-controlled social and individual
conscience by dint of fairness and free speech. This Deism (and the
equal dignity of each human individual which it implies) has by no
means conquered the world, though it has been challenging existing
religions everywhere. It is still helping us to today’s blessed (if slow)
growth in tolerance, and to the principles of human rights. Besides, the
mechanization of the world picture implicit in modern, rationality-
governed science and technology has been delivering to humanity
countless life-enhancing benefits, despite the continuing global injustices.
ON NOT “DROPPING OUT OF THE TRINITY”  /  115
More locally, even Catholics are now undeniably citizens of the United
States. They became loyal citizens by serving in World War II and the
Korean war; in the wake of the former, the G.I. Bill of Rights helped
them ahead in their emancipation into the mainstream by at least a
generation.10 Especially since the pontificate of Blessed Pope John
XXIII  and John F. Kennedy’s election to the Presidency they have been
significant participants in the American way and indeed, contributors
to it—a development that is apt (but by no means certain) to continue,
given the recent influx of the mostly Catholic Latin Americans.11
But there is a limit to all good things—even the most rational. In
fact, the rational approach to things and people produces moral and
spiritual confusions all its own. The Austrian genius Ludwig
Wittgenstein is a good case in point. He found himself forced to the
conclusion that whenever rational logic is pushed to the limit it will
lead to either meaningless action or a sense of mystery as irresistible as
it is disarming. Beyond rationality, he showed, lies revelatory silence.
But this is never assured; true reason and logic of the far-sighted sort
are not always welcome in a busy society relying on clever artifice and
on opinionate debate about truths that “work” and favor “progress.”
In this context, it is part of the Catholic theologian’s task to observe
that a similar wave of busy, opinionate rationality occurred before, even
if the world was pre-technological and the scale considerably smaller. In
fact, it just might be the task of the Catholic theological tradition to
make it memorable. For it was Gregory Nazianzen who saw that in times
of politico-religious equivocation and trendy twaddle, any understanding
of God must be rooted in silence. He made the point in the first of his five
Theological Discourses—delivered in the late summer of 380 A.D. and one
of the classic (i.e., Catholic) accounts of the Christian faith.
Yet before hearing Gregory, we, people of the twenty-first century,
must take ourselves through a few (admittedly impressionistic) sets of
learned preliminaries. They concern issues in cultural history.
So the next question is, What is theology today?
“Theologia”
Cross’s Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church gives a
dispassionate, accurate Catholic description and definition of
“theology”:
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Theology (Gk. θεολογία). In its Christian sense it is the
science of the Divinely revealed religious truths. Its theme is
the Being and Nature of God and His creatures and the whole
complex of the Divine dispensation from the Fall of Adam to
the Redemption through Christ and its mediation to men by
His Church, including the so-called natural truths of God, the
soul, the moral law, &c., which are accessible to mere reason.
Its purpose is the investigation of the contents of belief by
means of reason enlightened by faith (fides quaerens intellec-
tum) and the promotion of its deeper understanding. In the
course of time theology has developed into several branches,
among them dogmatic, historical, and practical theology. The
methods of classification of the sub-disciplines, however, fluc-
tuate in different theological systems.
Plainly, Cross’s text is accurate. It opens with a nominal definition
of theology, also known to Aquinas.12 It goes on to explain it as “the
science of the Divinely revealed religious truths God” and detail it by
recourse to the classical Christian topics; Aquinas might have called it
sacra doctrina but explained it in the same way. Appropriately, the entry
goes on to recognize Anselm’s classical definition of the underlying
dynamic and purpose of theology: “faith seeking understanding.” It
ends up by explaining that Christian theology has developed over time.
It plainly has. Yet at this point there is a snake hiding in Cross’s well-
trimmed grass. Theology has changed indeed, but not just by virtue of
development “into several branches, among them dogmatic, histori-
cal, and practical theology.” In the past four centuries what has
profoundly changed is the standing of theology as a discipline.
Aquinas’s functional definitions and descriptions of theology in the
opening quæstio of the Summa theologiae would not meet with general
assent today.
That quæstio includes treatments of theology’s necessity, scholarli-
ness, unity, practicality, excellence, sapientiality, its relationship to God
as “object,” and its reliance on argument, imagery, and Scripture.13
Clearly, Aquinas approves of what he describes. Cross’s description,
careful as it is, avoids even the semblance of approval or partiality in
regard to the value of Christian theology and its practice. But most of
all it stays away from the issue of the epistemological status of theology:
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(i) how true are theological statements, and even more, (ii) just how can
they be true, and in what context?
Here if anywhere, Cross’s “objectivity” betrays the influence of
modernity’s scholarly—i.e., impartial—approach to the truth-claims
implied in any theology. Put more pointedly, Cross is reticent on the
relationship between theology and any form of faith-commitment.
Ecumenically sound as it may look, it fails to ask today’s overwhelming
religious question, never mind answering it.
To tackle this point, let us go back to Aquinas. He is an epistemo-
logical realist; he thinks he “knows what he knows.” Yet this does not
make him “mediaeval” in the sense of “naive” by a long shot.14 Why
not? Answer: Aquinas shows evidence of being aware of what he is doing
when he finds himself knowing something. In other words, his treatment
of the nature of theology in the Summa shows that he has given himself
an epistemological account not only of the nature and function of
theology, but also of its limits. This enables him to write:
When we believe something and formulate our belief, the target
(terminus) we have in mind is not what we say but the reality we
are addressing. For in formulating propositions, we aim at real-
ity [Lat. rem], and this applies in both science and faith.15
Precisely here lies Aquinas’s realism: the point of what we say or write
lies not so much in what we say as in what we mean. After all, the real-
ity-out-there (which, so he implies, has induced us in the first place to
think whatever it is we think and whatever it is we are saying about it)
is the proper target of our effort to understand. Put differently, the
intentionality on our part and the intelligible object’s being-there-for-us-
to-know-it jointly account for our mutual actuation, even if our
understanding (which is not necessarily wholly mutual) remains less
than wholly comprehensive.16 Is this a prejudice? Well, Yes and No. It
does show, of course, that Aquinas is a man of the Middle Ages, and
this means that he deems both faith and theology to lie inside the one
realm of true knowledge—an assumption not widely held today, and
for good reason.
What has just been explained implies that for us human beings
times and places are characterized by shifts and changes in culture,
including next-to-normative horizons of human understanding and
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next-to-normative methods to give shape to that understanding. For
example, in the century after Aquinas (when Europe’s dominant
vernaculars were only just beginning to emerge as “polite” languages)
the philosophical question de significatione verborum became a control-
ling issue: What do words mean, and how do they do it?
But here it must be recalled that this question was first discussed
orally, in the schools, i.e., only in Latin. In due course, though, it got
increasingly applied, again, to written Latin texts. No wonder nominal-
ism became the normative climate of the life of learning, propped up
by church and university Latin, often with scant reference to meaning-
in-context, including faith-contexts.17
Thus, the almost purely notional type of learned theology exem-
plified by, e.g., Luther’s teacher Gabriel Biel (c. 1420-95) well
illustrates the gap between late-mediaeval theology and Christian faith-
cum-life. So do Erasmus’s (1469-1536) irritated dismissal of
scholasticism and his insistence on the Greek and Hebrew originals of
the Bible. So do Luther’s (1483-1546) attacks on scholasticism and his
determination in regard to both Bible translations in the vernacular and
his sola scriptura. Both are different-looking but equally tart fruits from
the quaint old tree of Latin learning in need of existential renewal.
But the issue did not stop there. In the early sixteenth century, the
printing press helped cause a veritable quantum leap in the normative
intellectual climate, as the late Walter Ong has explained so well. At
this point in our argument it suffices to repeat that the sixteenth
century experienced the beginnings of print literacy. It helped create the
impression that truth was real only if it was perpetual, stable, objective,
and a potential object of acquisition; at the same time, knowledge
looked real only if it meant the possession of at least some formulable
truths. Besides, the unspoken assumption became that truths are best
guaranteed when precisely formulated. Memory, understood as a bank
full of distinct memorable assets, replaced the mind viewed as the
distinctively human ability to understand what is both true and real.
In the park of theology this climate created what the French have
called la théologie savante. It favored debate (and, usually, acrid mutual
polemics) among the (mostly clerical) theologians. New forms of popular
faith, often full of spiritual affect but not in every case inspired by the
Great Tradition, came to be associated with pious religious associations
encouraged or at least tolerated by ecclesiastical and political authorities;
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by contrast, in the mostly militant seminaries, universities, or courts,
theology was often practiced as a function of politics. This became espe-
cially the case in the seventeenth century, as the Roman Church
increasingly defined itself and especially its unity by appeals to the
Papacy as a monarchy as real as the “great monarchies,” and as the
manifold offspring of the original Reformation were fanning out across
a broad political and theological spectrum.18 By the century’s mid
point, an exhausted Western and Central Europe, sick of religious
warfare—yet often riled by calls for holy war, especially on paper—
settled for an uneasy armistice, in which literalist dogmatic theologians,
ranging from hedgerow preachers to professors of high repute,
remained vociferous, quoting proof-texts, slogans, and extracts from
printed “sources.” No wonder George Fox and his Quakers got tired,
left, and quietly put their trust in God’s Spirit alone;19 and the amiable,
conciliatory Puritan Richard Baxter (1615-91) stood alone—a tragic
symbol of the failure of good intentions.20
Thus, tragically, religious diligence in the framing and reading of
texts as sources of authoritative unity in faith led to an accelerating
theological languor. The seventeenth century became the epoch of a
vastly overrated “freedom of theological opinion,” as distinct from the
profession of faith. In the Protestant world, this bad habit became only
worse as synodal agreements of great authority were revised to stem the
tide of insufficiently acceptable tenets; as a result, synods themselves
became increasingly divisive. By contrast, in the Catholic world, theol-
ogy decayed into systems of doctrines taught by sixteenth-century
commentators and upheld by the various recognized “schools” of theo-
logical learning—Augustinian, Franciscan, Dominican, even Jesuit—all
of them theoretically (and even practically) subject to Roman arbitra-
tion, but rarely taking the spiritual measure of their faith.
Unsurprisingly, these opinionate and specious theological debates
increasingly favored a Deism both practical and obstinate, which in
turn encouraged theological rationalism and “useful knowledge.”
Theology fed by living Catholic Faith and living Tradition receded—
nightmares of past warfare. But another nightmare, Pascal’s, refused to
go away; in retrospect, his prospect of the esprit de finesse getting lost in
quantity of knowledge had become prophetic, even in theology. No
wonder Yves Congar came to treat the seventeenth century as the effec-
tive low point in the history of Catholic theology.21
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Contemporary Nominalism: Technical Terminology
All this shows that nominalism and scrutiny of the meaning of
precise words has never entirely become a thing of the past. In fact, the
opposite is true. For, over the centuries, the modern culture of learning
has availed itself increasingly of such dominant vernaculars as have
become usable, first regionally and now internationally. No longer is
the international language of learning dependent on Latin (except for
the dying cohort of those who dream of Latin as a living language).
Instead, learning has come to rely on the artificial language of termi-
nology—i.e., on cold, systemically interrelated, technical terms. But
taken by itself, technical terminology creates only the presumption of
thought; it does not guarantee it. Having been designed and under-
stood only by experts capable of analyzing and diagnosing problems,
terminology cannot be counted on to equip experts with the judgment,
discernment, and especially the wisdom needed to bridge the widening
gap between, on the one hand, technological learning and technical
skills, and on the other hand, the requirements of humane, considerate
interpersonal living.22
Let us sum up. What late-mediaeval nominalism and modern
scientism have largely overlooked is that language is a matter of distinc-
tively human communicatory behavior before it ever becomes a
relatively free-standing instrument of thought.23 True, what lies at the
basis of thought is a fascinating phenomenon. It is called the “represen-
tative capacity of words”—i.e., their ability to “mean the same”
regardless of immediate communicatory situations. Words of all
kinds—let us say, “exceedingly,” “appear,” “broken,” “bulk,” “soft,”
“and,” “despite,” “no”—can be actually used in a multitude of possible
contexts, but we also “know” somehow what they “mean” in and of
themselves, regardless of any actual contexts. This captivating property
of words-out-of-context tempts us to treat single words as if they some-
how were stable objects.24 In fully human contexts, though, they never are.
Now it is not difficult to imagine how the arts of writing (which
came first) and reading (with which all of us now start) have amplified
our sense of the representative capacity of words. Over the past half-
century, the public (as well as far too many teachers at every level) have
accepted dictionary definitions and entries in thesauruses as authorita-
tive words, as if we could reliably use dictionaries without knowing the
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language. If languages could be learned from vocabulary alone we
would be able to be literate with encyclopedias alone. But what with
the modern emphasis on “info” rather than thought, modern people
will feel inadequate whenever they have to understand (never mind
translate) what they read, or write down what they think. Thoughtless
literacy is with us. And from a fully human perspective, thoughtless
literacy is increasingly apt to cease being the gate to the palace of truth,
and to become the discount store of quick opinion and not-so-hidden
persuasion, concretized by that garrulous but amiable morning visitor
requiring almost no attention, the newspaper. Nowadays his only
competitors are the various “today” TV shows, but the competition is
hardly serious. What do words mean any more, printed or not, moving
or still, loud or silent? Are we to conclude that mindless, moody powers
have become our rule of thumb?
Yet it would be historically shortsighted to stop here and despond.
For in fact, the opposite of thoughtless literacy is with us, too. In the
nineteen-fifties, in which the neopositivists were declaring religious
language to be devoid of any identifiable reference, a sharp little
volume appeared, written by a mixed circle of believers and unbeliev-
ers. We were also reminded that there are such things as religious
situations—all too long overlooked since the fourteenth century; this
in turn reminds us that language is at bottom a matter of behavior
(“performance”) not concepts; soon after, it was shown that no speaker
can stay entirely outside of what she or he says. Even theoretical physi-
cists have been pointing out that the apparent victory of objectivity had
been turned into defeat: Descartes’ atoms, Leibniz's monads, and
Newton’s unbreakable natural laws have become a thing of the past.25
A Secular Prophet and Precursor: Ludwig Wittgenstein
Yet even more interestingly, at least theologically speaking, the
most radical modern contributor to logic as the sole reliable way of
thinking is also the discoverer of its defeat. His name was Ludwig
Wittgenstein (1889-1951), an infrequent associate of an erudite group
that made a point of living intelligently by logic alone: the Vienna
Circle.26 The son of a family recognized for wealth and talent, he set out
to be an engineer; turned into a logician, he soon found himself irre-
sistibly waylaid by his own thinking, exploring the limits of logic in his
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Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,27 and facing the same rating of academic
philosophy as Horatio got to hear from his friend Hamlet:
There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.28
In his preface to the first English edition of the Tractatus (1922),
Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), a friend of Wittgenstein’s and the star of
logical positivism, sums up his attempt in one brisk paragraph:
The essential business of language is to assert or deny facts.29
Given the syntax of a language, the meaning of a sentence is
determined as soon as the meaning of the component words
is known. In order that a certain sentence should assert a
certain fact there must, however the language may be
constructed, be something in common between the sentence
and the fact. This is perhaps the most fundamental thesis of
Mr Wittgenstein’s theory. That which is to be in common
between the sentence and the fact, so he contends, cannot be
itself in turn said in language. It can, in his phraseology, only
be shown, not said, for whatever we may say will still need to
have the same structure.30
In his own preface, Wittgenstein gives his own, rather more collo-
quial-sounding summary, the latter half of which will return with a
vengeance, at the very end of the book (as we will see in a moment):
The whole point of the book might be summarized as follows:
Anything that allows itself to be said at all can be said clearly,
and whatever one cannot speak of one has to be silent about.31
Put differently, verbal statements of fact, whether spoken or written,
cannot be verified by means of other verbal statements, whether spoken
or written.32 That is why in both speaking and writing (but especially
in the latter) Wittgenstein would stress the importance of “hitting the
nail on the head,”33 lest the inaccuracy of anything that has been said
or written should prompt the need for further explanation in words;
and don’t we know from experience that the latter is apt to be an exercise
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in futility, and one sure way to lead to yet another lis de voce—a wrangle
about the meaning of a word?
So even mere “statements of fact” depend on human acts of
“zeigen”; that is, their actual meaning is a practical matter.34 “Points” are
“made,” manifested, shown, pointed out. Thus, the language of alleged
objectivity remains dependent on the kind of human—i.e., intersub-
jective—behavior that cannot be adequately captured by statements in
language.35 No wonder that Wittgenstein was a stickler for words, who
could write, in a letter to a friend:36
Just one thing. If it you are going to write something, be ready
to have it put you to a lot of trouble. Then there will be some-
thing to it for sure. And otherwise nothing, for sure.37
At first blush, this is no more than a teacher’s warning to students
learning how to write compositions. Yet Wittgenstein, that genius in
logic, means more. He has found—precisely because he is so meticu-
lous a logician—that no mere words will ever unmistakably state a
matter of fact, and that words about words will make things not clearer
but murkier. In other words, the very logician in him has become aware
that what can be stated in words is necessarily deficient in relation to
the unstatable that meets us everywhere. By dint of hunting for butter-
flies he has discovered that at the end of the day what he will be able to
pin down for his collection is not the world of butterflies, but just a few
samples, “wriggling on the wall” for a moment or two, then dead.38
There is more to what we have to say than what we can say. So, in writ-
ing anything at all, count on it to be laborious, for there is always more
to anything put in words. So, true to form, Wittgenstein can conclude
his Tractatus with the single, marvelously ambiguous sentence, oft-
quoted but just as often only half-understood: “What one cannot speak
of one can only be silent about.”39 Almost denotatively, he had written
earlier on in the Tractatus: “Actually, there exists such a thing as the
inexpressible. This reveals itself, it is the mystical.”40
Wittgenstein was an acculturated Austrian Jew—that is to say, his
sensibility was shaped by the cultural Catholicism of his native coun-
try. A Catholic from birth, he remained one all his life, though he never
became a “practicing” one. But he understood the believer’s mind-set,
and in articulating it, he could “hit the nail on the head”:
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If the person who believes in God looks around & asks
“Where does everything I see come from?” “Where does all
this come from?”, he is expecting no (causal) explanation; and
the funny part of his question is that it is the very expression
of this expectation. He is expressing, then, a posture toward
any and all explanations.—But in what way is this expressed
in his life?
It is the posture that will take a particular matter seriously,
but then at a particular point in time not take it seriously after
all, & declare that something else is still more serious.
For instance, someone can say it is grievous that So & So
died before he could finish a particular piece of work; & taken
in another sense, there is no matter at all. This is a case of
using the [same] words “in a deeper sense.”
What I would actually like to say is this: here too what is
decisive is not the words we use or what we think while saying
them, but the difference they make at different points in life.
How can I tell that two people mean the same when each says
he believes in God? And just the same thing holds for the 3
persons. Theology that insists on certain particular words &
phrases & prohibits others makes nothing clearer (Karl Barth).
It [i.e., theology] gesticulates by means of words, as it were,
because it wants to say something & does not know how to
express it. Its words make points by virtue of practice.41
In other words, to borrow a term from Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s
Phenomenology of Perception, doctrine is fundamentally gestural.
With this, we are ready at last to hear Gregory Nazianzen. He
knows that the connection between teaching and faith depends on the
manner in which the former is practiced.
Gregory Nazianzen on θεολογία
On the context in which Gregory wrote we can be brief. He is
writing in opposition to fellow bishops, Eunomius (c. 330-94 A.D.) and
his followers, most of them half-coherent Neo-Arians, yet conscious of
their importance. Yet in the last resort Gregory is worried not about his
fellow-Christians he so firmly disagrees with, but about the idolaters
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still practicing their superstitious polytheistic busyness, and the polite,
educated unbelievers—Platonists and Stoics alike. Why? To polytheists
and (what we might call) “non-theists” alike, Christians fighting theo-
logical battles among each other are an amusing as well as perplexing
spectacle. It is also a convenient one: it permits both ignorant idolators
and mature, thinking human beings to hold themselves excused from
proper inquiry—content to stay this side of the knowledge and love of
the Living God.42 For Catholics fighting prove by the very thing they
do that they are not talking of God. So Gregory says:
Gentlemen out there: Not just anybody—I repeat, not just
anybody—is able to philosophize about God. Plainly, it is not
something that comes cheap; it is not for those who hold on
to what is down below. And, let me add, it is not something
for just any moment, for just any people, and about just any
theme, but rather, it is for certain moments, for certain people,
and about certain definite themes. For what is most worthy of
consideration is not just anybody’s taste, but only of those
practiced and advanced in spirituality [theoria: “contempla-
tion”]— that is, those who have got (or have been getting)
themselves purified in both soul and body. The reason for this
is the fact that for the impure to touch Purity Itself is neither
a matter of course nor even a prudent thing to do—think of
ailing eyes being exposed to direct sunlight.
So which moments? [Answer:] When we take time away from
the impurity and confusion outside us, and when our higher
faculties are not submerged in wretched and misleading
images—think of elegant handwriting mixed up with ugly
scrawls, or of the fragrance of perfume mixed up with the
smell of the sewer. For we must really slow down and get to
know God, and when we get the right moment, come to a just
decision (cf. Ps 75, 3) regarding what is involved in the simple,
forthright knowledge of God [theologia].
So for whom? [Answer:] For those who take the matter seri-
ously, and not as one thing among many, and as a matter for
small talk, say, after the horse races, the shows in the theater,
the song festivals, the full bellies, and after what happens
further down, below the belly. Think, too, of people who revel
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[in theology] as a matter of banter or as a chance to show their
valor in argument.
So what to philosophize about and to what extent? [Answer:]
About what we succeed in comprehending, and to the extent
the listeners’ attitude and ability will allow them to compre-
hend. Careful now! Heavy noise or heavy foods have a way of
harming the hearing or the body, or if you will, heavy burdens
will bring down those who carry them, or heavy rains will ruin
the land. In the same way there are those who will be brought
down and overburdened by certain kinds of discourse that is
hard to digest, so to speak; indeed, they might discover that
such ability as they once had has been disabled.
Now I am not at all saying that we need not be mindful of
God all the time—I do not care to be badgered again by the
gentlemen who simply make a point of being facile and ready
to talk! For obviously, we do have to be mindful of God more
often than we need to draw a breath; and, in a sense, we have
nothing else to do except just that! I am one of those who
approve of the saying that recommends that we “meditate [on
God] day and night” (Ps 1, 2), that we “dwell [on God] at
nightfall, early in the morning, and at noon” (Ps 55, 17), and
that we are to “bless the Lord at all times” (Ps 34, 1). We can
also quote Moses where he says “when you lie down, when
you get up, when you are on your way” (cf. Deut 6, 7).
Mindfulness [of God] is exactly what stamps us on our way
to purity. So I am not condemning unremitting mindful-
ness, but [unremitting] talk about God; nor am I criticizing
talk about God as something irreverent, but its being done
out of season; nor [am I criticizing] teaching [about God],
but lack of appropriate restraint [in it]. A glut of honey to
the point of surfeit will cause vomiting (cf. Prov 25, 27)
even though it is genuine honey; and according to
Solomon—and to me as well—there is a time for everything
(cf. Eccles 3, 1). Also, something good is not good whenever
it is done at the wrong time, and flowers are completely out
of season in winter, and what suits men does not suit
women and the other way round. Also, a death no more
calls for mathematics than a drinking party calls for tears.
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And really, are we likely to pass up a good time only when
the perfect opportunity offers itself?
Of course not, my friends and brothers—note I am still call-
ing you brothers, even though you do not act as brothers.
Please let us not think this way of each other, and let us not,
like hot and hard-to-handle horses that have thrown off their
riders (which is Reason) and have spit out the bridle that
rightly restrains them, rush on and on, only to run past the
winning-pole by a long distance. No, let our philosophizing
keep within our limits. Let us not get carried away to Egypt,
nor let us get dragged off to Assyria, nor let us sing “the Lord’s
song in a foreign land” (Ps 136, 4)—I mean, making it heard
regardless, to audiences both foreign and our own, hostile and
congenial, reflective and inconsiderate. [I am thinking of
audiences] watching very carefully what is going on among us,
and keen on seeing the spark of our iniquities burst into flame;
in fact, they light it, they rekindle it, and raise it up to high
heaven by their furtive blowing, and prompt the ever-mount-
ing fire of Babylon to consume everything around (cf. Dan 3,
25 lxx). For since they are short of vigor in their own teach-
ings, they attempt to acquire it by using our weaknesses as a
foil, and for that reason, like flies on open wounds, they take
advantage of what we have to call either our misfortunes or
our sins.
But from now on, the least we can do is to stop doing an
injustice to ourselves, and forsake our decorum in regard to
these matters. At the same time, if it should be impossible to
put an end to hostility, let us in any case agree with each other
to be loud and clear in treating things mystical in a mystical
manner, and holy things in a holy manner, and to stop throw-
ing around, for all to hear, the things that are better not
bandied about. And let us not create the impression that those
who worship spirits and observe loathsome myths and prac-
tices are more honorable than ourselves—I mean the folks
who had rather shed their blood than share secret lore with
non-initiates. Instead, let us remember that just as there is
such a thing as decorum in matters of dress, food, life style,
laughing, and walking, there is in matters of speaking and
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keeping silent as well. After all, we pay special reverence to the
Word along with God’s other titles and powers; our taste for
contentiousness should stay within limits, too.43
If any conclusion can be drawn out of R.P.C. Hanson’s treatment
of Eunomius and Eunomianism, it is that their literary remains are
both clever and “fluid and almost chatty.” In fact, Hanson’s summary
is worth quoting in full:
Finally we must classify Eunomius as an individualist, philo-
sophically eclectic theologian, as many theologians of his day
were philosophically eclectic. He was indeed enough of a child
of his day to be soaked in Neo-Platonic thought. But his spirit
and many of his doctrines were far from Neo-Platonic. He
used Aristotelian logic to deploy his peculiar brand of rational-
ist Unitarianism. He took some of the ideas of what might be
called mainstream Arianism and developed them in an eccen-
tric and untypical direction. He is interesting for his own sake,
but not because he was representative of the thought of the
church of his day. It was no doubt the apparently strict logic
of his arguments and the high-minded consistency of his
conduct which attracted those who accepted his doctrine.44
Still, where Hanson sees “doctrine,” “rationalist Unitarianism” and
“eclecticism,” could “persuasive resourcefulness in answering each and
every question” be a more practical diagnosis of the theological prob-
lem posed by Eunomius? After all, he is apt to quote from the
Scriptures as dexterously as from Plato. He is irresistibly eclectic and
versatile. He has a patch for every scratch, a text to fit any tune.
Coherence, who needs it? Who can argue with a good, engaging bishop
who is perhaps only a bit trendier (or loyal) than Thou? Why not let
him talk as he can so he can half-agree with all and keep the Christian
show on the road?
In this predicament, Gregory Nazianzen finds, first of all, that
“having all the answers and giving them” is clearly a most sterile posture
for Christian bishops to adopt. Equally clearly, he regards expert garru-
lousness as an affront to God’s Mystery, and thinks that the details of
the Christian faith, delicate as they are, can wait. For now, he says, let
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us try, in our habits of speech, to act as friends of God—first in how
and when we speak up, and in front of whom.
Accordingly, Gregory uses the entire first Theological Oration to
demonstrate the need for conversion in speech. Only after that will he
spend the remaining four Orations explaining the fundamentals of the
Catholic faith, implicitly offsetting them against the lack of integrity of
the opinionated bishops, operating mainly politically. Quite interest-
ingly, nowhere does he call for obedience to teaching authority, say, by
referring to episcopal or even patriarchal authority or to the Council of
Nicaea, or to the various rules of faith current in the early church. His
argument is both philosophic and scriptural; that is to say, it is pastoral
and theological, not disciplinary.
So, I wish to suggest, whether we are cardinals (whether in Rome or
locally), bishops, priests, lay folk, concerned dilettantes or theological
experts, our first common issue is: steeped as we are in the modern North
American media culture,45 we do not sound like people who know the
living God—the One who has from eternity taken pleasure in being pres-
ent to humanity, ever so subtly and unemphatically, but also ever so
vulnerably, incarnately. Could this lead to “practical conclusions”? Let us
start with the media—hypothesizing they are the contemporary analogue
of the common culture and its bishops in the mid fourth century.
Intermezzo: A Twin Bill of Particulars for Today
“The connection between teaching and faith depends on the
manner in which the former is practiced.” “Catholics fighting prove by
the very thing they do that they are not talking of God.”
So let’s leave it to the media to be clever and fluid and chatty and
inconsistent. Using the media in the service of Catholic orthodoxy or
conduct or both (or even against alleged “dissent”) amounts to forget-
ting that the media—not always enemies—are unreliable and often
false friends. They are powers—ignorant of God’s ways, often supercil-
iously so. Something follows from this. Using the media to fight
so-called “dissent” in the Church is ignoring the faith of the voiceless,
who look to the bishops for pastoral guidance, not power. Besides, at
least since the Donatist crisis, bishops (Augustine is one example) have
insisted on treating opponents mercifully, as “brothers,” and encour-
aged their people not to shut them out as “dissenters.”46
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Here in the United States, a first misstep happened in the after-
math of Humanae vitae (1968): instead of showing pastoral care for the
married, some bishops publicly suspended “dissenting” priests—celi-
bates!47 A second faux pas was the attempt by “senior East coast
prelates” to stifle “dissent” and thwart dialogue of the use of condoms
in Africa by counting on newspaper headlines to publish their rejec-
tion. Then there was the undiscerning hurry, first in Rome, then in
Dallas, to meet the media’s demands for justice, for crying out loud!
Misled by at most a dozen influential but pastorally and theologically
inept figures, the bishops failed the married once again—this time by
omission. Were they pressured into forced solidarity by some of their
own, who had become criminally complicit with a tiny minority of
pathological priests? In any case, in the end quite a few priests, accused
of having taken sinful (but non-criminal) liberties in the past, were
facing serious ecclesiastical punishments forced on the bishops by an
unforgiving, zero-tolerance blackmailer—the media, conceivably aided
by lawyers taking advantage of them and opening courtrooms to mere
grudges. Worst of all, all this ended up further eroding the credibility
of the bishops’ pastoral authority in sexual matters.
In 1992, Cardinal Bernardin put into place a plan to which (cour-
tesy of the media) he was the first to have to submit. He did so without
suspending himself while the investigation was going on. By the time
he was cleared he sounded like a man who knew God and had let
himself be known by God. But he got the common reward of virtue:
“senior prelates,” making use of the media to oppose “dissent,” publicly
disavowed his last pastoral effort, the Common Ground Project.
Another rather more different case in point. Protestations of
loyalty are not always acts of faith. We have had a copious pontificate,
and now Pope John Paul II is dead. But the Vatican courtiers have
access to the media and have him speak; so do many others, among
them an army of bishops, biographers, and experts. Yet none of those
who employ the media to speak for (or against) the pope or interpret
him deserve the faith of any of us; in the general confusion, they too
plainly speak mainly to be heard. But the dead pope needs no admira-
tion, no approval, no victory. He is still giving all he has left to give. He
has largely become an author suffering the fate of authors: being half-
understood by others with an ax to grind. And most of all, he himself
still has met the Truth. None of us turn canonical till we die.48
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Finally, before returning to our theme, some food for meditation.
Ever thought about the well-worn portrayal of Almighty God as a little
old bearded guy in an outsized T-shirt on a cloud, with a halo over-
head—“the man upstairs”? By contrast, ever thought of Gregory of
Nyssa’s definition of Christianity as the “portrayal of God’s nature”?49
“Not Dropping Out of the Trinity”
Unlike some modern deconstructionists fascinated by the many
“fissures” in any text, the Cappadocians are not interested in silence for
its own sake.50 This holds for Gregory of Nyssa and his brother Basil the
Great. By the time Gregory Nazianzen has set fort, in the extensive
second Theological Oration, how God transcends any and all defini-
tions, he has also gone, unsurprisingly, through a long list of particular
created wonders baffling the human mind, witness not only the
Scriptures of both Testaments, but also the writings of Greek philoso-
phers, cosmographers, and mathematicians.51
The third and fourth Orations are both titled “Of the Son.”
Gregory starts by insisting that we have the mysterious order in the
universe to account for—a given not explained by either atheism or
polytheism, for either would have resulted into chaos. So if God is,
God is One. Passages from Plato and Plotinus suggest that this One
God is a transcendent fount of divinity, irresistibly overflowing into the
universe. Bold as this image is, Gregory explains, it lacks the sovereign
freedom that we cannot but attribute to the Divine. The sole remain-
ing possibility, therefore, lies in what Nicaea saw: the everlasting God,
the Father Almighty, has begotten the coeternal, ordering Logos, time-
lessly, and so has been creating the world of time. A series of eloquent
philosophic consequences and clarifications follows, and the discourse
is brought to a conclusion with dispatch, with appeals to christological
proof texts in the New Testament. The fourth Oration is (to use a
modern term) more soteriological; it takes the shape of a review of the
titles of Jesus Christ, and leads to an obvious theological conclusion:
You have the Son’s titles. Travel by all of them—by the tran-
scendent in a godlike way, by the corporeal in a compassionate
way. Or rather, go in a way altogether divine, so as to become
God as you go up from down here, by the same way as the
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One who for us came down here. Make a point of doing so in
all things and above all things, and you are unlikely to get lost
on your way by either the sublimer or the humbler titles—
[for the way is] “Jesus Christ, yesterday and tomorrow,” in the
Body “the same” as in the Spirit, and for ever and ever [cf. Heb
13, 8]. Amen.52
Still, in many ways, Gregory does not show his hand till he is
speaking, in the fifth Oration, of the Spirit. In every patristic textbook,
we are told that the Cappadocians “proved the divinity of the Holy
Spirit”—a fact as true as it is jejune. What they did was much more far-
reaching. Let us read before we comment.
We, however, have so much confidence in the divinity of the
Spirit we venerate that we will even start the theologia with it,
and apply the same words to the Trinity—even if some may
find this a bit much to take. “He always was the true light,
which enlightens every human being coming into the
world”—the Father [Jn 1, 9]. “He always was the true light,
which enlightens every human being coming into the
world”—the Son. “He always was the true light, which
enlightens every human being coming into the world”—the
other Advocate [Jn 14, 16. 26]. Always “was,” and “was,” and
“was”; but what “was” “was” One.53 Light, and Light, and
Light; but One Light, and One God. That is what David intu-
ited of old, in the words: “In your light we shall see light” [Ps
35, 10]. And now, we, too, have seen, and we, too, proclaim:
from the Light-Father we grasp the Light-Son in the Light-
Spirit—how’s that for a short and plain theologia of the
Trinity! Say No, all who want to say No! Do wrong, all those
who want to do wrong [cf. Rev 22, 11]. We proclaim what we
have come to understand! We will “go up a high mountain
and shout” even if nobody down below should hear us! We
will exalt the Spirit “without fear” [Is 40, 9]. And even if we
should let ourselves be frightened, we will rest assured, with-
out proclaiming!
If there was a time when He—the Father—was not, then
there was a time when He—the Son—was not. If there was a
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time when He—the Son—was not, then there was a time
when the Spirit was not. If the One [to hen] was “from the
beginning” [1 Jn 1, 1], then the three [ta tria] were, too.54 If
you take down the One, let me be bold and tell you not to
exalt the Two. For what is the use of an imperfect deity? Or
rather, what is deity if not perfect? And how can anything be
perfect if it lacks the thing that makes it so? And something
would be missing if there were nothing holy to It [i.e., to the
deity].55
In other words,
Hold nothing of the Trinity to be of your stature, lest you
should drop out of the Trinity.56
Of this maxim, our common culture can make no substantial sense.
Most unbelievers and agnostics put up with God-the-Father talk; they
appreciate the historical Jesus; yet Holy-Spirit talk smacks of pious self-
justification and hypocrisy—i.e., it refers not to so much to God as to
human religiosity. By contrast, regular Orthodox, Catholics, and
numerous Protestants think of God and Jesus Christ as somehow
inseparable, yet are at least slightly embarrassed by fervent idioms like
“gifts of the Spirit”: they sound like “Pentecostal,” evangelical, individ-
ual or prayer-group professions of piety, moral aspiration, or religious
experience—alleged but unverifiable and worse, without appeal. That
is to say, “we hold it to be of our [human] stature”; we put the things
of God the Spirit at our level. To most, it conveys little of Godself.
Might Gregory Nazianzen say that we—both non-Christians and
Christians have “dropped out of the Trinity”?
How about Gregory’s observation, “Something would be missing if
there were nothing holy to It”? First of all, this is the exact point where
modern Catholic commentators will get nervous.57 For Catholics and
most classical Protestants, to think of God as not holy is impossible. Of
course the Father is Holy. Of course the Son is holy. And the Spirit is the
Holy Spirit. The Trinity as a whole is Holy. The Western preference for
safe, objective, conceptual Sabellian Monarchianism is alive and well.
By contrast, for Gregory Nazianzen, the Spirit is precisely what
drives God’s Holiness home, in actuality, and the human awareness of
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Holiness Present is a “responsory direct-act phenomenon.”58 If creation, and
especially humanity and its works, are sublime, God is—only
absolutely more so. That is to say, wherever and whenever we human
beings find ourselves grasped by an unmistakable, affective sense of
Mystery out of proportion with the particular things or human beings
that encounter us, making it impossible for us to put a finger on it, we
must stop and notice what reveals itself.59 Then we may conclude—
usually in eloquent silence—that we are being touched by a Present
Holiness which we do not manage, possess, evoke at will, or control;
rather, if anything, It manages, possesses, calls to attention, compels us.
And oddly, we are apt to feel all the freer for the discovery.
Still, “for practical purposes”—and their name is Legion—we can
dismiss it, at least “for now.” On one occasion, the late Vice-President
Spiro Agnew prophesied, “Let it never be said that there was something
Americans could do, and they didn’t do it!” In North America, we will
do whatever we can indeed; in fact, dismissing keeps us too busy for
our own good as well as the world’s. We are not living thoughtfully—
i.e., slowly—enough to notice God’s Spirit advising us to live by the
long run. Even our charismatics, never in doubt about the Spirit, are
too busy getting to experiencing now, in alleged fullness. In this regard,
they resemble the huge commercial enterprises dealing in both goods
and money: driven by quarterly—i.e., short-term profit, they cannot
persuade themselves to meet any real future, marked by fairness to the
environment, not to mention fairness to the exploited everywhere in
the world. Justice takes time. To all leaders in the Churches, and in the
interest of those still driven by either superstition or current philoso-
phy, Gregory advises silence, and in that context, measured speech, at
least “for now.” That’s how the Christian Church can show the world
the way to go.
But how about the “forever” part? The simple Catholic answer is:
Jesus Christ tells it all. Put descriptively, Christians claim that “Christ
is risen” tells it all. Fair enough. But saying “Christ is risen” is an escha-
tological blessing exchanged between and among Christians before it is
ever a substantive truth claim.60 So, apparently unaware that Christ is
“only” the first-fruits of the dead-and-risen, Orthodox, Catholics, and
impatient Protestants of every stripe (including the fundamentalist
evangelizers), suffer from measurement problems; in practice, our
affirmed truths have a way of sounding overstated and impatient.
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Surely the substance of the message “Christ is risen” is a matter of hope
as against final possession?61 And so, it is imprudent to overstate the
Catholic claim in the encounter with either Jews or Gentiles. Besides,
are the Jews really unaware of the Holy Spirit, given that It appears
together with God and God’s Creative Word at the head of the Torah?
And as for Gentiles, is it so sure that they have been positively unre-
sponsive to God’s Spirit?
So, all Christians have a lot to hear and see yet. If the Logos is to be
discerned in Socrates and Heraclitus (as Justin Martyr saw), then we
should not be surprised by the news that God’s Spirit has has been felt
to fill the world “from the beginning.” In other words, we Catholics are
liable to drop out of the Trinity by claiming too much too fast on
behalf of the Son;62 and if we conclude that the great religions have
never felt God’s threefold encompassing Presence, we might find
ourselves implying that we can put conditions on God’s universal
salvific design. In fact, are we letting our trinitarian faith blind us to the
possibility that the face of the earth is already being renewed, mysteri-
ously because humanely, gently, gracefully, because “ that’s the way it
is”? If this should be true, then our bishops must learn the confidence
to speak up in praise of God—i.e., also, the fine art of piping down,
and leaving it to the media to be intemperate. And so must all of us.
Notes
Published here for the first time—a finger exercise for a new installment, to be
devoted to christology and trinitarian theology, of the author’s systematic
theology-in-process, God Encountered: A Contemporary Catholic Systematic
Theology (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1997-2001); henceforth GE,
followed by volume and section numbers).
The following developments are not argued, but supposed. The high-
mediaeval teaching that God’s Trinity is a matter of revelation (as
distinguished, but not separated, from natural reason) goes back to Aquinas’s
Summa contra Gentiles, written to equip Dominicans, sent out into the world
of North African Islam, with a missionary strategy for peaceful dialogue on
common ground: faith in the true God, and intellectual and practical accept-
ance of human nature. In the Summa theologiae, reason and revelation are again
treated sequentially but not contrasted (S. Th. I, qq. 2-26; 27-43). Only by the
end of the sixteenth century does a strictly philosophical approach to God
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arise. This begets a separation between itself and the treatment of God in
Christian faith and theology. In the mid-seventeenth century, with Leibniz as
the chief intellectual agent, revelation and natural reason begin to be treated as
adversaries. In the age of Enlightenment, with Christian Wolff as the typical
instance, natural reason effectively becomes the norm of what can (and cannot)
be believed. In the nineteenth-century Catholic philosophy and theology
begin to converge again. Transcendental thinking (Blondel), transcendental
neo-scholasticism (Rousselot, Maréchal, K. Rahner), and existential-phenom-
enological social theory (Plessner, Scheler, Jaspers) lead to a reintegration,
which helps produce phenomenological personalism as a coherent intellectual
climate. (Of this, Pope John Paul II is a key modern exponent.) Final thesis:
Only in the force field created by conditioned and wounded human freedom
and openness to God and a pliant but stubborn universe can humanity respon-
sibly shape itself—in hope, i.e., with no definite end in view, short of the
coming of Jesus Christ in glory to do justice to the living and the dead.
1. 2 Pet 1, 4: θείας κοινωνοÂ nύσεως.
2. See my God Encountered: A Contemporary Catholic Systematic Theology
(Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1997-2001), I, §44, henceforth cited
as GE, followed by volume and section numbers).
3. Yves M.-J. Congar, A History of Theology, translated by Hunter Guthrie
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1968).
4. See GE, II/i, §56; II/3, §124, 3 [x].
5. See John Henry Newman, Essays Critical and Historical, (London, Basil
Montagu Pickering, 1877), I, 40-42: “A Revelation is religious doctrine viewed
on its illuminated side; a Mystery is the selfsame doctrine viewed on the side
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Christian Faith and Theology in
Encounter with Non-Christians: Profession?
Protestation? Self-Maintenance? Abandon?
for Tom Jacobs, S.J.
This essay proposes, in twelve consecutive steps, to outline, in asystematic fashion, a theologically responsible Christian posture in
regard to the religions. It differs from many other approaches in that it
develops this posture entirely from within the Christian tradition; it
makes no claims about the religions. It also operates in a distinctively
Catholic manner: it combines dogmatic-theological themes and
approaches with fundamental-theological ones. The central contention
of this essay is identified in section VI; it is that the attitude to be
termed “receptiveness” has a squarely theological import all its own, so
much so that no Christian posture in relation to the religions can afford
to overlook it, let alone to belittle it. This is argued by showing that in
this posture, fundamental-theological intuitions of the most radical
kind turn out to coincide with christological intuitions of the most
radical kind.
I
The Church pre-exists all Christians. Accordingly, all Christians
profess a faith they have received. The matrix in which this reception
occurs, which also determines the manner in which it occurs, is called
“the Tradition.” In the transmission and reception of the faith there is
an important element of stability: traditional affirmations, ranging from
precise statements of doctrine (“articles of faith,” conciliar definitions),
to fairly standardized catechetical forms of teaching and explanation,
often of the homiletic kind. From the practical and strictly theological
points of view, however, doctrinal and catechetical affirmations, while
meaningful elements of the Christian faith-experience, are derivative,
on the following grounds.
Viewed from the angle of praxis, the doctrinal and catechetical
affirmations occur only as part of a wider idiom—a shared usage. An
idiom is the linguistic condensation of a community’s shared
commitments, as well as their continuing support; therefore, using
the Christian idiom is always an act of implicit, habitual, presum-
ably considered, and (at least ideally) deepening fidelity to a lived
(and hence, authoritative) tradition of Christian conduct—a tradi-
tion radically warranted by Jesus’ endorsement of Israel’s legacy of
active and patient faith and, ultimately, by his own call to faith and
discipleship. Only against the backdrop of such fidelity can the use
of catechetical affirmations represent a credible intellectual assent to
truth. Thus Christian praxis—the lived life undertaken as imitation
of Christ—is the proximate verification of any Christian truth-
claims.1 Accordingly, any interreligious discussion of the latter
without reference to the former is a mistake, both methodologically
and practically.
From the strictly theological angle, doctrinal and catechetical affir-
mations are rooted in the shared usage of a liturgical community. This
community most distinctively comes into its identity in direct acts2 of
praise, thanksgiving, and supplication offered to God through and in
Jesus Christ risen, in Spirited celebration and observance, in which
rehearsal of the old and the tested combines with discovery of the new
and the untested to awaken the sense of the divine presence and keep
it alive, in awe and intimacy, in utterance and silence. (Incidentally, in
worship Christians also find themselves both called and empowered to
embrace the community’s shared commitments as a way of life both
divinely mandated and divinely endorsed in Jesus Christ’s
Resurrection.) Since the original point of doctrinal and catechetical
affirmations is doxological, identifying one’s convictions and commit-
ments (and thus, indirectly, oneself ) by the use of them is believable
only to the extent that it in some way conveys intimacy with the God
worshiped by the Christian community (or at least a familiarity with
this God), supported, presumably, by the habitual practice of
worship. In other words, the affirmation of, say, the articles of faith is
plausible (or, alternatively, appropriately intriguing or infuriating)
only if it echoes in some way the living tradition of Christian prayer.3
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Thus, interreligious discussion of the Christian faith-affirmations
without reference to worship is a mistake, both methodologically and
theologically.
II
Not surprisingly, relatively few Christians and Christian commu-
nities live in full appreciation of their privileged condition. In many
cases, though, they are growing in it; but then again, in many other
cases, they are downright sluggish; in almost all cases, they mean well.
In any case, as a result of immature faith, the Tradition is liable to show
signs of degeneracy. The form of degeneracy most germane to the pres-
ent argument consists in living by habit and clinging to custom—a
problem not unknown in the early Church.4 While those devoted to
custom are usually sincere when they appeal to (what they take to be)
the tradition, the shortage of deeper resonance in their declarations
causes such appeals to sound less than confident, and hence, not too
convincing. Frequently, this lack of deep confidence is not lost on
observers and listeners, both the interested and the skeptical. In such
cases, concerned lest they profess too little, Christians are apt, on the
rebound, to compensate for lack of substance by excess of emphasis;
they will overstate their case. In this way, professing becomes protest-
ing; and protesting is apt to become protesting too much.5 The implicit
agenda of protesting too much is (not faith but) self-maintenance.
Neither theology nor theologians are necessarily exempt from this.
III
Christians must pursue both effectiveness and integrity in profess-
ing Christ; accordingly, while boldly professing their faith, they must
take care not to protest too much. Faced with this delicate task, the
great Tradition has tacitly (but quite often explicitly, too) regarded itself
as a tradition of ongoing faith-discernment, guided by the Holy Spirit.
Discernment characterizes the Christian approach to the world of
human culture, and of religious culture in particular. Christians must
give an account of themselves in a variety of situations; familiarity with,
and critical appreciation of, the convictions and manners current
among their non-Christian neighbors, but also in the culture at large,
must enable Christians to overcome defensiveness in testifying; to the
extent they succeed, they are likely to offer credible witness.
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One example is Gregory of Nyssa’s Great Catechetical Oration (c.
390 A.D.); it offers, without a hint of either apology or overstatement,
a firmly catholic catechism reliably informed by a fair and articulate
understanding of the notions about God, gods, the divine, and the
human prevalent in the surrounding religious culture. Accordingly,
John Henry Newman can explain, about 1450 years later, in the Essay
on the Development of Christian Doctrine (1844 A.D.), that the organic
integration (often combined with subtle, mostly tacit transformation)
of foreign elements is the indication of living Tradition.6
Accordingly, Christians and Christian communities cannot come
into their true selves without embracing the world in a discerning
manner.
IV
The foregoing implies that discernment in professing the Christian
faith, and hence, the tradition itself, are a matter of mutuality.
Accordingly, the structure of the discernment process is hermeneutical.
Even as they interpret what is “other,” interpreters will find themselves
interpreted to themselves; familiarity with the unfamiliar other turns
out to be inseparable from familiarization with a yet-unfamiliar self;
discovery of the other turns out to be an exercise in distortion unless
attended by the chastening and often delightful experience of self-
discovery.7
Accordingly, Christian discernment will properly proceed (that is,
it will genuinely advance the Tradition, as well as those who live by it),
only on condition that the cyclical nature of the hermeneutical process
(“the hermeneutical circle”) is respected.
Not surprisingly, therefore, discernment is borne on the wings of a
dual dynamic—that is, one which combines constructiveness and
receptiveness.
V
The element of constructiveness typically manifests itself in posi-
tive affirmation. It is dominant whenever and wherever Christians
confidently turn their faith in God and Jesus Christ by the gift of the
Spirit into an authorization for a discerning, sympathetic appreciation
of forms and elements of humanity and religion foreign to the
Christian community, to the point of positively commending and even
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integrating them. Jesus’ openness to all comers and his vocal apprecia-
tion of the occurrence of true faith outside Israel (for which there is
some precedent in late-Jewish universalism of the sapiential kind)
constitute prototypical warrants for this.
The constructive approach began to be vigorously adopted in the
late first and early second centuries, when Christian thinkers first
engaged in thoughtful, appreciative encounter with contemporary
philosophic thought. In this regard, Justin Martyr’s writings (c. 150
A.D.) are a classical example—the first in a long tradition. They show
an uncomplicated familiarity with contemporary thought, and explic-
itly praise sages living by reason, like “among the Greeks, Socrates and
Heraclitus and those like them, and among the foreigners, Abraham,
Elijah, Ananias, Azarias, Misael, and many others,” as manifestations of
the Logos, “of whom all humankind has received a share.”8
Because of its preference for affirmativeness, constructiveness has a
largely unintended side-effect: self-assertion. Of course, implicit self-
affirmation is an inevitable ingredient of every act of affirmation
human beings engage in. Still, even implicit self-affirmation is a form
of self-assertion. And while self-assertion is often both healthy and
proper, it can be self-serving; specifically, in regard to things different
or strange, it has a capacity for aggression and outright hostility. Not
every form or instance of affirmativeness is authorized by faith in
God.
Questionable affirmativeness is far from unknown in the New
Testament or in the writings produced in the Church of the first few
centuries. Still, in fairness it must be noted that much of the inordinate
assertiveness in the New Testament and many early Church documents
is accounted for by the fact that they are profoundly indebted to the
surrounding culture. For all its literacy, Mediterranean intellectual and
moral life in late antiquity (as well as long thereafter) continued to live
and think by oral performance, which has a tendency towards agonis-
tic expression: it will indulge in extravagant praise and blame, and
cherish adversarial rhetoric in polemical defense of truth-cum-loyalty.9
It is, of course, only a matter of intellectual integrity to observe that this
style of encounter with others cannot claim the support of the histori-
cal Jesus10—a fact whose theological and christological significance is
insufficiently appreciated. Still, the fact remains that Jesus’ example did
not keep the early Church from embracing the customary vehemence
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in argument; the record shows that it came to share and even cher-
ish the surrounding cultures’ rhetorical habits. But then again,
vehemence in argument, often at the expense of others, did not keep
the Church from embracing much of the wisdom of the cultures
whose errors and sinful habits it rejected. All of this suggests that
polemical defenses of the Christian faith, while widespread, did little
serious harm, either to the Christian conscience or to non-
Christians, at least as long as Christians were a minority—an easy
target for harassment. Thus, Christian orthodoxy, orthopraxy, and
reputation were in no position to set the public climate, intellectu-
ally, culturally, and politically.
The developments ushered in by Constantine’s victory at the
Milvian bridge (312 A.D.), which over time led to the establishment of
the Christian church, are a different matter altogether. In fact, the
contemporary Christian experience in the context of both non-
Christian and post-Christian civilizations, demands that these early
developments be critically reassessed, theologically and ecclesiologi-
cally. This judgment is not primarily based on the penitential
acknowledgment of the fact that the dominance of Christianity has
given rise to sinful excesses.11 Rather, it is predicated on the realization
that much of the doctrinal and theological tradition we continue to live
by took shape, roughly, between the fifth and seventeenth centuries—
the era that marks the emergence and establishment of Christianity as
the normative intellectual, cultural and (eventually also) political
climate, especially in the West. While this tradition, at its best,
produced fine instances of constructiveness,12 it suffered from never
having to deal, systematically and from a position of equality (let alone
subordination), with non-Christian religions as an actual phenome-
non.13 Purely politically and culturally speaking, contemporary
Christian thought about non-Christian religiosity and religions cannot
afford a posture of highhandedness any more than Christian thought
could in the second, third and fourth centuries.14
VI
Let us now turn to the element of receptiveness, which typically
operates by openness, inquiry, and sympathetic interrogation rather
than affirmation. First of all, though, let us observe that receptiveness
is not simply antithetical to constructiveness. As already stated, much
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theologically sound Christian affirmation rests on a careful, appre-
ciative understanding of theologically valuable ingredients of the
culture—the fruit of empathetic inquiry on the part of Christians.
Elements of receptiveness, therefore, regularly undergird instances of
constructiveness. Yet receptiveness has a theological significance in
and of itself. Exploring and clarifying this is the chief aim of this
essay.
As often as not (and more often according as the Christian
community is less in control of the normative climate), non-Christian
conceptions and practices do not lend themselves to easy interpretation
and ready affirmation; rather, many of them will strike Christians as
alien, hard to understand, intractable, practically unacceptable. No
wonder Christians will find their own conceptions and practices, and
indeed themselves, treated accordingly by others, whether rightly or
wrongly. (But then again, in a pluralistic situation, who decides about
right and wrong?) In this predicament of relative mutual incomprehen-
sion, it is tempting to jump to affirmation, and to take the risk of an
overstatement or two into the bargain. In fact, this may be, at times,
the only practical (that is, prudent) solution. It may even be imperative
theologically: there are situations—status crisis—where the only practi-
cal witness to faith and identity available to Christians is to close ranks
and say No to the culture and its religiosity. It stands to reason that
such negative stances must not be adopted impulsively or as a matter
of course; they are theologically sound only to the extent that, like the
affirmative stances, they are gestures of discernment—not of defensive-
ness, let alone of righteous self-assertion.
This has an important implication. Even if, in particular situa-
tions, a Christian community’s response to the culture should have to
be negative, its profession of faith is still reinterpreted in the encounter.
The dynamics of the hermeneutical process see to it that whenever
Christians responsibly engage in interpretative encounters with others,
their constitutive identity-experience (which is their faith in God) is
tested; that is, it is reinterpreted. A church that says No in a discerning
fashion is by that very fact developing a faith-experience (and hence, an
identity-experience) substantially deeper than the faith-experience it
enjoyed before the test, as (for example) those of us who recall the after-
math of the bekennende Kirche of the nineteen-thirties and ’forties will
remember.
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But this raises a crucial issue. How to take such a test? How are
Christians to interpret theologically an encounter that produces, not a
fusion of horizons that turns out constructive (and hence satisfying),
but one that reveals a chasm in the landscape or even opens one, thus
causing a standoff which, by prevailing standards, sets Christians back?
Will they accept the embarrassment or even embrace it? Or will they
take it only diffidently, grudgingly, resentfully?15 To resolve this painful
question, we must refine our notion of the hermeneutical process, by
exploring its properly theological dimensions.
VII
Constructiveness, with its tacit bias toward self-affirmation, could
give the impression that the encounter between church and non-
Christian religions, or between church and culture, is just that—a matter
of straightforward mutuality. But this overlooks that when Christians
offer their constructive faith-affirmations to the non-Christian world,
they are not being simply self-affirming. The reason is that ultimately
they do not represent themselves or their own faith. Here the doxolog-
ical and practical roots of doctrinal and catechetical affirmations
become crucially important. In the last analysis, Christians present
their integral selves to others only to the extent that they succeed in
communicating themselves as inseparable from Christ—a privilege
(they profess) they owe to God and for which they are answerable to
God. In giving an account of itself, therefore, the Church must convey
that even its best-discerned doctrinal affirmations and most enlight-
ened norms for conduct, embraced in the context of the most
intelligent and appreciative encounter with others, are not authorized by
self-possession, let alone by the desire for a comfortable settlement with
the world at large. For Christian constructiveness is not an exercise in
autonomy; rather, it must convey that the warrant for the Christian
welcome extended to the culture lies with the God it worships. In other
words, if Christians come into their true identity at all, this happens to
them when, in imitation of Christ, they mediate between God and the
culture along with its religiosity, dedicated to both and hence, tested by
both. Or rather (since the two relationships are asymmetrical), they
come into their true selves in the process of being appreciatively and
lovingly (and hence, discriminatingly) devoted to the culture by virtue
of thankful, loving (that is, exacting) devotion to God.16
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VIII
This has consequences for the practice of Christian discernment.
No Christian attempt at discerning encounter with other cultures or
religions has ever been quickly productive; understanding and cherish-
ing the world invariably comes at a price; this slows the pace; Christians
cannot expect either to understand and appreciate quickly, or to be
understood and appreciated quickly, let alone at cut rates. Specifically,
in any post-Christian civilization, there is only one way in which
Christians can convince others that their responses to non-Christian
religions or cultures, whether of the constructive or the disappointing
kind, are the fruit of discernment—that is to say, serious: they must
leave no doubt about their preparedness to let others test their faith in
God—that is, their very identity. Thus, whenever Christians encounter
non-Christian religions and cultures, deep receptiveness must be in
evidence if offers of Christian constructiveness are to be regarded as
credible and thus appreciated as valuable. Consequently, the real
danger in standoff situations lies not in the prospect of conflict or of a
long, wearying impasse, but in the undisciplined, undiscerning desire
to eliminate anxiety,17 to duck the demand for patience, to force issues,
and (especially) to win—the vision of Constantinian Christians accus-
tomed (in the wake of Eusebius’s Ecclesiastical History) to interpreting
constructive relationships with the culture and its religiosity as proof
positive of the truth of the Christian faith. It is the unchecked human
craving for peace assured by victory that is at the heart of the tendency
to trade discernment for overstatement. The temptation is always to
gain the upper hand and try to settle things in one’s favor, by protest-
ing too much.
Protesting too much takes two forms. The first, accommodation,
has affinities with modernism; it amounts to an overstatement of
Christian openness. Accommodation occurs when Christians crave for
constructive association with non-Christians to the point of jeopardiz-
ing the integrity of the faith. This, however, is in the long run bound
to diminish, also in the eyes of non-Christians, the intrinsic value of
association with Christianity; who cares to compromise sturdy, cher-
ished traditional religious and cultural goods through association with
something inclusive and tolerant but not really very distinctive? The
second is accommodation’s opposite, isolation; it has affinities with
integralism and amounts to an overstatement of Christian identity. It
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happens when Christians crave for certainty and assurance in believing
to the point of jeopardizing their responsibility to the non-Christian
world. This, too, is bound to diminish, in the eyes of non-Christians,
the credibility of the Christian faith; who cares to submit sturdy, cher-
ished traditional religious and cultural goods to the tribunal of an
intolerant religious ghetto?18 Theologically speaking, both accommoda-
tion and isolation are forms of self-affirmation in the service of
self-maintenance; they are failures in mediation.
In a post-Christian world even more than in a Christian one,
therefore, Christians and Christian theologians must systematically
rediscover that the Christian faith is measured, not by its success in
winning the world over to the Church, but by its ability to mediate
between the living God and the world. In all likelihood, mediation will
have to take a variety of forms. What these forms will need to have in
common is a quiet, unhurried, hopeful, deliberate insistence on
symbolizing and conveying God’s encompassing, long-suffering
embrace (in christological terms, God’s “assumption”) of all of human-
ity, along with its burden of inhumanity, in Jesus Christ suffering and
rising from the dead. That is, Christians must invite non-Christians to
share in their own pursuit of conversion, away from idols, ideals, and
ideologies that divide and kill, and toward the God who unites by hold-
ing out life to all at the expense of none. In this sense, the work of faith
is the work of justice rooted in Transcendence.
Those who pursue this justice operate by faith-discernment. While
deeply seeking to test everything in the light of God, with a view to
constructive, responsible relations with others, they even more deeply
seek to be tested themselves, sustained by faith in God, who tests and
judges all. For only the tested are true to God. Here we have the heart
of receptiveness.
IX
Thus far, the positions taken in this essay have been largely based
on particular, thematically Christian warrants. Yet when interreligious
and transcultural encounter is at issue, there usually arises a recurrent,
neuralgic theme: the need for common ground.19 Few issues in theol-
ogy nowadays raise this fundamental issue with similar urgency. If the
profession of Christian faith in the world is a matter of ongoing mutual
discernment about significant particulars, what is the basis for this
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discernment? Is it possible to identify a universal condition for the
possibility of theological hermeneutics?
This essay wishes to suggest that here if anywhere it is vital to culti-
vate patience. Let us clarify this by first elaborating patience’s opposite:
undiscerning zeal. Current discussion of interreligious encounter yields
a steady supply of proposals for “inclusivist” or “pluralist” reinterpreta-
tions of the Christian faith. Most of these promise improved
relationships between Christianity and other religions and cultures.
The improvement is usually obtained, at least theoretically, by purging
Christianity of “exclusivism” and placing it, together with all religions
and religious cultures, under an attractively universalist umbrella.
One immediate problem with this is that the umbrella is so obvi-
ously manufactured in the liberal-Christian and post-Christian
West—a West turned penitent and even friendly, but still residually
imperialist in spite of itself, witness its tendency to fit other religions
into categories that are the fruit of Western reflection.20 However, the
deeper mistake in most of the proposals lies in their gratuitousness. For
first of all, in the shade of this liberal umbrella the positive elements of
the religions—that is, all the colorful things that make religions “real,
vigorous, and definite”21—are made to pale into relative insignificance.
Vocal participants in this discussion are welcome to discourse, at little
cost to themselves, on the affirmations of religions whose inconvenient
details of conduct and liturgy they often have no intention of encoun-
tering and interpreting at close range, studiously or otherwise. But,
secondly and more importantly, the cool, theoretical atmosphere of
such parliaments where religions are reconciled free of charge suggests
that the discussion is relevant only to an élite privileged “to view the
whole world as like unto itself, and to keep its distance, even if it be a
sympathetic distance, from the wretched of the earth.”22 Where, in this
type of interreligious understanding, is the work of justice?
Justice demands, not only that we respect the positive elements of
non-Christian religions, but also that we curb our eagerness to offer
universalist interpretations until we patiently ask basic questions about
the work of interpretation itself. Is there such a thing as a fundamental
precondition of all interpretation? The answer to this question turns
out to be surprisingly simple.
First of all, we know from experience that human beings cannot
not communicate. Human beings never cross each other’s paths as
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neutral facts; the simple givenness of a human being calls for encounter;
human beings make moral and intellectual demands on each other by
their very presence; even when encountering the most bewildering
strangers, we implicitly recognize that they are in principle interpretable,
by virtue of their communicative behavior, especially their speech. That
is, both they and we have already been changed; the naked encounter
was sufficient. Thus, secondly, we know from experience that the
hermeneutical situation irresistibly involves the recognition of mutual-
ity: constructive interpretation is reliable according as the interpreters
allow themselves to be interpreted, both to each other and to them-
selves. Together, these two insights suggest that interpretability is a more
fundamental feature of humanity than its actual ability to interpret. That
is, what most deeply characterizes human beings is also what can unite
them most deeply with others: openness to interpretation. Humanity, it
turns out, lives more deeply by the grace of receptiveness than by the
work of constructiveness. This conclusion is hardly surprising if we
recall the bitter truth that constructive interpretation often divides,
sometimes unnecessarily, especially when offered prematurely.
X
The insight just developed would seem to suggest a fresh sense of
direction in the fundamental theological understanding of interreli-
gious encounter. Remarkably (to turn from fundamental theology to
positively Christian theology once again), it is reminiscent of two
profound passages in the New Testament (1 Cor 8, 1-3; 13, 12b):
We know we all have knowledge. Knowledge inflates, but love
builds up. All those who think they have knowledge do not yet
know the way they should know. But all those who love, they
are the ones who are known.23
And:
As of now, my knowledge is partial, but then I shall know as I
am known.
Here we are. We all dearly seek to understand, but even more
dearly, we seek to be understood. We are all natively intelligent, but
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even more natively, we are intelligible. We all deeply want to interpret,
but even more deeply, we are interpretable. The true warrant for our
understanding, and hence, its true measure, is our being understood by
God; being aware of being thus understood is the mainspring of mature
love of others.
Aquinas understood this. He anticipated that the truths accessible
to universal reason would create the common ground on which non-
Christians could be brought to understand much (but by no means all)
of the Christian faith. Yet he could entertain that cheerful anticipation
only because he knew that the experience of intelligence in us is an
experience, not so much of fullness as of hollowness; not so much of
power as of desire; not so much of attainment of actual knowledge as
of a affinity with all that is potentially intelligible—that is, with all as
it exists in God. This deep-seated affinity, he knew, is beyond our grasp;
it is simply there, inescapably—a given ingredient of our sense of iden-
tity; yet it is the soul of our attunement to all that is, and in it and
beyond it, to God. Its givenness invites our acceptance; it is by free
receptiveness (so we discover) that we turn a given receptiveness to all
reality and (in and beyond all reality) to God into a gift from God.
Intelligence is privilege before it is power. So he wrote:
The human soul, in a way, becomes all things, by virtue of
sense and intellect; in this manner, beings that have knowl-
edge approximate, in some way, the likeness of God, in whom
all things pre-exist.24
Karl Rahner offers an analogous insight:
Is there anything more familiar and self-evident (whether
explicitly or implicitly) to the self-aware human spirit than
this: the wordless questioning that extends beyond all the
things already conquered and mastered; the humble, loving
sense (that sole origin of wisdom) of having more questions
than answers? Down deep, there is nothing we know better
than this: our knowledge (that is, what in our everyday lives
we call knowledge) is but a small island in a measureless ocean
of elements not traversed; it is a floating island, and much as
we are more familiar with it than with this ocean, in the last
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resort it is carried; and only be cause it is carried can it carry at
all. Thus the existential question, put to all those who have
knowledge, is this. Which will they love more: the little island
of their so-called knowledge, or the sea of measureless
mystery?25
Understanding dwells in us, irresistibly; it urges us forward, toward
affirmation and legitimate self-affirmation. Yet we understand better
and more reliably according as we more deeply acknowledge and appre-
ciate understanding in its hollow, empty form, where knowledge
coincides with the consciousness of being known. This assurance will
prevent us from being so dependent on actual knowledge that igno-
rance, incomprehension, and misinterpretation become devastating. In
this way, it would appear, interreligious encounter understood as an
exercise in mutual interpretability is apt to be more fundamentally
theological than acts of mutual interpretation. It can be expected to
place those participating in it, not in the shade of a universalist
umbrella, but in the quiet clarity of Invisible Light.
Let us conclude. Christians profess their faith in encounter with
non-Christian religions and cultures, which they are to interpret with
discerning constructiveness. In fact, they are positively called to do so by
virtue of the Christian responsibility for the world. But they will do well
to reflect on the liabilities of constructiveness—on the self-assertiveness
it can mask, on the injustice it can do to other religions and cultures.
This reflection will also test their own readiness to pay the price of all
reliable interpretation: receptiveness to finding oneself interpreted by non-
Christian others. And we know, being interpreted takes the form of
construals. Some of them will be misconstruals. Maybe even many.
XI
All of this leads to a final point. The profession of Christian faith
is an encounter with others. It obviously demands interpretative moves,
of the constructive and especially of the receptive kind; theologically
speaking, our explorations have suggested that the latter is the basis of
the more radical form of profession of faith. Now receptiveness takes
the form of interrogation, and even more of interrogation’s deeper
precondition: readiness to be interrogated. Surprisingly perhaps, this
last insight suggests a radical leap into New Testament christology.
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In places too many to mention in the present context, the New
Testament shows that the early Christians, powerless as they were by
and large, were keenly aware that their reliance was not on human
beings and their judgments and courts of law, nor on cultures, powers
that be, or celestial elements with their incessant demands for submis-
sion; all of these had been disqualified, since, as Paul puts it, they had
failed to recognize Jesus as the Lord of Glory (see 1 Cor 2, 8). In sum,
their reliance was not on “this world” and its idols and authorities.
Their ultimate (that is, their true) reliance was on God, who had raised
Jesus to life, and so freed them from every enslavement.
Characteristically, the fourth gospel presents Jesus as the prototype and
source of this faith-attitude: Jesus knows enough not to entrust himself
to others (Jn 2, 24), and draws his identity, his sense of mission, and
the assurance with which he works from the Father alone. But far from
isolating him from those around him, this supreme abandon to God—
the true source of his identity—opens Jesus unconditionally to others.
Curiously, Mark’s gospel conveys this by means of an interrogation
scene, set at its turning point, smack in the middle of the gospel viewed
as a dramatic composition. Jesus faces his disciples with the question to
which the whole gospel is composed to provide the answer (Mk 8, 29):
“But who do you say that I am?” Is it fanciful to suggest that this
unconditional invitation to interpret his person is also the ultimate,
most universal, most radical form of Jesus’ profession of total abandon
to the living God? In this scene as in the gospel as a whole, the invisi-
ble God who is the engine of Jesus’ life is the decisive and indeed the
only presence that accounts for the Messianic secret—Jesus’ identity
and mission. That is, who Jesus is is not revealed through any overt
claims to distinction, of the kind that others (demons, disciples, phar-
isees and scribes, the crowds, high priests, Pilate) constantly dare Jesus
to make. Matthew will put this in explicit words: the revelation of
Jesus’ identity does not come from “flesh and blood” (Mt 16, 17). It is
not even a matter of Jesus making something of himself: “I do not seek
my own glory,” as the fourth gospel will put it (Jn 8, 50). The secret of
Jesus’ person lies exclusively in what he trusts God to make of him. In
the mean time, he himself only agrees to be “delivered up.” That is, he
allows others “to make of him whatever they want” (see Mt 17, 12). But
for Jesus, in the end, being interpreted means being misinterpreted—
“misconstrued to death,” like the new Elijah, John the Baptizer, had
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been. In this light, it is only natural that Mark should place Jesus’ first
prophetic prediction of his execution hard on the heels of Jesus’ ques-
tion to the disciples. And to drive home the depth of the paradox,
Peter, the very one whom the Father had inspired to interpret Jesus’
identity right, becomes the one who finds the way in which that divine
identity is exercised humanly impossible to swallow (Mk 8, 31-33).
Touches like these help shed light on the New Testament picture
of Jesus. Jesus welcomes all those around him, because he interprets
them all as children of the living God, his Father dear, whom he trusts
with his whole person. At this Father’s kind mandate, Jesus is to accept
all comers as his trust, without letting anyone get lost (see Jn 6, 37-39).
In return for this welcome, Jesus suffers total misinterpretation and the
worst available mistreatment: death by crucifixion.26 The Fourth
Gospel conveys this dramatically by having Pilate trot Jesus out to face
the crowd as the picture of humanity (Jn 19, 5): the Just One mirrors
in his person the injustice which a wayward humanity inflicts on itself.
Yet the one who can thus silently accept and welcome being miscon-
strued and mistreated and executed is precisely the one who so trusts
God that he can entrust all those who misinterpret him as well as them-
selves (that is, all who kill him as well as themselves), along with his
dying self, to the God of Life. “He in person took our sins up on to the
wood, in his own body, so that released from sin we might live for
justice” (1 Pet 2, 24).27 These are the themes summed up in a liturgical
hymn old enough to enable Paul to quote it as a piece of Christian
tradition and to turn it into an exhortation to self-effacing modesty in
dealing with one another (Phil 2, 5-9):
Let this mentality prevail among you
which we also find in Christ Jesus:
He shared the condition of God,
yet did not consider equality with God
a matter of grasping, of seeking advantage.
Instead, he made himself empty—of no account;
he took on the condition of a slave.
Born in human likeness and found in human from,
he went on to lower himself:
he became obedient to the point of death—death on a cross.
That is why God exalted him above all,
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and bestowed on him the name above all names.
Thus, at the name of Jesus, every knee should bend,
in heaven, on earth, and under the earth;
and every tongue should confess,
to the glory of God the Father:
“Jesus Christ is Lord!”28
This is radical mutuality brought to divine perfection. Jesus accepts
being cast in the role of the other-made-stranger, forced into death by
dint of human affirmativeness aggressively exercised at the expense of his
integrity. Yet this fatal affirmativeness finds itself not rejected but
quenched and absorbed and outsuffered in Jesus’ receptiveness, which
he patiently exercises on behalf of all others, trusting and glorifying
God. This means life, for Jesus first, and then also for “the many” whom,
by sheer receptiveness, he has reconciled with each other, with God and
in God. The hermeneutical circle both respected and broken wide open.
XII
By way of envoi, an intriguing question, perhaps to stimulate the
theological imagination. Let us assume we can learn from Origen’s
Contra Celsum, composed between 246 and 248 A.D., on the eve (as we
now know) of the establishment of Christianity. By then, the Christian
faith was a notable influence, yet its predominance was by no means
assured, for the alternatives were real. In our day, Christianity is still a
notable influence, but there are real alternatives once again. Origen’s
book represents the best of Christian thought in encounter with
respected and confident non-Christian thought, about a century before
Christianity’s establishment; we live and think about a century after
Christianity’s disestablishment, at least in the Western world.
Unlike the tracts of, say, Irenaeus and Hippolytus, which had faced
the painful divisions inside the Christian community, Contra Celsum is
the ancient Church’s first full-scale, coherent, eloquent, even voluble
controversy with a total outsider: Celsus was a religious pagan philoso-
pher, an Epicurean who had decided, after serious study, that he
remained splendidly unimpressed, and who had explained himself in a
tract entitled Alethes Logos (“True Reason”; c. 175 A.D.).
Incongruously, the preface to Contra Celsum is a commentary on
the words: “But Jesus kept silence” (Mt 26, 63). The choice of text is
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intriguing. Is it an instance of clever rhetorical posturing, or is there
substance to it? Origen begins by declaring that these words are as true
now as they ever were. Jesus is still keeping silence: present-day
Christians evidence the truth of their faith by their lives rather than by
word and argument. After that, however, the picture gets complicated,
for Origen goes on to define his target audience. Since true Christians
will not have been impressed by Celsus, he writes, the only readers he
has in mind, besides people wholly unacquainted with Christianity, are
Christians weak in the faith. This is an odd reading public. What could
Christians, even Christians of dubious caliber, have in common with
non-Christians? Could this statement, puzzling as it is, be the clue to
the significance of Origen’s choice of text?
Let us recall that Origen had first-hand experience of persecution,
both as a youth and in old age. Eusebius29 relates that as an ardent
seventeen-year old he had presumed to write a letter to his father,
imprisoned for the faith and about to be martyred in 202 A.D., to
implore him to persevere; meanwhile his mother, worried that her son,
the eldest of seven, might leave the house to seek martyrdom in the
anti-Christian tumults that made the streets of Alexandria unsafe, had
found it advisable to hide his clothes. Contra Celsum was written
toward the end of Origen’s life, when rumbles of persecution were in
the air; he died about five years after completing the work, at the age
of sixty-nine, of the effects of torture suffered for the faith in the perse-
cution of Decius (250 A.D.). Origen, if anybody, had a right to
commend martyrdom, as he in fact did in his Exhortation to
Martyrdom. But he had first-hand experience of ecclesiastical worldli-
ness and mediocrity as well, and he gave vent to his disillusionment
with privilege and prelacy by furiously commending the ascetical and
mystical life (of which he also had first-hand experience). Did he, on
the threshold of protesting at length (and, on more than one occasion
in Contra Celsum, protesting a bit much), recall the receptive (that is,
ultimately, mystical) nature of the Christian faith-commitment? Did
he, perhaps, sense that the Christian faith was on the verge of triumph,
as the public, political victory of Christianity just short of a century
later, would bear out? And precisely because of that, did he feel
compelled to recall the inconvenient truth that Christianity is, in the
last analysis, upheld not by protesting, but by the saintly lives of true
Christians? Did he, in other words, feel torn between the Christianity
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of the martyrs and a lesser type of Christianity, whose witness smacked
of overstatement, yet many of whose instincts he shared? Was he, a
martyr manqué, appalled at the prospect of success and its conse-
quence—a church marked by crowd and compromise? Yet also, was he,
a fastidious, irrepressible genius with a knack for public stances,
worldly enough to want to beat the pagans at their own game, giving a
sharp public account of the Christian faith? And thus, could the open-
ing moves of Contra Celsum be an implicit apology—the gesture of an
aspiring Christian ascetic, contemplating the silent Master in front of
his judges and repenting in advance for the excessive (and obviously
exciting) affirmativeness he was about to embark on in professing the
Christian faith before the tribunal of contemporary learning? Did he
intuit that the development of a lesser brand of Christianity was
inevitable? A Christianity more assertive, yet less persuasive? A
Christianity religiously devoted to a tradition of affirmativeness, often
very discerning, yet not always very patient, and sometimes quite exces-
sive—of the type his book was to exemplify?
Notes
A paper read at a conference of Protestant and Catholic theologians teaching,
respectively, at Duta Wacana and Sanata Dharma Divinity Schools in
Yogyakarta, Indonesia, July, 1993. Radically rewritten in the Fall of the same
year. In the end, published in Theological Studies 55 (1994): 46-65. Revised
once again for the present collection.
1. The fact that verbal witness, both of the oral/acoustical and the writ-
ten kind, is part of Christian praxis has consequences for the interpretation of
doctrine. See my “Rahner on Sprachregelung: Regulation of Language? of
Speech?” Oral Tradition 2 (1987): 323-36; reprinted in the present volume.
2. Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s emphasis on the primacy of the actus directus of
faith is relevant here. See my Christ Proclaimed: Christology as Rhetoric (New
York: Paulist, 1979), esp. 232-47.
3. This is meant to imply that, if, instead of worship, catechetical affirma-
tions echo nothing but, say, the voice of authority or the atmosphere of
theological discussion, they are practically and theologically pointless.
4. Even a traditionalist like Tertullian saw this: “Sed Dominus noster
Christus ueritatem se, non consuetudinem, cognominauit” (“But our Lord
Christ gave himself the title ‘the Truth’ not ‘Custom’ ”) (De Virg. Vel. I, 1).
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5. “The lady doth protest too much, methinks”: William Shakespeare,
Hamlet, the Prince of Denmark, III, ii, 240.
6. See esp. chap. v, section 3, and chap. viii.
7. Readers of Hans-Georg Gadamer will recognize my deep indebtedness
to his thought. See also my “Divine Revelation: Intervention or Self-
Communication?” Theological Studies 52 (1991): 199-226.
8. Justin Martyr, Apology I, 46, 2-4.
9. On these issues, many of Walter J. Ong’s writings are illuminating,
especially Ramus, Method and the Decay of Dialogue (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1983), The Presence of the Word (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1970), Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1971), Interfaces of the Word (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977),
Fighting for Life (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), and Orality and
Literacy (New York: Methuen, 1985).
10. But, it is only fair to add, neither can the sort of tolerance that insists
on the avoidance of all confrontation and conflict in order to mask an under-
lying lack of commitment.
11. One serious blot on the history of the Catholic church in the Western
hemisphere deserves specific mention, by way of example. Unlike the slave
traders, who made only the feeblest attempts at offering a religious justification
for their crimes against humanity, the leadership of the Spanish Conquista
expressly used Christ’s victory over the demons as the rationale for the brutal
treatment of the native Americans and the destruction of their culture. The
protests of prophets like the Dominican friar and bishop Bartolomé de las
Casas (1474-1566), the author of The Only Way to Draw All People to a Living
Faith (New York: Paulist, 1992) and many other splendidly indignant writings,
were largely disregarded. The problem, of course, could become so virulent
because it was as widespread as Christendom itself. Thus the rise of Christian
and post-Christian Deism must, to a significant extent, be laid at the door of
the aggressive ecclesiastical triumphalism that once prevailed in Europe. And
while it is unfair to exaggerate the links between colonialist imperialism and
the Christian missionary endeavor in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
it is unwise to deny them altogether. The efforts of contemporary scholars like
Wilfred Cantwell Smith, John Hick, and even Paul Knitter to reinterpret the
Christian faith and its relationship to other religions in “inclusivist” or “plural-
ist” terms may well have to be judged theologically unsatisfactory in the end;
what cannot be denied is that the blind spots and scandals of the past cry out
for the kind of remedial theological reflection they offer.
12. Examples that come to mind are a few early medieval controversial
encounters with Islam and contemporary Judaism, and Aquinas’s Summa
contra Gentiles (see Avery Dulles, A History of Apologetics [New York: Corpus;
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Philadelphia: Westminster, 1971], 72-76), which are models of intellectual
fairness, and early Jesuit attempts at principled inculturation, such as Matteo
Ricci’s in China and Roberto de Nobili’s in India.
13. Aquinas points this out explicitly, and goes on to interpret it as an
opportunity to develop a universalist apologetic based on reason (Summa
contra Gentiles, i, 2). In the background of this analysis lies, of course, a sad
fact: for all its devotion to the Old Testament, Western Christendom and its
theology systematically ignored the actual presence of a non-Christian religious
community right in its midst: the Jews. Andrew of Saint Victor is the rare
exception here; see Beryl Smalley, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978), 112-95.
14. In light of fresh study, I am forced to qualify this. It is true that early
Christianity was influential only as far as the emperor allowed. Still, public
meekness was still far to seek except perhaps among the monks, and even they
could be a formidable political force by dint of sheer numbers when displeased.
Libido dominandi long prevailed as a norm in imperial days. Men in positions
of influence were expected to be self-important, dominating, and intransigent.
Accordingly, bragging about “famous men,” usually military commanders, had
long been a fact of life, especially in the Roman world, as Suetonius’s and
Cornelius Nepos’s writings show; in the mid fourteenth century Petrarch, who
dreamed of a new Roman republic, was to imitate the genre in his De viris illus-
tribus. Jerome’s De viris inlustribus was written to prove that many Christians
were major writers, starting with the apostle Peter and ending with (of course)
himself.
15. Readers familiar with the life of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906-45) will
recall how he ended up quite sharply taking his distance from the bekennende
Kirche in which he had been so active, and instead, began to associate with
conscientious non-Christians. He did so when he realized that, instead of
accepting the testing of its faith at the hands of the Nazis as part of the
Christian vocation, the Church resented it, and became chiefly interested in
reclaiming its former position of privilege. The most alarming aspect of this
quest of self-maintenance was the Confessing Church’s failure to condemn the
Nazi treatment of the Jews and to help put an end to it. Not always does the
traditional Christian reliance on a position of privilege take so crass a shape. I
recently heard a respected Indonesian Jesuit of sixty who has spent his entire
adult life teaching at a graduate-level institute of catechetics dedicated to the
education of Catholic catechists appeal to the small number of Christians in
Indonesia (approximately 8%) to raise the agonizing question: “Could it be
that the Christian faith has failed to engage the South East Asian soul?” This
disconsolate question overlooks the disturbing fact that to Constantinian
Christianity it was increasingly the bodies that counted; the aspirations of souls
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were a concern indeed, but one that could wait. So in the post-Christian
world, the question invites a counter-question: “Does the Christian faith have
to be the dominant cultural force for Christians to have the sense that they are
supremely privileged?” The answer is obvious, but we may have to get accus-
tomed both to it and to the question.
16. A phrase about the love of God and the love of neighbor in Jan van
Ruusbroec’s writings expresses this dual loyalty to perfection, except that the
passage assumes, of course, that the church is set in a Christian society. Writing
to motivated Christians (that is, to the effective church in the not-so-Christian
culture of the later Middle Ages), Ruusbroec writes: “We must make our home
between the love of God and of our fellow-Christian” (“Wi moten woenen
tusscen die minne Goods ende ons evenkerstens”); see Van den gheesteliken
tabernakel (“The Spiritual Tabernacle”), §liv; Werken (Amsterdam: De Spiegel,
1932-34), ii, 125.
17. Hans Urs von Balthasar calls acceptance of anxiety a mark of
catholicity: Das Katholische tilgt nicht, aber verwandelt die Angst (“Catholicity
does not cancel anxiety, but transforms it”): Katholisch (Einsiedeln:
Johannes, 1975), 12; see the English translation, In the Fullness of Faith (San
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988), 20, where, however, Angst is unhappily
translated as “fear.”
18. On these issues, see my God Encountered, vol. 1, Understanding the
Christian Faith (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1989), §17-19.
19. It did for Aquinas, who saw the solution in “the need to have recourse
to natural reason, to which all are forced to give their assent” (necesse est ad
naturalem rationem recurrere, cui omnes assentire coguntur; Summa c. Gent. i, 2).
Modern scholars like Wilfred Cantwell Smith, John Hick, and Paul Knitter are
on a comparable search: they seek to identify a common ground on which all
religions agree (or can be brought to agree).
20. Universalism of the Neo-Hinduist kind (which continues to hold such
appeal in the West) is, of course, a product of late nineteenth- and early twen-
tieth-century India. Still, it arose, not spontaneously, but as a universalist
defense against Western pressure embodied in the forceful introduction of
Christian churches, with their missionary programs.
21. “wirklich, kräftig und bestimmt”: Friedrich Schleiermacher, Über die
Religion (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967), 186; see the English
translation, On Religion (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), 234.
22. Tom F. Driver, “The Case for Pluralism” in The Myth of Christian
Uniqueness (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1987), 203-18; cited at 206. The present
paragraph sums up a case made at length in my “Professing Christianity
Among the World’s Religions,” The Thomist 55 (1991): 539-68, an essay
which appears in final form as §61-64 in God Encountered: A Contemporary
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Systematic Theology, vol. Two/1, The Revelation of the Glory: Introduction and
Part I: Fundamental Theology (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1993).
23. For verse 3, I am adopting the lectio difficilior found in the third-
century papyrus known as P46: ei de tis agapai, houtos egnostai.
24. “anima hominis fit omnia quodammodo secundum sensum et intellec-
tum, in quo cognitionem habentia ad Dei similitudinem quodammodo
appropinquant, in quo omnia præexistunt . . .” (S. Th, I, 80, 1, in c.).
25. “Was ist dem Geist, der zu sich selbst gekommen ist, thematisch oder
unthematisch vertrauter and selbstverständlicher als das schweigende Fragen
über alles schon Eroberte und Beherrschte hinaus, als das demütig liebende
Überfragtsein, das allein weise macht? Nichts weiß der Mensch in der letzten
Tiefe genauer als daß sein Wissen, d.h. das, was man im Alltag so nennt, nur
eine kleine Insel in einem unendlichen Ozean des Undurchfahrenen ist, eine
schwimmende Insel, die uns vertrauter sein mag als dieser Ozean, aber im
letzten getragen und nur so tragend ist, so daß die existentielle Frage an den
Erkennenden die ist, ob er die kleine Insel seines sogenannten Wissens oder
das Meer des unendlichen Geheimnisses mehr liebe”; Karl Rahner, Grundkurs
des Glaubens (Freiburg: Herder, 1976), 33; see the English translation,
Foundations of Christian Faith (New York: Seabury, 1978), 22.
26. Martin Hengel’s Crucifixion (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977), a book as
scholarly as it is unsettling, offers the best explanation of what this means, at
least to my knowledge.
27. Note that the Vulgate enhances this picture by adopting, at the end of
the previous verse, a varia lectio, as follows: tradebat autem iudicanti se iniuste
(“He entrusted himself to one who judged him unjustly”).
28. For the translation of v. 6, see N.T. Wright, “harpagmos and the
Meaning of Philippians 2, 5-11,” The Journal of Theological Studies 37 (1986):
321-52. On the whole hymn, see esp. Martin Hengel, Crucifixion, 62-63.
29. Hist. Eccl., vi, 2.
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ABRAHAM’S FAITH AND ISRAEL’S DIGNITY

Two Kind Jewish Men:
A Sermon in Memory of the Shoah
for Paul Davidovits and Gene Borowitz,
two kind Jewish men
Being no authority on either Judaism or the Holocaust, dear friendsin God, I must ask you to let me fashion this sermon out of
personal recollections and reflections. But what prompts me to speak at
all is something else. Ever since I came to the United States, in 1968,
in the course of twenty-four years in two Jesuit universities, several
professional societies, and countless occasions of one kind or another,
Jewish colleagues and friends have become a regular as well as a most
enriching feature of my life. I would not be speaking to you today with-
out that experience.
I
Before 1968, I had known only two Jews, but at least I had known
them at close range. Their names were Samuel Schuijer and Enrico
Morpurgo.
Mr. Schuijer, a Dutchman born in The Hague, was a fairly well-
known, all-round musician. He became my first violin teacher in the
spring of 1939, when I was eight years old; he was a firm, kind old
man of sixty-six, who taught music in a bare room that had a few
yellowed posters of past performances on the walls. There was also a
grand piano and a puzzling little tin box on the door-post, which I
now know was a mezuzah. Besides my violin lessons, I vividly
remember that he once stopped by our home to cancel class; he was
wearing, just below the left lapel of his overcoat, that awful yellow
Star of David with the word “Jew” at the center. “I don’t want to get
you into trouble,” he said, so he refused to come in, but my mother
at least succeeded in getting him to have a cup of coffee with her at
the front door. (Not even that courtesy was wholly risk-free: a next-
door neighbor’s brother was a captain in the German army.) In late
November of 1942, he was picked up. I will never forget the dread-
ful late afternoon of Wednesday, November 25, a few days before my
father’s birthday, when I found myself walking back home in tears,
having discovered that the front door of Mr. Schuijer’s apartment,
where I had gone for my weekly lesson, had been secured by means
of a seal whose significance we had come to understand only too
well. He had been taken to Westerbork (where Etty Hillesum was
just then writing her letters and diaries). In early December, one of
those ominous cattle-car trains took him to Auschwitz, where he was
killed on the day of his arrival, December 11, 1942. I was twelve by
then.
I was more than twice that age when I first met Professor
Morpurgo, an Italian Jew from Venice, who was an expert on the
history of the clock; I was a Jesuit seminarian a little too emphatically
attired in clerical black, doing doctoral studies in English and Italian
literature at the University of Amsterdam. He was easily the most virtu-
oso teacher I have ever had; he never brought a book to class, and
recited large swaths of prose and poetry by heart. He taught me the
survey of Italian literature and sat on my comprehensives board. Unlike
Mr. Schuijer, Professor Morpurgo had survived the war. His life had
been saved by a combination of kindness and shrewdness: he had
spent the war studying, in a Catholic monastery in Italy, dressed as a
Dominican priest. Those Italians. They are made neither for high
principle nor for heroic action, except, perhaps, in the fantasy world
of opera. But in those ugly war years, many of them quietly managed
to overcome boundless evil by doing a lot of carefully aimed good, of
the kind that succeeded in eliciting no further violence from the
oppressor. Theirs was a courage of the everyday kind, but it did take
care of the neighbor in need, like the giving of a drink of water to a
weak person, of which Jesus says that those who do it will not forego
their reward.
II
The very different destinies of these two very different men give
rise to different responses. What I hope to suggest to you is that these
responses meet in a common theme.
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III
Let me start my meditations with Professor Morpurgo. The kind-
ness that had saved his life—he told me about it some time in 1958 or
1959—had been instrumental in making a free, kind, compassionate
man of him. One day, at the classroom door, he took me by the right
sleeve and pulled me aside. Lei mi pare stanco, he said, you look tired.
And before I could put together a coherent little answer in Italian, he
continued, Lo so, lo conosco, anche I Domenicani l’hanno; lavorano
troppo: “I know, I understand it, the Dominicans have it, too; they
overwork.” End of conversation. From that moment on, I had an older
professor-friend—an agnostic Jew who was both demanding and capa-
ble of conveying, in the most implicit of ways, a deep appreciation of
my vocation. I remember wondering why he did not seem angry at the
Holocaust, which had kept him confined for three or four years, in an
alien, Catholic garb; if he had been, what could I have said by way of
response? But he never brought it up; it probably did not occur to him
to complain; for all his artistic intensity, he always struck me as a thank-
ful, contented man.
Many years later, when I was going through Viktor Frankl’s Man’s
Search for Meaning, and even later, when I read some of Elie Wiesel’s
writings and especially Abel J. Herzberg’s Amor Fati,1 I began to
wonder. What struck me then for the first time was a deep similarity in
tone: Professor Morpurgo, who had been safely sheltered in a religious
community, had sounded very much like these survivors, who had lived
through the horror of the death-camps. Could it be that there is a
capacity for human wisdom in us that can be activated both by
Morpurgo’s quiet dependence on the resourceful kindness of others and
by Frankl’s and Wiesel’s and Herzberg’s forced engagement with the
murderous brutality of Auschwitz and Bergen-Belsen? Is there an affin-
ity between humanity acquired by enduring human cruelty and
humanity acquired by experiencing human compassion? And conse-
quently, could it be that the unspeakable atrocity of the Shoa and the
measureless suffering it inflicted is not in a class all by itself? That is,
could the Shoa not be the last word? Let us probe further.
IV
We turn to Mr. Schuijer. What was he like once he was in the tran-
sit camp, and on his way to death, in the train, and at Auschwitz? We
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will never know. But Etty Hillesum’s diary and letters from Westerbork
have preserved for us a few infinitely touching sentences from one of
its inmates, Philip Mechanicus:
I’ve grown softer here in this camp, everyone has become the
same for me, they are all like blades of grass, bending to the
storm, lying flat under the hurricane.
And:
If I survive this time, I shall emerge a more mature and
deeper person, and if I die, then I shall die a more mature
and deeper one.
Everyone has become the same, blades of grass in a hurricane. A softer,
more mature, and deeper person. Friends, is this the still, exquisite
voice of universal kindness—of a love that understands both goodness
and evil and, as a result, does not try to defeat evil, just like God, who
gives sun and rain to both the just and the unjust? Let’s rub our eyes,
my friends. Can kindness and mature humanity flower in the face of
human heartlessness, even when it takes the mad proportions of genocide?
Before we indulge in theoretical speculation about the root of this
unexpected, oh so delicate flower, let us observe that it is noticed and
appreciated only from close up. None outside the camps knew of it.
Inside the camps, a prisoner’s deep humanity would occasionally infu-
riate the brutes that ran the camps, but it mostly escaped their notice.
To this day, rage, fury, and indignation, no matter how principled and
righteous, have no access to deep human maturity. It was and is and
remains the secret—the tender secret—of the fellowship of the suffer-
ing and the long-suffering.
Abel Herzberg, who survived Bergen-Belsen, tells the story of Labi,
the young schoolmaster from Benghazi in Libya. In 1942, about to lose
the campaign in North-Africa, the Nazis had, with the idiocy of prin-
ciple, moved the Jewish communities of Tripoli, Tobruk, and Benghazi,
first to Italy and from there to the death-camps in Poland. Jews were
not to be exterminated locally; they all had to be part of the Final
Solution, and that was supposed to take place in the camps, not on the
battlefield.
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Being from North Africa, Labi is a Jew of the old stamp, older than
any European Jew. No wonder he starts a harmless little school, where
he teaches the children to sing, in Hebrew:
The people of Israel lives,
The people of Israel lives.
And:
Blessed we are, blessed we are!
How lovely is our lot,
How fair is our portion,
We are blessed, we are blessed!
Labi’s fellow-prisoners explain to him that the food-laws are
suspended in the camp. Labi still refuses to eat the only soup avail-
able—the one that has bits of horse-meat floating in it. He quietly
whispers, “There is a difference between clean and unclean.”
Here we have it, my friends, in the midst of a hurricane of merci-
lessness and violence and death, the true Israel—the combination of
the praise of God and the Law of God: Todah and Torah. Awe-filled
faith in a God both faithful and inscrutable beyond compare—the faith
that begets a quiet, assured humanity. That humanity does not demand
that the world in which it finds itself be perfect; it knows and accepts,
quietly and without drama, that we live in a mixed world, in which
some things are (and always will be) kosher and some tref, in order to
convey that some things are (and always will be) lawful and some
forbidden, that some things are (and always will be) good and some
perverse. A world, too, where the wheat is mixed in with the weeds, and
the just are mixed in with the unjust, and the good people with the evil-
doers, and where goodness and virtue will never quite succeed in being
victorious, either in individuals or in communities. A world, therefore,
in which unjust suffering borne in patience is not infrequently a sign of
intimacy with God.
This kind of world needs mercy more than anything else; hence, it
is measured by it. We discover the true measure of the shame involved
in the Shoa, not in our rage and indignation at the crassness of human
crime, but when we are struck by the pity of it all: such deep faith and
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such quiet devotion to justice snuffed out! We kill the kindness we
should cherish and cultivate!
V
Kindness can take incongruous shapes. Professor Morpurgo’s
survival through the kind, unobtrusive services of Italian friars who
have remained anonymous is oddly (you might even say perversely)
reminiscent of the “Schindler Jews” (the Schindlerjuden)—the people
behind the story so memorably told by the Australian novelist Thomas
Keneally, in his book Schindler’s List.
2
A German born in 1908 in
Zwittau, in the Czechoslovakian part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire,
Oskar Schindler was an engineer by training. By the time the second
World War began, he had become known for a well-advertised taste for
the best in food and drink, in fast motorbikes, and, yes, in fast women.
He was also running a few businesses of his own, but he was distin-
guishing himself mainly by an ability to move around central Europe
with the dubious ease of the man who finds it impossible to imagine
that somebody might not like him and not get along with him. The
only trait that seems out of character with all of this was his marriage,
at the age of twenty, to Emilie, the daughter of a nearby gentleman
farmer, a quiet, dignified, infinitely patient person, whose love he treas-
ured and who remained faithful to her roguish husband all her life.
Between 1939 and 1945, the criminal vulgarity of the Nazis met
its match in the blatant, unprincipled opportunism of this irresistible
bon vivant. By dint of extraordinary swagger and bravura, Schindler
succeeded in employing, right under the noses of the Nazis whose
company he cultivated, as many Jews as he could in his enamel facto-
ries near Krakow and elsewhere, which he got classified as Nazi labor
camps. By an amalgam of braggadocio, astuteness, and daring he
succeeded in turning high-ranking SS-officers, whose sinister passions
he understood from almost daily association, into accomplices; he then
proceeded to hire hundreds of Jews away from the death camps, espe-
cially Auschwitz, and to smuggle them out to freedom—many of them
outside Europe.
“Schindler’s camp in Brinnlitz,” an international Jewish organiza-
tion testified after the war, “was the only camp in the Nazi-occupied
territories where a Jew was never killed, or even beaten, but was always
treated as a human being.” After the war, he was honored in Israel as
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one of the Righteous, and invited to plant a carob tree along the
Avenue of the Righteous at Yad Vashem. And in 1966, this cheerful
double-dealer was recalled to West Germany to be awarded the Cross
of Merit and a state pension by the German Federal Republic, and even
a papal knighthood. For this, he had to be brought back from
Argentina, where he had emigrated after the war to be a pelt farmer,
along with twelve Jewish families, whose passage across the ocean he
had paid. In 1974, he collapsed at his apartment in Frankfurt and died
a few days later, mourned by Jews on every continent.
Some time after his death, his wife declared that her husband had
done nothing remarkable before the war and nothing exceptional after.
Yet within weeks of his death, this lifelong but undistinguished, seem-
ingly unprincipled Catholic who had never lived without a mistress or
two and who had become an ardent supporter of Hebrew University in
Jerusalem got the wish he had shared with many of his Schindlerjuden:
he was buried in the city of both War and Peace, Jerusalem, in the
Catholic Cemetery just outside the South Wall. Deep down in his soul,
he must have held on to something on which he refused to compro-
mise: no high moral principle righteously professed, but a wordless
faith maybe, and an un-self-conscious, un-self-righteous sense of
justice, to support a practical conviction that Jews are not for abuse and
killing any more than any other human beings.
VI
At this point, friends, allow me a few musings of my own. I have
never been able to feel any violent rage or indignation at the Holocaust
and its atrocity; I often used to wonder why. I do remember my revul-
sion when Rolf Hochhuth’s play The Deputy hit the stage. Hochhuth
makes an acceptable enough theoretical case for the thesis that a public
protest against the treatment of the Jews on the part of Pope Pius XII
might have made an enormous difference, given his position of influ-
ence in Europe and in Nazi Germany; but he goes on to suggest that
such a protest was simply incumbent upon him as the deputy of Christ,
and that his failure to protest was an act of cowardice as well as cold-
blooded calculation. I have often been embarrassed at my own distaste
for Hochhuth’s thesis, and I used to wonder why. Incidentally, my
problem has never been either an excessive devotion to the Papacy, or
a poor sense of justice, or an incapacity for passion. Like any ordinary
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Catholic, I know that some popes have been guilty of serious mistakes.
I have always found Nazi-hunters like Simon Wiesenthal and, later on,
Beate Klarsfeld fairly easy to understand and accept: the persistent
search for criminals in hiding is part of our agreement to live in a world
of laws, not expedience. And as for passion, I understand indignation.
I was only fourteen when the war ended, but that made me old enough
to have been affected for life. Now, fifty years after the war, I am still
no stranger to rage. I confess that over the years I have uttered some
harsh words to Germans who acted or sounded a little too much like
the Germans we knew in the nineteen-forties, and just over twenty
years ago, near the Heidelberg Schloß, a close friend had to restrain me
physically to prevent me from jumping from behind the steering-wheel
and taking after a hapless German parking guard who had needlessly
yelled at me.
So I used to wonder, why have I never experienced any violent
reaction to the Shoah? Over the years, I have come to a conclusion.
VII
Between them, I now think, kind, defenseless Mr. Schuijer and
kind, compassionate Professor Morpurgo have inoculated me against
raw rage as well as against the kind of principled, righteous indignation
at the Shoah that young Hochhuth’s play celebrates and makes an effort
to induce. Thanks to these two men, the Shoah, to me, for all its horror,
has never become a cause. Thanks to them, it has remained a human
fact; and human facts resist reduction to theory.
Why? Human facts are created and cherished and suffered in
neighborliness, whereas causes and theories are made and upheld and
refuted from a distance. There is an unholy affinity between distance
and fury; absence obviously makes the heart grow, not only fonder, but
also more enraged. I remember a difficult person I was friendly with at
one time. A man of considerable talent and idealism, he was also
discouragingly intolerant. He had a few preferred ways of countering
those of us who even mildly questioned him and his doings. He would
vehemently refer us to the writings of the young Marx (with which he
had only a glancing acquaintance); he would go on about the murder
of Allende (which had occurred in faraway Chile); and he would quote
Nietzsche (whom he had scarcely read) to inveigh against what he
called the prevailing “slave-mentality.” That is, he availed himself of
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faraway causes and theories of undisputed righteousness to browbeat
people right in front of him, by implicitly accusing them of not caring
about the wrongs of the world. Deep down, I guess, he must have felt
impotent and lonely: as impotent as the powerless and the over-
whelmed and the abandoned who see no option other than that of
conveying their offended sense of justice by means of the threat of
violence; as impotent as the many little people in a Germany humili-
ated by the Treaty of Versailles, ready to run after a small man with a
shrill voice and a large ego and a murderous theory, who was ready to
find fault and to pass the suffering on and to take the impotence—his
own and a whole nation’s—out on all of Europe, and above all on the
Jews.
It is in human facts, my friends, that our thirst for violence and our
appetite for faultfinding is quenched. For human facts are tender and
make tender.
My personal link with the Shoah, I know, is flimsy indeed:
what’s two elderly Jewish men, one dead and one a survivor, in
comparison with the Shoah’s millions of silent Jewish dead and its
twelve million anguished Jewish survivors, forced to be spectators at
the Shoa from abroad or to remember it after the fact, many of
whom have drawn the conclusion that it marks the end of any
possibility of faith in Israel’s God—my God—the Lord of history
and the God of mercy?
And what are those two in comparison with the countless Jews
who suffered violence before the Shoah? This year marks the fifth
centennial, not only of Columbus’s discovery of the New World in
1492, but also of the event that up until the Holocaust was regarded as
the high point of Jewish suffering—the event that put an end to the
most significant Jewish community of the Middle Ages: the expulsion
of the Sephardis from Spain. There were Jews who stayed of course, but
some hundred thousand of them were compelled to forswear their faith
and adopt the Catholic religion. At the risk of their lives, many of these
Jews continued to attend the synagogue in secret. To this day, every
time the Kol Nidrei is sung or said before sundown during the service
that opens Yom Kippur, to declare the annual dispensation from all
vows, the Spanish persecution comes back to mind, when the Jews sang
the Kol Nidrei text as a way of freeing themselves from the vows
enjoined upon them by the Inquisition. And the evil did not stop there.
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A cloud of suspicion continued to hang over the heads of the Jews (and,
incidentally, of the many Moors who had not fled to North Africa
before the armies of Ferdinand and Isabella) who had become Catholics
and even their descendants, since they could not claim the purity of
blood—the limpieza de sangre—that marked the true, “old” Christians.
In this way, my friends, five hundred years ago, it was Spanish Jewry’s
turn to be the field of blades of grass lying low in a hurricane of
unkindness. Again, what’s two kind, elderly Jewish men in comparison
with those hundreds of thousands?
The answer is that two kind Jewish men are a human bond, a tenu-
ous bridge of human kindness delicately but firmly leading to further
human kindness; through them, thank God, I have been placed close
enough to the Shoa to make it impossible for me to get stuck in distant
rage or to resort to high theory to support indignation or to insist on
determining who is to blame. Thank God for human kindnesses—the
kindness shown to Professor Morpurgo by a handful of obscure
Dominican friars and to the Schindlerjuden by Oskar Schindler. Thank
God, too, for the softness and the maturity and the depth of Philip
Mechanicus and so many others in the camps, who never came back.
They give us hope for a humanity renewed by kindness, in the name of
the God whose self-revelation to Moses in chapters 33 and 34 in the
Book of Exodus consists of two inseparable elements: the proclamation
of the Ten Commandments calls us to responsibility, and the glorifica-
tion of the divine Kindness and Compassion calls on us to be
compassionate as our dear God is compassionate.
VIII
Friends, the Shoah urges us to be on guard against all unkindness.
Violence of every kind inures us to further violence, and makes us
forever enamored of the kind of heroism that stirs the ego but dries up
the source of life in us. Self-righteousness encourages us to equate
everyday human resourcefulness and shrewdness with cowardice and to
despise ordinary virtue; the righteous forget that real cowards are
seldom gracious and often violent. Most forms of rage and indignation
will make us desperate to see some kind of justice harshly done—say,
by a furious Pius XII inflicting a mortal wound on the monster that
went around ravaging Europe and the Jews, thus goading it on to
further senseless ravage. What a deadly mess it was. What a horrible
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waste of human life and talent, knowingly inflicted. But if we are to
dread the instincts that made the mess and caused the waste, we must
also dread the murderous instinct in ourselves.
This means, among other things, that all of us are to dread the
moment when we feel that we are in the right in regard to the
Holocaust. Who is entitled to feel right in the face of unspeakable
suffering? The Shoah is simply too appalling and painful an event for
anyone to have a right to claim to be right about it. This kind of
“being right” occurs, for instance, when we find ourselves coming to
the conclusion that the only true virtue at the time of the Shoah was
extraordinary virtue, and that particular persons other than those
who practiced ordinary virtue should have practiced it. “Being right”
also happens when we, today, inflict another indignity on the Shoah
and its victims: overstatement with an air of finality. Liars make a
habit of calling things unprecedented and historic only because they
know neither precedent nor history. We must resist the rhetoric of
those who use superlatives only because they are both ignorant and
convinced they are right. The Shoah has horrors all its own, but it is
neither better understood nor more deeply repented of by being
called history’s worst sin. God knows what we may do next, or what
has really happened in the past. And only God knows the ultimate
sin.
IX
Kindness enables conversion. Conversion on the part of us
Christians first. We cannot plead innocent. Our own unhealthy broth-
ers and sisters committed the sinful crime, and we are members of the
same body. We have to beg our Jewish brothers and sisters for mercy.
Part of our penance will be that we endure their anger and agree to
suffer whenever their despair about the Shoa should turn out to have
robbed them of their historic faith in God. Part of our penance will also
be that we will kindly but resolutely disagree with them when their
anxiety drives them into the overstatement that the Shoa is the unique
and final evil, the unforgivable sin.
Why? Among human persons, mercy given to people begging for
it is mercy only if it softens and matures the people who give it. If we
Christians do not implore the Jews for mercy, we will rob them of an
opportunity to be kind, and so encourage them to feel justified in
TWO KIND JEWISH MEN /  179
giving us only wrath. Thus our prayer for mercy can give growth in
kindness and maturity to Jews. They need it; after all, they now share
with the nations the dubious privilege we Christians have had for
centuries: that of wielding weaponry that can kill. Now that we are
united by the capacity for institutional violence, kindness and forgive-
ness must unite us even more deeply.
X
In the Art Institute in Chicago, where I live, hangs Marc Chagall’s
White Crucifixion. It depicts Christ crucified surrounded by Jews killed,
Jews hunted down, Jews driven around, synagogues burning, Torah-
scrolls desecrated.
To a Jew, this is the world upside down: the cross, the traditional
symbol of the pogroms, has become the emblem of compassion. For
Christians, too, the tables are turned. Jesus is no longer (as even the
Gospels depict him) the victim of Jewish rejection; he is on the side of
the victims: the Jews. Naked and exposed, the picture of innocence, his
only covering is the talith, the shawl worn by Jewish men at prayer; he
has become the associate of the suffering Jews who have none but God
to commit themselves to.
And so, my friends in God, may I end by suggesting that Jesus can
unite us, Christians and Jews? We Christians think of his execution as
history’s worst sin. But we do not claim to understand this dreadful sin
down to the bottom, and consequently, our faith does not entitle us to
profess the ugliness of the killing of Jesus in such a way as to suggest
that other appalling historic sins are less deplorable by comparison.
And in any case, we profess above all that the dying Jesus embodies
God’s life-giving embrace of all of us sinners—an embrace that calls for
universal reconciliation and kindness, not discrimination. Together,
then, could we not all abandon ourselves, in worship, to the
Compassionate God who has made us and who forever wishes to
restore us? And together must we not recognize in one another the
family features we have in common with all of humanity? Kind knows
kind. Those who have eyes to see know the secret: humanity—all of
humanity!—visibly, indelibly made in the image and likeness of the
invisible God.
180 / Frans Jozef van Beeck
Notes
A sermon delivered at the Sage Chapel at Cornell University on May 3, 1992,
as the annual sermon in commemoration of the Shoah. Published in Cross
Currents 42 (1992): 174-84; it elicited an exchange of letters between Eugene
B. Borowitz and the author, in the Fall issue of Cross Currents that same year:
42 (1992): 417-24. Lightly revised for the present collection.
1. Abel J. Herzberg, Amor fati: zeven opstellen over Bergen-Belsen
(Amsterdam: Moussault, 1947); translated into English as Amor Fati,
Attachment to Fate: Seven Essays on Bergen-Belsen, translated by Jack Santcross
(Middlesex, England, 2001).
2. Thomas Keneally, Schindler’s List (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1982).
TWO KIND JEWISH MEN /  181
Picking up the Cross–Whose?
Christian Resources for Growth-by-Repentance
If Jesus, crucified, had remained gone and away, I would in all
likelihood not have openly acknowledged the cross, for I
would probably have covered it up, along with my Master. But
with the resurrection coming after the cross, I am not ashamed
to speak about it at length.1
What is it to be a Jesuit? It is to know that one is a sinner, yet
called to be a companion of Jesus was: Ignatius, who begged
the Blessed Virgin to “place him with her Son,” and who then
saw the Father himself ask Jesus, carrying his Cross, to take
this pilgrim into his company.2
Preliminary: The Cross
Jews executed by stoning. In the Greek world, crucifixion was
universally regarded as a barbarian import. For the Romans it became
summum supplicium—the severest and worst form of execution.3
In the New Testament, the noun “cross” (Gk. stauros) occurs
twenty-seven times.
4
In twenty-two instances, a firm majority, the word
is directly associated with Jesus of Nazareth, the Christ—an unsurpris-
ing fact given that the New Testament writings were produced by a
far-flung network of small communities worshiping as alive, right in
their midst, a Jew fairly recently executed by crucifixion.
Still, in the five remaining instances—all of them occurring in
sayings attributed to Jesus—the noun is immediately associated not
with Jesus, but with discipleship, and in a hypothetical sense: “if some-
one should wish to be a disciple, . . .” Of these five, three occur in
synoptic parallels, combined with their apparent equivalents, “if some-
one should wish to save/lose his life, . . . ,”—the latter phrase being also
found in the fourth gospel (Jn 12, 25). In the remaining two cases,
presumably deriving from the sayings source known as Q, the cross is
coupled with that other requisite of discipleship around Jesus: if you
should wish to be a disciple of Jesus,’ “leave everything behind and pick
up your cross” (Mt 10, 38-39 par. Lk 24, 25-27).
It seems unlikely that Jesus actually—i.e., historically—picked up
his own cross; Simon from Cyrene was forced to do that (Mk 15, 21);
only in the fourth gospel does he carry it for himself (Jn 19, 17).
Historically speaking, did he pronounce those five sayings? There are
good reasons to assume he did not. But the historical fact of Jesus’
crucifixion does make it easy to understand why “carrying one’s cross”
should have become a pregnant Christian phrase. In fact, the Pauline
corpus shows a number of other, expressive, very quotable phrases, no
two of them identical, most of which can be confidently dated between
50 and 90 A.D.— i.e., older than (or at least as old) the gospels as we
have them. Here they are: the cross must not be “voided” or “nullified”;
“talk of the cross” is hard to take;5 “the cross’ scandal” has conse-
quences; yet paradoxically, Christ’s cross is also a “boast”; and while
Christ was dying to do the Father’s will to the point of “death on a
cross,” some people are “enemies of Christ’s cross”; God has united two
enemies of long standing—Jews and Gentiles—“in and by means of
the cross”; thus, Christ’s “bloodied cross” has created peace; God has
“posted on the cross the writ listing the charges against us”(1 Cor 1, 17-
18; Gal 5, 11; 6, 12. 14; Phil 2, 8; 3, 18; Eph 2, 16; Col 1, 20; 2, 14).
In this context, the verb “crucify” (Gk. stauro) is relevant as well, espe-
cially in the form “letting oneself be crucified” (Gk. staurthnai): Christ
(not Paul!) let himself “be crucified out of weakness.”6 Even the author
of the Book of Revelation can talk about the Evil City where the two
Olive Trees were killed and left lying in the street and where “their
Lord, too, let himself be crucified” (Rev 11, 8). Finally, the Letter to
the Hebrews sums the meaning of the cross in a single word: shame.7
In Hebrew, “shame” (6&8:) is the appalling contrary of God’s Holy
Name, meaning “Abomination,” and used to avoid dignifying “Ba’al”
with his proper name.
No wonder the theme of shame takes us back all the way to the
“original shame” in the account of the Fall in Genesis. Adam and Eve
are hiding from God, behind the bushes, ashamed because naked on
account of having committed the one sin God had forbidden: eating
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the food that will give them the powerful wisdom enabling them to
hold others accountable for good and evil. Overwhelmed by shame,
they now sit in judgment on themselves and overlook the most obvi-
ous thing they can do: emerge right into the presence of God, even if
defeated by shame. Instead, they settle for what they have wished for:
along with shame and miserable self-consciousness, ingrained prefer-
ence for judging will be their doom; it will unmake their lives—with
themselves and with others.
If Adam and Eve have lost their ability to enter into the Presence
of God, Jesus of Nazareth does precisely that at his Baptism, right in
the teeth of John the Baptizer’s protest that he is turning the world
upside down. By replying that this is the proper way “to fulfill all
justice,”8 Jesus makes the saving difference. Still, eventually, his offen-
sively kind approach to sinners turns out to be more than anyone can
live with: he is forced out into death, once and for good, with the
shame of human sin beaten into his innocent body—“made sin for all”
(2 Cor 5, 21. Cf. 1 Pet 2, 24). At last, there he hangs, on “his” cross,
put to the utmost test but found true to God, ready to get himself
revealed as the sacrament of God’s new creation, to the ever-greater
glory of God’s faithful, merciful Love.
Thus, if anything qualifies as a Christian means to help bring on
conversion and repentance among the world religions it is the combi-
nation of the twin ingredients of true worship: giving glory to God by
confession of human sin, and vice versa, taking responsibility for
human sin in praise of God, as Augustine reminded his listeners.9 Our
late pope, John Paul II, has been doing this time and again, whether the
cardinals liked it or not, especially on his later journeys: acknowledging
the Catholic Church’s past sins and asking for forgiveness, and praising
God in hopes of a humanity renewed by justice and peace based on
mutual forgiveness and appreciation.
Let this be the opening thought for this essay. It is also found in
the two epigraphs at the top of this essay.
Religions Crossing Borders: Surprises, Anxieties
In the city of Chicago, in the Art Institute, hangs Marc Chagall’s
White Crucifixion. In that remarkable painting, finished well before the
Shoah and its horrors, the crucified Christ is surrounded by scenes from
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East European pogroms—Jews harassed, hunted down, driven out of
town, synagogues on fire, Torah-scrolls desecrated. What sense do
Jewish eyes make of this? Surely, this must be the world upside down?
Is the cross, the immemorial sign and symbol of persecution, becom-
ing the emblem of God’s compassion with the suffering Jews?
However, in any case, Chagall’s painting turns the tables on us,
Christians. Here, Jesus is not the victim of Jewish rejection, as he is
portrayed even in the gospels; rather, naked and forlorn, he is on the
Jewish—i.e., the victims’— side; his only covering is the talith, worn by
Jewish men at prayer. He has become the exemplar of the suffering Jews
on their endless way through “the desert of the nations” (Ez 20, 33-38),
with only the Living God to abandon themselves to. The Exodus all
over again, pictured by a Ukrainian Jew in the nineteen-thirties, when
the worst was yet to come for the Jews in Europe.
Is Jesus Christ really scorned by Christians? In Chagall’s painting
the answer to this question is all the plainer for being wordless: Yes,
those who acknowledge Jesus of Nazareth as God’s Messiah and their
Savior do disavow him in the persons of the Jews they persecute
systemically—i.e., as a matter of habit. But how can this be? Another
Jew, Zvi Kolitz, in his famous short story Yossel Rakover Speaks to God,
written in 1946, not only asks the question but also very explicitly
answers it: in the figure of Yossel Rakover, about to die with the words
of the dying Jesus on his lips, Jesus Christ is rejected by those who
actively inflict violence on the Jews, but more insidiously, by all the
self-absorbed, apathetic Christians who by their silence become accom-
plices to that injustice.10
A change of scene. What comes to mind is Chaim Potok’s novel My
Name is Asher Lev—the story of the Jewish painter whose Brooklyn
Crucifixion gets him estranged from his Ladover Hasidic community,
albeit with the tacit blessing of its mysterious rabbi.11 There is also the
voice of Hans-Georg Gadamer, born in 1900 and at the age of ninety-
nine still asking questions raised by the future. He was also saying that
he was now aware of “how often I have been wrong.” But then again, he
was also raising a theme he had always treated with agnostic (if respect-
ful) silence, namely, the great religions’ common responsibility. They
must keep their differences from degenerating into violence, he said;
only thus will they succeed in doing justice to the Mystery beyond all of
our horizons. In Gadamer’s eyes, this was the hermeneutical challenge of
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our day. In saying this, was he repenting of his long silence on religion?
Was he a prophet speaking up with a voice he had long heard inside?
Was he both? Who knows? But does it matter?
Yet another scene. There is our Holy Father Pope John Paul II at
prayer in Assisi, flanked by so many other people of the Spirit in posi-
tions of prophetic opportunity and responsibility in the religions. But
on the rebound, I hear the panic-stricken laments, begun by fellow
Catholics less than twenty-four hours after the prayer at Assisi and still
heard as well as disseminated in print today, declaring that Pope John
Paul II is a near-heretic misleading the whole world about the truths of
the Catholic faith, that we Catholics are now being told to eat the bitter
fruits of the apostasy authorized by Nostra Ætate, the second Vatican
Council’s decree on the Catholic Church’s relations with the non-
Christian religions, and even that the recent earthquakes at Assisi
simply must be considered divine punishment for the iniquity commit-
ted there.12
In our day, what is befalling us? Let us go back to the other end of
the spectrum. In August 2000, the Elijah School for the Study of
Wisdom in World Religions in Jerusalem invited an international team
of professors and students to raise the following questions: What is
conversion? Is it conceivable for persons or even communities to be
members of more than one great religion? Thus, could I, a committed
Jesuit priest, be a Jew or a Hindu as well, recognizably, in a meaning-
ful sense of those designations? The teaching team consisted of a
Baptist Christian, a Hindu, a Muslim, a Buddhist, a dean of a religious
studies department at a North American university, an orthodox Jew,
and a Jesuit priest, a Roman Catholic by both default and choice, not
to mention election.
Something else. A few years ago, we have witnessed the publication
of Hindu Wisdom for All God’s Children, written by a Jesuit priest; could
this be a promise of a new harvest—of peace?13 Some more facts. After
centuries of oblivion, the writings of the sixteenth-century Dominican
priest and bishop Bartolomé de las Casas (1474-1566) are being read
again; they are the single most poignant indictment of the Spanish
Conquista in what is now Northern Latin America.14 They decry the
soldiers’ and missionaries’ tactic of demonizing the native Americans’
deities and rituals in order to create pretexts for destroying the culture
and seizing the people’s lands. Six years ago, an old Jesuit friend who
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has lived, learned, and taught theology in Indonesia for over fifty years,
told me that the Portuguese (“who have never bothered to do anything
for the indigenous peoples they colonized except bring them the faith”)
are loved to this day by the natives everywhere, at least in the coastal
areas they colonized—East Timor being one example. Hard to believe.
But could it be true, at least to a degree? And to that degree, could it
tell us something today?
So we could go on and on, especially in Jerusalem—still as preg-
nant with the Promise of Final Justice and Peace as it has been the scene
of perpetual injustice and war, starting (arguably) with King David’s
capture of Zion, the Jebusite stronghold that became the City of David,
whose third millennium was commemorated at the Shalom Hartman
Institute in 1991.15
What is happening to us, I suggest, is that the great religions are at
last beginning to find it within themselves not only to affect other great
religions—that has happened a lot, often with a vengeance—but also
(and especially) to let themselves be affected by them. Are the mixed-
up fortunes of past history really turning into today’s moral agenda? Is
fated encounter at last occasioning human encounter? And will this
encounter beget peace or war? My answer is provisional. It may lead to
peace, if only we can stop living our religions politically and instead, let
ourselves be fed at the wellsprings of repentance within each of our reli-
gions. Why repentance? Because it is the only way to create something
new and gracious out of our centuries-old history of blaming and
meting out punishment to each other. So what I will discuss with you
is the following question: What are the inner resources for repentance
in the Christian faith I find myself privileged to profess?
Universalism
In a prophetic essay, Karl Rahner explained years ago that the
Catholic Church is now empirically catholic—i.e., universal—for the
first time in history.
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It had always been universal by virtue of the
Creed (“I believe in the Church, One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic”),
but now there actually are Catholics everywhere, along with their nuns,
catechists, deacons, priests, even bishops. This is a fact of elemental reli-
gious significance, and I wish to explain that it represents not a Catholic
success, but a new Christian (and thus, Catholic) responsibility, one of
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whose critical elements is voluntary repentance. Empirical universalism is
here, and here to stay. So must repentance be. Why? Let me start with
a few thoughts on universalism.
All the great religions are universalistic. One way or another, they
have a world view; the universe is their horizon. Jews and Christians
start their Scriptures with a God who creates “the heavens and the
earth”; they know of eternal Wisdom, Word from the beginning, pre-
existent Torah dwelling with God’s human children, which will bring
humanity and the universe home to God, Holy, Faithful, and Just.
Hindus know of the Lord Vishnu and his consubstantial Consort Sri—
the Unity from which and to which flows all that lives and dies, in a
perpetual quest for a Universal Self-Knowledge and Liberation (moksa).
Buddhists know of the Nirvana—the Lightsome Nothing-of-any-Kind-
in-Particular beyond all change and beyond all the passion change has
caused, is causing, and will always cause. China knows of the Tao, the
unchartable Road that invisibly maps all charts and roads—the everyday
ones we think we know as much as the ones we do not know, or do not
know yet. Muslims worship Allah Who is no less Merciful for being
Great, and Who will judge the whole world accordingly: in Majesty and
Mercy. And even the “little,” “local” religions—of the tribes, the clans,
the nomads, the marginals—are “great”: for they, too, have their broad
horizons and their intimations of a Transcendent Mystery that bears and
carries and steers and judges all of us and the whole world as well.
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Yes, no human soul, and few if any human cultures, are without a
taste for the Infinite, and thus, no world religion is without universal-
ism. Wonderful. Entrancing. And so, the place where we can fall prey
to great illusions. Let us see.
The Bewitchment of False Universalism
It is the height of irony that the cultural movement which first got
interested in the world religions, namely, the early Enlightenment, not
only put tolerance at the top of its agenda, but also ended up drawing
the worst conclusion from these religions’ existence. How so? In the
late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, Western Europe and
North America saw the rise of a new type of faith in God, now better
known as Deism. It was residually Christian in that it did not altogether
drop either the Bible or Jesus. Still, disgusted with the religious wars of
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the recent past and enchanted by a largely implicit Platonism, it viewed
worship and doctrine as root causes of hypocrisy and violence and
wrote them off; instead, it put its faith in ethics. Accordingly, in Deism,
sincerity and reasonableness became humanity’s chief religious virtues,
and the Living God became distant: on principle, God ceased to be the
God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and of Moses and the prophets, God
the Father of Jesus Christ, and Allah Great and Merciful—the latter
probably unbeknownst to most Muslims at the time Deism developed.
The first victims of Deist Enlightenment were the educated Jews,
especially in the German-speaking countries. In Jerusalem oder über
religiöse Macht und Judentum (1783), Moses Mendelssohn (1729-86)
agreed that the truths of Judaism were none other than those which
God had taught to all rational beings “by fact and idea”; hence, prac-
tices enjoined by the written Torah are a matter not of truth but (like
all things in “organized religion”) of optional acceptance of special,
non-universalist traditions.
On the rebound as it were, the new, enlightened cultural arbiters
of the West decided they had now at last understood what religion
really was, namely, humanity’s natural religiosity, pure, unspoilt, and
so, universal as well as tolerant on principle. Accordingly, Jews were
considered “wise” people and nothing else—Gotthold Ephraim Lessing
(1729-81) wrote Nathan der Weise to show just that. In fact, all the reli-
gions of India, Japan, China, “Turkey” (i.e., the world of Islam), and
Ethiopia (not to mention all the noble savages that the Enlightened
thought they were seeing all over the world) were deemed fascinating
as well as pure—far purer, in fact, than unenlightened European
Christianity and ditto Judaism, both of which were largely mired in the
darkness of custom and credulity, since they had mistaken worship and
doctrine for something they were certainly not, namely, integral to religion.
I leave it to my Muslim friends to tell us if they agree that the Deist
depiction of their religious observances as a matter of custom rather
than reality is a compliment. Somehow I doubt it. Somehow, too, I
doubt that Christian theologians like John Hick (whose thought was
shaped by Vedanta neo-Hinduism, whose literature is entirely in
English) have done us an enduring service.18 For in the real world, filled
with resentment as it is, we cannot expect a peaceful future except if we
agree in principle to settle our accounts with the past. But I am running
ahead of myself.
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Universalism and the Modern Study of the Religions
That all human beings and cultures live by a native, undeniable
sense of Transcendence is one thing. But I wish to propose that the
idealization of human religiosity as the common umbrella of principled
tolerance, under which all actual religions can feel equally at home,
amounts to a huge exercise in overlooking and forgetting—one of lais-
sez-faire Western devising. Let me start with a few quick arguments.
I am an educated Christian believer, thank heavens; but precisely my
education must teach me that I must be wary of thought-systems that
authorize me to make positive truth statements about things I have never
studied—matters I know just enough about to realize I do not really know
about them at all. In my case, an example would be Hinduism. Let me put
this in more general terms. It is clearly sound to distinguish between
humanity’s common, innate orientation to the Infinite on the one hand and
the particular cults, codes, and creeds of the “positive” religions on the other.
But it is equally clearly unsound to separate the two, and then to proceed to
idealize the religious impulse at the expense of the great religious traditions.
Idealizing the former is implicitly to declare that the religions’ distinctive
traits are of no religious (or, for that matter, human) significance.
Quite rightly, therefore, historians of religion have concluded that
world religions must be studied in their particular manifestations if
they are to be understood. Yet even here a caution is fitting: the reli-
gions must be studied not “neutrally” or “objectively” (as if they were
mere folklore or social construction) but sympathetically—i.e.,
precisely as the distinctive traditions that enable the many members of
actual religious communities to live in awe, docility, self-awareness, and
intellectual integrity in the face of the Always-Greater Unknown
Present in the Cosmos, and closer to home, somehow Present here and
now, with, among, and in us. Here if anywhere, “God is in the details.”
This is where an eminent hermeneutical challenge meets us, at two
levels of increasing ontological intensity.
False Universalism, Enlightened Irresponsibility
First off, the hermeneutical task involved in the study of the reli-
gions is in and of itself daunting. Friedrich Schleiermacher intuited this
when over two centuries ago he wrote that
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in those despised positive religions . . . everything proves to be
real, vigorous and definite; there every single intuition has its
definite consistency, and a connection, all its own, with the
rest; there every feeling has its own sphere and its particular
reference. There you will find every modification of religiosity
somewhere, as well as every state of feeling to which only reli-
gion can transport a person; there you will find every part of
religion cultivated somewhere, and each of its effects achieved
somewhere; there all common institutions and every individ-
ual expression are proof of the high value placed on religion,
even to the point of forgetting everything else. There the holy
zeal with which religion is observed, shared, and enjoyed, and
the childlike desire with which new revelations of heavenly
powers are anticipated, are your guarantee that not a single
one of religion’s elements, which it was possible in any way to
perceive from this standpoint, has been overlooked, and that
not a single one of its moments has vanished without leaving
a monument behind.19
So, understanding a religion other than one’s own from within its
own amazingly coherent world is a huge interpretive undertaking. Let
me remember here with admiration the late Wilfred Cantwell Smith
(1916-2000), a Christian missionary who came to love the Muslim
subculture of India, and so came to understand it deeply. His works
evidence both the blessings inherent in the task and its difficulty.20 For
great blessings are indeed attached to understanding religions different
from one’s own, and the great philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer has
made it his life’s work to explain how and why. Only by attempting to
understand the unfamiliar “other” (Gadamer has shown) can we, famil-
iar with ourselves but always to a degree prejudiced as well, come to
refreshingly authentic self-discovery; painstaking discovery of the other is
the royal road to self-awareness.21 And self-awareness— “Know Thyself”—
purified by long-suffering has a way of turning us into serene and fair
judges in all things human.
Please allow me to transpose this into the language of the Christian
Creed. Only the one who comes down “for our sake and for the sake
of our salvation” and is “crucified under Pontius Pilate” can be trusted
to “come in glory to do justice to the living and the dead.”
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So far so good. We must turn to the second level. Schleiermacher
is aware that religions often appear in “the form of a servant”;22 not only
do they bear the marks of their limitations in time and space; they also
bear the multifarious marks of their adherents’ human poverty. The
religions, he implies, are not above criticism. But, so Schleiermacher
goes on, if we are to criticize them correctly, we must make thoughtful
efforts to interpret them as they deserve to be interpreted, namely, in
light of what he calls the reverential feeling of absolute dependence on
the Deity. This is what I just referred to as “humanity’s common, innate
orientation to the Infinite.”
Now this is exactly where Deism has let us down. It has reduced reli-
giosity to an exclusively human attribute and left the question of its
reference to the Infinite to its own devices; in doing so, it can be said to
have missed a major theological issue—one that it took geniuses like
Maurice Blondel and Karl Rahner to develop: humanity’s “transcenden-
tal” orientation to an actual Infinite. But what concerns us at this point is
something else: Deism’s proposal for an enlightened religiosity is an
anthropological error. The Enlightened Few, basking in their enlighten-
ment, and preaching a gospel of simplicity, sincerity, rationality, and
tolerant optimism à la Voltaire’s Candide, took their leave of reality. Firstly,
they did not dignify us, common humanity all over the world, with any
informed interest in our diverse ways of being human; but secondly and
far more importantly, by declaring us natively pure, they tacitly disavowed
any association with failure, evil, and sin—ours and (presumably) their
own. By thus treating humanity’s history of violence and discrimination
en bagatelle, the Enlightenment did all of us an injustice in the very act of
paying all of us a compliment: at first blush, what it told us about our
original “pure” humanity was flattering, but the naiveté hidden in the
compliment was sinfully misleading. For, by calling us unspoilt children,
the Enlightenment and its aftermath came to wash its hands of moral
responsibility and encouraged all of us to do the same. Schleiermacher did
not make this mistake. He recognized “the human form” as “the form of
a slave” when he saw it; dare I presume he saw it in Jesus to start with?
Blaming? Forgetting? Repenting?
All this raises a big theological issue. Let me begin by giving you
fair warning: this issue cannot be raised without embarrassment, and
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embarrassment is just that: embarrassing. Around the Mediterranean
basin, embarrassment has long been one of the worst crimes against
humanity: loss of face, brutta figura. “Thou shalt not embarrass” is
regarded as a near-divine commandment—one (let me quickly add)
far from unknown in other parts of the world. One of the character-
istics of Pope John Paul II’s indubitable courage has been to fear
neither embarrassment nor human judgment. Chagall did the same
by portraying Jesus as the associate of the persecuted Jews; even while
criticized by many Jews, he also faced the traditional Christian self-
understanding with a major embarrassment, by suggesting that
Christians could, or should, recognize the suffering Jesus in suffering
Jewry.
So, can we Christians tolerate the embarrassment of being faced
with the sins of a culture which we have played a principal part in shap-
ing? Can Jews here in Israel learn how do it? Can Muslims, Hindus,
Buddhists, Taoists? Or are we all doomed to at once remind all those
who embarrass us by challenging us how wrong they are, or in any case,
that they are at most only partially correct—something that typically
applies to most of us?
Accordingly, can (or should) we Catholics see the suffering
Jesus in the victims of the Crusades—many of them simple
Muslims whose religion was defamed in the interest of a Holy
War—a Christian one this time? Can we see Jesus in Jan Hus,
burned at the stake for reasons that had far more to do with city-
dwellers’ anti-peasant affect than with God? Can we see Jesus in
Galileo, a testy man for sure, but silenced, imprisoned, and discred-
ited for trying to understand what he had observed? Can we see him
in wild souls like Giordano Bruno and Girolamo Savonarola and
Michele Sozzini and Menocchio the miller,
23
a bit of an influential
village particularist bullied by the Inquisition in Northern Italy in
the late sixteenth century—all of them burned at the stake? Do we
really owe it to ourselves to be ready first of all to resort to history
or apologetics in the interest of at least partly excusing ourselves, by
explaining that those things were due to “emergency situations” or
“different times”?
Let us tighten our question. Pascal wrote that “Jésus sera en agonie
jusqu’à la fin du monde: il ne faut pas dormir pendant ce temps-là.”24
Could we Christians, Orthodox, Catholics, and Protestants, agree that,
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as a matter of habitual ecumenical effort, we will attempt to discern first
of all—i.e., before we say anything else—in the measureless suffering in
our world, the suffering Jesus? Will we try to listen before we get to
profess the clarity of our consciences or to defend our reputation? Can
we become more open to corrections ventured and charges brought by
others and less interested in self-maintenance and self-assertion? Do
we have an habitually open ear to the cries of the otherwise voiceless
poor?25 Can we suspend our habits of insisting on being our own
judges, and try to determine the precise extent of our mistakes before
we listen to others? Or will we let ourselves and our exploits be called
into question only after we have come up with answers that show our
past mistakes are “not so bad as they are being made to appear”? And
are we ready to suffer embarrassment at least partly deserved? And if
so, does this require of us Catholics and all other Christians, first, a
change of imagination, and then, too, a reinterpretation of the
Christian doctrine about the person of Jesus and his ministry of show-
ing understanding for “the ignorant and the wayward”?26 Will we
undertake such a reinterpretation in the light of our past relationships
with Jews, Muslims, Unitarians, with honest dissenters inside the
Catholic Church, with pioneers in scholarship and science? We could
go on. Will we try to follow Jesus in his silence when he was facing his
judges, as Origen tried to do, witness the preface to his Contra
Celsum?27 Will our theologians? Will our bishops? Will the Roman
curia?
Praise and Repentance
This essay has become more homiletic than readers can be
expected to tolerate. In fact, the human frailty obvious even in such
powerful communities as the Catholic Church or indeed, the Christian
world, may make it hard even for those giants to tolerate it. So let us
end by suggesting more articulately where in our own Tradition we
Christians can go to repentance school.
Saint Augustine puts it quite tersely: confessio and confiteor mean
both “praising God” and “accusing ourselves;” the two are but two sides
of one and the same coin.28 And we have his Confessions to prove it: they
are the longest prayer of praise and thanksgiving offered to God in
Christian history as well as the longest act of penitence for a sinful and
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misguided past life—a life which, being incomplete, is apt to continue
to be plagued by sin.
Augustine, original as he may be, is not the one who discovered
what I just pointed out. He found this habit of praise and penitence
in the Bible, and specifically in the Book of Psalms. “It is not
surprising that the Confessions, suffused as they are with a dramatic
sense of God’s interventions in Augustine’s life, are studded with the
language of the Psalms.”29 In ever so many Psalms, laments about
one’s own weakness and sin, professions of innocence in God’s pres-
ence, indignation about the lack of fairness and justice in the world,
denunciation of violent and cunning enemies all around,
complaints about God’s apparent indifference to the just, and more
than anything else, consternation at the prospect of losing one’s life
are being shamelessly uttered, with a passion; yet, in the very act of
being uttered they turn into the very stuff of praise and thanksgiv-
ing offered to God, “the Lord, Mighty, Merciful and Gracious,
Longsuffering and Abundant in Love and Truth, keeping faith with
thousands, forgiving iniquity, transgression, and sin, but who will
by no means clear the guilty” (Ex 34, 6-7). The knowledge and
acknowledgment of God and the profession of unworthiness are
inseparable, witness Moses and Elijah.
Faith and Asking Questions
For Christians, faith in God through Jesus Christ is inseparable
from what we call Jesus’ Resurrection. We are a habitually disconso-
late humanity, often caught in failure and sin; yet like Adam and
Eve, rather than appearing shamefaced before the Living One, we try
to abscond in the underbrush and cover our nakedness in front of
each other. But no cover-up will do; what we need is not a palliative
but the truth: an image of the very snake that has bitten us, lifted up
on high, a monument to our lostness for all of us gaze on (Num 21,
6-9); we need Jesus, trotted out by Pilate as the witness—bringing
up the rear of a large cloud of witnesses to both our humanity and
our inhumanity, all of them Jewish (Heb 12, 1)—to be lifted up on
high and impaled (Jn 3, 14-15; 19, 5). Only that kind of encounter
with wounded humanity will ready us for the revelation by God (and
by God alone) of “the Faithful and True Witness” and “the Just and
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Holy One” (Rev 3, 14; Acts 3, 14). He enables us to glory again, in
God, in the world, in each other and thus in ourselves. Glorying and
glorifying and dignifying—in practice, how are they done? Let me
end with a hint.
Smack at the midpoint of Mark’s gospel we have the scene of the
recognition of Jesus, by Simon Peter, as God’s Anointed One—the
Messiah (Mk 8, 27-33). The recognition happens in response not to
a teaching proposed by Jesus but to a question he asks: “But you, who
do you think I am?” In other words, to get his identity established,
Jesus delivers himself up to others—fallible others, frail and sinful;
they are liable to misinterpret him. In fact, Simon Peter at once does
just that: he explains to Jesus that suffering and dying are the last
thing he has in mind for the Messiah, and Jesus at once turns his back
on him and tells him to get lost: “Go away, Satan.” So Jesus shows
who he is by opening himself to others by means of a question;
implicitly, however, he lives not on the strength of the human judg-
ment he requests but by virtue of God’s assurance. In that assurance,
he can also afford to live like the lamb led to the slaughter, confident
that God is the God of Life. He can afford to lose his own life, for he
is all trust in the Living God.
I once had a curious dream. Jesus and Gautama the Buddha actu-
ally met and conversed with each other. Neither had any ready
answers to give; both had only questions to ask. Unsurprisingly, in
my dream, Jesus ended up asking more questions than even the
Buddha could answer. But both Jesus and the Buddha began by asking
questions, one of the other, trying to understand each other’s wisdom
and folly, disappointments and pains, fulfillments and joys. Thus,
dignifying each other by questioning, probing, and searching, they
were giving glory to the One to whom Glory is due, now and always
and forever.
So let us Christians settle for a waking dream. Can we abandon
ourselves into other’s hands, only to end up finding ourselves in the
hands not of enemies but of lasting friends? Two things we will
certainly need. First, the fortitude of those who bravely stay awake in
the dark in hopes of Light—the watchmen commended in Psalm 130.
And besides, for the time being, endless patience inspired by compas-
sion—of the curious, questioning kind.
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Our Approach to Ecumenism,
Especially in the Light
of Contemporary Judaism
In this essay, I intend to make four points. First, recently, in thecontext of the millennium Jubilee, we received from the
Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith a document titled Dominus
Iesus;1 I wish to explain why I am taking this document as the launch-
ing pad for my paper. On that basis, I will propose, secondly, that
interreligious dialogue, to be fruitful, requires what I call “virtually
unconditioned commitment” on the part of all participants. My third,
brief point will be a huge contention: viz., that the sheer factual exis-
tence of Jewish people today has created a dynamic situation of historic
proportions—one that requires of all Christians that they engage
contemporary Jews, wherever they are, in dialogue and cooperation.2
My fourth point, which is substantially autobiographical, will explain
the considerable obstacles this requirement involves, yet also that it lies
at the root of any Christian attempts at interreligious dialogue today.
Introduction: Dominus Iesus
Dominus Iesus leaves no doubt about its intentions. The two signa-
tories, the well-known theologian Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, now Pope
Benedict XVI and Archbishop Tharcisius Bertone, now the Cardinal
Archbishop of Genoa, a canonist, explain what they are going to offer
and why. Interreligious dialogue is one of the things which the Church
must do in representing Christ to the world. It is also a new issue in the
Catholic Church, and many problems still remain to be identified. So
in the encounter between the truths of the faith and non-Christian
cultures there is a need for precision.
One wonders if this is true, and if it is true, how true it is; and even
more importantly, how (i.e., in what manner) it is true. The late
Herbert McCabe, O.P., would probably say: We do need rules of the
game, and players should know them, but they are chiefly for umpires;
what players need, not so much just to play the game as to play it well,
is “coach’s advice.”3 Dominus Iesus claims to state the rules of the game
of Catholic participation in interreligious dialogue. Fair enough. The
problem is that Dominus Iesus does not offer “coach’s advice” on how
the game should actually be played well. Unhappily, it offers no strate-
gies—just ground rules. Unsurprisingly, it adds that expository prose is
the appropriate stylistic medium for this activity; rules of the game are
invariably written in expository prose; they are non-negotiable. They
are also unreadable. The fatal mistake of Dominus Iesus is that it does
not help. It puts “Stop” signs at signed side streets while commending
main street and leaving any side alleys unsigned.4 On the former you
follow the rules; on the latter you travel at your own risk.
So, finally, Dominus Iesus is tedious. It seems to forget that playing
the game is what counts; I know of no players who prefer reading rule
books to playing the game. And the few umpires I have known are
virtuoso former players, not theoreticians, let alone lawyers.
The document lists eight ground rules, and treats them under six
headings. They are the following: (1) the revelation given in Iesus
Christ is full and definitive; (2) the Holy Spirit and Iesus Christ are ever
co-active in the work of salvation;5 (3) the salvific work of Christ Jesus
is both of one piece and unique; (4) the Church of Christ is both
unique and one;
6
(5) the Church is inseparable from God’s Kingdom
and the Reign of Christ; (6) as far as salvation is concerned, there are
relations between the Church and the religions.
So far so good. Besides, I have found no positive inaccuracies or
departures from Vatican II in these six sections of the declaration.7 The
only thing that I miss is incentive toward interreligious dialogue.
It is common knowledge that Dominus Iesus ran into considerable
reception problems. Pope John Paul II acknowledged as much by his
many clarifications of Dominus Iesus in the weeks after its publication,
delivered from his window; after all, the universal primacy of Jesus
Christ has been the single most important theme of his pontificate.
What happened? If I were a practicing Vaticanologist, I would say that
the Pope was disappointed not with the theme but with the document
that purported to broadcast it. Was he signaling that he had put up
with the Declaration but decided he did not want to sign it?
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Well, what the media I follow made of Dominus Iesus was theolog-
ically and spiritually meager: the Pope is a great and exciting man, but
his message is, as usual, “conservative.” This is plainly untrue. For one
thing, no pontiff has more frankly faced the troubled relations of the
Catholic Church with other Christians. But as a former ecumenist and
ecclesiologist, I profess I can see a few reasons for the umbrage taken at
Dominus Iesus by irritated spokespersons for the Protestant
Communions and even the Oriental Churches. Which are they?
First of all, speaking as a Catholic in the narrow sense of the word,
the notion that Dominus Iesus is addressed to “Bishops [capital “B”],
theologians (lower-case “t”), and “all the Catholic faithful” is both an
illusion and a mistake.
As for “Bishops and theologians”—transeat. Let us address the illu-
sion. Is Dominus Iesus written for “all the faithful”? Poppycock. Only
theologically educated persons are capable of reading it. Still, mistakes
in identifying audiences raise suspicions. Are Catholics-at-large being
intimidated by distant, higher-up teaching authorities who imagine
they can put the church as a body under orders?8 And, are the laity not
entitled to truthfulness?
Now for Dominus Iesus as a mistake. Let me speak as a Catholic
ecumenical theologian. Some developments in the Great Tradition and
its teaching are historic and normative simply because they happened.
The second Council of the Vatican happened in the presence of
invited, recognized non-Catholic observers. It made a huge difference.
From that experience on, it has become virtually impossible to limit
Catholic discourse to Catholics alone. Non-Catholic Christians are
now part of the conversation at least in the role of auditors and
presumed commentators—a fact of enormous ecclesiological impor-
tance. Ecumenism is no longer optional. I suggest it would have been
wise to write Dominus Iesus not only with Catholic Bishops and
Catholic theologians in mind, but also the governing bodies of the
non-Catholic churches and ecclesial communities. Like it or not,
others are listening in on us these days, and Vatican II has taught us
that we Catholics are to be happy that this is so. In all probability, a
modification of the intended reading publics such as I propose would
have led to a better document.
Thirdly, elsewhere I have elaborated, virtually without contradic-
tion or correction from either fellow-theologians or from the teaching
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office, the proposition that the Christian faith taken as a whole requires
an understanding of its three fundamental, distinguishable but insepa-
rable moments (or “components”): worship, life, and teaching, and that
a dynamic hierarchy prevails among them—worship being the pinna-
cle,9 life the mediating element,10 and teaching the humblest.11 I have
also proposed, virtually without contradiction or correction, that
“Roman Catholicism must be on guard against what may very well be
its greatest weakness: a systemic affinity with sectarian, monolithic
conceptions such as those favored by integralism,” though I did imme-
diately add that “the mainstream catholic tradition agrees with
Newman, and views the Christian faith as a fundamentally open (i.e.,
growing, developing) system.”12
Once again, with Herbert McCabe as my mentor, let me put this
in a more positive manner. Catholics have a right to expect from the
teaching office not just “rules of the game,” but also coach’s advice and
encouragement as to how to play the Catholic game as a whole in
actual life and how to play it well—in liturgy, in shared conduct, and
in the understanding and teaching of the Catholic truth. If Dominus
Iesus is indeed addressed to all the Catholic faithful (again, an illusion
in my judgment), it is far too narrowly doctrinal to meet their expecta-
tion; the document itself admits this, but that does not take away the
fact that legitimate expectations remain largely unmet by a highly visi-
ble Roman office. An honest, prudent acknowledgment of this
limitation in the very text of Dominus Iesus might have helped alleviate
the irritation of many Christians who want a life, and a life with God,
both within the Catholic Church and outside it.
Finally, I want to take what I just said one step further. For good
reasons, the document opposes cultural errors of the day—“relativism”
being the principal culprit. But its authors never acknowledge that ever
so many educated, practicing North American, European, and Asian
Catholics find it very hard to understand, let alone explain, how the
truths of the Catholic faith can be anything but relative. How so? The
Roman document, like it or not, sounds absolutistic, and the repeated
references to the requirement of “firmity of belief ” scratch exactly
where the itch is—not a helpful remedy. I am speaking not “pastorally”
but as an ordinary Catholic theologian when I propose that the
Catholic faithful are entitled to more than diagnosis and condemnation
from the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. There is such a
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thing as theological balm, and Cardinal Ratzinger, who wrote a distin-
guished dissertation on Bonaventure, knows this. Thus, Dominus Iesus
could have been far more prudent; as it is, it is at best correct and at
worst intemperate.
Let me conclude this first section by making a suggestion. In any
interfaith situation, including conversion-situations, framing the ques-
tion determines the way in which you think about the “firm assent of
faith” so forcefully commended by Dominus Iesus (7).13 How absolute
and ultimate is it or can it be, what does it imply? For a moment, I wish
to concentrate on the mystical aspects of both religious commitment
and commitment to interfaith encounters—mystical aspects that have
consequences in the park of logic. I propose that the assent of faith
must be understood as a “virtually unconditioned commitment.” This
is a truly ultimate matter, as follows.
“Virtually Unconditioned Commitment”
Just how committed can any convert to any religion (and thus, any
Christian who has deliberately requested Baptism) claim to be? Or, for
that matter, any believers who find themselves attempting to give
themselves an account of their present religious commitment? Is it
really possible to embrace any positive religion in an absolutely uncon-
ditioned manner? This question raises a terrifying dilemma, for the
following reasons.
If we affirm that faith is “a wager,” an “individual choice,” or “a
matter of personal taste for spirituality,” no convert to, say, Catholicism
nor any Catholic believer can be expected to be unconditionally
committed. But then things begin to look as if explicit religious rela-
tivism in the style of Neo-Hinduism,14 John Hick, or the Vedanta
Society is our only reasonable alternative to stated Christian faith. The
statement “All religions state and do virtually the same” is then apt to
become the fundamental thesis of all religions, and interreligious
dialogue will turn into an exercise in both harmlessness and ignorance.15
The problem is that this relativism—for that’s what it is—will eliminate,
certainly in the long run, the ability of most of us to live our religious
commitments as a matter of ultimate concern—of the kind that takes us
outside ourselves, ecstatically, into God, into the Body of Christ, into
the sacramental (i.e., mystical) Communion of the Church.
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Now let us turn the coin to look at the other side. If a convert or
believer must be unconditionally committed, how can we tell the
difference between faith and fanaticism, not just within our church
communities but also among outsiders? Human beings, both alone and
with others, are essentially conditioned—i.e., “situated,” as the late Piet
Schoonenberg used to explain so often; no storm-free zone is available
to those who profess a religion that entertains truth claims. Like
Christian marriage, the Christian’s religious life is a tested life, and at
least part of the test of faith is a commitment to searching fidelity to
the Church’s teaching.
What, then, is the nature of any religious conversions, commit-
ments, and claims? Lonergan’s expression “virtually unconditioned
assent” can be helpful here: it must be understood as the mystical
protection against religious absolutism. Mystical in what sense? Should
believers’ claims to be engaged in a formally (or absolutely) uncondi-
tioned assent, then they cannot help engaging in the kind of
self-supporting, self-sufficient dogmatism in which faith loses every
connection with a “transcendent object” and becomes an exercise in
purely subjective autarky—graceless and thus, ungracious. But absolute
assurance does not sum up a properly religious commitment; rather, it
is a declaration of absolute religious independence (usually masking a
deeper-seated dependence), be it individual or social. You know, the
aggressively overstated catechism-and-bible quotations and the set jaw
of the fanatic.
I once argued that faith in God cannot survive without a sense of
privilege.16 Not until the Church’s teaching office makes a habit of
conveying that a deep sense of privilege is a virtually indispensable
prerequisite for the acceptance of definite doctrines, numerous modern
Catholics will continue to feel they are mainly being told. Inner ease
and harmony are the signs of God’s presence, not rigid orthodoxy and
forced conviction.17
So, come on, Pope Benedict, come on, Archbishop Bertone, we
know that “teaching with authority” (Mk 1, 27; Mt 7, 29) is a hard
thing to do any day, but you can afford to drop some of your professo-
rial and canonistic seriousness, at least once in a while. We’ll
understand. In fact, we’ll understand better. For we will have no inter-
religious dialogue until we become as well as meet dialogue partners
who profess their faiths with a virtually unconditioned commitment to
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them, i.e., with commitments based on a sense of privilege, not on
alleged tradition or on whatever else is a pseudonym for fanaticism.
They are those who are liable, as a matter of transcendental theological
principle, to find the faith-commitments of actual neighbors admirable
or curious enough to be intrigued and attracted by them—I mean, by
the neighbors rather than by their faiths. Odds are this will happen not
at the hierarchical top—but who knows?—but at the bottom, among
God’s people, i.e., unpredictably.
I wish I could have stopped this paper here. I am an elderly man
now, and finishing projects already started is plenty to keep me occupied;
I am not looking for fresh trouble. Specifically, I do not expect to be an
expert in Hebrew any time soon. Still, in my judgment, Dominus Iesus
suffers from a most serious theological and ecclesiological error not
committed by Vatican II, which has to be part of our ecumenical agenda.
I am referring to the absence of any positive reference to the Jews.
“The Covenant Never Revoked”18
“God’s salvation begins with the Jews” (Jn 4, 22).19 After the
Holocaust, none of us Christians can afford to continue to act and
speak as if the history of salvation starts with Jesus Christ and as if the
Jewish nation—which Paul expected to be saved in the end (Rom 9-
11)—is extinct. The simple fact of contemporary Judaism’s existence
demands of us, divided Christians, that we do justice to it. And the first
step of this actual dialogue with actual Jews must start with the realiza-
tion that we Christians worldwide are simply ignorant of contemporary
Judaism; every time we rely on our (much-needed!) familiarity with the
Jewish Bible to profess our openness to Judaism we forget that we have
everything to learn about Jews today. Only to the extent that we
become the disciples of modern Judaism can we Christians claim to
enjoy the worldwide “game” of interreligious dialogue20—Hippolytus
of Rome hints it is really a playful dance, viz. “the dance of the Word
Incarnate.”21 Why?
First of all, Jews are virtually everywhere in the world, in numbers.
In the State of Israel, those who have returned “from the desert of the
nations” (Ez 20, 35) are now living, as a very troubled, internally deeply
fractured nation,22 not effectively living by faith, almost completely at
the mercy of Jews elsewhere and everywhere. But, secondly as well as far
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worse in my Christian view, only small is the number of Jews carrying
out the mission entrusted to them by God in the Diaspora:
It is not enough that you should serve me to raise up Jacob’s
tribes, and to restore those of Israel left over; I have also
appointed you as a light to the nations: you are to be the
source of my salvation to the end of the earth. (Is 49, 6; Acts
13, 47)
But then again (as the Pentecostal movement has not ceased pointing
out, mainly to Christians, but in places also to Jews), how large is the
number of Christians shouldering their vocation in the Holy Spirit to
bring the nations home to (in Blaise Pascal’s words) the “God of
Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, not of the philosophers and the
men of learning”?23
What is the history that gave rise to the picture I have just painted?
First of all, there is no doubt that by the end of the second century
Judaism and Christianity had become religions related to each other
only by mutual disputes.24 This dissociation of Jews and Christians was
already underway in the City of Rome in the second half of the first
century. After the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 A.D., only a small
number of Christian Jews remained in Palestine, probably poor, and on
speaking terms with the Aramaic-speaking Jews in the area. Eventually,
they drifted out of communion with the Christian communities else-
where around the Mediterranean.25 On the other hand, Jews began to
get reorganized, both in Palestine and in the diaspora, and by the turn
of the first century Christians were no longer welcome in some syna-
gogues, whether they spoke Greek or Hebrew or Aramaic. The process
of independent development had started. For Paul, the mixed Jewish-
Gentile community in Rome had still been a “dramatic” situation,
forcing him to rethink what he had written in Galatians, especially
since a good number of the Gentile Christians, attracted by the noble
way of life of the Jews, had been proselytes before they became
Christians.26 But eventually, slowly but surely, the largely Gentile
Church settled for the facts: Christians and Jews, while often not disre-
spectful, lost contact with each other. The segregated ghettos of the
ancient city enhanced the estrangement, and, after Diocletian’s perse-
cution, positive imperial favor toward the Christians did the rest.
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Obstacles Today
From this point on, please allow me to be substantially autobio-
graphical—the privilege of the professional dilettante I have been all
my life. The brief amateurish survey just completed leads to a most
important conclusion for all of us Christians: much as we have had
varying relationships with Jews for the past seventeen or eighteen
centuries, we have remained ignorant of Judaism as an actual religion.
In the interest of clarity, let me rephrase this: the only probable differ-
ence between me and some of you is that I have learned not to treat
Judaism—and thus, contemporary Jews—as a religious phenomenon I
somehow understand on the sole basis of my being a Catholic
Christian, and despite the fact that the Jewish Scriptures are part of the
air I breathe. This implies I admit that I am substantially ignorant of
the world of contemporary Judaism—i.e., ignorant enough to want to
learn at least the minimum. How has that happened to me?
Incidentally, here the word “contemporary” in the title of this essay
comes into its own.
Two early personal encounters helped me. The first was the elderly
Jewish gentleman who was my violin teacher for about three years; he
was arrested when I was twelve and murdered in Auschwitz. The
second was a learned Italian Jew from Venice, my professor of Italian
literature in graduate school, who was also one of the best lecturers I
have ever had. He once said to me, as I walked into his lecture hall
dressed in clerical suit, that I looked tired; while I was groping for an
answer in decent Italian, he explained that the Dominicans had the
same problem, as he had noticed during the three war years he had
lived with them dressed up as a Dominican.27 In this way, I was deci-
sively taught by two emblematic Jews—one an observant Jew who
would wear a torn jacket on Yom Kippur and had mezuzas on all the
doorposts in his apartment, the other a mischievous agnostic humanist
who was also an expert on the history of the pendulum clockwork and
who enjoyed making fun of the Devil in front of Catholic students and
(especially) Protestant ones. But what has helped me most was a triad
of life-changing works by Jewish thinkers: Martin Buber’s Ich und Du
(read when I was twenty-two or twenty-three), Abraham Heschel’s two-
volume The Prophets (my first encounter with a non-Catholic reading
of the Hebrew Scriptures), and most of all, Emmanuel Lévinas’s
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roundly polemical radio address Aimer la Torah plus que Dieu.28 Much
later on, I was to remember
the consternation that invaded me as I read Lévinas’s short,
squarely polemical piece—originally a radio talk broadcast
from Paris on Friday, April 29, 1955. Rereading only made
things worse. There it was. Right under my nose I had the
single most compelling intellectual and moral challenge to my
Catholic and Christian faith I had ever experienced.29
This is where I was really learning, from a contemporary Jew
equally disappointed by the cheap Judaism among his modern fellow
Jews as he was certain of the superiority of classical, tough, intellectual
Jewish-Lithuanian30 religiosity over Christianity as he had come to
understand it. He saw a Christianity which (to use an insipid North
American phrase in common use today to express approval) had grown
“comfortable with God”—a “God” ratcheted down to the level at
which he becomes “a God I can live with”; Lévinas was shocked at this
“children’s God,” who saves softly, and lets human adults remain
perpetual children, and allowing them to turn a majestic world into a
nursery governed by mere indulgence. He had written:
The true humanity of Man and his virile tenderness come into
the world along with the severe words of a demanding God;
the spiritual becomes present, not by way of palpable pres-
ence, but by absence; God is concrete, not by means of
incarnation, but by means of the Law; and his majesty is not
the felt experience of his sacred mystery. His majesty does not
provoke fear and trembling, but fills us with higher thoughts.
To veil his countenance in order to demand—in a superhu-
man way—everything of Man, to have created Man capable of
responding, of turning to his God as a creditor and not all the
time as a debtor: that is truly divine majesty!31
An unpleasant anecdote. Over thirty years ago, a Jewish
American woman born after 1945 insisted on telling me that I did
not have the slightest idea what the Holocaust meant to Jews, so I did not
have the right to disagree with her, even on points unrelated to the
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Shoah. I told her that my excuse for treating her as an adult, without
any guilt-feelings on my part, was something I had earned: I was there
to find Mr. Sam Schuijer’s front door sealed the day after he was
snatched from his bed; it gave me at least an opportunity to weep for
him on my way home. Emmanuel Lévinas has made the same point, if
in a very different context.32
What I mean is this. One—I mean only one—of the most unfor-
tunate things that has happened in the wake of the Holocaust is the rise
of an aggressively complacent form of undifferentiated Judaism aimed
at silencing non-Jews across the board. First and in my Catholic view
worst of all, this form of global Judaism has few religious or theologi-
cal claims to make, and so, few elements of an interreligious dialogue
to offer. Secondly, miserably, it is apt to succeed only in reviving the
broad anti-Semitisms of the past; this is not a reason for condemnation,
but for compassion. For thirdly, Judaism is miserably divided, and post-
Holocaust Judaism has long done everything to conceal this fact. Too
many Jewish congregations are little more than local benefit societies,
and the present State of Israel is only the most visible instance of the
calamitous and obstinate and often unprincipled divisions within
Judaism. After a century of ecumenism, one thing that all Christians,
must learn is this: how to forge, patiently, charitably, and with tough-
minded intellectual integrity, as well as with a desire to learn,
differentiated accounts of the truth of Judaism—many of them offered
by contemporary Jews. This means: the only dialogue that may
enlighten is a Christian dialogue with local Jewish communities less
interested in Judaism as a cause than in God and in faith-cum-justice in
God, within Judaism and outside it. It is also wise, and not any sign of
anti-Semitism, to recognize that the continuing spate of Jewish expati-
ations upon the horrors of the Holocaust is an aggressive political
cottage industry claiming the privilege of victimhood for all Jews by
taking advantage of the wide-spread ignorance about Judaism among
Christians and half-Christians. It aims to remind the world of selected
past horrors inflicted on Jewry and stifle honest dialogue. North
American culture has swallowed this fraudulent propaganda hook, line,
and sinker.
Another point—a properly ecumenical one this time. Mainly (but
far from exclusively) outside North America, it is often overlooked that
Catholicism and Protestantism have had significantly different histories
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with regard to Judaism. Needless to say, this influences our ecumenical
relationships as well; an example is my discovery, years ago, that the
card catalogue of the theological faculty at the University in Lund was
chock full of New Testament items and surprisingly short on Old
Testament. Does such crypto-Marcionism reflect Lutheranism’s sharp
distinction between Law and Gospel? If it does, it is hard to imagine it
does not affect Lutheranism’s relationships with Judaism. In fact, there
is enough reason to think that much Jewish agnosticism of German
stock is the bitter fruit of Moses Mendelssohn’s decision to accede to
the Enlightened version of Lutheranism current in eighteen-century
Prussia.33 Complete ignorance forbids me to comment on the Jews in
the Orthodox world picture.
Let us return to things Catholic. Numerous Catholics these days
are aware only that Catholic relations with Jews have been conflicted at
least since 1492 A.D., when Ferdinand and Isabella, the “Catholic
Kings” of Spain, ordered the expulsion of the Jews from Spain.
Nowadays this event is apt to be presented as the event that started
modern Catholic anti-Semitism, which was to reach its hideous pinna-
cle in the Holocaust, and even more (at least since 1963, when Rolf
Hochhuth’s play Der Stellvertreter was first performed) in the very
person of a calculating Pope, Pius XII. As a result, Western (and espe-
cially American) Catholics have become easy targets for modern Jewish
anti-Catholicism, which is now all the harder to heal for being predi-
cated on wide-spread liberal-agnostic affect on the part of “secularized”
(i.e., non-religious) Jews. The latter have a way of regarding the
Catholic Church largely as a political reality, as anybody who reads the
New York Times knows. In parts of Western Europe negative moods
among liberal Christians have led to a largely uninformed yet obbligato
philo-Semitic mood aimed at undoing, at least in appearance, the
undifferentiated “anti-Semitism” of past centuries. Catholics shaped by
these contemporary judgments and sentiments are largely unaware of
the fact that from the mid-eleventh to the early sixteenth centuries the
urban Jews were better integrated into the societal fabric of Western
Europe than heretics and suspected heretics, including the worlds of
learning, art, literature, and (most of all) banking and commerce.
Nevertheless, right in the teeth of our own ignorance, being a
Catholic Christian after the Holocaust plainly means this: after close to
eighteen centuries of separate development, we are to pick up where we
212 /  Frans Jozef van Beeck
began to settle for a practically abstract affinity with the Jews. For it is
part of Christian faith to believe that God’s Covenants with Noah, with
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, with his friend Moses, and with the
Second-Temple community can never be repealed—a theme declared
by Pope John Paul II in his discourse in the Synagogue in Rome in
1986,34 and capably elaborated by Jewish traditionalist David Novak in
several notable books.35 Today, Christians cannot be Christians without
realizing that they have an essential feature of faith in God in common
with those Jews who still insist on keeping Israel’s divine election alive.36
Emmanuel Lévinas rightly describes this Judaism as virtually unknown
to Jews and Christians alike:
Over the past one hundred years, Hebrew learning has faded,
and we have lost touch with our sources. What learning is still
being produced is no longer based on an intellectual tradition:
it remains self-taught and untutored, even when it is not
improvised. And what worse corruption can befall an author
than being read only by people who know less than he does!
With none to check them, none to put them in their places,
authors tend to mistake the lack of counter-pressure for free-
dom, and this freedom for the touch of genius. Small wonder
that the reading public remains skeptical; for them, Judaism,
with its few million unrepentant adherents left in the world, is
no more than a matter of quibbling over religious obser-
vances—something uninteresting and unimportant.37
Thus, we, Jews and Christians, find ourselves “dramatically
together” once again, thank God, after centuries of impoverishing
separation. What unites us most obviously is a common environment:
the ignorance of nominal Jews and nominal Christians. This igno-
rance is all the more deceptive for being fatally predicated on the best
of human intentions and a faith in the power of moral resolve that is
being proved illusory every day. But what also unites us, less obviously,
in the Spirit, is an identical eschatological mission: bringing the
nations home to the Living God. Both of us are awaiting the Messiah,
and in the mean time we are to speak of God. For that reason, the
worldwide interreligious dialogue is not a hobby, let alone a luxury,
but a way of life. For the foreseeable future, at least we Christians will
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have our hands full learning the game, first with Jews, and then with
all other non-Christians.
Dominus Iesus quite rightly emphasizes time and again that it is a
mistake to separate Jesus Christ from God’s Holy Spirit. Yet it is unde-
niable that Israel and Judaism have known of the Holy Spirit apart
from God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ, and it is a theological mistake
so to speak of the Spirit as to imply that the presence of the coeternal
Spirit of God remains somehow less real without explicit reference to
Jesus Christ Risen. To us Christians, of course, Christ’s Resurrection
has definitively enhanced the historic, attested presence of the Spirit in
Israel and its Scriptures. In and among neither of us is God’s Holy
Spirit a stranger. We have no excuse for not talking with each other, or
for that matter, to every believer in the world.
One conclusion of this essay should probably be: ecumenism and
efforts in the direction of interreligious dialogue are now a lot more
intertwined than they were as little as fifty years ago. But let me con-
clude on a far more Catholic note. As far as the rules of the game are
concerned, they can wait, as long as the rulers can wait and let us be.
Notes
Paper read at the 17th International Congress of Jesuit Ecumenists on Current
Issues in Ecclesiology, held at Manreza Retreat House, Dobogókö, Hungary,
July 25-29, 2003. Circulated by the Jesuit Secretariat for Interreligious
Dialogue, Rome, 2003. Slightly revised.
1. “Declaration on the unicity and salvific universality of Jesus Christ and
the Church Dominus Iesus” [Declaratio de Iesu Christi atque Ecclesiae unicitate
et universalitate salvifica], August 6, 2000; AAS 92 (2000): 742-765.
2. Hans Urs von Balthasar would probably call it “dramatic.”
3. Herbert McCabe,“Manuals and Rule Books,” The Tablet 247 1994):
1649-50.
4. The image was used at the press conference held on September 5, 2000
on the occasion of the official presentation of Dominus Iesus. Rev. (now
Archbishop) Angelo Amato, S.D.B., stated that “the theological discussion
remains open,” and that “only the alleys that have proved blind have been
barred (“Il debattito teologico, cioè, resta aperto. Sono state chiuse solo quelle
strade che portavano a vicoli ciechi.”) He did so after stating that the theological
214 /  Frans Jozef van Beeck
task ahead of us is the following: exploring what Vatican II was teaching when it
wrote that “far from excluding various degrees of participative cooperation on
the part of creatures, the Redeemer’s one and only mediation stimulates it
(Lumen Gentium 62: “unica mediatio Redemptoris non excludit sed suscitat
variam apud creaturas participatam ex unico fonte cooperationem”). I suppose
this is an encouragement of sorts, but it sounds buraucratic.
5. Careful here! Surely the Scriptures of the Old Testament know of the
Holy Spirit as active before Christ?
6. Here, it is fairly explained that “Christianity” is not the same as
“Church,” as John Bossy has well set out in his Christianity in the West, 1400-
1700 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).
7. Very concretely, the document repeats Vatican II’s teaching of that the
Church of Christ “subsists in the Catholic church” and goes on to explain that
precisely for this reason Catholics must expect to be judged more severely.
8. I am old enough to remember very specific instructions and prohibi-
tions of the this has to “Stop!” variety appearing on the notice-boards of large
religious communities; all the rector or his assistant needed to do is ask around
quietly about who the real culprit(s) was/were. But that would have required a
confrontation with actual people. As it was, all that happened was that every-
body was put on notice, without effect other than a cynical shrug of the
shoulders. Speaking more autobiographically, I vividly remember the veiled
threats issued by the German commanders and publicized on billboards every-
where during the years 1940-45; looking like communications of general
importance, they were de facto vulgar threats. We merely smiled and learned
how to live.
9. Vatican II, Constitution on the Liturgy, Sacrosanctum Concilium, 7.
10. F.J. van Beeck, God Encountered: A Contemporary Catholic Systematic
Theology, vol. 1: Understanding the Christian Faith (San Francisco: Harper and
Row, 1989), esp. §23, 7; §43, 7; §49).
11. God Encountered, esp. §23, 7; §43, 7; §53.
12. God Encountered., §19, 1, e.
13. At a conference at the University of Chicago shortly after the promul-
gation of Dominus Iesus, my friend Paul J. Griffiths, who now holds the chair
of Roman Catholic studies at the University of Illinois in Chicago, was of three
presenters. He pointed out to us that the Creed in Dominus Iesus does not
include the filioque. I am sure this is intentional, and it is a sound, generous
gesture in the direction of the Orthodox. But it takes a trained theologian to
notice it! He also took issue with the first chapter of Dominus Iesus by observ-
ing that if the completeness of God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ means that
(as he put it) this completeness is not only ontological but also epistemologi-
cal, (i.e.,that the Catholic Church has nothing left to learn, that would be
OUR APPROACH TO ECUMENISM /  215
unacceptable. Both in the light of the history of doctrine and in light of the
Church’s need to keep on getting to know and appreciate and love ever more
fully both Christ and God, and the world and the cosmos, in the Holy Spirit.
In good American idiom, the Church’s present knowledge, appreciation, and
love of Jesus Christ is incomplete, and hence, relative to God’s promised fulfill-
ment. This is something the Catholic laity will readily understand, and it has
the advantage of appealing to the eschatological sensibility of the Jews, too—
no small matter for Catholic theology, especially in North America.
14. But remember, Neo-Hinduism arose as an attack on colonialist non-
universalist Christianity by fairly agnostic culturally Hindu intellectuals
writing in English.
15. The former comes from the fact that existing differences are ignored,
the latter from the fact that one cannot make judgments on things one has not
properly studied.
16. F.J. van Beeck, “One God: And Other Revelations,” Commonweal 123,
no. 6 (March 22, 1996): 15-19.
17. Gerard Manley Hopkins puts this in his own inimitable way (see
Gerard Manley Hopkins, ed. Catherine Phillips [New York: Oxford University
Press, 1986], “My own heart,” 170):
Soul, self; come; come, poor Jackself, I do advise
You, jaded, lét be; call off thoughts awhile
Elsewhere; leave comfort root-room; let joy size
God knows when to God knows what; whose smile
’S not wrung, see you; unforeseen times rather—as skies
Betweenpie mountains—lights a lovely mile.
18. See Norbert Lohfink, Der niemals gekündigte Bund: Exegetische Gedanken
zum christlich-jüdischen Gespräch (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1989); trans-
lated into English as The Covenant Never Revoked: Biblical Reflections on
Christian-jewish Dialogue (New York: Paulist Press, 1991). Lohfink takes his title
from a discourse delivered by Pope John Paul II to a representative group of Jews
in Mainz, as far back as 1980, Here is what the Pope said: “Die erste Dimension
dieses Dialogs, nämlich die Begegnung zwischen dem Gottesvolk des von Gott
nie gekündigten (vgl. Röm 11, 29) Alten Bundes und dem des Neuen Bundes,
ist zugleich ein Dialog innerhalb unserer Kirche, gleichsam zwischen dem ersten
und zweiten Teil ihrer Bibel” (‘The first dimension of this dialogue, viz., the
encounter between the People of God of the Old Covenant—the one never
revoked by God—is at the same time a dialogue within our Church, between the
first and second parts of its Bible, as it were.’). See also Jared Wicks, “Pieter
Smulders and Dei Verbum 3: Developing the Understanding of Revelation to
Israel 1962-1963” Gregorianum 83 (2002), 225-267.
216 /  Frans Jozef van Beeck
19. Gk. Óτι º σωτηρία ¦κ τäν Ιουδαίων. Note the definite article º;
accordingly, “salvation” does not denote a general well-being enjoyed by
humanity, but the “actual salvation as God’s gracious gift; the traditional acutus
¦στίν on  confirms this.
20. I would be less than candid if I did not confess that my position is
substantially (though negatively) predicated on Cardinal Joseph
Ratzinger’s Die Vielfalt der Religionen und der eine Bund (Hagen: Urfeld,
1998)—a gift from my friend Rudolf Pesch. Unsurprisingly, Ratzinger’s is
a learned book. My problem is that I cannot imagine that any of my
Jewish friends would want to read it. It is a declaration of Catholic faith
and openness throughout, but it does not touch on any existing theologi-
cal or cultural Jewish issues that I am aware of. Nowhere in the book did
I find evidence that the author was in actual dialogue with any actual Jews’
beliefs and practices. I admit this is a harsh judgment on a fine Catholic
theologian of obviously good intentions, but a comparison of Ratzinger’
book with the consistently dialogical and illuminating writings on
Hinduism by my unmistakably Catholic confrère Francis X. Clooney will
illustrate what I mean. For my basic position on interreligious dialogue,
see “Christian Faith and Theology in Encounter with Non-Christians:
Profession? Protestation? Self-maintenance? Abandon?” Theological Studies
55 (1994): 46-65.
21. Hugo Rahner wrote: “Hippolytus . . . interpreted this [dance theme]
with a view to the mysteries of the work of salvation, in words that mystical
theology would be unable to forget, right down into the Middle Ages: What
great, great mysteries! “See, my beloved (‘sister’s-boy’) has come skipping, he
has arrived [see Song 2, 8].” What does ‘skipping’ imply? The swiftness of the
Word! He skipped from heaven into a Virgin’s womb, [skipped] from a [sacred]
womb onto the wood, [skipped] from the wood into Hades, [skipped] from
Hades up to earth again in this [our] human flesh [Such good news: resurrec-
tion!], [then skipped] from the earth to heaven. [There he is seated at the
Father’s right hand. And once again] from heaven [he will skip] to earth, [as he
did] once to save, but this time to judge [offer the reward of recompense].”
(Der spielende Mensch, [Einsiedeln: Johannes-Verlag 1952]; translated into
English as Man at Play, or, Did You Ever Practise Eutrapelia? [London: Burns
and Oates, 1965], 67-68.)
22. Christians wishing to face reality must learn to accept this most
perplexing fact.
23. From Pascal’s Mémorial; text in Oeuvres complètes, ed. Jacques
Chevalier, Bibliotèque de la Pléiade, 34 (Paris: Gallimard, 1954), 618.
Pascal’s words, of course, raise the whole issue of the continuity between the
God of Israel and the “God” of modernity. On this, see my tentative
OUR APPROACH TO ECUMENISM /  217
remarks in The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Trinity, ed. S.
Davis, D. Kendall, and G. O’Collins (New York: Oxford University Press,
1999), 320-24.
24. See Thomas H. Tobin, Paul’s Rhetoric in its Contexts: The Argument of
Romans (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2004); and Alan F. Segal, Rebecca’s
Children: Judaism and Christianity in the Roman World (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1986), esp. 163-81.
25. Writing around 150 A.D., Justin Martyr, born in Palestine, on the
West Bank of the Jordan, in what is now Nablus, is still prepared to cele-
brate Eucharist with the Ebionite (“poor men’s”) Jewish-Christian
communities around Jerusalem, in spite of their adoptionism; Jesus, they
say, was born of Joseph and Mary. Less than half a century later, in Lyons,
Irenaeus writes he is no longer prepared to do so; the Ebionites are no
longer catholic; Jesus, they say, was not possessed by the heavenly Christ till
his baptism. Besides, they reject Paul and limit the gospels to Matthew and
parts of Luke.
26. In Paul’s Rhetoric in its Contexts, Thomas H. Tobin, gives a full account
of this.
27. See “Two Kind Jewish Men: A Sermon in Memory of the Shoah,” Cross
Currents 42 (1992): 174-84.
28. French original: “Aimer la Thora plus que Dieu,” in Emanuel Lévinas,
Difficile liberté: Essais sur le judaïsme (3rd ed., Paris: Albin Michel, 1976), 189-
93; English translation and commentary in F.J. van Beeck, Loving the Torah
More than God? Toward a Catholic Appreciation of Judaism (Chicago: Loyola
University Press, 1989), 31-53.
29. Zvi Kolitz, Yossel Rakover Speaks to God: Holocaust Challenges to
Christian Faith (Hoboken, NJ: KTAV, 1995), 43.
30. Zvi Kolitz was a born Lithuanian; Emmanuel Lévinas was of
Lithuanian stock. Lévinas’s recognition of Kolitz’s story as a piece of authenti-
cally Jewish fiction must have been rooted in a deep-seated experience of
kinship.
31. “La vraie humanité de l’homme et sa douceur virile entrent dans le
monde avec les paroles sévères d’un Dieu exigeant; le spirituel ne se donne pas
comme une substance sensible, mais par l’absence; Dieu est concret non pas
par l’incarnation, mais par la Loi; et Sa grandeur n’est pas le souffle de son
mystère sacré. Sa grandeur ne provoque pas crainte et tremblement, mais nous
remplit de plus hautes pensées. Se voiler la face pour exiger de l’homme—
surhumainement—tout, avoir créé un homme capable de répondre, capable
d’aborder son Dieu en créancier et non point toujours en débiteur—quelle
grandeur vraiment divine!” Emmanuel Lévinas, Difficile liberté: Essais sur le
judaïsme (Paris: Albin Michel, 1976), 192-93. Incidentally (but not entirely
218 /  Frans Jozef van Beeck
so), we post-World War II Christians are apt to hear in Lévinas’s words echoes
of Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s passionate rejection of “cheap grace”; see Dietrich
Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship, revised ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1963),
esp. 61-86.
32. See Difficile liberté, 190: “Nous n’allons pas raconter tout cela, bien
que le monde n’ait rien appris et ait tout oublié. Nous nous refusons à offrir
en spectacle la Passion des Passions et à tirer une quelconque gloriole d’au-
teur ou de metteur en scène de ces cris inhumains. Ils retentissent et se
répercutent, inextinguibles, à travers les éternités. Écoutons seulement la
pensée qui s’articule en eux.” (“We are not going to recount that whole
story, even though the world has learned nothing and forgotten everything.
We pass when invited to stage the Passion of Passions as if it were a show;
we refuse to derive even the smallest bit of author’s or play-director’s glory
from those inhuman cries. They resound and reverberate, never to be
silenced, through the everlasting ages. Let us listen only for the thought that
articulates itself in them.”
33. See Moses Mendelssohn, “Israel’s God, the Psalms, and the City of
Jerusalem: Life Experience and the Sacrifice of Praise and Prayer,” Horizons 19
(1992): 219-39.
34. He spoke as follows: “gli ebrei rimangono carissimi a Dio, che li ha
chiamati con una vocazione irrevocabile” (‘the Jews remain most dear to God;
he gave them a vocation not to be revoked’).
35. See esp. The Image of the Non-Jew in Judaism: An Historical and
Constructive Study of the Noahide Laws (New York: Edward Mellen Press,
1983), and Jewish-Christian Dialogue: A Jewish Justification (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1989).
36. “Il primo è che la Chiesa di Cristo scopre il suo legame con
l‘Ebraismo scrutando il suo proprio mistero. La religione ebraica non ci è
estrinseca, ma in un certo qual modo, è intrinseca alla nostra religione.
Abbiamo quindi verso di essa dei rapporti che non abbiamo con nessun’al-
tra religione. Siete i nostri fratelli prediletti e, in un certo modo, si potrebbe
dire i nostri fratelli maggiori” (“Firstly. Christ’s Church discovers its bond
with Judaism by scrutinizing its own mystery. The Jewish religion is not
foreign to us, but in some way intrinsic to our own religion. Thus, in regard
to it, we have relationships that we do not have in regard to any other reli-
gion. You are our favorite brethren, and one could say you are in a way our
elder brethren,”).
37. “Le tarissement des études hébraïques, depuis cent ans, nous a
éloignés des sources. Le savoir qui se produit encore, ne repose pas sur une
tradition intellectuelle. Il demeure autodidacte, même quand il n’est pas
improvisé. Et n’être lu que par de moins savants que soi, quelle corruption
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pour un écrivain! Sans censeurs, ni sanctions, les auteurs confondent cette
non-résistance avec la liberté et cette liberté avec le trait de génie. Faut-il
s’étonner que des lecteurs n’y croient pas et voient dans le judaïsme, auquel
dans le monde s’attachent encore quelques millions d’impénitents, un amas
d’arguties charnelles sans intérêt ni importance?” (Lévinas, Difficile liberté:
Essais sur le judaïsme, 189.)
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CLOSE READING: EYE AND EAR

Hopkins: Cor ad Cor
for Richard E. Hughes
“counter, original, spare, strange”
Enough said, then, about Hopkins’s partiality to Scotus’s haecceitas,about inscape and instress and sake. Technical metaphysics and
personal idiom do not a poet make. Terminology winds up after the
fact what should have proved true in the doing; it does lend the color
of intellectual legitimacy to what has been done, but if the deed has not
made it on its own, no amount of terminological legitimation will
avail. Only if it appears that Hopkins felt and thought and responded
and expressed himself in terms of the particular will his professed
partiality to Scotus’s concept be more than an interesting detail for
academics to discuss.
The particular is never popular. It is more comfortable—and
certainly more respectable—to be hand in glove with the prevailing
ideology and the going concern, just as it would have been more
comfortable for Hopkins to have named the Church, with the first
Vatican Council, the “sign raised among the nations” than to have
likened her to a cow ambling around the pasture-ground. Had
Hopkins been less partial to the particular, Bridges would not have felt
he had to apologize for his obscure friend’s “efforts to force emotion
into theological or sectarian channels” and for “the naked encounter of
sensualism and asceticism” of The Golden Echo. Just fancy: faith (not
religious sentiment) in poetry!—how narrow-minded can you be? No,
better to rhapsodize, explicitly or implicitly, on the Spirit of the Age,
and thus experience yourself, poet that you are, as the privileged, oh-so
sensitive instrument that is in tune with what’s in the air. In that way
you have all the benefits of being both able to boast your own “original”
talent and capable of feeling concerned with the totality of life. It will
get you to the high altar of the culture, whence you can pontificate; it
will make you Poet Laureate. Never will you have to pay attention to
precious detail and feel its attractiveness and intractability in that
“naked encounter”; never will you be forced to be so irrational as to
profess partiality to something whose relevance cannot be demon-
strated by cogent proof or general consensus; no, just paint the large
canvas with Tennyson and Swinburne, mind the general weal with
moral tone and coaxing phrase, and let the van Goghs and the
Gauguins pay attention to old shoes, rush-seated chairs, and oddities in
the Pacific. Be lofty, not precise. Edify or shock, but don’t encounter.
Better for your reputation, to say nothing of your nerves. So be sweet,
be reasonable, if necessary emphatically so; mind the general. Or be
“against,” be unreasonable; mind the general by defying the established
order, by becoming the prophet of the fin de siècle. Eschew the partic-
ular (except if you can fit it into a general frame of things), be
impartial, never be “sectarian.” Don’t cultivate “things counter, origi-
nal, spare, strange; whatever is fickle, freckled (who knows how?)”
Otherwise you may find yourself eventually put away in Dublin,
obscurely correcting undergraduate compositions, and having to admit
demurely: “Now it is the virtue of design, pattern, or inscape to be
distinctive, and it is the vice of distinctiveness to become queer. This
vice I cannot have escaped.”
Well, better be an honest neurotic buried in Dublin with no
prospect of having your poetry published than aim for the cheap recog-
nition that comes from putting the cognoscenti to sleep—Hopkins saw
that twenty-three years before he died at age forty-five, and wrote it
down with the deadly precision of a Martial:
Our swans are now of such remorseless quill,
Themselves live singing and their hearers kill.1
For what if the particular—including the “sectarian”—is precisely
the source of your awareness? If you find yourself moved, not by the
general, but by the irrationally individual? If you find the broad sweep
cheap? If totality and infinity happen to be, not your first order of
business, but your last perspective? If you are the kind of person
Martin Buber was to paint: suspicious of the autonomous construc-
tion of reality in the name of philosophy, imagination, creed, or
psychology, and firmly basing yourself on encounter—doing justice
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to the particular? If you find that reliable and durable speaking-about
(“I-It”) is only won the hard way, by speaking-to and being spoken to
(“I-Thou”)?
That may leave you forever “a lonely began,” praying for patience,
casting for comfort; “my taste was me.” No soothing generalities for an
anodyne. The heart, “hard at bay,” vulnerable, “not outward-steeled,”
open to the touch of whatever strikes it, and compelled to speak, “never
ask if meaning it, wanting it, warned of it.”
Heart of a Poem
Ah, touched in your bower of bone
Are you! turned for an exquisite smart,
Have you! make words break from me here all alone,
Do you!—mother of being in me, heart.
O unteachably after evil, but uttering truth,
Why, tears! is it? tears; such a melting, a madrigal start!
Never-eldering revel and river of youth,
What can it be, this glee? the good you have there of your own?
This is stanza 18—the middle stanza of a series of thirty-five that
make up Hopkins’s The Wreck of the Deutschland.
Six stanzas lead up to it (12-17), telling the story, from the sad but
peaceable sailing on Saturday to the outcry of the nun in the midst of
disaster. It is followed by (again) six stanzas “reading” the story to the
core (19-24); its name becomes: Christ Crucified. The whole complex
is held together, by the figure of style known as inclusio, by stanzas 11
and 25. The former is an evocation of a dance macabre on a theme of
Isaiah, with “Life is Death” for a message (Is 40, 6). The latter conjures
up the Spirit of God hovering over the primal tohuvabohu and Jesus in
the midst of the storm surrounded by frantic disciples—“the God who
makes the dead live and summons things that are not as if they were”—
with “Death is Life” for a message (Rom 4, 17).
Preceding stanza 11 and following stanza 25 are again two sets of
six stanzas each (5-10 and 26-31), affording another striking paral-
lelism. In stanzas 5 and 26, Nature is recognized as a way to God, but
with a proviso; “his mystery must be instressed, stressed” and “what by
your measure is the heaven of desire”?
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Stanzas 6 and 27 lead one step closer to the meeting-place with
God, who encounters humanity not out of the blue, but in time.
Whatever guilt-hushing, heart-flushing terror the powers of the
universe may administer, the real locus of the heart’s surrender is not
universal but particular and dateable: “it rides time,” “the jading and jar
of the cart, time’s tasking.”
But the culmination-point is reached in stanzas 7-8 and 28-29: the
suffering Christ draws all human hearts for himself in an ultimate deci-
sion: Ipse, he is the name and the shape of present and past, heaven and
earth. There is no obvious parallelism between stanzas 9-10 and 30-31,
although the theme of God’s ways with Man, leading to God’s merci-
ful mastery (9-10) rhymes with the “heart-throe, birth of a brain,
Word, that heard and kept thee and uttered thee outright,” and with
the call issued to the “poor sheep” in the disaster through the nun’s
outcry (30-31). The encompassing theme of the two sets of stanzas (5-
10 and 26-31) may thus be roughly characterized as “the particular
encounter of God with Man.”
Finally, there are the introduction and the coda of this poem,
which so strikingly resembles the build-up of, say, César Franck’s D-
minor Symphony, or Tchaikovsky’s Serenade for Strings, whose codas
also return to the opening motifs, only enriched and confirmed by the
experience of what has happened in the course of the work. Both sets
of four stanzas (1-4 and 32-35) deal with God’s mastery experienced as
a call to total surrender in and through and beyond the threat of disin-
tegration and even death.
Put schematically, then, the course of The Wreck of the Deutschland
runs as follows:
1-4 – 5-10 – 11 – 12-17 – 18 – 19-24 – 25 – 26-31 – 32-35
4  +   6    +  1  +    6   +   1  +   6    +  1   +   6     +   4
But the point is this: the entire ricercare is constructed around
stanza 18: the experience of the heart that will not be domesticated.
The heart, not to be reduced to system or ideology or principle or law.
The heart, vulnerable and undefended. The heart that does not even
try to beat the system. Individuum est ineffabile. The heart which yearns
(irrationally, says the head; Id, says Freud) for the really-real in the oh-
so-particular Other (arbitrary, says the head that has its norms and
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systems pat). Yes, the tools of generalization are safe only in the hands
of those who relish the particular. The hand’s grasp kills by sheer
comprehension unless it is sensitive enough to grope and touch, and
prepared, in the last resort, to be pierced. Comprehensive concepts
become tyrant killers unless they remember that originally they were
conceptions born out of intercourse with the particular. The generally
valid and the even number tend to repress the realization that they go
back to partiality and the odd number, don’t they?
But only the undefended heart knows this:
Áh, whát the heart is! which, like carriers let fly —
Doff darkness, homing nature knows the rest —
To its own fine function, wild and self-instressed,
Falls as light as lifelong schooled to what and why.
(“The Handsome Heart”)
The appeal of the particular is unjustifiable before any tribunal.
No system of thought, taste, orthodoxy, culture, or law will be able to
account for that most fugitive, most human fact of all; the encounter
with the Other out of which I gain identity and truth, not as property,
but as gift. Cor ad cor loquitur. Indefensible? Yes, of course, as indefen-
sible as Prince Myshkin in Dostoevsky’s The Idiot. Yet this kind of
defenselessness tends to show up the weakness of the systems and the
powers that be. In comparison with Hopkins, who remembers Bridges?
One way of measuring Hopkins’s reliance on the heart’s response
to the particular is to point to the enormous intellectual demands he
makes on the language, and, through the language, on his readership.
It is as if he trusts that people, once they have allowed themselves to be
touched down to the bottom of their individuality, will be capable of
great intellectual presence of mind in the face of the most diverse and
varied allusions, associations, visions and ideas crammed into the
language—in other words, that they will be capable of a really compre-
hensive world-view with plenty of room for everything and everybody.
Since the human-potential movement and the writings of people like
Carl Gustav Jung, Carl Rogers, Abraham Maslow, and Dr. Laing this
trust on Hopkins’s part may have become more credible to us. Not
adaptability (nor its rebellious counterpart) but personal depth now
appears to us to be the safeguard and the source of intellectual integrity.
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Really “doing your own thing,” really “letting it be” is a far more reli-
able road to a coherent world-picture, including a commanding creed,
than buying into the system. Here again Hopkins warns: “take breath
and read it with the ears, as I always wish to be read, and my verse
becomes all right.” Not the dissociative, cognitive, distantial, objectify-
ing approach to Hopkins’s poetry—which is: reading it with the
eyes—but the associative, affective, interpersonal, “presential”
approach—which is: trusting your ears (Cor ad cor loquitur!)—will give
a person access to the ability to hold Hopkins’s thought together.
Again, the general is anchored in the actuality of the particular.
In The Wreck of the Deutschland all that is comprehensive and all-
encompassing, all that is total and infinite at the level of content, too,
is unflinchingly anchored in the particular, without the slightest
attempt on Hopkins’s part to justify, apologize, explain, or make palat-
able. Modern-day jargon would call this: critique of ideology. Except
that in Hopkins we find, no elaborate critique of the repressive conven-
tions, tastes, and agendas set by the religious and secular sensibilities he
finds himself a part of, but simply the practical and unapologetic (if,
understandably, somewhat self-conscious) start of a process that has
time and again put dominant moods and metaphors and systems in
their places: he delivers himself up to his perceptions of, and responses
to, the particular, and allows himself to be shaped by them. The
Impressionists had done something analogous a few years earlier, when
their way of showing what things really looked like had put the so-
called realisms of the previous century to shame. And in a world
dominated by idealism Brentano and Husserl were trying to go “back
to the things”—a rather unpopular move for the time being.
Hopkins is as much part of the late nineteenth-century Roman
Catholic Church in England—though probably with some sound
Tractarian reluctance—as he is part of the late Victorian literary world.
Yet at the core he fits neither, because he undercuts, by personal depth
of perception and responsiveness, the ideologies and systems and tastes
any culture tends to inculcate.
At three points in The Wreck of the Deutschland this anchorage of
the far-flung picture of God’s all-encompassing mastery and mercy is
most obvious.
First, there is the unashamedly autobiographical start of the poem,
crammed with the paradoxes that Rudolf Otto was to sum up under
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the general rubrics of tremendum and fascinans, paradoxes that are
resolved by an account of the particular heart’s decision to go to the
person of Christ:
I whirled out wings that spell
And fled with a fling of the heart to the heart of the Host.
My heart, but you were dove-winged, I can tell.
Carrier-witted, I am bold to boast,
To flash from the flame to the flame then, tower from the grace
to the grace. (st. 3)
Second, there is the theological fulcrum of the poem in stanzas 6-
8. The sense of God’s presence, though available in “the world’s
splendor and wonder,” stems, not from the experienced harmony of the
world, but from surrender to a particular moment in time. Le dieu des
philosophes is—for all his speculative attractiveness—not the living
God, but a rationalization, which does not in the least mean that those
who find the living God are cocksure in their surrender to the scandal
of particularity:
But it rides time like riding a river
(And here the faithful waver, the faithless fable and miss).
(st. 6)
And once again we are faced with the picture of the particular heart’s
surrender to “the revelation of the glory of God in the face of Jesus
Christ” (2 Cor 4, 6):
What none would have known of it, only the heart, being hard at bay,
Is out with it! Oh,
We lash with the best or worst
Word last! (st. 7-8)
Eventually the large canvas does appear:
Make mercy in all of us, out of us all
Mastery, but be adored, but be adored King. (st. 10)
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But that large canvas comes forth out of the recognition of this very
particular event: Jesus of Nazareth.
Third, there is the sweep of stanzas 12-17. The narrative of the
ship’s departure and sailing and wreck, and of the misadventures and
despair of its crew and passengers is narrowed down, finally, to the one
figure that becomes the key to the far-flung interpretation of the entire
event’s significance:
Till a lioness arose breasting the babble,
A prophetess towered in the tumult, a virginal tongue told.
(st. 17)
It is precisely at this point that the heart’s response—the crucial
stanza 18—is placed. Significantly, the imagery, both of the nun’s
outcry and of the heart’s response, is consistently oral/acoustical: faith
comes from hearing, and hearing is fiducial and interpersonal and
“presential,” whereas sight is objectifying and distantial.
Once the whole scene has been read and interpreted in terms of an
ineffable (the aposiopeses of stanza 28) encounter with Christ, the far-
reaching significance of the event can be stated in stanzas 32-35. The
“comfortless unconfessed of them” function as the transition to the far-
flung question of the end of stanza 31: “is the shipwrack then a harvest,
does tempest carry the grain for thee?”
And Hopkins, going back to his own experience of the outset of
the poem, sums up: 
I admire thee, master of the tides,
Of the Yore-flood, of the year’s fall;
The recurb and the recovery of the gulf ’s sides,
The girth of it and the wharf of it and the wall;
Stanching, quenching ocean of a motionable mind;
Ground of being, and granite of it: pást áll
Grásp Gód, thróned behind
Death with a sovereignty that heeds but hides, bodes but abides;
With a mercy that outrides
The all of water, an ark
For the listener; for the lingerer with a love glides
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Lower than death and the dark;
A vein for the visiting of the past-prayer, pent in prison,
The last-breath penitent spirits—the uttermost mark
Our passion-plungèd giant risen,
The Christ of the Father compassionate, fetched in his storm
of his strides. (st. 32-33)
The Particular Christ
There is a strict analogy between Hopkins’s responsiveness to the
particular and the critique of late-Victorian poetical sensibility implied
in this on the one hand, and, on the other hand, his personal surren-
der to the person of Christ, which is the essence of Christianity—the
search of which was such a neuralgic concern of the era he lived in,
witness the series of books on Das Wesen des Christentums published in
the nineteenth century. For Hopkins, the encounter with the particu-
lar is both the source and the abiding norm of any generalization,
including the Church’s Creed and the Spirit of the Age.
In August 1935, Dietrich Bonhoeffer (whose theology was to be
discovered posthumously as much as Hopkins’s poetry) was addressing
a fraternity of assistant pastors of the Confessional Church of the
Province of Saxony about the question: How can biblical texts be “re-
presented,” how can they come to life in the present, how can they be
made relevant and of actual importance now? His answer: not by tailor-
ing them to the dominant mood. Never must the scandal of
particularity be subdued in favor of a facile consonance with the
prevailing culture. Bonhoeffer said:
The question became acute in this form for the first time in
the era of the emancipation of autonomous Reason, i.e., in
Rationalism, and it has determined theology till now, up to
and including German-Christian theology. Rationalism was
nothing but the long-dormant human demand for an
autonomous construction of life on the basis of the forces in
the world as given, and to that extent the matter in hand is
indeed a question that is contained in man’s very demand for
autonomy; that implies: autonomous man, if he wants to
acknowledge to be a Christian, too, demands that the
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Christian message should justify itself before the tribunal of
his autonomy. Should the justification come off, then he will
call himself a Christian; if it fails to come off, then he will call
himself a pagan. It makes no difference that the tribunal
before which the Christian message has to justify itself is called
Reason in the eighteenth century or Culture in the nineteenth
century or Volkstum in the twentieth century (or the year
1933, with all its implications). The question is exactly the
same: Is Christianity justifiable before us the way we are—
thank God? All those who want to lay claim to being called
Christians for whatever reasons—whether rational, cultural,
or political—have exactly the same urgent need, viz., to justify
Christianity before the tribunal of the present. The assump-
tion is exactly the same, viz., that the Archimedean point, the
solid, unquestionable point of departure has already been
established (whether in Reason, in Culture, or in Volkstum), and
that the movable, questionable, fluid element is precisely the
Christian message. The method is exactly the same, viz., to
engage in re-presentation in such a way as to run the Christian
message through the sieve of one’s own knowledge—what does
not go through is despised and thrown out; so to trim down and
lop off the message as to make it fit the fixed framework; until
the eagle can no longer raise itself and soar up into his true
element, but becomes, his pinions clipped, one particular show-
piece among the other tame, domesticated animals. Just as the
farmer who needs a horse for his land leaves the fiery stallion in
the market-place and buys himself a tame, spunkless workhorse,
so domestication has produced a serviceable Christianity; and
then it stands to reason that people will lose interest in this
entire construction pretty soon and turn away from it. This type
of re-presentation leads straight into paganism.2
There is, then, a deep affinity between Hopkins’s fundamental
option as a poet and his fundamental stance as a Christian: not service-
ability to the dominant concerns, but truthfulness to the encounter is
the norm, both for the poet and for the believer in him. It is ironical
that this man, so very particular both as a poet and as a Christian, was
summoned before the tribunal of ecclesiastical and cultural taste so
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often, and treated so condescendingly by both: he was not an ideologue
speaking from a covert or overt creed (his critics were!), but first and
foremost one touched by the particular, to which he responded from
the oh-so particular (and indeed somewhat fastidious) heart, not from
the generalizing head. Did Hopkins realize that he could do justice to
the particular, because in this man Jesus the particular had been taken
up, converted, and turned into the bearer of an absolute perspective,
one in whose light (fugitive though it may be, “as skies betweenpie
mountains”) dominant moods appear far less powerful, and indeed
downright transitory?
O then, weary then why should we tread? O why are we so
haggard at the heart, so care-coiled, care-killed, so fagged,
so fashed, so cogged, so cumbered,
When the thing we freely fórfeit is kept with fonder a care,
Fonder a care kept than we could have kept it, kept
Far with fonder a care (and we, we should have lost it) finer,
fonder
A care kept.
(“The Leaden Echo and the Golden Echo”)
If the particular is so absolutely kept, it is indeed worth doing
justice to, never mind the Spirit of the Age. And well, should the alleg-
ing of haecceitas lend this attention to detail some intellectual
respectability into the bargain, then more power to Scotus.
Notes
Published in The Month (Second New Series) 8 (1975): 340-45. This is the
issue commemorating the hundredth anniversary of Hopkins’s return to poetry
in 1875 and an act of posthumous reparation for the rejection of The Wreck of
the Deutschland by the then editor of The Month. Lightly revised for the pres-
ent collection.
1. Gerard Manley Hopkins, ed. Catherine Phillips. The Oxford Authors
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 33. All quotations from Hopkins’s
poetry in this essay follow this edition, and are referred to in my text by stanza
number or title.
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2. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, “Vergegenwärtigung neutestamentlicher Texte,”
in Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Eberhard Bethge (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag,
1966), III, 303-24; cited at 303-05. Volkstum was Nazi shorthand for gesundes
Volksempfinden (“the people’s healthy sensibility”) to promote political
conformism on the basis of racial identity. The meaning of the word is close to
what certain U.S. politicians have at certain times called “the silent majority,”
with the same undemocratic agenda in mind.
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A Note on Ther in
Curses and Blessings in Chaucer
for Pat, with respect and love
The purpose of this note is to make a statement on the use and themeaning of the word ther (“there”) in thirteen passages in the
Chaucerian corpus. In these passages, it will be argued, ther functions,
syntactically speaking, as the introductory adverb of a main clause
involving a curse or blessing. Specifically, what will be denied is that it
functions as a relative adverb, which would reduce the clause to a
subclause. It will also be argued, semantically speaking, that this use of
ther, while almost purely expletive, introduces connotations of what
will be called “indeterminacy with theological or religious connota-
tions.” The treatment offered here has no textual claims to make;
hence, the use of Robinson’s text merely reflects the author’s personal
preference. At the same time, in the interest of making the point clearly,
Robinson’s punctuation will be modified in places; the appropriateness
of the changes will be argued in the course of this note.
This note uses seven editions. The earliest is Robert Kilburn Root’s
edition of Troilus and Criseyde of 1926 and Walter W. Skeat’s 1933 one-
volume Oxford University Press edition of the entire corpus; the most recent
is Fisher’s 1977 edition of the same corpus. No statement is implied in this
selection other than the claim that this represents a fair sampling of edito-
rial comment on the problem in hand.1 The bracketed transpositions into
modern English are Nevill Coghill’s.2 The following passages to be discussed
are numbered for easy reference. Uses of ther are highlighted by italics.
(1) Troilus and Criseyde, II, 586-588:
Ther were nevere two so wel ymet,
Whan ye ben his al hool, as he is youre.
Ther myghty God yet graunte us see that houre!
[Never were two so fortunately met
As you, when you are fully his, will be;
Almighty God! May I be there to see!]
(2) Troilus and Criseyde, III, 946-947:
That is wel seyd,” quod he, “my nece deere.
Ther Good Thrift on that wise gentil herte!
[Pandar replied: “That is well said, my dear,
A blessing on your wise and gentle heart!]
(3) Troilus and Criseyde, III, 964-966:
And with that word he for a quysshen ran,
And seyde, “Kneleth now, while that you leste!
There God youre hertes brynge soon at reste!”
[He ran and fetched a cushion from the chest
“Now kneel away as long as you may please,
And may the Lord soon set your hearts at ease.”]
(4) Troilus and Criseyde, III, 1013-15:
Alas, that he, al hool, or of hym slyvere,
Shuld han his refut in so digne a place!
Ther Jove hym soone out of your herte arace!
[Alas that it — or even a small slice
Of it — should refuge in so fair a place!
May Jove uproot it, may it leave no trace!]
(5) Troilus and Criseyde, III, 1436-40:
Thow doost, alIas, to shortly thyn office,
Thow rakle nyght! Ther God, maker of kynde,
The, for thyn haste and thyn unkynde vice,
So faste ay to oure hemysperie bynde,
That nevere more under the ground thow wynde!”
[Alas, too briefly is thy business done,
Swift night! May God, the Lord of Nature, hear,
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And for the malice of they downward run,
Curse thee, and bind thee to our hemisphere,
Never beneath the earth to reappear!]
(6) Troilus and Criseyde, III, 1455-56:
What hastow lost, why sekestow this place?
Ther God thi light so quenche, for his grace!
[What hast thou lost? What doest thou seek of us?
God quench the light in thee for doing thus!]
(7) Troilus and Criseyde, III, 1524-26:
And with swiche voys as though his herte bledde,
He seyde, “Farewel, dere herte swete!
Ther God us graunte sownde and soone to mete!”
[And with the voice of one whose spirit bled
He said “Farewell, my dearest heart, my sweet,
And may God grant us safe and soon to meet.”]
(8) Troilus and Criseyde, V, 1525-26:
“Awey” quod he; “ther Joves yeve the sorwe!
Thow shalt be fals, peraunter, yet tomorwe!”
[Off with you! God’s sorrow
Light upon you! I’ll prove you false tomorrow!]
(9) Troilus and Criseyde, V, 1786-88:
Go, litel bok, go, litel myn tragedye!
Ther God thi makere yet, er that he dye,
So sende myght to make in some comedye!
[Go little book, go little tragedy,
Where God may send thy maker, ere he die,
The power to make a work of comedy.3
(10) The Canterbury Tales, I(A) 2815-16 (The Knight’s Tale)
Arcite is coold, ther Mars his soule gye!
Now wol I speken forth of Emelye.
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[Arcite is cold. Mars guide him on his way!
Something of Emily I have to say.]
(11) The Canterbury Tales, II(B
1
) 598-602 (The Man of Law’s Tale)
This knyght, thurgh Sathanas temptaciouns,
Al softely is to the bed ygo,
And kitte the throte of Hermengyld atwo,
And leyde the blody knyf by dame Custance,
And wente his wey; ther God yeve hym meschance!
[Little did she note
How he, o’ermastered by the Fiend’s temptation,
Had softly come upon her; then he smote
The Lady Hermengild and slit her throat,
Then laying the bloody knife beside the bed
Of Constance went his way. God strike him dead!]
(11) The Canterbury Tales, III(D)1561-62 (The Friar’s Tale)
“Heyt now,” quod he, “ther Ihesu Crist yow blesse,
And al his handwerk, bothe moore and lesse!”
[“Hup, there!” he shouted, “Jesus bless you, love,
And all His handiwork!”]
(13) The Canterbury Tales, IV(E)1307-08 (The Merchant’s Tale)
This sentence, and an hundred thynges worse,
Writeth this man; ther God his bones corse!
[Opinions such as these and hundreds worse
This fellow wrote, God lay him under curse!]
Editorial Comments
The editorial comments on these texts cover a broad range. In
terms of sheer frequency, Donaldson comments on the largest number
of passages (all except 2, 6 and 8), whereas Skeat, in the Glossarial
Index of his edition, interprets only three (1, 5 and 12). Pratt covers all
four passages from The Canterbury Tales (10, 11, 12 and 13). Passages
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10 and 12 have elicited the most numerous comments, with number 10
receiving attention from Robinson, Baugh, Pratt, Donaldson and
Fisher, and number 12 from Skeat, Robinson, Baugh, Pratt and
Donaldson. Passage 8 is the least commented upon: in fact, none of the
editors surveyed explain it. The range of comments is wide, too. Some
editors confine themselves to a simple explanation of the meaning,
whereas others comment on the syntax of the turn of phrase, and some
even volunteer hints at semantic development and derivation to explain its
meaning. Our treatment of these editorial comments will follow this order.
Meaning
Pratt simply notes that ther in passages 10, 11, and 12 means
“may,” and that ther God in 13 means “may God.” Donaldson, too,
simply notes that ther in the passages he comments on means “may”;
there is no reason to assume he would have made any different
comments on passages 2, 6 and 8, had he chosen to do so. In his
“Glossarial Index.” Skeat provides us with three different meanings. In
passage 1, ther means “as to which”; in passage 5, it means “wherefore”;
these two interpretations have this in common that Skeat reads the
clauses as dependent relative clauses in the optative subjunctive. The
third passage explained by Skeat admits of no such interpretation; this,
it seems, is what prompts him to supply the main clause by interpret-
ing ther in passage 12 as “wherefore (I pray that).” Fisher, in the
passages annotated by him, shows two distinct interpretations. In
passages 5 and 6, he comments, ther means “may”; the same interpre-
tation, slightly expanded, is given for passages 2 (“may prosperity be”)
and 9 (“may God”). But in passages 4, 10 and 11 Fisher sees quasi-local
adverbs. In the case of passage 4, this results in a syntactic connection
between Criseyde’s prayer that Jove may remove the viper of jealousy
from Troilus’s heart and her complaint at the viper’s having taken shel-
ter there in the first place; but this construction is stylistically
cumbersome on account of the presence, in the same sub-clause, of the
relative adverb as well as the adverbial adjunct (“where . . . out of your
heart”). Fisher’s reading of passage 10 is curious, too: if ther indeed
means “wherever,” the modern English rendering would run: “Arcite is
cold, wherever Mars may lead his soul.” Not very satisfactory. Fisher’s
interpretation of passage 11 suffers from a similar lack of naturalness;
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if ther does indeed mean “where (i.e., may),” the rendering would be:
“And he went his way, where God may give him ill fortune.” If the
curse were effective, where else could God give the evil young knight
the bad fortune he deserved for his heinous deed? Such a truism hardly
fits Chaucer’s ability as a story-teller. If we survey the thirteen passages
at this point it would seem that both the force of analogy and the
awkwardness of the interpretations of Fisher and, to some extent, Skeat
already point in the direction of our contention that all the passages
under consideration are best construed as main clauses expressing a reli-
gious wish.
Syntax
The syntax of these optative main clauses is well described by
Root. He comments on the structure of the expression in his note on
passage 5, which also refers to 2, 3, and 6, and simply points out that
ther is used “to introduce a prayer or curse.”
Robinson’s comments are found in three main places. His glos-
sary mentions “the idiomatic use [of ther] with optative clauses of
blessing and cursing,” and refers the reader to his note on passage 10.
A very similar note is found in his commentary on passage 2, with
references to passages 3, 5 and 6. Notes on passages 9 and 12 give no
new information; they simply refer the reader, once again, to the note
on passage 10, which reinforces the impression that the latter note is
meant to be understood as the place where Robinson will furnish the
reader with his considered opinion. Robinson’s note on 10 is a curi-
ous blend. It seems to interpret ther both as a relative adverb and as
an introductory expletive. Could it be that Robinson’s interpretation
marks the half-way house between Skeat and the later commentators?
The note runs:
2815 ther Mars hissoule gye, “where (or there) may Mars
guide his soul.” For the use of ther as an expletive in optative
clauses of blessing or cursing cf. FrT, III, 1561; MerchT, IV,
1308; Tr iii, 947, 966, 1437, 1456; v, 1787. The primary
sense seems to have been “in that (or which) case,” “under
which circumstances”; hence, “therewith,” “wherewith,” and
perhaps “wherefore.”
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Robinson’s note is ambiguous on two scores. Firstly, it is not clear
whether Robinson means to contrast the use of ther in 10 to its use in
passages 2, 3, 5, 6, (9), 12 and 13, or to draw a parallel. The only
resource left to decide this is punctuation. As in passage 10, ther in
passages 3, 5, 6, 9, and 13 is preceded by a comma, thus creating the
impression that we are dealing with a dependent clause—an impression
reinforced by the reference, in the note, to the relative “primary sense”
of ther. But in passage 2, ther is preceded by a period. Passage 12 leaves
no real option for variety in punctuation to bring out the syntax.
Secondly, it is not clear whether Robinson is speaking diachroni-
cally or synchronically. Is ther, as Chaucer uses it, an expletive (hence,
a word with neither denotative nor connotative meaning), or does it
carry at least a vestigial meaning held over from its “primary sense”?
The total picture of Robinson’s note is one of irresolution.
Baugh offers us a variety of syntactical comments to interpret ther
in passages 1, 2, 5, 10, 11, 12, and 13. In passage 1 (and, by summary
reference, also in 2), ther is called “an exclamatory intensive introduc-
ing a wish or imprecation.” In passage 5, it is explained as “introducing
a curse.” In passage 10, Baugh states, “the expletive use introducing a
wish,” while in 11, he calls it an “intensive.” Ther in 12 is explained as
a “hortatory adverb” and in 13 as “hortatory ther.” Baugh’s comments,
however, for all their variety, have this in common that they appear to
opt firmly for the main-clause interpretation of the idiom, and for the
interpretation of ther as an introductory syntactic device.
This is confirmed by §73 of his introductory treatment, titled
“The Language of Chaucer,” to which Baugh refers in most of his notes
on the texts. In this paragraph, ther gets company:
73. Hortatory as (also), the, so. An imperative or hortatory
subjunctive of wish, imprecation. etc., is commonly intro-
duced by as, ther, or so.
Among the examples cited, our passage 13 illustrates the use of ther.
The problem with Baugh’s comments is, again, twofold. Firstly, in
passages 6 and 9, neither of which elicits Baugh’s comments, ther and
so are found in the same sentence, which suggests that there are differ-
ences, too. Baugh, together with all the other editors surveyed in this
note except Root, does not stress a feature of ther noticed by himself in
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passages 1, 3 and 10, and in his own §73, viz., that it introduces a wish,
whether of cursing or blessing. Incidentally, none of the editors point
out that in every instance, ther is also immediately followed by the
name of a deity—good thrift in 2 is something very closely akin to
Fortuna!— which is the true subject of the sentence. Hence, among the
adverbs listed by Baugh in §73, ther is not completely parallel to as and
so: it must be considered in its own right.
The second problem is that “hortatory” is not the same as “exclam-
atory,” or, for that matter, as “intensive” or “expletive.” Moreover, there
are differences between “hortatory” and “imperative” words and expres-
sions, which in their turn are different from a “wish or imprecation.”
Imperatives have this in common with hortatories that the person, or
persons, addressed are also urged to be the subject of the action
commanded or commended. In the case of imperatives, the addressee
never includes the speaker; in the case of hortatories, the subject of the
action commended often includes the speaker. Wishes and imprecations,
however, express, in what is usually called an “optative,” a desire on the
speaker’s part that some third party—in our passages, a deity—should
accomplish something in relation to the person(s) addressed and/or to
some other party or parties connected with the person(s) addressed.
From Baugh’s examples in §73 it would appear that as and so can indeed
function in hortatory, imperative and optative clauses (our passages 6 and
9 suggest that they are not always introductory), whereas our evidence
suggests that ther has a much more limited use, viz., that of an introduc-
tory linguistic device of the syntactic kind, immediately followed by the
name of a deity, in optative main clauses of cursing and blessing.
This finding prompts us to propose a change in punctuation.
Hussey has rightly pointed out that “modern punctuation . . . is
inevitably a form of interpretation.”4 Modern punctuation practices, by
contrast with, say, seventeenth-century ones, tend to bring out syntax
rather than diction; we tend to be analytic and visual in our approach
to print rather than synthetic and oral-acoustical. In accord with this, I
have changed Robinson’s colon in passage 1 into a period, his commas
in passages 3, 4, 7 and 9 into exclamation marks; his comma in 6 has
become a question mark, and his commas in passages 8, 10, 11 and 13
have been replaced by semicolons. Passage 2 did not require a change;
passage 5, which now shows an exclamation mark after nyght (following
Tatlock and Kennedy), could also have been repunctuated by putting
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an exclamation mark at the end of the line preceding the line in which
ther occurs.5 Passage 12 does not offer much opportunity for variation;
I have omitted Robinson’s exclamation mark after Heyt, if only to show
that there are other factors besides syntax that determine punctuation,
taste being perhaps the most important. 
Semantic Development and Derivation and Meaning
Skeat and most probably Robinson detect a relative function in
ther; Robinson suggests that, at any rate, its “primary sense” may be (or
have been) relative. The first point to be made here is that etymologi-
cal, diachronic approaches to present meaning are notoriously
unreliable. It is, of course, true that ther, in Chaucer, can be relative as
well as demonstrative, but it seems unnecessary and far-fetched to
suggest that its function in the passages under discussion is detectably
relative in synchronic terms. This observation is strengthened by the
fact that, even if we were to allow that passages 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10,
and 11 could conceivably be construed as relative subclauses (though
only at the cost of great strain on the meaning of the text), passages 2,
8, 12, and 13 do not permit this construal at all, since ther, in those
passages, does not have any possible antecedent, and hence can only be
construed as the introductory move to an optative main clause.
If, therefore, we take our cue from analogy and notice the identi-
cal syntactic of all our passages, we must say a firm goodbye to ther
viewed as a relative adverb—that is to say, as a word with a clearly, or
even dimly, denotative meaning. This is tantamount to saying that
semantic development and derivation do not provide us with a clue to
whatever meaning, if any, ther contributes to the passages under discussion.
Is it possible to go on to suggest any semantic function ther might
have in synchronic terms? Both Robinson and Baugh use the term
“expletive”; this suggests that no meaning, whether denotative or
connotative, can be attributed to ther. Baugh, in addition, uses the
terms “intensive” and “exclamatory,” thus restricting whatever meaning
ther may have to enhancement of the other elements in the sentences
or to the speaker’s affective stance.
Thus the question arises, Are we in a position to suggest any other
contribution the word may have made to the meaning of our passages, in
the ears and minds of Chaucer, his listeners and his readers? I think we are.
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Impersonal “There”
“There” in modern English, like er and (archaic) daar in contem-
porary Dutch and da in modern German, frequently often introduces
“impersonal” sentences—the most ordinary turn of phrase being:
“there is/are/was/were/have been,” etc. + subject + (in English omis-
sible) relative pronoun + verbal form: “There’s a man wants to see
you.” To my knowledge, this usage has occurred in the languages
mentioned throughout their known histories. The fact that,
diachronically and etymologically speaking, “there” represents a
“weakened” form of the demonstrative adverb of place is of no rele-
vance to its real meaning in this kind of context. A closely analogous
use of “there” is found in phrases like: “On a fine winter’s night, there
arrived a stranger in the village.” When compared to its alternative,
“On a fine winter’s day, a stranger arrived in the village,” it will be
noticed that the former expression has a slight connotation of some-
thing impending, of an atmospheric, indeterminate quality
surrounding the stranger’s arrival.
Many languages, including non-Indo-European ones like
Hebrew, have linguistic devices to subdue the tone of determinacy
inherent in the declarative sentence, and even in non-declarative
sentences, if the subject of the sentence is God or a deity. Could it be
that ther in the passages we have discussed is a linguistic device whose
function it is to give the sentence a note of “indeterminacy”—i.e., a
“numinous” connotation, in order to convey that neither God nor
deities are agents in the same determinate way as mere mortals are, and
to convey that, in regard to God or gods, all we can do is wish, not
command, let alone control? If this should be the case, this would help
seal the fate of the construal of ther as a relative adverb in the passages
we have discussed.
A final note. Eleven of the thirteen passages were noticed by the
author in the course of reading all of Chaucer’s works. A quick check
of the Tatlock-Kennedy concordance, while confirming the incom-
pleteness of the author’s findings beyond the shadow of a doubt, did
turn up two more instances, viz. passages 8 and 11. Tatlock and
Kennedy did not turn up contrary evidence—ther God hire bones blesse!
I have not reread Chaucer to find more instances. The list of passages,
therefore, is probably exhaustive, but not presented as such.
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Rahner on Sprachregelung:
Regulation of Language? Of Speech?
Introduction: Homage to Karl Rahner
The late Karl Rahner’s elder Jesuit brother Hugo, a fine scholar aswell as a fine stylist, is said to have quipped at one time that he
hoped to become famous in his old age by translating Karl’s work into
German. Yet Karl’s works did win for their author, in 1973, the
Sigmund Freud Prize for Scholarly Prose of the German Academy for
Language and Literature, with the citation stating: “The master of the
literary word has succeeded in winning a new hearing for the word of
religion.”1 What a striking contrast between two appraisals!
The first, humorous remark calls to mind the high degree of
abstraction, formalism, and technicality in Rahner’s theology, where
terms have to be distinguished: existentiell is not identical with existen-
tial, and formell is not the same as formal, and the “transcendental”
must be carefully told apart from the “categorical.” This aspect of
Rahner’s works, if we apply Walter Ong’s analysis, is associated with the
visual, the objectifying, the analytical, the logical—in short, with the
kind of literacy that is associated with reading, with concentration on,
and analysis of, words and terms, and further down the road, with
scientific method, along with its panoply of terminological tools.
There is a second aspect to Rahner’s works—the one which the
Deutsche Akademie für Sprache und Dichtung, in awarding him the
prize, must mainly have had in mind. Rahner’s work has deep roots in
the literary world, where the living word, the oral-acoustical, the inter-
personal, the synthetic, and the rhetorical are predominant. In fact, the
citation explicitly refers to this: Rahner has won a new hearing for the word
of religion. After all, the German word Sprache in the name of the Academy
that awarded the prize, conveys a concern not only with “language” and
“usage,” but also with “speech”—not only with langue/langage, but also
with parole, in F. de Saussure’s classical distinction. Rahner has indeed
greatly enriched the German language and the usage of theology
viewed as the stable, available linguistic equipment scholarly theology
needs; in this way, he has succeeded in making large new areas of
cultural and religious experience habitually amenable to theological
expression and discussion. But this success is rooted in a more funda-
mental achievement in the area of live speech: once touched by Rahner,
the language of theology and thus, the German language itself have
sounded differently. Many of Rahner’s formulas have rung a new note;
a new excitement and a new eloquence have been brought to the inter-
national theological conversation.
This second, literary aspect of Rahner’s work is most prominent in
some of his more “popular” writings in the areas of pastoral practice
and spirituality, and in his many interviews, recently published—all of
them models of liveliness and depth. Still, it is by no means absent
from the “heavier” writings, which is consistent with the fact that a
large portion of Rahner’s works, especially his essays in the many
volumes of the Theological Investigations, were not written by him at all,
but, of all things, dictated—second-order abstractions and periodic
sentences and all. What we read, in other words, is very often live
speech edited for the purposes of publication. Both Augustine preach-
ing and Thomas Aquinas dictating come to mind, both with their
scribes scribbling. Hans Urs von Balthasar, who has tended to claim the
great aesthetic traditions of the Christian West as the principal source
of his theology, once conceded in an interview that Rahner has been
“the strongest theological power of our day”; but then proceeded to
characterize the distinctive difference between himself and Rahner as
follows:
our points of departure were always different, really. There is
a book by Simmel, titled Kant und Goethe. Rahner opted for
Kant, or Fichte, if you wish—the transcendental starting-
point. And like the Germanist I am, I opted for Goethe.2
Let the last sentence of this confession pass; the one before that, in
its baldness, does Rahner, a lifelong reader of poetry, and his written
work, with its strong undertow of literary and theological passion, a
serious injustice. Much to the point, a younger friend colleague wrote:
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Much of what Rahner wrote may be stiff reading. But that
is no reason to deny he had the gift of literary language-
use.3
Noticing the coexistence of these two, the periodic sentence and
the accouterments of second-order abstraction, is a good way to
approach the literary complexity of Rahner’s work. For all its high
literacy, the periodic sentence hails from the world of rhetoric, with
its cultivation of conviction, persuasion, and loyalty; it is a product
of the tradition that has Cicero and Quintilian for its masters. The
other ingredient, the abstractions, along with their daunting array of
terminology, hail from the dispassionate world of methodical intel-
lectual operations, aware—with a clarity that certainly goes back to
the Aufklärung, but beyond that to scholasticism—of their uses, but
also of their limitations. Walter Ong has explained that thought in a
“preliterate,” that is to say, a rhetorical culture is bound up not with
dispassionate observation, but with the dynamic world of interper-
sonal communication; once the world has been made “objective,” set
off from the personal world as essentially neuter—in the best
Kantian fashion—human thought is exercised no longer as a response
to the world but as an operation upon it.4 One of the attractive
features of Rahner’s work is precisely the harmonious, yet tensile,
coexistence of two styles of thought, along with their corresponding
linguistic styles. On the one hand, we have faith seeking to address
Church and World, as well as trying to respond to them, both with
a passion; on the other hand, we have the same faith dispassionately
seeking for its own foundation, and probing Church and World to
find the core of their integrity: the periodic sentence and the termi-
nological tool.
“Sprachregelung”
No wonder that Rahner, so eloquent and at the same time so
formal a thinker, came to take a strong interest in the status of theolog-
ical language. More particularly, he came to take a strong interest in
what he called Sprachregelung, “linguistic ruling”: the communal, i.e.,
ecclesial, fixation of doctrine in terminological form. The word first
occurs in an essay entitled “What is a Dogmatic Statement?” first
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published, in German, in 1961.5 Over the next ten years, Rahner
returned regularly to the subject, as appears from the lists of citations
in the Schriften zur Theologie, which give the original dates and occa-
sions of the individual essays.6 It appears that Rahner saw the need for
a treatment of the meaning of terminological doctrine mainly in three
related areas of theological inquiry, namely, (1) the relationship
between kerygma and dogma, (2) ecumenical relations, and (3) the
obligations imposed by magisterial definitions.
Sensitivity to the tension between the (“kerygmatic”) language of
faith and the formal language of dogma, as well as their relative auton-
omy, became a fundamental feature of Rahner’s thought. His main
emphasis came to be on the fact that the latter is an intellectual special-
ization, and hence a limitation, of the former, and one dependent on
historical circumstances.
In treating ecumenical matters, Rahner came to apply this special-
ization-concept. It allowed him to explore the implications of
pluralism, and thus to show the significance of dialogue—dialogue
among Catholics and with other Christians, but also with non-
Christians. This dialogue, Rahner argued, was not only possible as a
matter of principle, given the partiality of divergent dogmatic expres-
sions. It was also a downright requisite for the deeper understanding of
one’s own faith-commitment; ultimately, it would remind all partici-
pants of the basic function of all theological and religious
language—the reductio in mysterium.7
The authority of terminological dogma is not Rahner’s most
fundamental theme, yet it appears to be the one he treats with the
highest sense of urgency. It is never far to seek, not even when the
first two areas are the principal subject of discussion. It was this
issue which brought Rahner face to face with the issue of the unity
of the Catholic Church in believing, and, in connection with this,
with the functions of the magisterium. What is the effective
authority of terminological dogma, and how is its interpretation
to be regulated?8 The controversy surrounding Hans Küng’s
Infallible? occasioned much pointed discussion along these lines.
9
Still, we should not forget that the question had already come up
much earlier, and in a far quieter, more speculative context, when
Rahner was pleading for an alternative terminology in trinitarian
theology.10
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Terminological Dogma: From Meaning to Function
Now what is interesting—certainly from an “Ongian” point of
view—is that Rahner, in treating the problems connected with termi-
nological dogma, refers only to the problem of meaning involved. His
theme is, invariably, that the meaning of these dogmatic expressions is
relative: i.e., relative to the original kerygmatic expressions, to other
approaches to the same mystery, to the ecclesiological issue of unity in
believing, and ultimately to the mystery involved in and behind the
proposition. Rahner is not by any means alone in treating the issue in
this way. In fact, while his distinctive contribution lies in his particular
conception of the “relativity” of doctrine, and in his reasons for it, he
scarcely differs with any other theologian on the basic question as to
what the issue is, namely, one of meaning: the interpretation of termi-
nological doctrines is a cognitive matter. It is both interesting and a bit
surprising to watch such a sensitive and eloquent stylist as Rahner
agreeing with most of his colleagues, and even with the Roman
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, on this basic point.
The observation just made is important. It involves the realization
that terminological dogma is widely regarded, among theologians, as
regulated language. Hence the standard practice of interpretation: one
concentrates on a fixed dogmatic text (preferably set in its historical, and
especially its literary, context) in order to establish what this particular
doctrine means.
This essay is written to suggest that this focus on the cognitive (in
Ongian terms, the chiefly visual) function of doctrine is incomplete.
Dogmatic propositions, even the most terminological ones, can, and
often do, also function in affective (that is to say, predominantly oral-
acoustical) fashion. We will argue, therefore, that terminological dogma
often involves the regulation of speech. To make this case, some prelim-
inary observations of a general linguistic nature are in order.
Connotation in Natural Language
The distinction most frequently used to deal with the way words
function is that between denotation and connotation: words “say”
more than that which is amenable to our cognitive constructs. Words
connote. That is part of their attractiveness: they are not only precise;
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they are also eloquent. This applies not only to individual words, but
also, and even more, to word-complexes: they say more than they say.
This means, very concretely, that they betray, even in written or printed
form, that they “address,” not only issues, but also people in situations:
they create an audience in the very act of conveying thought. Much of
the time, such situations and audiences are incidental: many utterances
are ad hoc, fleeting, and impermanent; most language is the verbal
accompaniment of the ways in which we do this, that, and the other
thing with Tom, Dick, and Harry.
But there are situations that are more permanent, and they are
characterized by stable patterns of connotative language-use, especially
if those situations are “natural”: the family, the village, the tribe, even
the school. These permanent human configurations are characterized,
as Walter Ong has not tired of pointing out, by language-use that is
strongly formulary: myths, epics, sagas, legends, proverbs, tribal histo-
ries, family stories, playground cant, and what have you. Notice that
the term “connotation” is really too weak to convey all that is involved
here; it is better to resort to a term like “function” to approach the issue.
The formulary usages of more or less permanent natural human config-
urations function as the bearers of the group’s identity, and those who
speak and listen in these situations react, not so much to what is said
or heard, as to the way the words are used appropriately, i.e., as a function
of the understanding and the loyalty that hold the group together. In
joining such a group, we learn the usage before we get the understanding.
Meaning and Use of Terms
In what we have said so far, we have been dealing with the formu-
lary use of natural language, whose constitutive elements are what we
know as words—“regular” words. But our language, even our everyday
language, employs not only words, but also terms: special words,
usually (though by no means always) derived from foreign roots; words
which you have to know how to pronounce and use right, because they
tend to have very precise, usually abstract meanings laid down by defi-
nition. In other words, terms are maximally denotative, at least in
intention; in fact, one definition of “term” is: a word without connota-
tions, to be used exclusively in the service of rational discourse about
objective realities. Yet at the same time, terms look and sound, certainly
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to the non-initiated, a lot like formulas, and so the question arises: do
terms also function as bearers of community loyalty?
The answer is obvious: yes. But we must be careful here. In natu-
ral language, there is a close, spontaneous connection between the
meaning of a word and its appropriate use, between its cognitive mean-
ing and its rhetorical impact. In the case of terms, no such close
connection prevails. Terms mean what they are defined to mean, and
hence, the rules for their appropriate use are rather more extrinsic to
their meaning.11 Armed with this knowledge, we can easily see how
terms function as bearers of community loyalty: terms bestow
“membership in the profession,” but only on those who both under-
stand what they mean and have learned to use them appropriately.
“Displacement” of Terms
Now it is one of the characteristics of our technological, highly
literate age that “sounding educated” often means “using technical
terminology”; we associate knowledge with expertise, with a panoply of
technical terms—that is to say, with cognitive meaning as it is shared
among professionals. But this also means that we live in an age in
which many terms are liable to revert, as it were, to the realm of natu-
ral language. Terms are born at one or more removes from natural
language; then, on account of the spread of education, the populariza-
tion of professional knowledge, and the authority of such knowledge,
hundreds of terms find their way back into natural language. This
chain of events creates a very real problem, which is connected with the
relatively loose link between the meaning of a term and its appropriate
use. When a term is used outside the sphere of rational discourse, some of
the normal ambiguity and vagueness of natural language comes back to
it, but in an uncontrolled way, “through the back door, dragging along
a number of implicit assumptions not always easily detected.”12
There is nothing necessarily sinister in this, though it is true that
advertisers, mellow-speakers, and ideologues abuse precisely this qual-
ity of terms in the interest of “hidden persuasion”: lots of prejudice and
unexamined loyalty is expressed and promoted by means of comput-
erese, sociologese, journalese, economese, nationalese, theologese. The
problem is not that the quasi-natural-language use of terms conveys
and creates non-professional loyalties, but that these loyalties are hard
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to examine. That is why operators, fast talkers, rhetoricians, and
sophists—the well-intentioned as well as the unscrupulous, and also
the merely mindless—love to use terms: there’s no loyalty like unexam-
ined loyalty.
Terminological Dogma and the Profession of Loyalty
Abusus non tollit usum is one of the many oral maxims once taught
in seminaries: the fact that something is abused is no reason for its
abolition. While it is right to conclude from the foregoing that termi-
nological doctrine is likely to be correctly understood and used only by a
small minority of professionals, it is wrong to conclude that only
professionals may use it. The Christian tradition has, at any rate,
encouraged the opposite. Terminology has become part of the ordinary,
that is to say, the live, oral-acoustical profession of faith.13 What we
should also conclude, however, is that the non-professional use of
doctrinal terminology can be expected to involve not so much mean-
ing or precise understanding as profession of loyalty, and that this will
show in a certain lack of proportion between the term’s (rhetorical)
significance and its (cognitive) meaning.
This essay will test this hypothesis in the case of three terminolog-
ical doctrinal definitions, viz., Jesus Christ’s consubstantiality with the
Father in Godhead; the change, by transubstantiation, of bread and
wine into the Body and Blood of Christ; and the infallibility of the
ecclesiastical magisterium in matters of faith and morals.
Homoousios
Christ’s “consubstantiality with the Father” occurs in the Creed
promulgated at Nicaea in 325 A.D. It found its way into the Nicene-
Constantinopolitan Creed: “And [we believe] in one Lord Jesus Christ,
. . . of one substance [homoousion] with the Father.” It is part of the
tradition of the undivided Church. The term has a very precise mean-
ing: every predicate attributable to the Father must also be attributed
to Christ, except “Father”; Christ is the Son. However, several observa-
tions are in order.
First, this clarity is the product of hindsight. Anyone familiar with
the Arian controversies of the fourth and fifth centuries knows how
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long it took before this precise focus was a matter of consensus. That
Arius was wrong was, perhaps, not too hard to establish, but at the
time, many found the remedy worse than the disease: how prudent was
it to commit the Churches to the mandatory use of a new, non-bibli-
cal and hence, suspect technical term—homoousios? While it took care
of Arianism, it might well cause more undesirable problems in the
future. And indeed, it took the best part of the fourth century to
discover, in the course of much confusing debate and episcopal and
imperial politicking, just how restricted—if crucial—the area of affir-
mation covered by homoousios really was. And this lack of precision has
continued. I have met a theologian who was less than entirely clear on
the point!
Secondly, this lack of precision in the fourth and fifth centuries did
not prevent the term from being abundantly used—mainly as an eccle-
siastical loyalty-flag. But since the fourth century also witnessed the
gradual establishment of orthodox Christianity as the sole religion
permitted in the Empire (Theodosius, Cunctos populos, 380 A.D.), the
emperors, both of the West and of the East, developed a taste for apply-
ing homoousios as a civil loyalty test, too. Similarly, but on the other
side, we have the professed Arianism of the Ostrogoths under
Theodoric and his successors in the late fifth and early sixth centuries,
over against the orthodoxy of the old Roman establishment, over which
they held military sway. Thus, there is every reason to doubt the strictly
theological significance of both.
This enormous disproportion between the (chiefly oral) use of
homoousios as a loyalty-marker and its (literate) use to express ortho-
doxy is paralleled by the use of transubstantiation, albeit with a
difference.
Transubstantiation
In the Latin church, “transubstantiation” defines the change of
bread and wine into the Body and Blood of Christ at the Eucharist.
The dogma was first laid down by the fourth Lateran Council of 1215.
More than three centuries later, in 1551, the Council of Trent picks up
the terminology, stating that the substances of bread and wine are
entirely changed into the substances of the Body and Blood of Christ,
and adding that this change has been aptly and properly been called
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transubstantiation. Now the question is, What is the reason for the
aptness and propriety of the term? What, in other words, is the target
of the affirmation? The question is of great ecumenical significance, for
acceptance of transubstantiation separates the Catholic Church from
the Reformation.
It turns out that the meaning of “transubstantiation” is surprisingly
restricted. Around the time of the fourth Lateran Council, “transub-
stantiation” and the affirmation of the real presence were simply “two
sides of a single coin,”14 with no affirmations implied about the way in
which the real presence was thought (or imagined) to come about. In
fact, authorities like Peter of Capua and Lothar of Segni (who as Pope
Innocent III was to preside over Lateran IV), regarded the three preva-
lent theories about the coming about of the real presence
(“consubstantiation,” “annihilation,” and “transubstantiation”) a
matter of theological opinion,15 even though they themselves favored
the third explanation. At this point in time, therefore,“transubstantia-
tion” serves two purposes. In the conciliar definition of Lateran IV, it is
a term used as a natural word; it simply affirms the real presence. By
contrast, as a term among theologians it defines one of three ways in
which the real presence was responsibly thought to come about. Not
till a generation later does Aquinas argue that annihilation and consub-
stantiation are both illogical and heretical, and only transubstantiation
orthodox; interestingly, though, he does not quote Lateran IV in
support of his position. Fifty years later, Scotus and Ockam disagree
with Aquinas: they find consubstantiation intellectually more attractive
than transubstantiation, but since Lateran IV has made the latter an
article of faith, they consider “transubstantiation” simply a matter of
authoritative doctrine, not of conceptual understanding. This, of course,
goes a long way towards explaining why the only claim Trent made in
regard to the term “transubstantiation” was that the real change of the
eucharistic elements is “aptly and properly so named.” It is as simple as
that, and besides, stated in a relative clause as it is, it hardly passes the
test of defined doctrine.
“Transubstantiation” is an intriguing term, a fact which helps to
explain why it has functioned so prominently in theological debate and
controversy, even down to our own day. At the same time, the doctrine
of transubstantiation is conceptually feeble: while stating the real pres-
ence, it does not furnish any insight into its structure. This, however,
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has not prevented it from being vigorously alleged as a mark of loyalty.
In this regard, it both resembles Homoousios, and differs from it: like
homoousios, “transubstantiation” functions as a loyalty-badge, but
whereas homoousios can be shown to have a very precise logic, “transub-
stantiation” is little more than an authoritative term of considerable
oral-acoustical weight to convey and commend the realism of the
Catholic eucharistic tradition.
Infallible Magisterium
Infallibility expresses the freedom from error in teaching faith and
morals enjoyed by the Church’s teaching office, whether papal or colle-
gial-episcopal, under certain conditions. The exercise of infallible papal
magisterium was defined at the first Vatican Council in 1870; episco-
pal-collegial infallibility, while made much of at Vatican II, has never
been formally defined.
In a fairly recent book, the nature of magisterial authority, both of
the “non-definitive” and the “definitive” (infallible) kind, has been
explained with exquisite clarity.16 What is striking in the book, from a
literary point of view, is the care with which its author argues the limi-
tations of infallible magisterium—something which may worry some
readers. What is especially striking is the way in which the author
argues the limits of the object of infallibility. Thus, for instance, he
denies that matters of natural law can ever be the object of infallible
teaching by the ordinary universal magisterium—a position highly
relevant to the interpretation of Humanae vitae.17 Yet while stressing the
limits of infallibility, the book clearly shows a high esteem for the teach-
ing office, and it does everything to commend a responsible, mature
attitude of respect and obedience, on the part of the faithful, toward all
authentic teaching in the Church, whether non-definitive or definitive.
The reason behind this apparently negative tendency in the book
is not far to seek: while the target area of infallibility as a defined
doctrine is very narrow—and relatively few theologians and bishops are
so keenly aware of this as Francis Sullivan—its non-professional use as
a loyalty-marker is extremely broad. The latter use really bears out the
characteristic Catholic faith-attitude. This attitude is not so much
concerned with the precise definition of the pope’s infallibility, as with
a particular practice of universal papal jurisdiction and episcopal
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governing authority, which is vastly more influential in everyday life in
the Church than the infallibility-dogma. Again, as in the case of
homoousios and transubstantiation, the term infallibility shows a big gap
between its professional, literate use as a cognitive counter, and its
natural-language, oral-acoustical use as a loyalty-marker.
Three Conclusions
This essay has been written to illustrate how Catholic theology has
gained enormously from the two influences at work in Karl Rahner’s
theological achievement: the formal-literate and the rhetorical-literary.
It has also been written to say that in the latter area theology stands to
gain even more from the insights of scholars like Walter J. Ong if it
wants to overcome its one-sidedly cognitive biases, which are notice-
able even in so literary a theologian as Karl Rahner. Hence, three
conclusions to wind up.
First, dogma is a determination, or normative regulation, not
only of language, in the form of canonized pronouncements author-
itatively taught, but also of speech, in the form of formulary
professions of faith and loyalty couched in “displaced” terminological
language. The two must be carefully distinguished, so that both may
be truly appreciated.
Second, there tends to be a notable gap between the meaning of
terminological dogmatic language and its use in the ordinary profession
of faith. This realization should influence the practice of theological
hermeneutics: theologians should ask not just what certain dogmatic
formulas mean, or meant, in cognitive terms, to theological profession-
als, but also in the interest of what affective concerns they are, or were,
regularly used.
Third, loyalty is fine, but the formulas that carry it are often the
carriers of prejudice, too. This has special relevance to ecumenical
theology. It is easier to change minds than habits of speech; different
ideas can coexist, side by side, in the same space, while different voices
are harmonious only if they are “in synch.” In many areas of the faith,
it is not doctrine that separates us, but formulas. They need not do so,
provided the different formulas are given equal time, so that all
involved can attune the ears of faith to them.
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“Lost and Found” in Luke 15:
Biblical Interpretation and Self-Involvement
for Margy and Rick
We live in space and time. Even our two most sophisticated senses,sight and hearing, can work only in space and time, as
Immanuel Kant well saw. Nevertheless, differentiation is the name of
the sensory game. There exists a very sophisticated natural affinity
between seeing, analysis, space, understanding, and ideas; analogously,
an only slightly vaguer natural affinity prevails between hearing,
synthesis, time, trust, and affectivity.1 Yet for all its acuity of vision, the
eye cannot say to the ear, “I do not need you.”2 Let us apply this piece
of wisdom about the twin steeples of the human sensorium, sight and
hearing, together with a few items from Greek grammar, to the
fifteenth chapter 
of the third gospel.
*  *  *  *  *
Let us begin with a translation of the chapter—at first blush, an
unduly free one.
Now all the toll collectors and the sinners were crowding
Jesus, listening to him; and the Pharisees as well as the Torah-
experts were muttering among themselves: “This man keeps
the company of sinners and eats with them.”
So he told them this parable, as follows. “Which of you,
owning a hundred sheep and losing one of them, does not
leave the ninety-nine on their own in the desert and go after
the one that got itself lost, until he finds it? And once he finds
it, he is happy to put it on his own shoulders, and when he
gets home he calls his friends and his neighbors together and
tells them, ‘Be happy with me, for I have found my sheep,
which got itself lost.’ Let me tell you: this is how there will be
joy in heaven because of one sinner converting, rather than
because of ninety-nine righteous people who have no need of
conversion.
Or take a woman who has ten drachmas: if she should lose
one drachma, would she not fix a light and sweep the house
and search carefully until she finds it? And once she finds it,
she calls her friends and neighbors together, and tells them,
‘Be happy with me, for I have found the drachma I lost.’ Let
me tell you: this is how there will be joy among God’s angels
because of one sinner converting.”
But then he said: “Somebody had two sons. And the
younger of the two told his father: ‘Father, give me my right-
ful portion of the estate.’ So he divided his estate for them.
And a few days later the younger son got everything together
and left home for a distant land, and there squandered every-
thing he had, living it up beyond any possibility of recovery.
But as he was spending away, a serious famine spread every-
where in that country, and he began to run out. And he took
to the road and committed himself to some citizen in that
country, and he sent him to his farmlands to tend the swine.
And he would have loved to fill his belly with the pods the
swine were eating; and nobody offered him anything. Then it
was he came to himself. He said, ‘How many of my father’s
day laborers have food aplenty, and here I am, getting myself
starved to death. I will get up and travel to my father and say
to him: Father, I have sinned against God and in your face; I
am no longer fit to call myself your son; treat me as some day
laborer of yours.’ And up and off he went, to his own father.
Now while he was still at a long distance his father saw him,
and was filled with pity, and he ran out, fell around his neck,
and covered him with kisses. But the son said to him: ‘Father,
I have sinned against God and in your face; I am no longer fit
to call myself your son.’ Yet the father told his servants:
‘Quick, get the best dress and put it on him, and put a ring on
his finger and sandals on his feet, and fetch the fatted calf,
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slaughter it as the Law prescribes, and let us feast and make
merry together. For this son of mine was dead and has come
back to life; he was lost and let himself be found.’ So they
started making merry.
But his elder son was out in the field, and when on his way
home he approached the house, he heard music-making and
dancing going on. And he called some houseboy to himself
and inquired just what might be going on. And he told him:
‘Your brother has arrived, and you father has had the fatted
calf slaughtered, because he has gotten him back safe and
sound.’ But he got angry and did not care to come in. So his
father came out to plead with him. But he replied to his
father: ‘Look, so many years have I been a servant to you, and
I have never failed to follow any order, and you have never
given me a kid to make merry with my friends. But now that
this son of yours arrives, who has devoured the living you
worked for in the company of lewd idolaters, you have slaugh-
tered the fatted calf for him.’ But he told him: “Dear child,
you are always with me, and everything that is mine is yours;
but, by God, we are to make merry together and enjoy
ourselves, since this brother of yours was dead and has come
back to life; he was lost and let himself be found.”
Luke 15 is a literary composition in its own right, i.e., apart from
any indebtedness to sources. As such, it invites analysis and intellectu-
ality.3 Still, its unity resides not just in its written, visual form but also
in its rhetoric; like every writing in the New Testament, it is written
down only to be read out loud and heard, i.e., to be performed and
received in one piece, synthetically, affectively.
The two opening verses are a Lucan favorite,4 defining both the
occasion and the target audience: on the one hand, Jesus, crowded,
typically, by “all the toll collectors and the sinners”—bad company, yet
hanging on his words (•κούειν αÛτοØ); on the other hand, “both the
[οË τε] Pharisees and the [καÂ οÊ] Torah-experts (γραµµατεÃς).”5 The
two groups’ divergent attitudes toward Jesus are conveyed by a sample
of that favorite figure of speech in pre-literate and early-literate
cultures, the play upon words: ¦γγίζοντες-διογγύζοντες—an oral-
acoustical contrastive parallel only awkwardly rendered by something
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like “close company” and “carping complainers.” Lots of black preach-
ers in North America could (and would) do better, on the spur of the
moment (though in reality they have puns by the dozens in their
memory stores, ready to go, to hold the happy pew’s smiling attention).
A second feature of Luke 15 (and one which must be remembered
in the interpretation of any New Testament text) is allusio—literally,
“indirectly playing with something.” Allusion is to be understood not
so much as the practice of calculated quotation, whether “literal” or
not, but oral-acoustically, i.e., as “biblical background music”—idioms
perhaps only dimly familiar to the listener, yet somehow reminiscent of
the whole wide world of faith created by God’s Word at work in the
Tradition. In the case of Luke 15, Joseph A. Fitzmyer’s commentary
offers instances of allusio as touching as they are illuminating. Thus, to
mention only two instances, the younger son’s confession “Father, I
have sinned against God and in your face” echo Pharaoh’s desperate
words to Moses and Aaron; likewise, the portrayal of the father “falling
around [his son’s] neck” recalls Jacob’s relief at his meeting with his
dreaded brother Esau, and Joseph’s deep emotion at the encounter with
Benjamin and his other brothers in Egypt.6
Another oral-acoustical feature of Luke 15 is a figure of speech
often called fortiora-fortia-fortissima, as follows. In due time, three
items get lost: a sheep, a coin, and a younger brother. They are, in
order, a prized animal, a valued object, and a treasured person. The
sequence squarely places the culmination of the series in the third story:
the “prodigal son.” The effect is enhanced by the fact that Jesus’ direct
speech is interrupted by “But then he said” (ΕÉπεν δέ; v. 11).
A fourth figure of speech is repetitio: the return of identical words
or turns of phrase throughout the passage even as it is heard. In this
case, the turns of phrase are several, as we shall see. The words repeated
are mainly verbs: “hear,” “lose” and “lost,” and “find” and “found.”
Yet there are differences. In the case of the lost drachma, the
responsibility for the loss is emphatically placed on the woman: “if she
should lose just one drachma” (v. 8; emphasis added) and “the drachma
I lost” (v. 9); accordingly, the finite forms are simply in the active voice:
•πολέσ®, •πώλεσα. The case of the sheep is a bit different. The shep-
herd does lose (•πολέσας) the one sheep, but when he goes out
(πορεύεται) to find the animal a note of sympathy is sounded: he goes
out because of (¦πÂ) the sheep, which becomes “the one that has gotten
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itself completely lost”: τÎ •πολωλÎς—the middle participle of the
resultative perfect tense. For its sake, he wanders all over till he finds it
(ªως εàρ® αÛτό), and willingly carries it home on his shoulders and
calls “his friends and his neighbors” in to share in the joy (συγχάρητέ
µοι). The story ends with another repetitio: the shepherd does almost
literally the same as the woman will do after she recovers her coin (vv.
6, 9).7 After all, the point of both parables is God’s joy over “one repent-
ing sinner” (¦πÂ ©νÂ µαρτωλè µετανοοØντι: vv. 7, 10).
Unsurprisingly, neither the coin nor the sheep are invited; they are not
company.
*  *  *  *  *
In the case of the younger son, however, there is no question that
he gets himself lost. He does so by first impudently claiming his share
of his father’s property and leaving, to have a life of his own somewhere
else, “living it up beyond possibility of recovery” (ζäν •σώτως;; v. 13):
nobody at home knows where he is or what has become of him. His
elder brother will not be exaggerating when he sums up the scrape his
younger brother has gotten himself into by describing him to his father
as “that son of yours who has devoured (Ò καταnαγών) the living you
worked for (σου τÎν βίον) in the company of lewd idolaters (µετ
πορνäν).”
The understanding that the younger son is acting on his own is
implied throughout the narrative; he is the subject of the highest
number of narrative sentences—about a dozen of them. He demands
his share of the property. He leaves home and sets out on his disastrous
journey. He wastes his fortune. When he feels the pinch, he picks up
and commits himself (¦κολλήθη) to some local citizen, who puts him
in charge of his swine—to Jewish ears, godforsaken dirty work in every
sense of the word. Being without food, the boy is driven to extremes:
he would even have loved to fill his belly with the pods the swine were
eating (if only he could have gotten himself to do so),8 and nobody
offers him anything in the way of (human) food. He comes to his
senses. He realizes he is getting himself totally lost (•πόλλυµαι). He
decides to “let on”—i.e., to “up and travel (•ναστς πορεύσοµαι)”9 to
his father, with a prepared speech: “Father, I have sinned against God
and in your face (»µαρτον εÆς τÎν οÛρανÎν καÂ ¦νωπιόν σου), I am
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no longer fit (–ξιος) to call myself (κληθ ναι) your son; treat me as
some laborer of yours (ªνα τäν µισθίων σου).”10 And he does up and
go (•ναστς ³λθεν) to his own (©αυτοØ) father, who, on the look-out,
sights him from afar and filled with pity and love, comes running out,
throws his arms around his neck, and covers him with kisses. He starts
his prepared speech. The father does not even bother to hear him out;
the boy never gets to beg for a place among the day laborers—the
outsiders on the ancient homestead, working only for food or money.
For the father is already issuing orders to his domestic servants (το×ς
δούλους αÛτοØ) to get his boy dressed festively, and to fetch the fatted
calf, kill it as the Torah prescribes (θύσατε), and join in the feasting and
general merrymaking. The reason: “This child of mine was dead and
has come back to life (•νέζησεν), he had gotten himself lost beyond
retrieval (•πολωλãς; cf. τÎ •πολωλÎς, said of the sheep) and is now
found (εßρέθη).” So the merrymaking begins. Obviously, it takes
sinners and those who feel for them to enjoy company—a pointed
reminder of the chapter’s opening line.
This sets the stage for the father’s encounter with his elder
son—the counterpart of Jesus’ dissonant critics mentioned in the
opening verses, as we will see. For now, however, one last grammat-
ical-rhetorical feature in the first part of the parable requires our
attention.
There is no doubt that the aorist passive ¦κολλήθη (v. 15) has a
reflexive meaning: “he committed himself to someone.”11 There is little
or no doubt that the meaning of τÎ •πολωλÎς, •πόλλυµαι, and
•πολωλãς (vv. 6, 17, and 24, repeated at 32) is reflexive, too: both the
sheep and the kid have gotten themselves lost—the former in the shep-
herd’s eyes, the latter in both his own eyes and his father’s. Besides, in
the country where he is a nobody to start with, the boy decides he
cannot proudly call himself (κληθ ναι) his father’s son any longer—
another reflexive phrase, which he repeats even after his father has
unmistakably welcomed him (v. 21). Even the father’s call for celebra-
tion shows this grammatical feature: the verbal form εÛnρανθäµεν, a
hortative passive-voice aorist, has once again a reflexive meaning: “let
us make each other merry”—i.e., “let us be merry together”; the text
gives us no grounds for assuming that the family servants—never
mind others of even less consequence, say, the hired laborers—are
excluded from the celebration.12 Now in this context, is it not tempting
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to interpret εßρέθη (v. 24: “he was found”—another passive aorist) as
“he let himself be found”? Let us see.
*  *  *  *  *
The account of the father’s encounter with his elder son begins with
a startling repetitio: just as the toll collectors and the sinners are surround-
ing Jesus (¦γγίζοντες) and hanging on his words (•κούειν αÛτοØ), the
elder boy comes close (³γγίσεν) to the house and hears unexpected
music-making and dancing going on (³κουσεν συµnωνίας καÂ
χορäν—no definite article). He “gets angry” (éργίσθη). Is this a faint
echo of διογγύζοντες—i.e., another oral-acoustical contrastive parallel?
It could be, especially if the reader should make a point of sounding it
out that way. Also, does this passive aorist have a reflexive meaning, too?
In other words, is he “getting himself angry”? Are we to understand that
a latent preparedness to take offense is the elder brother’s first reaction to
any merrymaking? No wonder, after arrogantly asking one of the “boys”
(ªνα τäν παίδων) “just what might be going on” (τί —ν εÇη ταØτα)13 and
learning that his brother is back “safe and sound” (ßγιαίνοντα), he “did
not care to come in” (οÛκ ³θελεν εÆσελθεÃν), so his father comes outside
to play the advocate (παρεκάλει). The elder son is unwilling; his refusal
to join in the merrymaking is painfully matched by his resentful
complaint to his father: he has never been given as much as a kid to “have
a good time for myself with my friends” (Ëνα µετ τäν nίλων µου
εÛnρανθä). ΕÛnρανθä[µεν] is the very word the father had used on his
younger son’s arrival; the merrymaking which the elder son protests he
never got to enjoy for himself is of the opposite kind: exclusive partying
away from home—the kind that is apt to turn into something else.
The son’s implicit point—“I am the sole heir to this estate”—evokes
an immediate counterpoint, which also serves to introduce the closing
line of the chapter as a whole. The father says: “My child, you are always
with me, and whatever is mine is yours. But by God, we had to (ªδει)
make merry together (εÛnρανθ ναι) and be joyful (χαρ ναι).”
*  *  *  *  *
In this way, the text ends on a note of consonance, with Jesus
commending the cheerfulness of the chapter as a whole: the general
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merrymaking after the younger son’s arrival and the common joy of the
shepherd and the housewife with their friends and neighbors. Both are
conveyed by two passive aorists, the latter chiming in with the invita-
tions of the shepherd and the housewife (συγχάρητέ µοι). And finally,
there is Jesus’ urgent invitation to his critics: “This brother of yours was
dead and has come to life, and having gotten himself lost, he let himself
be found (εßρέθη; cf. v. 24)”—another passive aorist.
*  *  *  *  *
One last observation on the text of Luke’s fifteenth chapter.
Strikingly, there is no mention of either recovery or return in the piece,
even though both verbs are part of Luke’s vocabulary.15 Could it be that
in the world of Luke 15, where the differences between losing and find-
ing are obviously real, there is a wider horizon? Does the chapter imply
that in the end both getting lost and getting found are occurring within
the one universe accounted for by one and the same Father, who has no
enemies and thus, will never agree to let either the world or humanity
run their course apart from him? Do the words, “all that is mine is
yours” imply “world without end”?
If it does, we can go to the Nicene creed for a parallel: “I believe in
one God, Father, Sovereign Ruler of all that is” (Πιστεύω εÆς ªνα
Θεόν, Πατέρα παντοκράτορα). God is God of Gods and Lord of
Lords: nothing lost or runaway can defeat God’s design for creation. The
boy’s father is in no hurry; he is waiting. In the end, there will be joy.
*  *  *  *  *
Are we overinterpreting? Who knows? But there are moments in
the New Testament that suggest we are not. The significant passive
voice, for example, is not a grammatical quirk limited to Luke 15. A
much older writing already shows it. Paul writes to the Galatians: “Now
that you have come to know God (γνόντες θεόν)—but more impor-
tantly, now that you have come to be known by God (γνωσθέντες ßπÎ
θεοØ)—how can you go back to the feeble and starveling powers to
which you want to enslave yourselves again?” (Gal 4, 9a). It is incon-
ceivable that Paul considers the new Christians to have not been known
by God at all until recently; there has to be something new the matter
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here, and it has to be a matter of actual, shared experience to the
Galatians themselves, for Paul appeals to that experience throughout.
So is it not wise to forget about the semi-Pelagian debates five centuries
later and boldly translate, “now that you have let yourselves be known
by God”? In other words, “Do you not realize that you have accepted
yourselves as God’s own children, with the God-given freedom which
this new self-acceptance involves?” In the first letter to the Corinthians
a similar expression occurs, except that its underlying theme is not free-
dom but love—a theme hardly unknown in the letter to the
Galatians.16 Paul writes, “All those who think they have come to know
something do not yet know the way they are meant to know (εÇ τις
δοκεÃ ¦γνωκέναι τι, οÜπω §γνω καθãς δεÃ γνäναι); but those who
love—they are the ones who (show that they) are known by God” (εÆ
δέ τις •γαπ”, οàτος §γνωσται ßπz αÛτοØ).17 That is, by faith in Jesus
Christ, they know who they are. Small wonder Paul acknowledges he
regards himself as “known.”18 Liberated and loved, he can afford to “let
on.” Paul uses the rhetoric of self-involvement—something the Church
Fathers, for all their literary sophistication, were to continue.
*  *  *  *  *
Time to conclude. Why pay attention to rhetorical and oral-
acoustical details and implied reflexives (both of them self-involving
features) in a New Testament text? Let us pass over in silence one obvi-
ous reason already mentioned: all New Testament writings were written
down to ensure reliable oral performance at community meetings. But
for close to a century and a half now, the art of biblical interpretation
has been largely a matter of cut-and-paste, with spectacular results.19 Yet
this largely visual, academic, and (allegedly) theologically impartial
approach has raised the question: is living faith now implicitly regarded
an irritant to the objectifying mind reading and studying in silence?
One would hope not.
But if not, then the written Word of God remains trenchant,20 and
Bible-scholars must learn how to listen. While it takes a robust head to
study and teach, scholars, too, are not entirely unmoved by what
happens in their chests: air, breath, affect. Obviously, here the question
of controls becomes very difficult: it is much harder to establish
whether what I “hear” is part of the biblical author’s intent or just the
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result of my familiarity with the world of Scripture as a whole. But
that ambiguity (and the scholarly duty to accept it) is the price of
print literacy.21 For faith is the fruit of (affective) hearing,22 so sight
is at least to some degree subject to affect: ubi amor ibi oculus.23 So
we theologians can do worse than systematically use our eyes and
heads in the service of our chests, where (among many other things)
the Spirit of Love urges us to speak, or rather, to say something—
let’s say, “The Word.” He is alive in the Spirit, and has use for both
our hearts and our voices (not to mention our ears). Thus, far from
being the academic theologian’s poor relative, some form of live
faith is his faithful, inspiring wife or her ditto husband. And we all
know that around live spouses, we sense something live is going on,
never mind the exact word for it; analogously, theology properly
professed never turns a life into a neutral academic venture, not
even at universities.
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OCCASIONAL COMMENTARY

Apophaticism, Liturgy, and Theology
for Geoffrey Wainwright
In a profound and perceptive article, later incorporated into a finelittle book, Louis Dupré has given us much to think about.1 He raises
an issue which any liturgical theologian must face sooner or later: the
correlation of silence and speech in the language of worship, and so, in
the language of theology. He writes:
Those who enjoy the closest familiarity with God are the most
reluctant to be loose-lipped about him. But sooner or later the
question arises: How can we continue to use words at that point?
Is silence the end? Is a purely negative theology itself not a “crea-
turely” approach to God? Should it not, at some point, abandon
also its own creaturely reservations and in the absence of words
of its own listen to the Word that God himself has spoken? . . .
should we not say that in God’s silence I hear the Word, in his
darkness I see the Light, in his rest I enjoy his active Love?2
In an article written by such a quintessentially Catholic philosopher of
religion like Dupré, this is an unexpected thing to find. First of all, the
very etymology of the noun “mystery” reminds us of the significance of
deliberate, eloquent silence in liturgical celebrations;3 a scholar like
Dupré, whose religious sensibilities were shaped by the Roman liturgy,
must be presumed to appreciate the significance of silence in worship.
Even more is it to be presumed that Dupré is aware that the philosoph-
ical and theological traditions of the West have found it imperative to
have recourse to apophaticism in the service of speaking of God;4
Thomas Aquinas himself can close one of his treatises with a nearly
literal quotation from a famous decree promulgated by the fourth
Council of the Lateran (1215 A.D.), which goes so far as to suggest that
the element of negativity enjoys pride of place in language about God:
the measure of human and divine perfection is not the same.
For no likeness, no matter how great, can obtain between the
Creator and the creature, without there being found right there an
unlikeness which is greater. This is so because the creature is at an
infinite distance from God.5
No wonder we find young Aquinas explaining, in his Commentary on
Peter Lombard’s Sentences, that
when we proceed towards God on the road of removal, we
first deny everything corporeal of God. Then we deny every-
thing spiritual as it is found in creatures, such as goodness
and wisdom. At that point, all that is left in our minds is that
God is, and nothing else; thus God is, in a kind of perplex-
ing fashion, so to speak. Last of all, however, we remove from
God even this very being according as it occurs in creatures.
At that point, God is left to dwell in a kind of darkness of
ignorance; yet after the manner of this ignorance—at least as
long as we are on our present way—we are best united with
God, as Dionysius says. It is a dark of sorts, in which God is
said to dwell.6
Why, then, should Dupré wish to revise a tradition that goes back
to the Cappadocians? Why does he want to commend what looks like
naiveté in naming God?
The answer is as simple as it is profound. Dupré’s suggestion raises
the stunning possibility that our habit of imposing on ourselves an
absolute silence in matters pertaining to the knowledge of God may be
the very opposite of docta ignorantia; it may betray a residual intellec-
tual self-regard that is inappropriate in the Presence of God.
Let us explain the implications of Dupré’s proposal. Meister
Eckhart insists that the definitive form of the knowledge of God is utter
silence. If Dupré should be right, it would follow that Eckhart’s posi-
tion is all-too-human, since it would imply that human intelligence is
the tribunal of last appeal to decide what language suits the living God
and what doesn’t.7 And as a matter of fact, it turns out that Dupré asks
us to entertain the possibility that John Tauler, and even more Jan van
Ruusbroec, are not just closer to the Great Tradition (which has boldly
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spoken of God in explicitly trinitarian terms), but also superior to
Eckhart in philosophical subtlety. Dupré writes:
John Tauler . . . shows how the Trinity inhabits the soul. . . .
“We should learn to find the Trinity in ourselves and realize
we are in a real way formed according to its image.” . . . Even
in its natural state the soul, however imperfect, bears this
divine image. Being a finite reflection of that perfect Image of
God’s self-expression, the soul participates in the divine life of
the Son. Spiritual progress consists “in recognizing this blessed
image in ourselves above all things.”8
In sum, Dupré argues that Ruusbroec’s explicit, articulate trinitarian-
ism is not so much the Christian stepping-stone toward apophatic
theology as its inseparable, co-equal friend. The Christian tradition has
tacitly endorsed this conviction by acting on it: it has not hesitated to
speak of God in trinitarian terms, right in the teeth of its own insis-
tence that God is essentially incomprehensible (•κατάληπτος). How
can this be accounted for?
To understand this, we have to start by recalling that the undivided
Jewish and Christian Tradition of faith in God is a tradition of glorifi-
cation, from protological start to eschatological finish:
. . . in his temple the cry is: “Glory!” Holy, holy, holy is the
Lord of powers: the whole earth is full of his Glory. (Ps 29, 9;
Is 6, 3)
Holy, holy, holy is God the sovereign Lord of all . . . You are
worthy, Lord our God, to receive glory and honor and power
. . . You are worthy to receive the scroll and break its seals . . .
Praise and honor, glory and might, to the One who sits upon
the throne and to the Lamb, forever! (Rev 4, 8. 11; 5, 9. 13)
Let us reflect. Praise and thanksgiving are abandon, not cultivation
of self. They are ecstatic before they ever give rise to thought. They lift
humanity to the peak of the cosmos and its worship, and in this very
act of worship humanity finds its transcendental attunement to God
(i.e., its radical participation in God) actualized to the fullest available
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extent. Yet, pace the apophatic tradition, articulate cataphatic praise
and thanksgiving very much drive home the realization that God is
semper maior. In that sense, dedicated speech accomplishes the same as
what is accomplished by the posture of speechless awe before God.
This leads to conclusions about apophatic theology. In the
Christian tradition, apophaticism it is first of all a response. Like glori-
fication in words, it acknowledges: “God, You are God.” In other
words, in the Christian tradition apophaticism is a form of worship; it
is not a free-standing, autonomous, self-authenticating form of human
religiosity. At root, apophaticism proceeds not so much from human-
ity’s realization of the inadequacy of its own conception of God as from
its awe at finding itself placed before and encompassed by God. This
awe is also the point made by articulate Jewish and Christian cataphasis:
We will say a lot, and we never arrive; the sum of what we say
is: the All—He is it. Glorifying him, at what point will we be
up to it? For he is the Great One; beyond compare, above all
his works. The Lord is awesome and terribly great; wonderful
is his sustained power. Glorify the Lord as much as you can, for
he will always be higher.  As you extol him, muster all your
strength; be untiring, for you never arrive. (Sir 43, 27-30 [lxx])
Thus the inspiration to praise God affirmatively, in speech and not by
silence alone, comes from awe; even as we utter God’s praises we real-
ize that no matter how much we glorify God in explicit words, there
will always be more to say. Apophaticism in built right into the explicit,
expressive language of praise and thanksgiving.
Let us sum up. The Great Tradition tacitly claims that human
language is capable of cataphatic affirmations that leave God’s incom-
prehensibility intact.
However, the claim just made raises a serious fundamental ques-
tion. From a linguistic point of view, is it legitimate to propose that
affirmative language leaves God’s incomprehensibility intact? Let us try.
We live in a culture which glorifies information and data. Large
numbers of educated people tend to think you either know exactly
“what you’re talking about” or you don’t. In latter case, you “hypothe-
size,” “do research,” and “collect data,” to find “solutions” and
“answers”). The method is practical (or at least common practice). It is
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hardly subtle. Why? We tend to overlook Aristotle’s warning, to the
effect that our knowledge
will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter
admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all
discussions.9
In such a denotative world, pleas for ethics (especially of the
contractual, just-play-by-the-rules kind) can still be heard (if rarely
followed con amore). By contrast, pleas in favor of value-driven ethics
are seldom heard. Why? Because it takes a commitment to a shared
system of moral values and priorities conscientiously endorsed to arrive
at a moral consensus rather than a merely pragmatic one. Yet experi-
ence teaches us that appeals to conscience are invariably used to assert
individual rights and justify individual decisions.
In this rational, contractual context, material value ethics are hard
to come by. What is in even scarcer supply is agreement on the tacit
foundation of any value-based ethic: the sense that the moral sense is
not self-supporting. In the end, moral living is predicated on a sense of
mystery. But in a world of denotation, appeals to “mystery” sound irra-
tional and naive; they are “medieval,” “vague” and not “practical.” In
other words, where denotation reigns supreme, wisdom and considered
judgment are scarcely part of “objective” or “useful” learning, and
prayer even less (not to mention contemplative prayer).10
What is far less well realized today is this: we use words symboli-
cally, and we do so all the time, even today. We often speak and write
to convey, with an odd immediacy, something different from what our
words signify, denotatively or connotatively. Let us give a linguistic
account of this.
We begin by recalling that meaning is not the prerogative of words
taken singly. True, the fact that words taken by themselves can signify
apart from context or particular situations is one of the marvels of
language. But normally words convey meaning not by themselves, but
in clusters; reading dictionaries from cover to cover is not a habit of the
mentally healthy. Only together with other words do single words reli-
ably refer to realities out-there. In that sense, too, “the meaning of
words is determined by the company they keep” (Ludwig
Wittgenstein). In religious language, clustering typically occurs in two
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different (though related) “figures of speech”: metaphor and paradox.
This invites clarification.
Those among us who have ever harbored, or muttered under our
breath, or actually uttered sentiments like “A real toad!” or “A real
honeybun!” know that these phrases not only connote a few exquisite
feelings on their part, but also refer to an intensely-present reality out-
there. However, they do not do so by ordinary denotation. Instead,
“toad” and “honeybun” are metaphors.11 Metaphors are “figures of
speech,” but this makes them anything but meaningless, harmless,
bloodless, or less able to refer to truths. For metaphors say more, not
less. They help us refer to and deal with realities more compelling than
mere denotation is apt or able to convey. Just think about “My shep-
herd is the Lord.”
Paradoxes have one thing in common with metaphors: they, too,
refer to “compelling realities out-there.” But in paradoxes the reference
results from the complete vacuum of denotative meaning created by the
clash of opposites. One example is T.S. Eliot’s powerful evocation of
Christ as the “wounded surgeon” plying “the steel that questions the
distempered part” (East Coker, in Four Quartets, iv). Gerard Manley
Hopkins, in addressing God, weds metaphor to paradox to create a
sense of God’s mysterious presence:
Be adored among men,
God, Three-numberèd form;
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .
Beyond saying sweet, past telling of tongue,
Thou art lightning and love, I found it, a winter and warm;
Father and fondler of heart Thou hast wrung;
Hast thy dark descending and most art merciful then.
(The Wreck of the Deutschland, 9)
In light of such texts, why not consider it reasonable, even today, to
join Hamlet, face to face with his father’s ghost? Caught between the
Great Tradition (which knew of dreams and visions) and the New
Learning (which had come to consider them purely mental) he said:
There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy. (I.v.166-67)
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A twentieth-century American woman with a sharp pen, intensely
Catholic instincts, a splendid love of the truth, and an uncanny flair for
the difference between plain truth and learned humbug, Flannery
O’Connor, puts it differently, but no less incisively. To an inquiring
friend she writes:
Dogma can in no way limit a limitless God. The person outside
the Church attaches a different meaning to it than the person
in. For me a dogma is only a gateway to contemplation and is
an instrument of freedom and not of restriction. It preserves
mystery for the human mind.
And to drive the point home, she adds, with characteristic sassiness:
Henry James said the young woman of the future would know
nothing of mystery or manners. He had no business to limit
it to one sex.12
Point made. But in this case, the point made is not to add to what we
have learned from Geoffrey Wainwright, but to honor what he has
taught us. And to honor him.
Notes
Geoffrey Wainwright put himself squarely in the center of the ecumenical
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3. The Greek noun µυστήριον is derived from the verb µύω. Any good
Greek dictionary will inform us that µύω means “to close one’s eyes” or “to
close one’s mouth.” But what does that mean? Let us try. Μύω means: “observ-
ing the kind of silence that becomes so eloquent that it elicits the kind of
speech that reveals the Truth (while at the same time veiling it), and thus
creates room for a sacred silence once again, inclusive, pregnant with truth,
and intolerant of falsehood.” This is not a translation, of course, but a
periphrasis; it sins by prolixity, but it conveys the true meaning.
4. For an early treatment of affirmation and negation in modern thought,
see Louis Dupré, The Other Dimension: A Search for the Meaning of Religious
Attitudes (New York: Doubleday, 1972), 323-76.
5. Expositio super secundam Decretalem (Opuscula theologica I, ed.
Marietti, nr. 1198): “Non tamen est idem modus perfectionis humanae et
divinae, quia non potest esse tanta similitudo inter Creatorem et creaturam,
quin major inveniatur ibi dissimilitudo, propter hoc quod creatura in infini-
tum distat a Deo.” Cf. Denziger-Schönmetzer 806.
6. In I Sent., 8, 1, 1, ad 4: “quando in Deum procedimus per viam remo-
tionis, primo negamus ab eo corporalia; et secundo etiam intellectualia,
secundum quod inveniuntur in creaturis, ut bonitas et sapientia; et tunc
remanet tantum in intellectu nostro, quia est, et nihil amplius: unde est sicut in
quadam confusione. Ad ultimum autem etiam hoc ipsum esse, secundum quod
est in creaturis, ab ipso removemus; et tunc remanet in quadam tenebra igno-
rantiæ, secundum quam ignorantiam, quantum ad statum viæ pertinet, optime
Deo conjungimur . . . et hæc est quædam caligo, in qua Deus habitare dicitur.”
The last phrase alludes to Solomon’s words at the temple dedication according
to the Vulgate (2 Chron 6, 1): “Dominus pollicitus est, ut habitaret in caligine.”
7. Dupré adds that Eckhart runs the risk of placing God’s unity beyond
the Father—i.e., beyond God’s trinity. He might have added that Eckhart also
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surprisingly), this very conception of monotheism has been called into doubt
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8. Dupré, “From Silence to Speech,” 33 (italics added for emphasis).
Readers familiar with Cappadocian theology will notice that Tauler here
retrieves—intentionally or coincidentally—the understanding of the Son as
“archetype” (•ρχέτυπος: the stamped image on a coin).
9. Aristotle, Nicomchean Ethics, I, 3 (1094b14-15) (italics added).
10. What has been explained can also be put as follows: we live in a culture
that admires denotation. However, theologically and philosophically speaking,
we cannot speak of God in denotative ways. We do not have any handles on
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God; we have no purchase on God, which would allow us to speak denota-
tively. Yet the culture we live in loves denotation. No wonder many will say
that knowing and speaking of God is a matter of feeling: they will suggest that
we speak of God only by connotation, and in fact we often do. That connota-
tion is a factor at every level of human communication is, of course, well
known, and interpreting faith in God in terms of pure feeling has interesting
credentials in Romanticism. The problem is that the feeling elements in
language both spoken and written cannot so easily be separated from the
rational elements. So when we are told connotation signifies the “irrational
part” of human communication we are skating on thin ice; for feeling is a qual-
ity of what we say, not a “part.” Besides, believers claim that faith in God is not
only deeply felt, but also reasonable, as well as a call to responsible action. To
account for the “knowledge” of God on the basis of connotation alone is to
ignore that all connotation is parasitical on denotation and performance. On
“performative” language, see J.L. Austin’s classic How to do Things with Words
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962).
11. In terms of structural linguistics, what happens in metaphors is “the
disjunctive (or selective) application of meaning-elements.” To clarify this, let
us explain ex contrario. Take the two sample phrases, and assume that, instead
of yourself, the speakers are, respectively, a zoologist and a pastry-baker. In
their several contexts, odds are that the entire complex of meaning-elements of
“toad” and “honeybun” would apply, respectively, to an (ungainly) little animal
or to an (attractive) piece of confection. After all, amphibiologists and pastry-
bakers are apt to refer to an actual toad and a honeybun almost every day. In
other words, they would use the two words denotatively; they would apply all
the meaning-elements of “toad” or “honeybun” together (“conjunctively”) to
the amphibian or the piece of pastry. In metaphors, however, only a few
selected meaning-elements—the “relevant” ones—are applied, either to the
unpleasant person or to the attractive one. But that application is all the more
forceful for being selective. Less denotation means stronger reference. Would
you not rather deal with a little unpleasant amphibian croaking sotto voce and
scrambling around your office than with a colleague you cordially detest, and
is a charming friend not infinitely better company than the sweetest bun?
12. Letter of 2 August 1955, in Collected Works: Flannery O’Connor, ed.
Sally Fitzgerald, The Library of America, 39 (New York: Literary Classics of the
United States, 1988), 943-44.
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Twenty-Three Points
on the Ordination of Women
1
The issue of the ordination of women to the diaconate, the priest-hood, and the episcopate is primarily not a doctrinal, but a
discretionary one. Far from relegating the issue to a secondary status,
the discretionary nature of the issue puts it at the heart of what the
Church is all about.
2
None of the existing doctrinal justifications of the exclusion of
women from Holy Orders are compelling; rather, they tend to appear,
on closer hermeneutical inspection, to be nothing but doctrinal invo-
lutions of time-determined cultural habits.
3
In particular, the justification of the exclusion of women from
Holy Orders on the basis of the christological argument (“By God’s
own revealed will it takes a male to be the shepherd of the Church.”) is
not just dubious, but downright close to heresy, since it places
masculinity in a privileged position in the hypostatic union, contrary
to the teaching of the Church, which has held, ever since the
Cappadocians, that the Word assumed the human nature “without the
individual characteristics.”
4
The only doctrine that applies is the doctrine of God’s all- inclusive
love, as implied, e.g., in the baptismal formula of the letter to the
Galatians: “As many of you as were baptized into Christ have put on
Christ. There is . . . neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ
Jesus” (Gal 3, 25). Hence, all human persons can become the bearers of
Christ’s person and of his ministries. But then, doctrine is not everything.
5
Hence, the doctrinal arguments in favor of the exclusion of women
from, or inclusion in, the ministry fail to convince. Therefore, if any
reasons in favor of either are to be found, they will have to come from
‘agapeic’ considerations. These will appear in the form of discretionary
judgments born out of the desire to show concern for the weak and the
wronged. An analogy is afforded by Paul’s treatment of the eating of
meat offered to idols (1 Cor 8, 1-13; 10, 23-11, 1) in spite of his real-
ization that “an idol has no real existence” (1 Cor 8, ). Since “knowledge
puffs up, but love builds up” ( 1 Cor 8, 1 ), the issue of women’s Orders,
seen as an agapeic question, is part of the central concern of the
Church.
6
There are good reasons to claim that the very agap which, in the
tradition, provided some compelling arguments in favor of the exclu-
sion of women from the ordained ministry, now favors their inclusion.
However, it is possible to see this only if the tradition is viewed, not as
culpably unaware of the fact that women were the object of discrimi-
nation, but as invincibly ignorant on this score. To appreciate this, two
other assumptions are necessary.
7
The long-standing discrimination against women, justified by
philosophical, anthropological, and psychological theories, and shown
in such degenerative phenomena as the Malleus Maleficarum and the
ensuing witch-hunts, is a cultural prejudice, and, as such, a concrete
example of social sin. Social sin is not less sinful for being social, nor
does it engage human responsibility less for its going undetected for
ages. Its victims, in this case, are both women and men.
8
The raising of the issue of discrimination against women in the
world as well as in the Church is, theologically speaking, an instance
of historical revelation, and, to that extent, the work of the Holy
Spirit in the world as well as in the Church. A parallel example is
afforded by the nineteenth-century revelation of the immorality of
slavery.
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9
Discrimination against women has had profound consequences for
the understanding and the practice of the ordained ministry. In the
past, it led to the ministry developing into a clerical caste, the existence
of which has been theologically rationalized, since the third century, by
a mistaken appeal to the Old Testament priesthood, and by a (mostly
tacit) reliance on the cultic sensibilities and structures of the late
Roman Empire, the feudal society, and the monarchic state. The
Rationalist perception of the male as rationally and functionally supe-
rior is not blameless either.
10
One of the essential features of a caste is: excessive reliance on objec-
tive powers, masking a lack of real integration of the person, and even
impeding its growth in the future. Hence, the sacramental and preaching
ministries, sanctioned by ordination, are often unsupported by personally
undertaken “real” ministry. As a result, members of the clergy are
frequently—and often only half-consciously—the prisoners of their caste.
11
Hence, one should be no more in favor of men’s ordinations than
women’s. In other words: women as well as men could jeopardize their
integrity in aspiring to the ordained ministry.
12
The recent process of erosion of the clerical caste must be
welcomed, though without glee.
13
Ordained ministers who act in a caste-like fashion suffer from a
social affliction, and hence, require understanding, compassion, and
forgiveness. They do not know what they do. What looks like the
awkward exercise of naked power is often a cloak for the experience of
acute personal insufficiency.
14
Women who aspire to ordination in order to get where the power
is suffer from the same social affliction, and hence require understanding,
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compassion, and forgiveness. What looks like raw ambition is often a
cloak for the experience of acute frustration.
15
In and of itself the aspiration to power or the actual exercise of
it has no standing in the Church viewed as the Temple of God in
the Spirit, the Body of Christ, the Servant of God in Christ Jesus.
This is also true of the sacramental and preaching ministries, no
matter how valid or authorized, and no matter how capably exer-
cised.
16
Both ordained ministers and men and women aspiring to the
ordained ministry must be encouraged, by hierarchy and faithful
alike, to venture into the fears, doubts, and crudities of “real”
ministry, so that they may also come to experience its rewards.
These rewards are first and foremost the building of the Body of
Christ as sinners and sufferers come to life, but also the discovery of
the actual working of divine grace as an experienced reality in the
process of one’s own integration into, and reconciliation with, the
Body of Christ.
17
Real ministry includes all the corporal and spiritual works of
mercy, and “whatever is true, whatever is honorable, whatever is
just, whatever is pure, whatever is lovely, whatever is gracious,
whatever is excellent, whatever is worthy of praise” (Phil 8), done
by apostles, prophets, evangelists, pastors, teachers, and others
(Eph 11).
18
Putting the issue in terms of the “hyphenated priest” is fatal to the
discussion and leads to a separation between the sacramental and the
real ministries. Both mental health and an Incarnation-inspired theol-
ogy demand that the issue be put in terms of the “integrated priest.”
Hence, encouraging women to engage in real ministry with the inten-
tion of keeping them out of the ordained ministry, and encouraging
men to engage in sacramental ministry while making it difficult for
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them to engage in real ministry both offend against the reality of the
Incarnation. Ordained ministry, therefore, is not fully Christian if it is
not supported by real ministry.
19
Many Christians are not ready for real ministry extended to them
by women. Some of them are not even ready for real ministry extended
to them by men. The only way they will be delivered from this debili-
tating prejudice is by experiencing real ministry. The latter will have to
reekon with the probability of rejection. The real minister who is
rejected—if he or she does not turn self-righteous—is in excellent
company.
20
Many Christians are ready for real ministry by both men and
women, and hence, they are largely ready for the ordained ministry by
both women and men. This does not mean that men do not need
support for real ministry, nor does it mean that women do not need
support for ordained ministry.
21
It is part of the mission of the authorities in the Church to do the
supporting, especially if the ministers meet with rejection.
22
The issue of women’s Orders, if set in the context of agape, should
not become an ideology, especially when viewed against the back-
ground of the Church’s badly needed agapeic concern with war and
hunger in the world, with national and international injustice, etc. Yet,
no issue becomes unimportant because there are more important
issues. The Father also cares for the flowers and the sparrows (and the
whales).
23
In the Roman Catholic Church it is psychologically hard to imag-
ine that the admission of women to Holy Orders could be
accomplished without compulsory celibacy becoming optional
celibacy.
288 /  Frans Jozef van Beeck
Notes
Discussion points at numerous clergy meetings in the northeastern United
States, both Anglican-Episcopalian and Roman Catholic, in the 1970s, origi-
nally privately printed and distributed as “Some Theses in Connection with
the Ordination of Women” by The Propers, Kansas City, Missouri. Published
in German as “Thesen zur Ordination von Frauen,” Orientierung 39 (1975):
153-55. Slightly rephrased in places.
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Pushing or Pulling:
One Theologian’s Perspective
So Archbishop Raymond Burke of Saint Louis threw down thegauntlet to the Catholic politicians who have voted pro-choice in
his former jurisdiction of Lacrosse, Wisconsin, where he also ordered
his clergy to refuse Communion to them. For me, a bishop denying
sacraments to Catholics was not a first. In February 1942, in the Dutch
City of the Hague, I watched a Catholic gentleman, a pious daily
communicant, being refused Holy Communion in a noisy scuffle at
the communion rail. I was an eleven-year-old sixth grader, an altar boy
in awe at the liturgy, and determined to be a priest.
The Sunday before, I was serving at the 7:00 A.M. mass, when our
pastor, a short, feisty man, surprised us. He emerged from the sacristy,
mounted the pulpit after the Gospel, and vigorously read to the congre-
gation a pastoral letter from the Dutch bishops. In it, any Catholic
directly or indirectly involved in checking the public registries
anywhere in the Netherlands for names of ethnically Jewish citizens was
excommunicated. The pastor repeated his performance at the other
four liturgies; I was there. Later on I heard he did not want to get his
associates arrested by the authorities.
One result of the bishops’ letter was revenge. Within weeks, the SS
were rounding up all Jews who were Catholic converts or somehow
associated with Catholics; being Protestant or having Protestant associ-
ations became a lifesaver for some Jews. Nine months later, toward the
end of November, I found the door of my violin teacher’s apartment
sealed shut; his common-law wife was a Catholic. He was killed in
Auschwitz in early December. Three months before, a Carmelite nun
best known as Edith Stein, arrested in the Netherlands, had also been
killed there. Five years before, in 1938, she had fled Germany in the
dead of night. Five years ago, in 1998, she was canonized as Saint
Benedicta of the Cross.
*  *  *  *  *
No sooner had I learned about Archbishop Burke’s measure in
regard to Catholic politicians voting pro-choice on abortion and
euthanasia than I recalled the Dutch bishops’ letter. I also found the
archbishop’s measure out of proportion. On reflection, I found my
reaction reasonable enough to put it in writing. This essay is the result.
A warning to the reader. This is a complex essay, but it has a domi-
nant thesis: since Humanae vitae the Catholic bishops have suffered a
painful loss of pastoral and magisterial authority among both laity and
clergy on matters pertaining to marriage and human life, a loss deci-
sively worsened by the recent crisis. To Catholic theologians this must
raise the question to what extent this places the unity of the Catholic
Church in the United States in jeopardy. Under the circumstances, I
argue, it is imprudent for bishops to push the envelope by threaten-
ing Catholic politicians voting pro-choice with refusal of Holy
Communion. For, arguably, the canonical grounds on which such a
threat is based would not hold up even if the the bishops’ pastoral
authority were enjoying full acceptance. That is to say, here and now it
is by no means evident that the bishops have a positive pastoral duty to
utter this particular threat.
*  *  *  *  *
A Catholic theologian’s pursuit of what Aquinas calls “sacred
doctrine” involves responsibilities and privileges. The latter are wonder-
ful but few in number; they do not include the right to call into
question a bishop’s authority or his motives. The former may involve
questioning his pastoral-theological discernment in making particular
decisions. Accordingly, my argument with Archbishop Burke’s action is
based on theological sources: the Catholic Tradition since at least the
Middle Ages, and more recently, the Catholic way of doing things here
in the United States. As Bernard Lonergan used to say, “It’s not a short
story.” Not till the last third of this piece will I come to conclusions.
Let me start with some non-theological remarks. Firstly, I am not
stating “my opinion”; in fact, I admit to being allergic to theologians’
opinions. I have always agreed with Lonergan’s caustic saying: “Good
ideas are a dime a dozen.”
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I have greatly benefited from first amendment freedom of opinion in
the U.S.A. Unlike the freedom of opinion in the Northern half of the Low
Countries (where tolerance is a matter of régime rather than enjoyment),
American freedom of opinion is key to free thought. Much as opinions
enshrine neither truth nor sound judgment, an opinionate climate is intel-
lectually stimulating; it encourages thought by inviting tough
questioning. I find myself thankful for the many years I have lived and
learned (and taught) in this Republic, which has constitutionally relied on
Almighty God, has not opposed religion as a matter of principle, yet has
refused to consider the support of particular religious establishments the
duty of its elected government. What gives me pause these days is the
North American habit of reveling in opinions to the point of pushing
them as guiding truths, regardless of what “we the people” express demo-
cratically. Have habits of fighting two dangerous ideology-driven political
establishments rubbed off? Are we now fighting the world?
*  *  *  *  *
But now for the matter in hand. In Archbishop Burke’s judgment,
“the port of entry for the culture of death in our society has been the
abandonment of the respect for the procreative meaning of the conju-
gal act.” I could not agree more. Still, let me add something. Before the
appearance of Pope Paul VI’s encyclical Humanae vitae (1968), North-
America’s public culture had long been moving toward enjoyment of
sexual experience per se. It did so chiefly on social-psychological and
developmental-psychological grounds, favored by the hidden
persuaders of Madison Avenue and the media, and thus, lacking in
humane depth. Accordingly, our public culture now accepts,
commends, and indeed encourages sexual experience quite apart from
any consequences for life, except (and it hurts to write this) for the life
of those enjoying their allegedly “private” lives as they please.
I have more to confess. Ever since Humanae vitae (which I have
never gotten myself to oppose) I have been listening to Catholic
couples, both mature and less mature. It led to reflection, and more
recently, to study and writing to develop my theological understanding
of the encyclical. I regret to have taken this long, but then again, it took
me thirty-two years to make up my theological mind on that most
delicate of theological mysteries, the Virgin Birth. Such is the life of
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learning: the body travels on horseback, the mind arrives on foot. The
joining of catholic faith and intellectual integrity takes time; it is never
self-assured. And patience and perseverance are not so much the result
of effort as gifts found in one’s knapsack at daybreak—a major theme
not just in Luke’s Gospel but also in Augustine’s last writings. He wrote
a treatise on it two years before he died: On the Gift of Perseverance.
*  *  *  *  *
Now let me, as promised, take up the longer Catholic Tradition. In
its light, the single most important teaching of Humanae vitae is this:
contraception is not a matter of convenience, but a fully human—i.e.,
moral—issue. In this regard it differs in kind from our choice of, say,
medicine, furniture, or toothpaste. Paul VI gives us a coherent as well as
traditional argument for this teaching. Contraception is a moral issue.
But here I also recall a classroom incident in my second semester
at Boston College, in 1969. A sophomore, whose face and name I
recall, told me in class that it was the teaching of the Catholic Church
that people should go to confession before receiving Communion.
When I explained to him that this was in fact mistaken, he bristled and
took offense. It took me a moment to realize that he was resisting
discussion. But in due course I did discover how widely it was assumed
that an unmarried man was bound to have committed mortal sin,
mostly of the sexual kind. Now every Catholic knew that genital grat-
ification outside the context of marriage was mortal sin, period.
Aquinas had taught it in his day, when it was pretty much agreed that
important people, from the emperor (and the pope?) on down, were apt
to have begotten bastard children, whom they felt obliged in conscience
to provide for, as a matter of “honor.” But I also found that Aquinas, in
his original writings, never specifies sinful acts within marriage. And in
the Oriental Tradition, sexual sins of married couples are never
mentioned—as several Eastern prelates and theologians, both Orthodox
and Catholic, have told me over the years. “Our moral theology stops at
the door of the sanctuary which is the marriage-bed,” one said.
By the early seventeenth century a more subtle question had arisen,
possibly from habits of dalliance among younger folks in the growing
upper middle class. Between unmarried partners, how sinful is playful
intimacy that stops short of intercourse and orgasm? Let me make a
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long story short. It started with a duty imposed on Jesuit teachers.
They were obliged to teach that sexual play between unmarried erotic
partners could never be, in and of itself, “a small matter.” Put differ-
ently, intentional extramarital genital gratification was mortal sin as a
matter of principle. Let us phrase this in technical terms. The rule for
Catholic teachers was: genital activity outside marriage deliberately
pursued (luxuria procurata) does not recognize small matter (parvitas
materiae). By contrast, in the area of theft, “small matter” was possi-
ble: stealing a dime is venial sin by reason of the quantity of the
object; no such plea could be entered in the case of “fornication”;
outside the setting of marriage genital activity must be regarded as in
and of itself mortal. By 1647, this teaching was tightened to include
sexual activity engaged in by unmarried persons not actively pursuing
sex, but only acquiescing to it. This teaching, ratified by several
Roman pontiffs, is still in force. An expert writes in his class notes
distributed at the Gregorian University in Rome that “from at least
the beginning of the eighteenth century it has been commonly taught
by manuals and in seminaries that ‘outside marriage . . . intentional
sexual gratification, even if incomplete, is mortal sin.’ ”
Accordingly, the sole ground on which in particular cases such
pleasures could be taken to be venial sin was lack of due consciousness
or freedom. Priests knew this well. In actual practice, sins against the
sixth commandment are rarely black-and-white, and in the confes-
sional, the typical unmarried youngsters’ dilemmas were also heard in
the whispers of married women unable to resist their husbands.
In any case, it is fair to say that among North American Catholics
(but not just among them), especially in immigrant communities influ-
enced by Jansenism and Puritanism, all sexual activity was implicitly
considered morally delinquent, except, conceivably, in the dark context
of marriage. A total of five passages in Augustine were quoted regularly,
out of context of course, to the effect that there was no such thing as
intercourse without at least venial sin. But this was a departure from
Catholic tradition; my bristling sophomore was only one out of count-
less scrupulous American Catholics anxious about sex. I had
encountered this frenzied phenomenon in my own country, of course,
but not to such an excessive pitch. Unsurprisingly, Vatican II felt it had
to insist on the high human (i.e., moral) value of faithful sexual intimacy
and love. Accordingly, in Pope John Paul II’s discourses and writings on
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marriage, faithful sexual intimacy and love is the dominant philosoph-
ical and theological theme. (The media have kept insisting that the ban
on contraception is; they won’t have it any other way.)
After study and reflection, I came to this conclusion: Humanae
vitae teaches that every act of sexual intimacy must be open to life,
quite apart from the physiological issue whether life is likely to result
or not. One way to put it is this: between committed partners, there is
always more the matter than animal instinct. Hence, contraception
cannot be commended as “a positively good and human thing to do.”
At the same time, the encyclical stops short of teaching that every act
of sexual intimacy blemished by contraception is mortal sin. Several
bishops’ conferences saw this almost immediately. In an act of both
collegiality with Pope Paul and pastoral guidance toward the married,
they accepted the teaching of Humanae vitae, and referred the married
not only to Confession and the Eucharist, but also to their
consciences—a common Catholic way of suggesting that there is room
for “small matter” in the practice of sexual intimacy of married people.
Obviously, none of those bishops’ conferences wrote that contraception
within marriage is “only” venial sin, as if it were all right to disappoint
the Spirit of Love in small ways, furtively.
But here we must also remember the history of the contraception
issue in the Catholic Church. After the acceptance of artificial birth
control by the Anglican Communion, Pius XI made it clear in Divini
illius (1928) and Casti Connubii (1930) that sexual liberation was
abhorrent. But in the second half of Pius XII’s pontificate Catholics
began to distinguish between the morality of genital activity and the
morality of contraception. Unfortunately, one issue fell between the
cracks: the gravity of sins against the sixth commandment within
marriage. Pope Paul VI decided (prudently, I now think) to reserve that
issue to himself, and at once set up a committee to advise him. The
eventual result, intensely disappointing at the time, was Humanae
vitae. In my judgment, this is precisely where the United States bishops
overlooked an opportunity to show care for the laity.
*  *  *  *  *
Now let us focus on my second source: the Catholic way of living
here in the United States. In my judgment, what occurred in the
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United States was this: the bishops treated contraception not as a
pastoral-theological issue (which it was), but as a doctrinal one. Several
causes suggest themselves to account for this mistake. For one,
American-style liberal Protestantism, especially of the Puritan, individ-
ualist kind, has long viewed the Catholic distinction between venial
and mortal sin as a “typical instance of Roman hypocrisy”; after all,
“true Christians don’t settle for mediocrity.” (Note: Flannery
O’Connor lived to return the compliment: “Unfortunately,” she wrote,
“the word Christian is no longer reliable. It has come to mean anybody
with a golden heart.”) Also, some bishops may have been immobilized
by the old phantom of “Americanism,” others by the fear of appearing
less than entirely loyal to the Holy Father, others again by the simpli-
fied understanding, in many quarters, of contraception as an
exclusively papal up-or-down issue. Habits of confusing the Catholic
Church’s ethos with that of the Armed Forces may have played a role;
so may the analogy between episcopacy and the task of a CEO—after
all, most dioceses are incorporated this way. On the other hand, could
it be that some bishops gave in to the very American, very un-Catholic
temptation to equate religious faith with “being moral and doing the
right thing”? Who knows?
In any case, in the teeth of both loyalty to “Rome” and North
American civil religiosity and its righteousness, the wisdom of the
Great Tradition is theological, not categorical; it makes room for God
and God’s Mystery. This makes it subtle and merciful. Hence, almost
nothing in the area of faithful intimacy is black and white. Is Christian
marriage not a school of love? What students arrive fully formed? So I
am suggesting that in focusing on doctrine thirty-five years ago, the
United States bishops lost a key pastoral opportunity in behalf of the
married laity in the Church. Rather than teaching the married about
the opportunities for growth in love detailed in Humanae vitae, the
bishops left them to their own devices (so to speak). The sad result of this
was that the only Catholics who got to bear the brunt of the Church’s
public, canonical rejection of contraception were the “dissenters”—at
least those of them who were within the reach of canon law. Most of
them were priests—celibates! Ever since, the media world—that unsub-
tle patron of freedom without responsibility—has been taunting
Catholics with what it can only regard (and make merry over) as wide-
spread lay and clerical insubordination to papal and episcopal authority.
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Time for a quick sidestep. I hate to point out the structural anal-
ogy between the aftermath of Humanae vitae and the recent crisis. Still,
it is hard to miss. The bishops again fell short of their pastoral respon-
sibility to the married laity, only this time by omission. They appear to
have done so under the probable “leadership” of a handful of influen-
tial but pastorally and theologically inept figures, even to the point
where some of the latter had become criminally complicit with a small
minority of pathological priests. This ended up further eroding the
credibility of the bishops’ pastoral authority in sexual matters, and driv-
ing quite a few priests, accused of having permitted themselves sinful
(but non-criminal) liberties in the past, into serious ecclesiastical
punishments forced on the bishops by an unforgiving blackmailer—
the media, quite possibly aided by lawyers taking advantage of them
and opening the courtroom to mere grudges.
*  *  *  *  *
So where do I stand? Like all of us, I am a sinner, happy to be a
servant of Jesus Christ in a Catholic Church full of fellow-sinners. I am
a priest-theologian, but without worshiping the Church; indeed, I
suffer with it, as family members will with family. Blaming is as old as
the Garden of Eden; the Living Christian Tradition opposes it. My only
authority is familiarity with this Tradition; I rarely show my hand on
matters of current interest. Still, Archbishop Burke’s stand, politically
brave as it may be, raises so many doubts about the fit between North
American Catholicity and the Great Tradition that I have resolved to
do a bit of theology in public. I have concluded that withholding the
sacraments to Catholic politicians in the present situation is too severe
a penalty. First, it is out of touch with the practice of Christian mercy
vis-à-vis a wayward world wounded and steeped in sin, but not degen-
erate down to the root. Second, it comes perilously close to selective
blaming. (Ignatius Loyola is said to have called a Jesuit priest on the
carpet for criticizing the current pope’s sins from the pulpit; he told
him that we do not publicly discuss the sins of individuals.) Third,
human life is not the ultimate value—a point to which I will come
back. But savage as abortion-on-demand is, it has an up-side, like
everything sinful; so, some fifteen years after Roe v. Wade I found myself
suggesting to students that the knowledge that they were wanted at
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birth was a grace; and three years ago, in my hearing, a young religious
volunteered that a physician had “cautioned” his mother while she was
pregnant. Talk about thankfulness for the given gift of life!
As for euthanasia, have we Catholics not witnessed repeated
episodes in which the medical and judicial establishments have
colluded in order to prevent mostly older people suffering from termi-
nal illness from dying in peace? Have they not also colluded in order to
demand experimental surgery on babies with inoperable birth-defects?
Here we go again, the very old and the very young must pay the piper
at the contemporary dance of death!
So whenever we find ourselves saying, vehemently or piously,
“No matter what, we should at least be doing something,” we are
making a theological mistake. For in the last resort we Catholics
should let on, unobtrusively, that all human life is in God’s hand,
notably at the origin and at the end, as Gregory of Nyssa pointed
out almost seventeen centuries ago, and not long after him,
Augustine.
Finally, a minor point. Archbishop Burke would seem to over-
look the sound canonical practice of restrictive application of laws
imposing penalties and limiting freedoms, as well as the sound moral
practice of distinguishing between formal and merely material coop-
eration. Being resigned to the world’s evil is not the same as
approving of it, let alone promoting it; even logically, pro-choice is
not the same as pro-abortion; neither cowardice nor dodging is
evidence of positive malice, and so, not mortally sinful. Ignorant as I
may be, I know of no Catholic politicians who have advisedly elected
to advance abortion on demand or euthanasia; most of them are like
Catholic judges handing down uncontested divorce decrees; they may
“personally”—a bad choice of words—not approve of it, but (for
better for worse) it is the law of the land.
*  *  *  *  *
I need not explain that the ready availability of abortion is a horror
as well as a tragic miscarriage of the American system of just govern-
ment. Bypassing any careful, patient, fair political process, it made its
sudden entry by the judicial arrogance of a majority on the Supreme
Court inspired (frightened?) by ideologies whose popular support was
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far from majoritarian. But there is more. The general advertizing of
contraceptives as the “solution” to a human “problem” strikes me as a
malign intrusion into the human mystery of faithful affection. The
blind distribution of free contraceptives to high-school students is, to
borrow the late Cardinal Hume’s words, “a counsel of despair.”
Accordingly, we Catholic Christians must now learn how to testify to
our God and to our faith in God, but not by blaming the sower and
rooting up the tares. In matters of life and death, we should keep the
upper hand—hold the Sword of the Word by the handle, not the
cutting edge, lest we ourselves come under its edge. No evil in our
world is final, not even the “contraceptive mentality” so firmly identi-
fied as gravely (i.e., mortally) wrong by John Paul II. Our public
culture is savage because its only goal seems to be pleasure without
pregnancy; death-by-abortion now seems to be an acceptable tool to
favor existing life over any future vexation; “mercy-killing” has become
an alternative to tender loving care—a victory for those who seem to
hold that all pain should be fought or simply removed. In this North-
American world, it is now difficult to be a Catholic. But the Catholic
Catechism explains that the crucifixion of Jesus Christ is the worst
injustice ever, and that from it our omnipotent and merciful God has
drawn the greatest good.
Poor Catholic politicians. They’re no heroes, but they are not
censurable. They are sinners, but implausible candidates for canon-
ical penalties; and equivalently calling their sin mortal is not a
priestly ministry. Our “dissenters” (incidentally, not a Catholic
term) are miles removed from the Donatists, who treated ordinary
Catholics as schismatics. Yet Augustine insisted on calling them
brothers, and taught his congregation to do the same. He did not
refuse dialogue; he looked for it. As an old man, he did grow harder
and harder on the Pelagians; but they equivalently proposed that
faith was at least partly a human accomplishment, and hence,
substantially a moral duty. The senior bishops who publicly
opposed Cardinal Bernardin’s Common Ground Initiative were way
out of touch with the Great Tradition. What they said did not
sound like the Word of God.
In 1957, a tall, athletic, slightly mischievous Dutch Jesuit priest
who is now eighty-nine and still pastorally active, asked a twenty-seven-
year-old scholastic too intense for his own (and others’) good: “Can I
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tell you something?” He replied, hesitantly, “Yes.” He smiled and said:
“Don’t be so pushy with the kids; remember, God never pushes, He
only pulls.” One of those teachable moments: God’s people are not to be
pushed about.
Notes
A piece written for Commonweal, 131, no. 11 (June 4, 2004): 19-21). About
half of it made it into print.
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Being a Catholic Theologian in the United
States: A Preface That Got Out of Hand
for John C. Haughey, S.J.
in fraternal admiration
Emmanuel Lévinas, I am reliably told, once said that one’s philosophyis set off by one’s “formative experiences.” No sooner had I begun
to write this preface than I realized it was going to degenerate into a
theological confession. The French (who, as everybody knows, have “a
way of saying things”—as if we didn’t) might call it a prise de conscience:
taking stock of one’s consciousness. It is just that. It is a reply to the
customs officer’s question: “Have you anything to declare?”
This is a hefty book. It explores the human habit of balking at both
death and love, especially at the intimate love that accepts death as its
measure. It also suggests the transformation of this habit offered us by
God, with a pained love, of the kind that is in the end irresistible. Now
that it is done, I realize that one of its hidden themes is the conciliation
between the two chief formative experiences of my life: the Catholic
Church in which I was born and bred in the Southern Netherlands,
and the Catholic faith as I have come to profess it in my thirty-six years
as a Jesuit priest-teacher in the United States. The reader is forewarned.
I remember the Catholicism of the eastern part of the Province of
North Brabant. It still subsists in many of the elderly and the very old
in the area today. It had one enormous advantage: never having been
impugned, nobody was needed to jump to its defense. Neither the
Calvinists of the Northern and Western Low Countries nor the
Jansenists of Flanders had ever taken an interest in us; we were simply
too poor to be interesting. Most of us lived happily in the knowledge
that the Hollanders thought little of us. By the time I was old enough
to be aware of this, economic and educational development was well
underway. There was a handful of respected Catholic “colleges.” Jews
like Jurgens, van den Bergh, and Anton Philips (a distant cousin of Karl
Marx!) had gotten promising industries off the ground; farmers’ coop-
eratives had been started, mostly by local intelligentsia and small
factory owners who had learned how to draw on the dormant energies
of a small army of assistant parish priests, many of them gentlemen-
farmers’ sons. What was notable, too, was the virtual absence of
anticlericalism of the laissez-faire kind; but how could there be, since
there was no clericalism to speak of? (I recall how I heard, at the age of
nine or ten, one of my younger uncles call the assistant pastor “a cow”
without meeting with any contradiction in the jam-packed kitchen.)
If our Catholic faith was unsophisticated (and heaven knows it
was), it was also the quiet guiding light of the petty farmers, the hard-
working peat diggers, the factory workers, the small shopkeepers, the
local bureaucracy, and the handful of gentlemen-farmers. And I have
not even mentioned the (largely resigned) faith of many Brabant
women—farmers’, small business owners’, and especially factory work-
ers’ wives. Dedicated mothers of customarily large families, many of
them had looked for home work in addition to their household tasks,
to supplement the meager family income. Noisy we could be (the
people of Asten, my mother’s home village, had a reputation for being
“shrill-spoken”), especially with the help of some beer and loud
company from elsewhere; still, modesty, humility, good neighborliness,
and deep faith were far from unknown. Most of all, God—Zlieveneer:
“’r-dea-Lord”—was quietly and without ado held to be real, loving,
forgiving, and present.
Now comes the contrast experience. If there is anything I seem to
have become familiar with in over thirty years of living in the United
States, it is Deism—belief in the existence of a Supreme Being that
from an enormous distance keeps the world moving and makes ethical
demands on humanity, though without taking any active part in what
human beings (or for that matter, Nature) do. Deism started in Europe,
of course, especially in France, England, and Scotland; still, nowhere
did it properly establish itself as the normative cultural climate, except
maybe among the British intelligentsia; but even there the challenges
offered by the still large membership of the Church of England, the
Kirk, and the Free Churches were never feeble nor far to seek. Maybe
this is why European Deism never became affable; it always remained
too deliberate for that. By contrast, a full quarter century before the
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French Revolution, Deism had made its friendly, largely peaceful home
in the recently founded United States, spreading its obvious blessings
across the federation, as well as its less obvious curses. Both are consid-
erable, and for well over two centuries the former well outshone the
latter, most noticeably in the direct aftermath of the horrors of the Civil
War—a sensitive issue even today.
In the eighteen-thirties, Alexis de Tocqueville correctly observed
that American-style Deism was genuinely tolerant, unlike its European
counterpart. More than a century and a half later, I can say that
nowhere else have I felt such a generous invitation extended to me to
full participation in a culture by people proud of their national accom-
plishment yet invariably excited by things and people that are
“different.” Vive la différence (pronounced without the slightest hint of
a French accent) is an American saying. Even as they sing America’s
praises, Americans will invite the rest of us “differents” to join their
large, noisy family, managed somehow, in an unsubtle yet always gener-
ous way, by what simply has to be a big Invisible Hand. Only in the
United States have I found kind tolerance, in the form of the amicable
willingness, sometimes to the point of ludicrousness, to treat each and
every opinion as worthy of being entertained, and every individual
“experience”—a key word in the United States idiom—as the potential
bearer of a profound moral message of wide, if not general application.
A Jewish-Scots convert to the Catholic Church—a woman novelist
with a sharp eye and an even sharper pen—once wrote:
New York, home of the vivisectors of the mind, and of the
mentally vivisected still to be reassembled, of those who live
intact, habitually wondering about their states of sanity, and
home of those whose minds have been dead, bearing the scars
of resurrection.
1
Touché, many Americans are apt to say to this. (Europeans are apt
to bristle, or quail, or resort to ridicule, when their Europe is carica-
tured.) But in the quotation, please note the sardonic reference to the
central theme of the Christian faith. Typically, Americans have no illu-
sions of sanctity or morality, yet they are a proud and patriotic people,
and they love ethical principle and their many, mostly Christian
churches. But what is nearest and dearest to them are “the facts”; and,
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more often than not, those facts—loss of “moral fiber” and sins of every
weight and measure—can be trusted to see to it that humility remains
a respected virtue in the United States. To this day, Machiavelli has few
principled adherents here; in the teeth of daily evidence to the contrary,
most citizens think that in the last resort a-moral political opportunism
is wrong; there simply has to be a way of doing things right.
Accordingly, hypocrisy meets with very little tolerance; and faire comme
si—elsewhere considered the best way to learn civility, manners, and
ethics—is suspect. “Be sincere” is the motto. At the same time, one way
or another, freedom must rule. It’s a hard pair to hold together.
As Muriel Spark implies, freedom comes at a price. It is paid in the
coinage of stress. I tell inquiring friends “abroad” (as I now call the rest
of the world) that living in the United States is like having a lightly
elevated temperature as a permanent condition. But then again, there
is that sense of freedom: no self-impressed, self-anointed establishment
has succeeded in imposing itself and forcing its style on the common
culture without eventually being held accountable by a majority of one
kind or another. Once, a gay and lesbian manifestation in dismal taste
had interrupted the pontifical Sunday Eucharist in Saint Patrick’s
Cathedral on Fifth Avenue. As it happened, Ed Koch, the unforgettable
Jewish Mayor of New York City, had been in Saint Pat’s for his weekly
visit to a “place of worship.” Right after the service, facing the TV
cameras standing ready outside the cathedral, he declared, with a
preacher’s pizzazz, “It’s not American. In America, if you don’t like your
church you get out and start your own.” In Europe, this is liable to
produce peals of laughter, mostly of the condescending kind. In New
York or Chicago, if you show yourself horrified at theological
pronouncements like Mayor Koch’s, well-educated Catholic friends
will remind you that in the United States serious differences, including
those among Catholics, are by and large stated publicly, and best
addressed publicly as well; the better-traveled among them may even
politely remind you, “In this country, there’s no church tax.” We have
separation of church and state. And so, faith and public funds are sepa-
rate as well.
This implies, of course, that reactionary Catholic groups and indi-
viduals, especially of the very wealthy kind, regularly engage in
machinations to get a handle on “their” church. Wealthy Catholics
have tried that for centuries. (Just look up the name of Paul of
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Samosata in a decent Catholic dictionary, or read Acts of the Apostles
5:1–11.) Besides, there are authoritative parties in the Church, not only
here, but also in Rome, who have the good of the Church Universal at
heart and know the value of the dollar. They tend to be impressed by
“expert” groups and individuals willing to throw millions at projects
they expect will help make the church “really Catholic.” However, most
Catholics find this sort of thing almost unpardonably disloyal. From
experience we know that reactionaries occur everywhere, mostly behind
the scenes, but every now and then in embarrassingly full view. Many
American Catholics will occasionally call them unflattering names, but
they will rarely read them out of the One, Holy, Catholic Church (let
alone out of the Republic), and in any case, never by common consent;
some Catholics are embarrassing, that’s all. By way of explanation they
will say, “Well, it takes all kinds”—a phrase with religious overtones. In
the offices of that very Catholic, very American biweekly,
Commonweal, edited by thoughtful, intelligent Catholic lay people, the
motto is, “It’s a big church.”
Thus, being a Catholic in the United States means: being a
Catholic with no political advantage or privilege other than feeling you
are generally welcome to make a difference. “Do your thing.” A
number of years ago, there were voices objecting to the large amounts
of public funds allegedly being spent on the construction of an altar
with a canopy for a papal Mass. Almost immediately, a noted politician
let it be known that “once you let the pope come for a visit you also
agree to a mass Mass—that’s the kind of thing popes do.” One far less
symbolic proof of accepted influence on public life is that American
bishops and cardinals regularly testify before congressional committees
not as dignitaries but as significant citizens. And if there should be such
a thing as a negative symbol, the Catholic Church in the United States
neither tithes nor levies church taxes, never mind getting them levied
through public agencies. It needs a lot of money, not so much for its
church buildings (which are by and large modest) as for its many
schools (where non-Catholics have been made to feel more and more
welcome, and now fairly often decide to join the Catholic Church
without being exhorted to do so). It also runs fund-raising campaigns in
behalf of a wide range of worthy causes at home and overseas, from the
Vatican to the poor everywhere; in the Chicago archdiocese, two thirds
of the aid furnished by Catholic Charities ends up in non-Catholic
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hands—a barely advertised fact. Still, no matter how passionately the
contributions are solicited, they are offered, not exacted, not even
virtually.
Why am I distracting the reader with this outpouring of admira-
tion and contentment? Well, let me detail my earlier confession. When
I started to write this preface, in November 1998, I was in Rome, work-
ing for my university. I was surprising myself with what I wrote; long
before I ever thought of any readers I found myself giving an account
to myself of my having become a theologian. It boiled down to this:
never having prayed for the grace of living during a watershed of
historic proportions, I found myself thankful for having received
precisely that favor. And if I have gone through any growth and devel-
opment as a Catholic theologian innocent of doctoral studies in
theology, it is unimaginable without the context of the United States.
As early as 1964–65, during my tertianship—a virtually meaningless
routine in Jesuit formation at the time—I had reworked my licentiate
dissertation in theology, and offered it (if without my superiors’ permis-
sion) to the Journal of Ecumenical Studies. I was underway.
I arrived in Boston for a one-year stint in 1968—a year of wide-
spread unrest both here and “at home” (as I was still calling it) in
Europe. By that time, the Catholic Church in the United States was
still proving to itself and to the nation, even after the election of John
F. Kennedy, that it was truly American; still, there were many signs
indeed that the Catholic bid for national acceptance was spending
itself. One of its last prominent symbols was Francis Cardinal
Spellman, an antifascist and anticommunist once trusted by both Pius
XI and Pius XII, as well as a supporter of the Vietnam war; he would
celebrate Christmas surrounded by GIs near the front lines, in vest-
ments put on right over his army fatigues. Still, he had also been a
moving force behind Vatican II’s promulgation of Dignitatis Humanae,
the “liberal” Declaration on Religious Freedom.
Just what was Cardinal Spellman symbolizing? One of my friends,
the Jesuit historian James Hennesey, one of Msgr. John Tracy Ellis’s
students at the Catholic University of America and the author of a large
number of essays on American Catholicism, captures the complex situ-
ation in the sixties and seventies in the respective titles of the two final
chapters of his book American Catholics. Spellman still personified the
mentality of conciliation between “Cross and Flag”; however, in
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endorsing John Courtney Murray’s theories about religious freedom as
a human right he helped support the “Revolutionary Moment” that
saw the Catholic Church in the United States transformed into a
community that fosters scriptural studies of international caliber, free,
often critical yet also creative theological exploration, and what I like to
term a “charismatic” stance in the doctrinal, practical, and liturgical-
spiritual areas. Catholics of this kind by and large want to be “involved”
on the basis of personal motives and abilities.
Unsurprisingly, this was a huge irritant to a Catholic establishment
whose primary features had been shaped by the “pistic” stance: unques-
tioning orthodoxy, dependence on clerical authority, traditional
practices of sacramental and individual worship and especially piety,
and an exaggerated emphasis on the afterlife. What is now known as
the wars between the “liberals” and the “conservatives” had begun.
They are still continuing in some form, witness the halfhearted and
even downright negative reactions to the late Cardinal Bernardin’s
intensely constructive “Common Ground” project. In the United
States, Vatican II has not fully entered the Catholic Church’s blood-
stream by a long shot.
In retrospect, though, it was of great symbolic significance that the
frankest, most unvarnished account of what was happening, day by
day, at the second Vatican Council in Rome should have been written
by an American, and for a sophisticated magazine published right in
Cardinal Spellman’s metropolitan see, the New Yorker. His name was
Xavier Rynne. While he was writing, his pen name became a household
word, but his identity, thank heavens, remained a well-kept secret.
While the Council lasted, Rynne was variously identified as “a disgrun-
tled Catholic clergyman,” “a Roman student who after failing his final
exams criticized the Roman educational system,” “a fellow named
Wilfred Sheed, who used to write for Jubilee,” “a mild Redemptorist
professor of Church history,” “an American bishop,” “an English
Dominican,” “a New York Jesuit,” and “a writer inspired by the Vatican
Secretariat of State.” Even Jack Kerouac made the list of suspects, as did
(yes!) Phyllis McGinley (renamed “McGentley” for the occasion). After
a year, Rynne’s reports began to appear in weekly installments; they
must have greatly swelled the New Yorker’s Catholic readership; odds
are only the then-editors knew by how much. At Council’s end, they
appeared in four volumes—one for each session. The author turned out
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to be the mild early-church historian, a Redemptorist priest with that
most Catholic of American names, Francis X. Murphy. I still make a
point of exhorting young North American Catholic theologians, who
have grown up with the Council’s decrees, to read Rynne’s story before
the patina that comes with time dulls it for good. Maybe it has already
come to that.
In many ways, American Catholics, especially those with a good
education, went on, in the wake of the second Vatican Council, to
show just how American they were, except they were much less delib-
erate about it. Polarization between traditionalists and liberals became
both fierce and public, especially in the East and Northeast; in the
Midwest, Catholicism was both franker and gentler, probably because
it had never had natural enemies in positions of power before it arrived;
a more relaxed, open, welcoming (and in that sense “liberal”) climate
prevailed, as I noticed when in 1985 I moved from Boston to Chicago.
Still, the situation was far from quiet in the Midwest. If anyone felt the
heat, it was Cardinal Bernardin.
How so? The best way I know how to put it is as follows. Below
the superficial polarization, a far more profound crisis has been
surfacing. In my view, it has everything to do with Catholic iden-
tity—something more profoundly rooted than we have been led to
think in the United States thus far. Neither the tame fences of the
traditional church nor the liberal removal of needless restrictions can
guarantee Catholicity. Catholicity has been described by the dean of
American Catholic theologians, Avery Dulles, S.J. (by now a cardinal,
much to the satisfaction of both the right and the left), as “unity in
diversity.” A formula like this is, of course, just what fits the bill in
the United States, with its motto E pluribus unum: “unity forged out
of more than one unit.” Catholic unity-in-diversity is a matter
neither of being open nor of being closed, for openness without an
inner focus is shapeless, and closedness without a world view is a
prison. Faith in God is neither severe orthodoxy nor free-thinking
tolerance. In essence, it is a discerning habit of loving the Living God
and the neighbor—living, dying, or something in between—at least
as much as oneself. It has more to do with persons looking out for
persons than with self-made individuals, and more with growth in
communication than with the increase or the dwindling of ecclesias-
tical bodies large or small.
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This book will explore the reasons why the Deist culture of which
we are part has little or no idea of what this means. We Catholics in the
United States have experienced the blessings of Deism, but our aware-
ness of its curses is still limited. Accordingly, many of our typical
theological stances neglect a vital ingredient of the Catholic faith. (I
was tempted to write “the vital ingredient,” but I do not want the
reader to put this book to rest, unread, on a shelf, its back turned on its
owner—the fate that has befallen many fat theological tomes.)
The present Archbishop of Chicago, Cardinal Francis E. George,
O.M.I., has often remarked, in private but also in public, “The
Catholic liberal project is out of breath.” He has also made it clear that
he does not commend a turn to traditionalism. What I am fairly sure
he means is: having a good look at the Catholic Church now, in light
of the Great Tradition embodied in the apostolic Scriptures first, but
then also in actual, living witnesses to the Tradition; among the latter,
the successors of the Apostles and their teachings, especially those laid
down in Council decrees, enjoy pride of place.
However, this is pretty much the opposite of what Mayor Koch
thought of the Church, and he still has the vast majority of American
citizens in his corner. So, once again, the opinionated culture of which
we are part has little or no idea what being a member of the Catholic
Church means. Unsurprisingly, we Catholics in the United States have
only a very partial understanding of what it means. The issue as I see it
is this. Our Deist culture has given us the freedom of religion we need
and want, but this is not to say that freedom of religion is the heart of
Catholicity. So the issue becomes: do we Catholics now wish simply to
continue enjoying our freedom, or will we try to return the favor by
courteously offering to share with our Deist culture our central bless-
ing: “the knowledge of God’s Glory in the Face of Christ” (2 Cor 2, 6)?
And do we wish to do so—at least in principle—in front of all the
people we meet, “alone or with others”: Catholics, disaffected
Catholics, fearful Catholics, and non-Catholics, and to do so while
giving evidence of our being participants in the Great Tradition of
Christian worship, conduct, and teaching, in that order? This has a lot
to do with what Pope John Paul II has called a “new evangelization,”
by means of a fully Catholic pastoral-liturgical catechesis. This is not
likely to be always and everywhere welcome any more than cod liver oil
or the equally obsolete Baltimore Catechism, but it would seem to be
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badly needed. Latinos now are one-quarter of the Catholics in the
United States. They are Catholics to the bone, but also significantly
unfamiliar with North American culture. Who knows if this is not
going to be a decisive factor in the search for Catholic identity?
My mother was born and bred in Asten, not far from Eindhoven,
today the hub of the multinational company known as Koninklijke
Philips Electronics N.V. As a school child, she had learned by heart,
and given back by heart, what was known as “the big catechism,” and
not just the answers, but both the questions and the answers. In our
home, the award for this achievement could be seen on a book shelf: a
life of Godfrey of Bouillon, the Crusader, in “luxury binding.” “Sir
Dean”—the chief priest of the deanery—had personally handed it to
her. I mean, to our mother. As a small boy, I once asked her if I could
read a bit in it. Of course, never mind the fact that we back then had
had to learn by heart only the answers of the big catechism. Profoundly
impressed, I opened the book. Right on the first page, slightly
yellowed, I found strange things. The hero’s mother had seen unusual
lights during her “pregnancy,” and once born, he himself had “refused
his mother’s breast,” on Wednesdays and Fridays, if I recall. I immedi-
ately showed it to our mother. She read a bit, clearly for the first
time—a move that it had apparently never occurred to the Very
Reverend Dean Mossault to undertake almost thirty years earlier. Then
she returned the book to its place of honor on the shelf. In those days,
that’s the way things went in Catholic North Brabant.
Notes
An abortive attempt at a preface to volume Two/4B of the author’s God
Encountered: A Contemporary Catholic Systematic Theology (Collegeville, MN:
Liturgical Press, 1995).
1. Muriel Spark, The Hothouse by the East River (New York: Viking,
1973), chap ter 1.
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On Keeping Dogs and Strangers Out
Animals are by and large socially aware, even across different species.To their own kind they readily respond, mostly positively, yet they
are wary, so to speak, of birds of a different feather. But since wariness
implies awareness, my opening gambit must be at least broadly true:
animals are by and large socially aware. Still, the woodpecker I watched
going about his loud business this morning did not seem concerned
with other animals at all, except, I assume, the bugs he was knocking
out of their primitive habitat for the purpose of eating them as
detected. But actually, there are a lot of constructive things to report
about trans-specific ventures in the animal kingdom. As a teenager I
learned about an odd-shaped bird that eats the ticks that in turn feed
themselves on whatever it is that makes a rhinoceros’s back palatable to
them—such fine cooperation! I likewise learned that the yellow
meadow ant, a common denizen of the many meadows in the Low
Countries, keeps lice the way the farmers who own the meadows keep
cows on them: they nourish the lice and milk them of a delicious,
healthy, sweet fluid which the lice exude from two minuscule glands on
their hind quarters. It boggles the imagination, but it is not all that
different from what we have done for thousands of years with cows,
sheep, goats, and camels, not counting the mares whose milk is so
popular—or so I was taught in fifth grade—in Hungary.
Actually, we humans ourselves practice symbiosis with a
vengeance. If anyone were looking for proof positive for the correctness
of Friedrich Nietzsche’s characterization of the human species as das
noch nicht festgestellte Tier—“the as-yet unstabilized animal”—our
awareness of our pretty much completely festgestellte fellow-mammals
and indeed fellow-vertebrates would amply suffice. All animals are
specialized for better for worse, depending on your point of view. But
they have nowhere else to go, really; still, they are awfully good at doing
what they do and they bequeath their skills, narrow as they are, to their
brood. Lions are masters at frightening and killing. Hares and rabbits
run as if their lives depended on it—which they actually do. The deer
and the antelope are no different, except for their gait, of course.
Ospreys are hell-bent on catching fish and eating it—strictly business,
no bells and whistles. By contrast we humans have been going places;
we have populated every known climate on earth; they’re now talking
of turning parts of the Sahara into arable land where some of us will
learn how to live; and most efforts to get the Eskimos to live elsewhere
have failed. No wonder we humans have favored, bred, cross-bred, used
and gotten used to, and thrown in our lot with an immense variety of
animals.
We cultivate bovine cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, ducks, chickens,
peacocks, geese, monkeys, rabbits, cats, a wide array of dogs
(Chihuahua to Saint Bernard), camels both Bactrian and Saharan,
gerbils, horses, elephants, pet turtles, a snake or two, an alligator or
two, fish, carrier pigeons, finches (sometimes blinded “for better musi-
cal results”), canaries, caged quail, bees, parrots, not to mention all the
animals we keep in zoos. Some animals do not seem to mind providing
us with three staples: various meats (let’s not get into the particulars of
that habit of ours), eggs, and milk, not counting everything we fabri-
cate of that trio, like egg-beaters. But we also bring in harvests of
plumes, bristles, hair, feathers, idioms (“clean as a hound’s tooth”),
horsepower at the plough and transportation on the byways, tortoise-
shell spectacle-frames, target practice, song, expensive crocodile leather
shoes, companionship, cod liver oil, invectives (“that toad!”), random
occasions for sexual curiosity at a chaste distance, circus routines, safe
conduct for the blind, excuses for hunting and giving chase, scrimshaw
art, ivory napkin rings, visual entertainment (often of the brilliant
kind, as bird watchers will tell us), and expensive adventures at animals’
expense, like safaris. I will resist the temptation to delve into the poach-
ing of African rhinoceros with the intent to sawing off their horns,
grinding them up fine, and selling the powder to oil-millionaires
allegedly availing themselves of it as an allegedly potent aphrodisiac.
Nobody has ever explained to me how it is applied or taken, or
whichever other verb applies.
Some animals seek us out, too, or at least our facilities. Our heads
(used to) attract lice and our small intestines tapeworms; the special
foods we take on our camping trips are utterly irresistible to bears, some
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of them quite dangerous; our houses still invite shrews, mice, spiders,
cockroaches, mosquitoes, and moths; swallows, owls, and urban
pigeons find our roofs, window sills, sheds, barns, and railway bridges
appealing, just as ants, flies, and roaches like our sugar bowls, our fruits,
and the open pasta packages in our pantries—where I am sure they meet
the mice, which quite probably find them a nuisance the way we do.
*  *  *  *  *
Still, when it comes to animals being attracted to us, dogs take
the cake. The dog is our friend. “Man’s Best Friend.” Close to three
hundred years ago, I am sure Carl von Linné was right when in his
classification of the mammals he put the primates at the top, but
when he proceeded to put the monkeys next, my admiration starts to
wane. I have my doubts about his putting mandrills and baboons
ahead of our friends, the canines. Why classify animals by the shape
and number of their teeth rather than by their talent for compani-
ableness? Did the Greek philosopher whose name I forget not say that
humanity is the measure of everything? In the last eight decades or so
biologists have finally been studying animal behavior, but Linné’s
system is presumably written in stone by now, so I will spare my read-
ers an unwinnable war of words. But why in the world did the learned
Swede see fit to place the felines (and thus, our house cats) ahead of
our dogs? In my book, not even the noblest cat, whether Cheshire,
Persian, Siamese, nor even a Manx, can hold a candle to a dog—any
dog. My obvious reason: dogs live with us; cats at best live around us,
with that inquisitorial look on their faces and ready to eat the canary
when given a chance. After this, need I explain that the learned Swede
completely discredited his own humanity by placing the dog—
canis—between on the one hand the weasel and their sly and
cowardly blood-sucking cousins and the filthy, gross hyenas (for
crying out loud!), and on the other hand the bears? This shows you
what injustices rational systems will produce. The Dog, ipse, between
hyenas and bears. A scandal!
For the simple fact is, dogs are an existential human fact. I doubt
that dogs know this, but for us humans the fact needs no proof. Human
life is different in the company of dogs. The absence of a numbered
section titled Mensch und Hund: eigentliches oder uneigentliches Mitsein? in
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Martin Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit is a philosophic failure. Why do we
cultivate cemeteries for dogs?
Wherever we are, dogs are, and not just the way house sparrows
and cardinals (I mean the birds) and humming-birds offer us their
hungry companionship, sometimes shrill, sometimes deep-throated,
never dull. But dogs empathize, welcome us beyond the call of duty,
sympathize, console, watch out, defend, frighten or even attack
outsiders, finish leftovers, lick our hands. They love us. They expect our
attention even as they glower at us intruders—the pockmarked cur, the
wide-ranging mutt, the scrawny stray, the archbeggar for attention
living largely by his wet nose, the all-purpose trash can cleaner looking
for something delicious, right down to the shameless, inconvenient
public copulator raising pedagogical issues—am I supposed to pull the
kids away from the love scene, or do the opposite and change the
subject to the bees and birds?
Dogs are most like us in one highly moral respect. Like us humans,
they come in an improbable array of races, where they are barely fest-
gestellt. For example, I am convinced that the vast majority of
dachshunds alive today have never ventured into a badger burrow to
catch an actual badger, even though they are supposed to be past
masters at that subtle skill, on which the higher-end shaving-brush
industry relies. Note that whereas lions have no choice but to roar, kill,
and eat flesh, dachshunds get along fine without practicing their
specialty. Like human beings, there are enough huskies that show that
they do not have to live in the Arctic regions to be the real thing. Setters
go without setting to a crouch without protest, and retrievers can be
happy without retrieving anything beyond a frisbee. German shepherds
go without sheep without getting depressed. Dalmatians live outside
the North West Adriatic coastal regions, and I am reliably informed
that St. Bernard dogs do not insist on delivering hard liquor to forsaken
alpinists. The biggest advantage dogs have over humans is that in the
teeth of their multiple races they show no sign of racism. Only we do.
This by itself is reason to consider dogs our “best friend.”
Dogs are a bit much. Small wonder we don’t like them around
when we get serious—really serious. Thus, I have steadfastly refused
dogs admission to my classroom for the forty-three years I have taught;
I know how wonderful they must be, yet they do not belong in my
academic world. Shopkeepers, cash-register clerks, sextons, sacristans,
316 /  Frans Jozef van Beeck
priests, preachers, hair dressers, department store managers, pharma-
cists, supermarket owners agree: No Dogs Allowed. Judges too: No
Dogs in Court.
Now that’s precisely where the deeper problem starts, though. (I
apologize for not having explained that this is a theological essay.) At
least from Roman times on, dogs have lived with us in all public loca-
tions, back yards, front yards, streets, even temple areas. In Indonesia
today, they are still everywhere, enjoying the population density and
happily contributing to it. It has been like this from time immemorial.
They were a common sight in Roman basilicas; they still were in eigh-
teenth-century churches, especially in the Catholic ones before they
adopted pews—presumably to keep the people in their places. I imag-
ine dogs vanished from our churches as pews came in; they know the
difference between kennels that imprison you and big, friendly public
spaces where all kinds of people and also dogs go to see (and be seen
by) friends both human and canine.
*  *  *  *  *
But now what is my problem? What’s the point of writing this essay? It
will take me a while to explain.
At the far end of every ancient pagan basilica there was an elevated
area—the bema. That area was for serious business: lobbying, currying
favors, conspiracies, stitching coalitions together, large commodities
trading. Even more importantly, on the bema, the judges held court,
starting at sunrise. Dogs Not Allowed there.
How to manage this efficiently? Simple. You put up wooden
latticework fences, low brick walls, or even metal barriers to separate
the court personnel from the crowd and from the dogs who love
crowds. This was an essential requirement for serious business, for dogs
are even more shameless than the most barefaced humans going about
their business in court. Understandably, those separators were not
named for the judges, the barristers, or the important people. (Until I
set about editing this essay, I thought that they were named for the only
creatures that didn’t object to having fences named after them—the
dogs. These fences, you see, were called cancelli in Latin, which at first
blush sounds and looks like “doggies.” However, scholarly integrity
compels me to confess that as a matter of plausible etymological fact
ON KEEPING DOGS AND STRANGERS OUT /  317
cancelli derives from the Latin word for a particular type of reed, used
for the weaving of fences and baskets.) In any case, a minor official was
posted at the place of entry: the cancellarius—the fence-keeper. He kept
strangers and dogs out.
Now we know what happens when officialdom happens: function
turns into rank. The guy who still fixes toilets at the university where I
taught used to be Lavatory Lou or Bathroom Bob; he became first “the
plumber on staff,” then “the sanitary engineer”; now, finally, he is the
“sanitary engineering associate.” Analogously, “fence-keeper” became
“chancellor.” (Was “barkeeper” a transitional semiotic phase in this
steep ascent to sociological civilization?)
*  *  *  *  *
What you have just finished reading is a brief history of the “chan-
cel” in Anglican churches and the “communion rail” that marks off the
“sanctuary” in Catholic ones. Originally designed to keep dogs and
strangers out, they began to be used to keep “the people” out. While we
still had dogs in our churches (just study antique engravings of church
interiors!), dogs were refused admission near the altar, the font, and the
lectern. Not, of course, that they felt out of place there; being friends,
they feel at home wherever we are. (Years ago, at the annual commem-
oration of the war dead on Dam Square in Amsterdam on May 5, the
late Queen Juliana had just finished putting the wreath at the foot of
the National Monument, when, with everyone silent and at attention,
a little black-and-white dog sidled up to the monument to take a leak.
The nation saw it right on national TV. In the crowd, not a murmur
was heard, not a laugh seen. Smiles everywhere, if interspersed with
some purple-faced indignation among dignitaries. The mutt loped off,
happily, back into the crowd. He felt at home, visibly. After all, we were
there, so why not him? He just did not recognize our serious business.)
While we had dogs in our churches, one thing was clear: the whole
church was the sanctuary. It was the common property of God’s people;
they were often proud of it, pretty much the way we are now proud
(sort of ) of our oversize malls where we do our serious business. The
church embraced the world; so did church buildings: churches were
public places; dogs abounded; they were kept away only from where we
were being serious in church: the altar and the font. We turned a more
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serious corner when it was decided to get serious about church build-
ings as places set apart for matters of high purpose. The bitter fruit of
this our seriousness were “real churches”—of the sort where you go
only to pray, and where the ordained and their companions go about
their serious business way up front, whether they are standing or
(mysteriously) seated. That kind of church is also locked when nothing
(i.e., no “service”) is going on. People were no longer welcome, except
to “attend” religious services; dogs became pests. No chancel was
needed any longer; instead, sanctuary barriers were canonized: they
became communion rails—an object of devotion, and much later on,
in the later twentieth century, of irritated discord between the standers
and the kneelers at the Banquet of Unity.
What continued unabated was the fence-keeper’s instinct.
Chancellors (now often called ushers) saw to it that the communion
rail was a place where order prevailed, and where the non-ordained met
the ordained across the good fences that we are told make good neigh-
bors. Dogs were gone; their place was taken by the laity. The sanctuary
became the area restricted to the ordained and their associates vested
vaguely like them. Thank God for the renewal Vatican II gave us; in the
Constitution on the Church, Lumen gentium, the council treated the
unity of God’s People before ever raising the status of its ordained
servants, who were relegated to the third chapter. Happily, many “ordi-
nary” laity are once again where they belong: sanctuaries are for saints.
The dogs might as well have tried to stage a comeback; in fact, I once
found myself in a church that had a crèche for pet dogs in the back.
Seeing-eye dogs, an ecologically correct plastic sign on the wall
informed us, were welcome in the pews.
What is likely to continue, I think, is the fence-keeper’s instinct.
Chancellors will continue to abound, especially in Rome, but also here
at home, in places favoring canon law written in Rome. Lately, they
have told us there are limits to promiscuity. For now that some people
have made it to the bema to do serious business such as reading
Scripture and offering prayers, the church brass have to remain where
they belong, i.e., in the sanctuary: the ordained are not to join the
people, to preach to them or (worse?) to exchange the kiss of peace with
them. Dogs are no longer an issue nowadays; spayed as they now all
seem to be, I imagine they have lost interest in churches, too. The
fences are once again for our guidance. They have a vital job to do:
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protecting the ordained from the danger of being mistaken for ordinary
people.
I am an ordinary priest who has been a priest for forty-plus years—
no more than a few weeks by the measure of the history of Christian
worship. Yet I have never been mistaken for a layman while I have gone
about Christ’s business in the Liturgy; I guess only a fool would vest
like me. (I must confess, though, that I have heard a story about an
informal “mass” informally presided over by a woman religious; as she
went around to distribute the bread, the only priest in the room met
her pious “Michael, the body of Christ” with a friendly “Wanna bet,
Dorothy?” But then again, I have also heard of a cardinal who forbade
a community of contemplative nuns to join the lay guests standing near
the altar during the Eucharist; the reason (so the abbess told me): the
faithful—never mind the nuns—might get the idea that the nuns are
concelebrants. Now there’s a thought!)
*  *  *  *  *
In any case, neither folly is likely to be fixed by keeping celebrants
in any “sanctuary.” Vested in an unmistakable way, I don’t need a
communion rail, and I very much doubt if the congregation does. I
have not seen a dog in church for half a century, so chancels are now as
little needed as chancellors. Unless we priests are now being encouraged
to think of God’s people out there as dogs. Now that would be some
renewal!
Notes
A previous version of this essay appeared as “God’s Best Friend” in
Commonweal 128 (April 6, 2001), 31. The piece was originally provoked by an
unnecessarily severe insistence in high places on the duty of ordained sacra-
mental ministers not to venture out beyond the communion rail to preach or
exchange the Kiss of Peace during the Eucharist. Revised in light of continu-
ing, slightly irritated amusement.
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Not for the Kennel:
A Meditation
Somewhere in a subclause in the Jesuit Constitutions, in the contextof Ignatius’s discussion of health care in the Society, one of his focal
concerns emerges: “And even though it is part of our vocation to travel
from place to place, and to lead our lives wherever in the world where
there is hope of serving God better and helping souls better, it is still to
be left to one’s superior to determine . . . ,” etc.
*  *  *  *  *
I am by no means the sole Jesuit for whom the Society of Jesus is
in the first place and very palpably something international. This has
been the case for a long time. I have studied and worked in a fair
number of places in the Society. Six years of graduate school in English
while living at St. Ignatius College, Amsterdam (1954-60), with a one-
year leave of absence from the university (1955-56) to study by myself
at Manresa College, Roehampton, in the southwest part of London;
three months in northern Italy to get fluent in Italian, just before
doctoral comprehensives (1959); a year in the United States to round
out my training in the Society in tertianship (1964-65), and two years,
again in the United States, while I was working as a visiting lecturer in
theology at Boston College, a two-year part-time study in applied
behavioral study (1968-70). As a regular Jesuit priest, I have had three
full-time jobs thus far: coordinator for our schools and director of our
special students in the Netherlands (1965-68), lecturer and professor of
theology at Boston College (1968-85), and professor of theology at
Loyola University Chicago (1985-2003). But in the course of those
years I spent five semesters living, studying, and working in Toronto
(1973), Cambridge in England (1975), Yogyakarta in Indonesia
(1976), and Amsterdam (1980, 1983). Add to this that I spent eight
years in study communities, two years in a Jesuit noviciate (as assistant
novice director), and nine years in a community of university types.
Never mind the number of summers spent in parishes and retreat
houses (like that marvelous summer of 1980, in Java), or in the Jesuit
part of my old school, St. Aloysius College in the Hague, for a recov-
ery period. Also, by 1987 I had spent three Christmas seasons
somewhere on the outer islands of the Bahamas, where I was to return
for an additional seven years. Once, in 1974, I got an errand to run for
the Provincial, which meant ten days in Egypt. Once, in 1978, I spent
a summer month wandering around in Spain and Southern France,
with a packsack and a book of Spanish lyrical poetry and a brief history
of Spain. When I recall those weeks what comes to mind is a long,
intense conversation with a fellow-Jesuit from Poland, in the apple
orchard close by the cave of Manresa, in the sight of the little Cardoner
river where Ignatius had his decisive moment of spiritual enlighten-
ment in 1523. What also comes back is an two-and-a-half-hour
impromptu after-dinner community conversation in French, with
coffee and cognac of course, at our collège in Avignon, about christol-
ogy, after I told the friendly rector who was asking me questions during
dinner that I had just completed a book on that topic.
Heavens, what an enumeration—almost a successful career. And I
have not even mentioned the fact that I tend to find a lot of things
interesting and that I have a good memory for people and situations
and odd events. I do carry a lot of memories with me, and I keep a fair
number of them alive, by way of a Christmas letter every year. Fellow
Jesuits do ask me regularly just exactly where I am at home. Then it is
time to confess that “home” for me is really nowhere, and more often
than not I end with the comical confession, “This dog was made for
the streets, not for the kennel.” But this street dog remembers very well
the people he has met. I know a large number of Jesuits, from all over
the world. In my bibles and breviaries, I come upon quite a few ordi-
nation cards of friends and former students. And when in May of 1983
I received the list of the members of the upcoming 33rd General
Congregation, I was very happy to find that I knew 57 out of 214—34
of them from serious conversations and friendships. And at the actual
Congregation it appeared that a number of these men had read some-
thing I had written. That Congregation is one of the most beautiful
things that have ever come my way as a Jesuit. It became my richest
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experience of our Society as an international event, what with things
getting on my nerves every now and then, in the crossfire of all those
different mentalities and traditions. Nevertheless, I felt entirely at home.
*  *  *  *  *
In the fall of 1974 I was living in a community in an ethnic neigh-
borhood in Cambridge, Massachusetts, where we were trying to live a
little more socially committed, and hence, a bit more simply. Juan Luis
Segundo, S. J., the liberation theologian from Uruguay, who was teach-
ing at the Harvard Divinity School at the time, was living with us. He
once observed that the Spanish Jesuits were better hospitality artists than
any other European Jesuits. I remember making a mental note of that.
*  *  *  *  *
So on Thursday, June 15, 1978, at a quarter to seven in the morn-
ing, my overnight train from Madrid rolls into the Seville railway
station. Backpack strapped on, I walk across the empty square in front
of the station, approach a street sweep, and ask him in crippled Spanish
for directions to the residencia de los padres Jesuitas. He immediately
understands: just straight ahead and then off to the left, you will see the
Calle de Jesus del gran poder, the Jesuit church is on the right, a fifteen-
minute walk. Everything works out. It is a quarter past seven when I
push the door bell, introduce myself as a Dutch Jesuit teaching theol-
ogy at a Jesuit university in the United States, and ask if I could come
in and stay for a week. My Spanish barely makes it. Almost at once I
find myself having breakfast in the refectory. After some enjoyable
attempts at conversation it is made clear to me that it is unlikely there
will be a room free, but someone is already calling the colegio just
outside the city to find out if there is a spot there, and things will be
decided when Father Minister returns from his daily Mass in a nearby
convent. In the mean time I am already conversing in German: two
serious elderly fathers who studied theology in the Netherlands, at the
old German Jesuit theologate in Valkenburg, back in the good old days.
I conclude it would be imprudent to allude to anything political with
these old boys. The Minister walks in. He speaks English, and imme-
diately explains to me that he did his tertianship in Cleveland, in the
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United States. In no time we turn out to have friends in common. He
tells me there is only one free room in the house, and tells me I have to
go upstairs and see for myself before he will offer it to me. Yes, the attic:
a rough wooden floor, an authentic straw mattress in a brass bed with
curls, a small table, a straight-back chair, and a naked bulb hanging
from the rafters on a crinkly cord. The small roof chamber with walls
for the man of God in the second book of Kings, chapter four. I tell
him I would like to take it. A wonderful week, with visits to Cordoba
with its cathedral-mosque and its ghetto with statues of Maimonides
the Jew and Averroës the Muslim facing each other across a little plaza,
and to Granada, with its incomparable Alhambra, and the Capilla real
where Ferdinand and Isabella, and Philip the Fair and Joan the Mad
and their dead young children lie visibly buried in the dullest, blackest,
most inexorable boxes. A flood of memories and associations surfaces.
*  *  *  *  *
A little later, back in the Netherlands, my sister-in-law says to me:
“That is lovely, you Jesuits can drop in everywhere in the world and feel
at home. You never need to stay in hotels. You can have the real expe-
rience, not like the tourists who have to stay at a distance.” Well said,
I think, it is not that simple, but she is right.
*  *  *  *  *
About three days after leaving Seville I am staying in Madrid, at
the Calle Almagro Jesuit community. Time for a day trip to the
Escorial, the colossal building ordered by Philip II: monastery, school,
church, palace, all in one. When you walk into the space behind the
high altar, you suddenly find yourself in the severe world of Philip II:
crucifixes, panels by Hieronymus Bosch depicting the Seven Deadly
Sins, a cold brick floor, a wainscot of Talavera blue tiles, Brussels
tapesties, some fine Flemish leaded stained-glass window panes. There
is a throne as well, with a canopy and backcloth thickly embroidered
with a crucifix and an ojo de Dios—God’s All-Seeing Eye—overhead.
His Catholic Majesty. So this is where he lived and where he died, a
Spaniard through and through, and over there, in the chaise longue, he
lay reigning to the bitter end, his eyes fixed on the tabernacle in the
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church, just visible through a paneled opening. Ruling, administering.
By mail. Philip II was the architect of the first modern government,
based on correspondence: folders, archives, portfolios. The written word
as the nervous system of a global empire. At such a moment, a thought
will occur to us Dutchmen, obviously: well, but in the end he lost us.
Then it is time for us to think of the Philippines and Latin America.
*  *  *  *  *
Something dawns on me. Did Ignatius have a similar insight?
Franciscans and Dominicans are organized as provinces; their respec-
tive general superiors are not so much leaders as coordinators, presiding
over federations of independent provinces. That just might be a relic of
the age-old abbatial stability traditions. The preaching and mendicant
friars do roam town and countryside, but they are at home in a
province. For Ignatius the Society is as one as the wide world is one. Could
it be he felt the same relationship between being worldwide and being
literate? For him, at any rate, letters amounted to a lot more than tools
to issue orders; his letters form the largest body of correspondence that
has come to us from the sixteenth century—about eight thousand of
them. He insisted that Jesuits keep each other posted as to what was
going forward wherever they were. Writing letters, he thought, was
something “constructive” or “edifying”—hence the name literae aedifi-
cantes: letters of edification. No wonder Jesuits have always been
enormous letter-writers; just look at the letters that fill the volumes of
the Monumenta Historica Societatis Iesu. Ever seen the Relations, that
enormous series of letters, reports, and narratives of the seventeenth
and eighteenth century Jesuit missionaries in Nouvelle France, which
consisted in a long ribbon of settlements from Quebec to New
Orleans? Thus, writing as they went, Jesuits have been experiencing the
whole world as their world. In their own way, letters also accommodate
the Ignatian culture of obedience: well-thought-out, balanced, realistic
accounts of matters and of consciousnesses and consciences, followed
by orders and recommendations that do justice to those data.
That leads me to another idea. A learned American Jesuit, the
late Walter J. Ong, professor in the humanities at Saint Louis
University, spent at least thirty of his years teaching the world that the
modern Western mind largely goes back to literary developments in
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the mid-sixteenth century. In those critical decades the Society, too,
saw the light of day. This was when the Western world made the
change-over from a largely speaking and dialoguing and remembering
(“oral-acoustical”) culture to an evermore writing and reading and
learning-by-accumulating (“visual”) culture. This, of course, had every-
thing to do with the printing press. It enabled concentration on (largely
printed) texts—a new phenomenon. It also enabled (to name only one
thing) natural science; not even the best memory can keep up with the
ever-accumulating scientific data—for that, you need books (and even-
tually computers), in which you can “literally” store your (objective!)
truths in order to retrieve them again later.
But this new learned literacy also succeeded in putting enormous
pressure on the whole world of inner human experience and stretching it
to the utmost. Just think of all the classical authors newly edited by the
humanists; all at once, it became impossible to read them the way the
Christian Middle Ages had done. Even the Bible changed: the modern
study of the Scriptures started, but at the same time every heretic started
to find his own favorite text. Such an intensely developing world of read-
ing demands the utmost in interpretation—i.e., an ever-developing inner
world of imagination: the bigger and more brimful the libraries, the more
massive the data to take into account and process and discern inside. Add
to this, in due time, so sheer a quantity of news and information and
products from distant parts as well as the distant past. The world blos-
somed into a fullness. To contend with this kind of new world, you have
a lot of inside labor to go through. Increasingly, the New Learning began
to regard as prejudice what an earlier, more naive world had accepted as
faith and loyalty. The New Learning began to demand as much freedom
of exploration as the voyagers of discovery did. Ever since the mid
sixteenth century, research and study have demanded pride of place and
gotten away with it. No wonder a tempest of discord and disharmony
was the result. Now wonder the inside world turned troubled on the
rebound. Inner openness to the whole world is a lot more challenging
than staying at home—or (what really amounts to the same) tourism.
*  *  *  *  *
All this becomes even more compelling when you begin to realize
that the modern art of reading is based on habits of loneliness and
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silence. The mediaeval quaestio is reminiscent of disputatio—studying
was something you did as you listened and spoke, with others. Could
there be an affinity between (a) the quiet loneliness of Jesuit prayer and
examination of conscience and consciousness, in which the struggle for
unconditional, unreserved abandon to God our Lord must take place,
and (b) the course of studies demanded of Jesuits in view of the apos-
tolate, and (c) the capacity for serviceable living anywhere and
everywhere? I think there is, and it is not a foregone conclusion that the
three will always be perfectly balanced. I myself, for instance, have
always been good at studies, but I have always been quite a handful to
myself as well, and not till relatively late in my life did the grace of inte-
rior prayer find me home, thanks to the re(dis)covery of spiritual
direction in our Society over the past half-century. Thus the immediate
occasion for the permission I received, in the spring of 1970, to stay
away from the Netherlands for the time being and continue work at
Boston College teaching theology was not my own decision—they had
not even offered me a tenure-track job yet. No, my own cargo had
shifted so badly that I did not have the courage to return to the
Netherlands just yet; I had too much to come to terms with inside, and
the Dutch Provincial agreed. Thus my international Jesuit life, I find,
is only very partly supported by natural curiosity and enjoyment of
study and quickness in adaptation. To me, it looks more like a taste for
unsollicited inner adventure abroad. In this way, I have come to think,
being an international Jesuit has far more to do with an inner quest for
an inner at-homeness—with yourself, and with God.
*  *  *  *  *
With this, another salamander comes up to the surface to breathe.
My first “modern” spiritual director was the English Jesuit Paul
Kennedy. (Now there’s somebody who from the tertianship house in St.
Beuno’s, in Northern Wales, influenced the international Society!) I
was almost twenty-five when I first saw him in his filthy room in
Manresa College, Roehampton, in May, 1955. In the course of the
conversation he suddenly told me, “Say, yesterday I was looking at you
when to came into the refectory for dinner—you know, when I smiled
at you. That’s when I said to myself, ‘Now this man doesn’t look as if
he feels quite at home here yet, but more importantly, he doesn’t look
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as if he feels quite at home with himself yet.’” So that was the first
move, and it is unforgettable. It was not till years later—and thank
God, not too late—that I discovered what he meant. Inward peace is
the fruit of inward struggle, and I now know that there is a deep link-
age between the ability to come to terms with the world inside and the
involvement with a world-wide set of companions. No heart as whole
as a broken heart. Could this be the Ignatian variation on the opening
salvo of the Odyssey: the inspiring story of the resourceful loner, driven
hither and thither, got to see the strongholds of all kind of people and
to understand how they thought, and so got a lot of inner experience
to digest, all of it with the result that in the end he both got a grip on
his own life and found a way to take his partners-in-destiny home?
*  *  *  *  *
At least it seems that way. When, in 1539, the first, international
group of Ignatius’s companions decided to stay together as a religious
community, one of the decisive arguments in favor was the following.
Their shared interior conversion and prayer experiences of the
membership were so inextricably linked with the experience of finding
each other united in Christ in the course of their vagaries in the reli-
giously and politically fractured world of Europe that they were unable
to miss the conclusion that the hand of God had been active in their
shared experience. No wonder Ignatius was to write later on, in the
Constitutions, that there were to be no preferences for the various
parties and the shifting alliances into which the Christian princes were
regularly dividing up the world of their day; that meant a lot for the
international Jesuit communities at the time. Being impartial and yet
engaged: the only way we can do this is by seeing through and
inwardly—and thus together—digesting fragmentation and division
everywhere, including the Church. This is quite demanding, as we
Catholics have come to know by now.
Could it be that this is also at least part of the secret behind
Ignatius’ reference to a Jesuit’s need for “a way with people”—forma
agendi cum hominibus, i.e., a way of dealing with others of each and
every sort? Does he expect of us that we come to terms with ourselves
at least to such an extent that we can freely go in and out with ourselves
and each other, so as to let others freely enter in and freely leave
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again—without getting caught time and again on the barbed wire of
our own undigested, unmortified ego, or interfering with others in the
process? That as Jesuits we have to learn how to speak and otherwise act
in public, but as far as possible on the basis of open, sensitive empathy,
not of our own raw, undigested “experience”? So is it all about taking
on and owning a lot of inner stuff and so getting a grip on our own
lives, in order then to make our peace with ourselves and each other in
the service of others?
*  *  *  *  *
Now this takes me to another old song: Jesuits think they can
handle everything. In the English province I once heard one of Ours
ask another, “Hey, do you happen to know anything about chemistry?”
The immediate answer was, “Heavens, no, I’ve never even taught it.”
Yes, I do think that we have often postured as sharp boys with the gift
of omnicompetence, and that we have paid for it by losing a lot of
respect, not counting friendships. For competence is best acquired
letting oneself normally trained and educated (and then by developing
habits of study and letting one’s competence be tested in dialogue with
competent others.) Still, there is more to say on this subject, too. Thus
I have often asked myself a question that others have regularly asked
me: so you are going to Indonesia to direct retreats—what makes you
so sure you can do that? Now with that question you are liable to string
yourself up quick. If you say “Yes,” you show how appallingly arrogant
you are, because you obviously fail to appreciate the cultural chasm,
and if you say “No,” the next question immediately follows: “Why do
you do it all the same?” I have (over time!) come to the conclusion that
I do it because I trust the Indonesian Jesuit brothers who know me, and
who are at home in a world that I find largely unmanageable and
unknown. If they think I am doing something right, I don’t need to
“manage.” That means: I don’t have to overinvest energy in the enter-
prise. Thus disarmed by their trust in me, I can go about my business
without panoply. And the reward is plain as pie: I invariably receive
more than I give, because the emphasis is always on carefully shared
experience, not on my expertise. Any remaining illusions of omnipo-
tence wilt. The street dog, not the pedigree dog. Could this contribute
to world peace?
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By the way, I am not the first to evoke the image of the street dog
in the context of my own life. The first time was on Sunday, September
1, 1963, in my parents’ parish church—Our Lady of Seven Sorrows in
Haarlem, about twelve miles west of Amsterdam, during my first
solemn Eucharist. In his sermon, our unforgettable Father Jos. Daniëls
referred to Francis Thompson’s famous The Hound of Heaven, where
God becomes the Heavenly Hunting Hound. In the middle of the
homily he turned to me, looked me straight in the eyes from the lectern,
and said in his high tenor voice: “Frans Jozef, that Hound of Heaven is
not a pedigree dog, but a street dog. Will you always remember that?”
*  *  *  *  *
Over forty years after hearing those words, I cannot say I have
always remembered. But they have become true, in a slightly entertain-
ing, slightly disconcerting way. I have encountered, befriended, been
befriended by, admired, and been appreciated by, many hard-working,
smart, learned, but especially, devoted and even devout, fellow Jesuits
who have thought up, planned, designed, set up (or at least directed)
splendid kennels for dogs of every kind of canine cause, whether pedi-
greed, mixed, or mutt. Like them, I have labored like a dog—running,
pulling, but not doing my best (for who knows what is one’s best? Did
Jesus do it?) but my uttermost, breathlessly but always half-awake, loyal
as all hell, pushing, snarling, barking, with a bite or two thrown in.
Unlike them, I have piloted little—but then again, dogs never ever
initiate; they are company, not leadership, commentary, not main text.
But I have never met a dog who ended up leaving nothing. I am ending
up leaving nothing more permanent than writings on paper—the
record of my street-dog’s life, mainly disguised as Catholic theology.
And I am not even done yet—my nose is still wet and my flair for both
eye-openers and flinchers is still alive. In time, I guess I shall slink away
like a street-dog, somehow leaving much of my digested life experience
to my readers, to whose scent I will never wake up.
*  *  *  *  *
A number of years ago, I read Martin Walser’s novel Seelenarbeit—
“Labor of the Soul.” The principal character, Xaver, is the chauffeur of
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the board limousine of a large company. He is the bottom drawer
personified. The entire life of this calm, correct, silent back-row figure
goes up into undergoing, tolerating, and digesting of the heavy pres-
ences of important others. There are millions like him, especially in the
First World—poor like church mice in spirit, with never a free choice
to make. His kind of people are waiting for felt empathy and mercy
everywhere. Some one should offer it to them—people who know the
inner struggle for justice and integrity out of their own experience,
because they have voluntarily ventured into it, as Ignatius suggests in
the Spiritual Exercises.
*  *  *  *  *
Thus my meditation on my experience of our Society as an inter-
national community has returned me to the Heart of our Community,
Jesus Christ the Lord. For the title of that novel comes straight from
Isaiah 53, verse 11—the passage that combines inner digestion and
comprehensive salvation in one prophetic vision: “He will see the fruit
of the labor of his soul, and he will be satisfied; through his under-
standing, my just servant will make all others just, and he will bear their
injustices.”
So saving empathy and mercy toward the whole world are guaran-
teed by perfect inner self-emptying. The two are made flesh and blood
in the One who let himself be tested and tried and tempted, let nobody
get lost and go to hell, and so gained true life for himself on behalf of
all. He calls on us to follow him. More volumes could be written about
the things he did than the whole world would ever be able to accom-
modate (John 21, 25)—never mind this one.
Notes
Translation of “Niet voor de kennel: een overweging” in Jezuïeten in Nederland:
Kiezen voor geloof en gerechtigheid, ed. Paul Begheyn, Theo van Eijk, Jan van
Mulken, Catharina Visser, Hans Luyten, in Religieuzen en religieuze gemeen-
schappen, 11 (Aalsmeer: Boekmakerij/uitgeverij Luyten, 1987), 53-63. Revised
and updated, at least partly in the light of what feels like better self-knowledge
and self-acceptance.
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CONCLUDING DOXOLOGY

A Very Explicit Te Deum
From the beginning, we Christians1 have believed ourselves to be
living, moving, and having being in
the threefold All-Encompassing, All-Penetrating PRESENCE:
GOD, INVISIBLE ORIGIN, FOUNTAINHEAD, BEGINNING ALL-HOLY;
GOD, ARCH-IMAGE, ARCH-LIKENESS, WORD ETERNAL ALL-HOLY;
GOD, FIRE OF MAJESTY, FLOW OF BOUNTY, GLOW OF LOVE ALL-HOLY.
And so we say, pray, profess:
YOU,
One God, One Alone, Living and True,
Loving and Faithful,
world without end.
Amen.
HIDDEN GOD
yet nowhere and never leaving yourself without witness,
HIDDEN GOD
and yet to Israel unveiled:
all the more hidden for being so manifest.
God of all gods, LORD of all lords,
God of the army of unalterable law,
all the more incomprehensible for being so present,
so close, so awesome, so demanding, so simple.
YOU
Nameless, yet knowing your children by name,
YOU
Lover, Father as dear as a Mother,
YOU
Difficult Friend
To us, difficult people:
You are Brothers and Sisters to us, and Houses galore,
You are infinitely more than we can take, yet never enough,
You make us proud, You make us conscious,
revealing to us,
darkly, as in a mirror,
our own immemorial depth, only faintly remembered;
Our dim inner light reflects You, dazzling, invisible Light.
GOD OF HEAVEN AND EARTH, GOD OF GODS
YOU ARE and YOU ARE and YOU ARE:
YOU ARE
Not a Lonely High and Dry Thing Everlasting,
Not a Deity privately sunning itself under the lamp of its own glory,
not a Cipher, a Monad, an Item, an Article, an Ace;
YOU ARE
GOD ALONE yet not Alone;
by dint of Eternal Communion
YOU ARE
Known and present to us here and now in your Word:
9"$, ΛΟΓΟG WORD;2
WORD of WISDOM:
BEING ITSELF,
in the Everlasting Act of seeking only Your Glory;
WORD:
Empty of Self, and thus Full of YOU;
From eternity Living off You, Living GOD;
WISDOM:
Projection of Love making measureless Room for LOVE—
for a Worldful of Eloquent Being;
WORD:
GOD, Your Silence Made Speech;
Word of no one but YOU
Word calling us out of Unbeing, into Being for YOU;
WORD:
not a mere echo,
vague, impotent, ineffective, losing itself in the void,
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but SAY-IT-ALL ANSWER to YOU,
out of Your Silence kindly appealing to us,
making us, speaking of nothing but YOU,
Alive for us, out of YOU and with YOU,
world without end.
Amen.
WORD:
Word returning to YOU,
Response Everlasting;
and so,
GOD from YOU, GOD,
Light from YOU, Light,
Splendor, Reflection, Revelation, Intimation, and Symbol of YOU.
WORD:
WORD creative and ordering, WORD relieving and liberating,
WORD utterly spoken, WORD unheard, yet constantly speaking,
WORD written in time, in ink in the Book, yet with YOU before the ages,
WORD Key to Creation and Crown of it all,
WORD faithful Witness to YOU,
WORD with a Bang,
WORD running into billions,
WORD running like wildfire,
WORD irresistible as a grain of wheat,
WORD with a whisper,
WORD still as a painting, as a taste, as a whiff of perfume, a touch,
WORD going softly, delicately, “with trickling increment,”
from virtue to virtue,
in the Great Chain of Being,
in the cosmos and in all its invisible powers,
the rocks and the plants and the trees and the animals,
and finally,
in the first fullness of time,
in us,
humankind.
WORD OF GOD,
silent Voice,
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voice swinging
between breathtaking majesty and breathtaking intimacy,
WORD
heard with a vengeance, caught in the wind, felt, ever so faintly surmised,
by Abraham in Aram,
by skeptical Sarah smiling in a dark tent corner,
by bright-eyed Rebecca at the sight of the camels,
at the stone set up at Bethel, by Jacob, the fighter, the limper,
by Moses in the desert, at Sinai, at the Tent of Meeting,
by Joshua at the Jordan and Jericho,
by Rahab the whore saved from the massacre,
by Elijah in the light breeze,
by David and Solomon, in all they were up to,
by Isaiah, awe-struck in the Temple,
by Jeremiah, pilloried in the Temple,
heard by prophets, singers, priests, and sages,
heard by pilgrims in droves, tired of talking to each other:
Word inside words, Song inside songs, heard
in ever so many words, ever so many ways,
by Israel’s martyrs, lost, wearing sheepskins, famished, sawed in half,
by its poor, harassed, adrift in the mountains,
by its suffering wayfarers in search of GOD’S City,
JERUSALEM, vision of peace.
WORD undefined, yet defining,
WORD heard in the mind, in the crowd,
by Socrates,
by Heraclitus,
By Lao-Tze, by Gautama the Buddha,
by Moses ben Maimon, by his friend Ibn Rushd,
by Great Soul Gandhi and Great Soul Hammarskjöld,
by seekers and thinkers and just people and lovers of Mystery everywhere.
This All-Holy WORD,
always and everywhere present and calling for presence in return,
WORD “Come-to-me-all-of-you”
WORD “Come-and-see”
THIS WORD OF GOD
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came to a head,
in the second fullness of time,
in JESUS THE CHRIST:
Temple, Torah, Word, Wisdom Incarnate,
Tent of the Meeting not made by human hands,
Temple at home in the Temple,
Questioning Child, hearing the lessons of teachers,
Question of God, manifest in the flesh,
Young blood, yes,
(yes,
flesh and blood are weak and frail,
susceptible to nervous shock,)
so young, so old,
JESUS GOD’S Child,
Kid, Lamb slain from the beginning of the world,
Man of Truth, of Service, of Sorrows,
Child of Mary the Virgin,
born of woman by the Spirit of Holiness,
yet given his Name by the FATHER, by a Messenger, in a Dream,
JESUS, SAVIOR,
plunged in the Jordan by John, a second-rate preacher
(an odd type, a loud man,
you know, a bit of a menace, brimstone and fire,
the frightening, self-diminishing type,
prepared to go down on his knees,
but let me tell you, a drawer of crowds, a critic of vice in high places;
it earned him both Herod’s attention and a taste of his prison,
where he lost his head to the lily-livered king—
who, like the damn fool he was,
got himself mated, in front of the court, by a tart queen,
plying a girl too wise for her years as a pawn;
in any case, later on, they thought John had been Jesus’ own cousin;
he might have been, Jesus himself
thought the world of him, called him a prophet),
Jesus, Savior,
!*-), ΠαÃς,3 
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like Moses a Servant, yet Key to Creation and Crown of it all,
HOUSE-BOY, Key to the Household of GOD
(a mere boy, a child, really),
House-Boy, charged with the Housekeeping
(“See Me, I’ll talk to the Owner”),
House-Boy in charge of the Household
(“Talk to ME, take my WORD, the FATHER himself loves you”),
Child, Boy, House-Boy, Servant, Kid, Lamb of God,
innocent as strawberries,
inspired by the Spirit, at work by the Spirit—touch of the finger of God—
healer powerless and wounded, truth-sayer slandered and silenced,
worker of wonders,
(in league with the devil?
out of his mind?)
talker, walker, walk-in guest at odd tables.
Toward the end, embarrassed with far too expensive a gift,
in far too maudlin a mood,
by a woman of poor taste, who loved and who knew
that he was a dead man, as good as buried—
nailed to a cross, a mere thirty years old,
a slave, a blasphemous fool and a rebel,
a snake on a pole, a dead wayward kid come to terrible grief,
yet faithful and true (and we did not know it),
true to his FATHER (whom we did not know);
Witness Faithful and True, AMEN to God,
free giver, in life, of the Bread of Life, of the Wine of the Wedding,
free giver, in death, of the Spirit of Freedom,
Messenger of Life to dead Adam and Eve (that is,
to the countless held in suspended animation in the Cosmic Prison),
vindicated in the Spirit,
wrestler with all the powers that be,
cracking for good their hold on the universe,
opening for good the gateway to GOD,
preached among the nations, received in the world as GOD’S SON,
taken up in GOD’S Glory,
now LORD, clearly, and manifest,
SON OF GOD IN POWER
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(final justice is coming at last)
ONE AND THE SAME, THE LORD, THE MAN JESUS CHRIST.
And so, LORD JESUS, LORD OF GLORY
You are present around us, among us, within us,
yet gone and away
till the third fullness of time;
we await YOU in prayer and watchfulness around the Table,
Bread of Life and Peace for the world,
Wine of abandon, drink of the Kingdom,
Vine of the tendrils, Shepherd of the sheep,
Door of the sheepfold, Head-stone of the building,
Head of the body, Writer in the sand,
Rock of the house, First Walker on water,
Justice of God for the living and the dead,
Assurance in person of the Kingdom to come,
God knows how, God knows when,
We in You, and You in us,
Now and forever.
And so,
DEAR FATHER, DEAR SON,
DEAR LOVER, dearly BELOVED,
God of the Word, God-Word of God:
YOU ARE.
YOU are here and now,
YOU are there and then,
YOU are here and there and everywhere,
YOU are now and then and always,
YOU ARE ONE,
inseparably One:
YOU are ONE in the Wild Exuberance of Majesty,
ONE in the little Flame, in the Kindling of Love Everlasting,
ONE in the Presence Untamed in the World YOU have fashioned,
ONE in the Barely Felt Touch of Affection,
ONE in the :$8% (&9, the ΠνεØµα γιωσύνης, the SPIRIT OF HOLINESS.4
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And so, ALL-HOLY SPIRIT,
as close as a lover’s breath felt on the cheek
as wild as the wind, free to go where it goes,
SOVEREIGN LOVE:
YOU are and have been, from the beginning
hatching World out of Chaos,
coaxing words out of Prophets, by hook or by crook,
Giver of Breath, of Love,
Maker of God’s Hidden Children:
Your whisper is Life, endless Life.
YOU
Protector of the Poor
Giver of Gifts
Light of Hearts
Best of Comforters
Cherished Guest of the Soul
Delicious refreshment
Respite in toil
Breath of fresh air in the heat of the day
Comfort amidst Tears:
Please wash what is dirty
Shower rain on dry grass
Heal what is wounded
Bend what is rigid
Fondle the frigid
Set straight what is crooked.
SPIRIT, YOU are
CHRIST and his FATHER around, round about us;
SPIRIT, YOU simply ARE
Our BROTHER CHRIST and his FATHER around, round about us.
You are in us, we are in YOU,
and so we are
alive to the FATHER as dear as a Mother,
alive to Jesus the LORD as dear as a Brother,
alive to each other
In YOU.
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SPIRIT OF GOD,
Mother of Charity, Sister of Majesty,
Make us, remake us,
make of us a living offering to GOD,
Make us ONE, make us evermore ONE,
One, evermore ONE in the Body of Christ,
One, evermore One
in the shedding of our lives in the name of the Blood shed.
And so,
IN THE NAME OF † THE FATHER AND † THE SON AND † THE HOLY
SPIRIT.
We believe in the Church,
One and to be One,
Holy and to be Holy
Universal and to be Universal,
Sent out by the Son, forever to be Sent out by the Son.
In dread of the Fire, we acknowledge one Baptism in Water;
we await the forgiveness, once and for all, of our sins.
Headed for death, we hunger and thirst for justice,
final justice for all.
Still headed for death, we anticipate life beyond death,
the new heavens, the new earth, life of a world yet unseen.
And so,
$&",! ∆ΟΞΑ! GLORY!5
TO THE FATHER AND THE SON AND THE HOLY SPIRIT,
AS IT WAS IN THE BEGINNING, IS NOW, AND EVER SHALL BE,
WORLD WITHOUT END.
AMEN.
Too much, too much, enough said (though never really enough). Yet
for now, enough, enough words. Time to be silent. Silence! At least half
an hour (Rev 8,1). Let your words die into GOD; they will live.
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For CHRIST’S sake, let us die into GOD. We will live. Hush now.
Close your mouth, try not to talk. Close your eyes, do not try to see.
Do not be afraid of tears. If you feel like a desert, stay there for a while.
Contemplate. See. Trust the dark inner vision; live to see the Invisible.
That’s the SPIRIT. Hear the silent WORD. Love. You are being guided,
shepherded, carried, seen, loved.
You ARE. Are Mine. I AM WHO I AM.
YOU WILL BE LIKE ME. IN ME.
IN MY BELOVED, MY SON,
MY ADORABLE
CHILD.
Amen, Marana tha.
LORD JESUS, come.
AMEN.
AMEN.
LORD JESUS, have mercy on me, a sinner.
AMEN.
LORD JESUS, come.
AMEN.
Come.
Notes
This is the second half of a piece published as “A Very Explicit Te Deum: A
Spiritual Exercise, To Help Overcome Trinitarian Timidity.” Horizons 25
(1998): 276–91.
1. Cf. Acts 11, 22–26: “Now word came to the ears of the church living
in Jerusalem about these things, so they sent Barnabas to Antioch. On arrival
he saw the grace of God at work, and was glad at it, and encouraged them all
to stay with the Lord with loyal hearts. Yes, he was a good man, full of the Holy
Spirit and faith, so a fair crowd joined the Lord. Then he went to Tarsus to
retrieve Saul; he found him and took him to Antioch. And what happened was
this: they rejoined the church for as much as a year and got to teach a fair
number; and it was in Antioch that the disciples were first called Christians.”
2. Both Hebrew dabhar and Greek logos mean “word.”
344 /  Frans Jozef van Beeck
3. Aramaic talya’ (cf. Heb %-)) means “tender, young person or animal,”
and so, “kid” (i.e., the young of a goat), “lamb” (i.e., the young of a sheep),
“child,” but also “boy” (also as used for a servant). Greek pais means “boy,”
both in the sense of “male child” and “servant” (cf. French garçon).
4. Hebrew ruach haqqodeš and Greek pneuma hagiosyns mean “spirit of
holiness.”
5. Hebrew kabhod and Greek doxa both mean “glory.”
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